THE  ISTHMUS  AND  CANAL 


THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


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PANAMA 


THE  ISTHMUS  AND  THE  CANAL 


BY 
C.  H.  FORBES-LINDSAY 

AUTHOR  OF 

'India,  Past  and  Present",  "The  Philippines,  Under  Spanish 

and  American  Rules",  "America's  Insular 

Possessions",  etc. 


ILLUSTRATED 


PHILADELPHIA 

THE  JOHN  C.  WINSTON  CO. 
1906 


COPYRIGHT  1906, 

BY 
THE  JOHN  C.  WINSTON  Co. 

ALL  RIGHTS  RESERVED. 


Set  up  and  Electrotyped, 

June,   1006. 
Published,  July,  1906 


Co  tbc 

MEN  ON  THE  ISTHMUS, 

WHO  AMIDST  DIFFICULTIES  AND  DISCOMFORTS 

ABE  DEVOTING  THE  BEST  THAT'S  IN  THEM 

TO  THEIB  COUNTRY'S  WORK. 


1482049 


Affected  dispatch  is  one  of  the  most  dangerous 
things  to  business  that  can  be:  it  is  like  that  which  the 
physicians  call  predigestion,  or  hasty  digestion,  which 
ip  sure  to  fill  the  body  full  of  crudities,  and  secret 
seeds  of  disease:  therefore  measure  not  dispatch  by 
the  time  of  sitting,  but  by  the  advancement  of  the 
business;  and,  as  in  races,  it  is  not  the  long  stride,  or 
high  lift,  that  makes  the  speed;  so  in  business,  the 
keeping  close  to  the  matter,  and  not  taking  of  it  too 
much  at  once,  procureth  dispatch.  It  is  the  care  of 
some  only  to  come  off  speedily  for  the  time,  or  to  con- 
trive some  false  periods  of  business,  because  they  may 
seem  men  of  dispatch;  but  it  is  one  thing  to  abbrevi- 
ate by  contracting,  another  by  cutting  off. 
The  ripeness  or  unripeness  of  the  occasion  must  be 
well  weighed;  and  generally  it  is  good  to  commit  the 
beginnings  of  all  great  actions  to  Argus  with  his  hun- 
dred eyes,  and  the  ends  to  Briareus  with  his  hundred 
hands;  first  to  watch  and  then  to  speed. 

—  Bacon. 


PREFACE. 

In  the  following  pages  I  have  endeavored  to  relate 
the  story  of  the  Panama  Canal  from  the  earliest  ex- 
plorations to  the  present  time  with  as  much  avoidance 
as  possible  of  technics  and  in  a  manner  that  shall  be 
comprehensible  to  the  general  reader.  A  certain  de- 
gree of  familiarity  with  the  scene  of  the  operations  on 
the  Isthmus  and  a  somewhat  close  study  of  the  subject 
may  have  enabled  me  to  achieve  my  purpose. 

The  book  has  been  withheld  from  the  press  for  sev- 
eral months  pending  the  decision  as  to  the  type  of 
waterway  to  be  adopted.  The  85-foot  level  plan,  upon 
which  the  Canal  will  be  constructed,  is  described  in 
detail  and  illustrated  by  maps.  For  the  purpose  of 
comparison  a  description  of  the  counter  project  has 
been  included. 

Since  the  manuscript  was  placed  in  the  hands  of  the 
publishers  a  number  of  magazines  have  published  arti- 
cles treating  of  the  Canal  from  the  pens  of  other  men 
who  made  special  investigations  on  the  spot.  There 
is  a  close  correspondence  between  my  statements  and 
those  of  the  most  reliable  of  the.  magazine  writers.  As 
I  have  depended  chiefly  upon  official  sources  for  my 
facts  regarding  the  work  and  conditions  on  the  Isth- 
mus during  the  past  two  years  it  is  evident  that  the 
information  offered  freely  to  the  public  by  the  Canal 
Commission  since  the  inception  of  the  undertaking 
has  been  of  an  entirely  trustworthy  character,  and 
there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  it  will  be  so  in  the 
future. 

C.  H.  F-L. 

PHILADELPHIA,  July  15,  1906. 


CONTENTS. 

I  PAGE 

THE  AMERICAN    ISTHMUS   UNDER   SPAIN 11 

II 
CANAL    EXPLORATION 31 

III 
THE    PANAMA    RAILROAD 55 

IV 
THE  ISTHMIAN  COUNTRY 79 

V 
COLON    AND    PANAMA 103 

VI 
THE  PANAMA  CANAL'  COMPANY 125 

VII 
THE  NEW  PANAMA  CANAL  COMPANY 153 

VlII 
THE   AMERICAN   ENTERPRISE 181 

IX 
THE  PLAN  OF  THE  CANAL 201 

X 

VARIOUS   ASPECTS   OF   THE  CANAL 240 

XI 
PREPARATORY  WORK  ON  THE  ISTHMUS 266 

APPENDIX 
GREAT  CANALS  OF  THE  WORLD  .  297 


ILLUSTRATIONS. 

PAGE 

PORTION  OF  THE  OLD  FRENCH  CUT     ....     Frontispiece 

AMADOB  GUERRERO,  PRESIDENT  OF  PANAMA     ....  24 

RESIDENCE   STREET  IN   CRISTOBAL 40 

VIEW  OF  LA  BOCA,  PANAMA  BAY 50 

THE  CHAGRES  RIVER  AND  LABOR  CAMP 72 

STEAM-SHOVELS    WORKING    AT    CULEBRA 88 

RUINS  OF  ST.  AUGUSTINE,  OLD  PANAMA 104 

CHURCH  OF  SAN  FRANCISCO,  PANAMA 120 

FERDINAND  DE  LESSEES        136 

RESIDENCES  OF  FRENCH  DIRECTORS,  CRISTOBAL       .     .     .  153 

THEODORE  P.  SHONTS 168 

HEADQUARTERS  OF   THE   COMMISSION,   PANAMA     .     .     .201 

LABORERS'  QUARTERS  ALONG  CANAL  LINE 216 

HOTEL  FOB   EMPLOYEES 248 

BUILDINGS   OF   THE   ANCON   HOSPITAL 266 

FUMIGATING  BRIGADE  IN  PANAMA                                     .  280 


I. 

PANAMA. 
THE  AMERICAN  ISTHMUS  UNDER  SPAIN. 

Early  Settlements  on  the  Spanish  Main  —  Preparations  for  Ex- 
ploring the  Pacific  Coast  —  The  Search  for  a  Strait  Through 
the  Isthmus  —  The  Establishment  of  Overland  Communica- 
tion—  The  First  Survey  of  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  —  The 
Ill-fated  Darien  Expedition  —  Cortes  Establishes  a  Trans- 
continental Route  —  Investigation  of  the  Nicaragua  Route 
—  Disintegration  of  Spain's  American  Colonies. 

On  the  early  morning  of  the  twenty-fifth  of  Sep- 
tember, in  1513,  a  small  party  of  men  made  their 
laborious  way  up  the  densely  covered  face  of  a  steep 
ridge.  One,  keen  of  eye  and  with  determined  coun- 
tenance, pressed  forward  eagerly  ahead  of  his  com- 
panions. When,  at  length,  he  reached  the  summit, 
a  vast  expanse  of  water  stretched  before  him  on 
either  hand.  Balboa  had  discovered  the  Pacific 
Ocean.  Vasco  Nunez  de  Balboa  was  a  man  of  ex- 
traordinary intellect,  and  it  is  not  improbable  that 
something  of  the  true  significance  of  this  new  knowl- 
edge dawned  upon  his  mind  even  in  these  first  mo- 
ments of  discovery.  Perhaps  he,  first  of  all  contem- 
porary explorers,  realized  that  the  Tierra  Firma  of 
Columbus  was  not  the  Ultima  Thule  of  sixteenth 

11 


12  PANAMA. 

century  endeavor,  and  that  the  land  of  mystic  legend 
lay  away  toward  the  setting  sun,  beyond  the  spark- 
ling sea  whose  placid  waters  washed  the  shores  of 
the  bay  below  the  height  upon  which  he  stood.  It 
was  an  age  of  splendid  achievements  in  geographical 
science.  Bold  and  ardent  adventurers  were  fast  dis- 
persing the  haze  that  had  obscured  more  than  half 
the  earth,  and  disclosing  new  lands  almost  as  rapidly 
as  geographers  could  map  them.  In  the  last  year  of 
the  fifteenth  century,  Vasco  de  Gama,  returning 
home  from  his  eventful  voyage  to  India,  re-rounded 
the  cape  which  Bartholomew  Diaz  had  discovered 
and  which  King  John  had  named  Good  Hope.  A 
waterway  to  the  East  was  thus  opened  up,  and  this 
circuitous  route  remained  the  main  means  of  direct 
ocean  communication  between  Europe  and  Asia  until 
the  opening  of  the  Suez  Canal,  nearly  four  hundred 
years  later.  Columbus,  with  the  vaguest  ideas  of 
the  extent  of  the  globe,  and  with  none  but  the  most 
faulty  charts  for  guide,  thought  to  find  Cipango, 
where  he  ran  across  Cuba  and  died  without  knowing 
that  he  had  added  an  enormous  continent  to  the  map. 
First  in  the  West  Indies  and  later  on  the  mainland 
of  America  he  hoped  to  reach  the  capital  of  the 
Grand  Khan,  to  whom  he  bore  letters  from  Ferdi- 
nand of  Spain.  When,  upon  his  last  disastrous  voy- 
age, Columbus  beat  down  the  coast  from  Honduras 
to  Darien  seeking  a  strait  through  the  massive  bar- 
rier that  stayed  his  farther  progress  to  the  west,  he 


EARLY  SETTLEMENTS.  13 

little  dreamed  that  at  a  point  which  he  passed  in  his 
disheartening  search  a  caudal  cut  would  one  day 
separate  two  great  continents  and  unite  two  vast 
oceans. 

EARLY    SETTLEMENTS    OF   THE   SPANISH    MAIN. 

Amongst  the  horde  of  adventurers  who  followed  in 
the  wake  of  the  Great  Discoverer  was  Rodrigo  Bas- 
tides.  He  was  in  command  of  an  expedition  that, 
in  1500,  coasted  the  Spanish  Main  from  some  point 
on  the  Venezuelan  littoral  to  almost  as  far  south  as 
Porto  Bello.  Balboa,  a  lad  of  twenty-five,  received 
his  first  taste  of  adventure  upon  this  occasion.  On 
the  return  voyage  the  weather-worn  and  worm-eaten 
ships  of  Bastides  were  barely  able  to  make  Hispanola 
before  they  sank.  Balboa,  who  possessed  little  or 
no  means,  turned  his  attention  to  agriculture  on  the 
island.  He  had,  however,  neither  genius  nor  in- 
clination for  the  tame  pursuit  of  husbandry  and  was 
soon  in  difficulties.  The  spirit  of  the  rover  was 
strong  in  him  and,  in  order  to  indulge  his  desire  as 
well  as  to  escape  his  creditors,  he  concealed  himself 
in  a  cask  and  caused  it  to  be  carried  on  board  a  ship 
bound  for  Tierra  Firina.  At  this  time  Spain  had 
two  sparsely  settled  provinces  on  the  Isthmus  of 
Darien  and  an  important  stronghold  at  Cartagena. 

Having  landed  in  safety,  Balboa  wrote  to  a 
wealthy  friend  in  Hispanola,  one  Bachelor  Encisco, 


U  PANAMA. 

advising  kim  to  fit  out  an  expedition  and  recom- 
mending the  Indian  village  of  Darien,  on  the  Gulf 
of  Uraba,  as  a  favorable  site  for  a  settlement  on  ac- 
count of  the  reported  presence  of  gold  in  the  vicinity. 
Encisco  adopted  the  advice  of  Balboa.  The  expedi- 
tion arrived  in  due  course  and  a  town  was  established 
on  the  Isthmus  and  named  Santa  Maria  de  la  An- 
tigua del  Darien.  It  had  the  distinction  of  being 
the  first  episcopal  see  upon  the  mainland  and  of  con- 
taining the  oldest  church  in  the  American  continent. 
Balboa  soon  rose  to  a  position  of  importance 
among  the  colonists  of  Tierra  Firma.  He  learned 
from  the  Indians  that  a  great  sea  lay  beyond  the 
range  of  mountains  that  traversed  the  Isthmus,  and 
lost  no  time  in  investigating  the  statement.  With  a 
small  force  of  Spaniards  and  Indian  guides  Balboa 
succeeded,  not  without  great  difficulty,  for  the  whole 
way  was  through  dense  jungle  and  over  swamps,  in 
reaching  the  ocean,  of  which  he  formally  took  pos- 
session in  the  name  of  the  King  of  Spain.  During 
this  journey  across  the  isthmus  the  Spaniards  heard 
of  a  rich  land  to  the  south  abounding  in  precious 
metals.  Balboa  planned  the  conquest  of  this  coun- 
try, and  it  is  more  than  probable  that  Pizarro,  who 
was  his  companion  on  this  occasion,  shared  his  de- 
signs. Had  the  former  lived  to  pursue  his  energetic 
and  ambitious  career  Pizarro  might  never  have 
found  the  heroic  place  which  he  occupies  in  his- 
tory. 


THE  AMERICAN  ISTHMUSES. 


16  PANAMA. 

In  1515,  Balboa  received  the  reward  of  his  enter- 
prise in  the  form  of  the  appointment  of  Adelantado 
of  the  Southern  Sea,  as  the  Pacific  had  been  named. 

PREPARATIONS    FOR    EXPLORING    THE   PACIFIC    COAST. 

In  the  following  year  he  prepared  to  organize  an 
expedition  to  the  south  by  way  of  the  newly  discov- 
ered ocean.  The  problem  involved  in  the  under- 
taking was  one  to  daunt  a  less  bold  spirit.  Trees 
suitable  to  the  construction  of  ships  were  to  be  found 
only  upon  the  Atlantic  side  of  the  divide,  which  ne- 
cessitated the  tremendous  task  of  transporting  tim- 
bers over  a  route  that  presented  great  difficulties  to 
the  passage  of  an  unencumbered  man.  The  terribly 
onerous  labor  of  collecting  the  material  and  carrying 
it  on  their  backs  to  its  destination  was  imposed  upon 
the  Indians,  of  whom  thousands  were  gathered  to- 
gether for  the  purpose  and  impelled  to  the  unaccus- 
tomed work  by  the  merciless  severity  of  their  task- 
masters. Many  months  were  consumed  in  this  grim 
struggle  for  a  passage  of  the  Isthmus,  which,  in 
many  respects,  foreshadowed  the  endeavors  of  the 
modern  successors  of  these  hardy  pioneers.  Hun- 
dreds of  the  wretched  aborigines,  Las  Casas  says 
their  number  fell  little  short  of  two  thousand,  lost 
their  lives  in  the  undertaking,  but  it  succeeded,  and 
four  brigantines  were  carried  piecemeal  from  sea  to 
sea  and  put  together  on  the  Pacific  coast.  The  work 


A  SEARCH  FOR  THE  STRAIT. 

of  fitting  out  the  ships  proceeded  rapidly  and  Balboa 
was  upon  the  eve  of  departure  when  his  arrest  was 
effected  by  order  of  the  Governor. 

Pedrarias  had  entertained  a  jealous  hatred  of 
Balboa  for  years  and  could  not  endure  the  thought 
of  his  achieving  the  further  successes  that  promised 
to  follow  his  expedition  to  the  south.  The  Governor 
pretended  to  have  received  information  that  Balboa 
purposed  the  creation  of  an  independent  kingdom  in 
the  countries  that  he  might  discover.  Balboa  was 
tried,  condemned  on  evidence  of  an  ex  parte  charac- 
ter, and  executed.  Thus  fell,  in  the  prime  of  life, 
the  first  of  that  trio  of  Spanish  explorers  whose 
brave  deeds  excite  our  admiration  whilst  we  deplore 
the  cruelties  with  which  they  were  accompanied. 

THE   SEAECH    FOR   A   STRAIT   THROUGH    THE   ISTHMUS. 

Three  years  after  the  death  of  Balboa,  Magellan 
passed  through  the  Straits  of  Tierra  del  Fuego  and 
opened  up  a  western  waterway  to  the  Orient.  The  at- 
tempts to  find  a  strait  through  the  continent  were  not 
abandoned,  however.  Charles  the  Fifth  took  a  keen 
interest  in  the  prosecution  of  these  efforts.  He  in- 
structed the  governors  of  all  his  American  provinces 
to  have  the  coast  lines  of  their  respective  territories 
thoroughly  examined  and  every  river  and  inlet  ex- 
plored. The  orders  addressed  to  Cortes  were  espe- 
cially explicit  and  urgent,  for  at  this  time  the  hop« 
2 


13  PANAMA. 

began  to  prevail  that  a  solution  to  the  problem  would 
be  found  in  the  territory  of  Mexico.  It  was  in  ac- 
cordance with  this  idea  that  Gil  Gonzales  was  de- 
spatched from  Spain  to  the  New  World.  Gonzales 
had  authority  to  use  the  vessels  which  had  been  built 
by  Balboa,  but  Pedrarias  refused  to  deliver  them  to 
him.  Gonzales  was  not  to  be  balked  by  this  denial, 
however.  He  immediately  took  to  pieces  the  two 
caravels  with  which  he  had  arrived  and  transported 
them  to  the  Pacific  coast  by  the  route  which  Balboa 
had  hewn  out.  The  reconstructed  ships  were  soon 
lost  and  the  party  built  others,  in  which  they  pro- 
ceeded north  in  January,  1522,  to  Fonseca  Bay.  At 
this  point  the  leader,  with  one  hundred  men,  con- 
tinued the  exploration  by  land.  Lake  Nicaragua 
was  discovered  and  a  settlement  was  shortly  after- 
wards made  upon  its  shore,  the  Indians  having  been 
subjected.  The  new  discovery  awakened  fresh  ideas 
and  projects  relating  to  the  much  desired  interocean 
route.  It  was  at  first  reported  that  an  opening  ex- 
isted from  the  lake  to  the  South  Sea,  but  an  immedi- 
ate examination  failed  to  reveal  any  water  connec- 
tion. In  1529,  Diego  Machuca,  in  command  of  a 
considerable  force,  carefully  explored  Lake  Nic- 
aragua and  its  eastern  outlet.  He  found  the  naviga- 
tion of  the  San  Juan  River,  at  that  time  called 
the  Desaguadero,  extremely  difficult,  but  eventu- 
ally emerged  from  its  mouth  with  his  ships  and 
continued  down  the  coast  to  Nombre  de  Dios.  At  a 


OVERLAND  COMMUNICATION.  19 

later  period  an  important  commerce  was  conducted 
over  this  route  bj  vessels  making  ports  in  Spain,  the 
West  Indies  and  South  America.  Thomas  Gage,  the 
English  priest  who  visited  Nicaragua  in  1637,  men- 
tions this  traffic  as  in  existence  at  that  time. 

1HE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  OVERLAND  COMMUNICATION. 

Pending  the  discovery  of  a  maritime  channel  be- 
tween the  two  oceans,  the  Spanish  authorities  had 
decided  to  establish  permanent  land  communication 
across  the  Isthmus  of  Darien.  Under  Charles  the 
Fifth  a  line  of  posts  was  maintained  from  coast  to 
coast.  Nombre  de  Dios  was  made  the  Atlantic  port 
and  the  Pacific  terminus  was  located  at  old  Panama, 
which  was  created  a  city  in  1521.  A  road  was  at 
once  constructed  between  these  two  points,  which 
crossed  the  Chagres  at  Las  Cruces.  Great  difficulties 
were  surmounted  in  building  this  highway.  Much 
of  the  route  lay  over  swamps  that  had  to  be  filled  in. 
Several  streams  were  spanned  by  bridges  and  vast 
masses  of  rock  were  removed  to  facilitate  the  passage 
over  the  mountains.  The  way  was  paved  and,  ac- 
cording to  Peter  Martyr,  was  wide  enough  to  accom- 
modate two  carts  abreast 

About  ten  years  after  the  establishment  of  this 
route  a  modification  of  it  came  into  use.  Light  draft 
vessels  began  to  sail  from  Nombre  de  Dios  along  the 
coast  and  up  the  Chagres  as  far  as  Cruses,  where  the 


20  PANAMA. 

road  met  the  stream,  and  thence  the  journey  -was 
completed  by  land.  In  the  closing  years  of  the  six- 
teenth century,  Nombre  de  Dios,  which  had  been 
repeatedly  condemned  in  memorials  to  the  Crown,  as 
"  the  sepulcher  of  Spaniards,"  was  abandoned  in 
favor  of  Porto  Bello,  with  a  location  and  other  nat- 
ural advantages  decidedly  superior  to  those  of  the 
former  terminus. 

EABLY    TRADE   OF    PANAMA. 

This  interoceanic  communication  was  of  the  ut- 
most value  to  the  Spanish  Crown  after  the  conquest 
of  Peru,  and  the  isthmian  territory  grew  in  impor- 
tance year  by  year.  The  vast  treasure  that  was  ex- 
tracted from  the  mines  of  the  south  came  to  Panama 
in  the  first  stage  of  transit  to  the  Royal  Treasury. 
From  the  Pacific  port  it  was  carried  to  Porto  Bello 
on  pack-horses,  and  thence  was  shipped  to  Spain. 
Upon  the  arrival  of  vessels  from  the  mother  country, 
fairs  were  held  at  Cartagena  and  Porto  Bello. 
Thither  came  merchants  from  far  and  near  and  cara- 
vans from  Panama.  An  extensive  trade  was  con- 
ducted at  these  periodical  marts  and  the  goods 
brought  from  Spain  found  their  way  through  Pan- 
ama to  South  and  Central  America  and  even  to  the 
mainland  and  islands  of  Asia.  Thus  was  demon- 
strated at  an  early  date  the  logical  trend  of  trade  and 
the  great  advantages  of  a  trans-isthmian  route. 


FIRST  SURVEY  OP  ISTHMUS.  21 

The  idea  of  an  artificial  passage  had  already  been 
mooted.  It  is  said  that  Charles  the  Fifth,  in  1520, 
ordered  the  Isthmus  of  Darien,  or  Panama,  to  be 
surveyed  with  a  view  to  ascertaining  the  practica- 
bility of  a  canal.  There  is  no  record  of  this  survey 
nor  any  evidence  that  it  was  ever  made.  Fourteen 
years  later  the  matter  was  revived.  The  local  au- 
thorities were  instructed  to  employ  able  men  to 
closely  examine  the  country  lying  between  the 
Chagres  River  and  the  Pacific  with  a  view  to  deter- 
mining the  most  feasible  method  of  effecting  a  junc- 
tion and  creating  a  through  waterway  for  ocean- 
going ships.  The  instructions  were  carried  out  but 
the  report  of  Governor  Andagoya  was  so  extremely 
discouraging  that  the  Emperor  abandoned  the  proj- 
ect. 

A    CHECK   TO    CANAL    PROJECTS. 

The  policy  of  Philip  the  Second  with  regard  to  the 
American  possessions  was  very  different  from  that 
of  his  father.  The  former  was  averse  to  the  expan- 
sion of  his  empire  in  the  New  World  and  distinctly 
antagonistic  to  the  plans  for  an  isthmian  canal.  He 
reasoned  with  astuteness  that  the  existence  of  a  water 
route  through  the  continent  of  America  would  give 
easy  access  to  his  new  possessions  on  the  part  of 
other  nations  nnd  in  time  of  war  might  be  of  greater 
advantage  to  his  enemies  than  to  himself.  The  pol- 


22  PANAMA. 

icy  of  Philip  was  maintained  for  two  centuries  after 
his  death  by  succeeding  rulers,  but  maritime  com- 
munication continued  to  be  the  subject  of  much 
thought  and  speculation. 

During  this  period  of  quiescent  policy  on  the  part 
of  Spain  the  most  notable  event  in  the  history  of  the 
Isthmus  was  furnished  by  the  disastrous  attempt  of 
William  Paterson  to  establish  a  colony  in  the  prov- 
ince of  D'arien.  In  1695  the  Scotch  Parliament, 
with  the  approval  of  William  the  Third,  authorized 
the  formation  of  a  company  to  plant  colonies  in  Asia, 
Africa  and  America  and  to  carry  on  trade  between 
those  continents  and  Scotland. 

THE   ILL-FATED  DARIEJ*   EXPEDITION. 

Paterson  cherished  a  scheme  of  stupendous  colo- 
nial commerce,  the  Darien  Expedition  being  but  the 
initial  step  in  the  enterprise.  Toward  the  close  of 
the  year  1698,  five  vessels  having  on  board  twelve 
hundred  Scottish  settlers  anchored  in  a  bight  which 
they  called  Caledonia  Bay,  a  name  it  retains  at  this 
day.  The  colonists  were  received  in  friendliness  by 
the  Indians  and  purchased  from  them  the  land  upon 
which  the  settlement  of  New  Edinburgh  was  made. 
It  was  Paterson's  design,  based  upon  sound  enough 
reasoning  and  knowledge  previously  acquired  from 
the  buccaneers  of  the  West  Indies,  to  extend  his 
posts  to  the  Pacific  Ocean  and  open  up  a  trade  with 


ILL-FATED  DARIEN  EXPEDITION.  23 

the  countries  of  the  South  Sea  and  Asia,  in  the  man- 
ner which  had  been  so  profitable  to  Spain.  He  had 
not,  however,  anticipated  the  effect  of  the  climate 
upon  his  northern-bred  emigrants.  Before  any  steps 
could  be  taken  towards  the  contemplated  extension  of 
the  operations,  the  colony  was  decimated  by  disease. 
The  misery  of  the  settlers  wa$  increased  by  the 
loss  of  the  supply-ship  on  which  they  had  depended 
for  fresh  provisions,  and  eight  months  after  the 
landing  a  pitiful  remnant  of  the  original  expedi- 
tion abandoned  the  settlement  and  returned  to  Scot- 
land. But  before  this  disaster  had  become  known  at 
home  other  vessels  with  additional  emigrants  were 
despatched  to  the  new  colony.  These  made  an  effort 
to  revive  and  maintain  the  settlement,  but  with  no 
better  results  than  those  which  had  befallen  their 
predecessors.  The  numbers  of  the  later  comers  had 
become  sadly  reduced  when  they  were  attacked  by 
the  Spaniards.  After  a  feeble  resistance  they  capit- 
ulated. So  weak  were  the  survivors  that  they  could 
not  reach  their  ships  without  the  aid  of  their  ene- 
mies. 

Thus  ended  the  Darien  Expedition  with  the  loss 
of  more  than  two  thousand  lives  and  the  expenditure 
of  vast  sums  of  money. 

In  this  section  of  the  country  the  Spaniards  com- 
pletely failed  to  secure  the  friendship  of  the  Indians 
or  to  effect  their  subjection.  Their  amicable  recep- 
tion of  the  Scotch  immigrants  and  their  invariable 


24  PANAMA. 

readiness  to  assist  the  buccaneers  in  their  incursions 
against  the  Spanish  settlements  indicated  the  per- 
sistent hatred  with  which  they  regarded  the  first  in- 
vaders of  their  land.  The  Darien  region  was  wild 
in  the  extreme  and  abounded  in  secret  passes  and 
safe  retreats.  From  their  fastnesses  the  Indians 
made  frequent  raids  upon  the  Spanish  posts  and 
retired  by  trails  which  were  known  only  to  them- 
selves. 

In  the  latter  half  of  the  eighteenth  century,  during 
the  governorship  of  Andres  de  Ariza,  a  determined 
effort  was  made  to  establish  permanent  communica- 
tion between  the  coasts  at  this  part  of  the  Isthmus. 
Plans  were  laid  for  a  line  of  military  posts  to  be 
connected  by  a  road  which  should  run  from  a  point 
on  Caledonia  Bay  to  a  terminus  on  the  Pacific 
Ocean.  The  project  was  put  into  operation,  but  met 
with  such  formidable  resistance  on  the  part  of  the 
inhabitants  that  the  Spanish  authorities  became  con- 
vinced of  the  futility  of  their  endeavors.  In  1790 
they  entered  into  a  treaty  with  the  Indians,  agreeing 
to  disband  the  garrisons  and  withdraw  from  the 
country. 

COKTES    ESTABLISHES    A    TRANSCONTINENTAL    ROUTE. 

It  will  be  remembered  tljat  in  the  first  quarter  of 
the  sixteenth  century  Cortes  received  implicit  in- 
structions from  the  Crown  to  use  every  resource  at 


AMADOR    GUERRKRO 
President   of   the    Panama    Republic. 


TRANSCONTINENTAL  ROUTE.  25 

his  command  in  a  search  for  the  longed-for  strait. 
In  pursuit  of  this  object  the  coast  of  Mexico  was 
carefully  examined  and  the  Coatzacoalcos  River  ex- 
plored. Montezuma  afforded  valuable  assistance  in 
this  investigation  by  furnishing  descriptions  and 
maps  of  certain  portions  of  the  country.  Whilst 
these  efforts  failed  of  their  principal  object,  they  had 
important  results.  Cortes  established  a  transconti- 
nental route  along  the  course  of  the  Coatzacoalcos, 
over  the  divide,  and  down  the  Pacific  slope  to  Te- 
huantepec.  This  line  of  communication  soon  gave 
birth  to  an  extensive  trade  between  Spain  and  her 
provinces  on  both  coasts  of  America  as  well  as  some 
parts  of  Asia.  The  Ead's  ship-railway  of  modern 
days  was  planned  to  follow  practically  the  same  line 
as  this  early  route  of  Cortes. 

Towards  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century  there 
were  discovered  at  Vera  Cruz  some  cannon  of  ancient 
date  which  bore  the  mark  of  the  old  Manila  foundry. 
This  discovery  aroused  speculation  as  to  how  the 
pieces  of  artillery  had  been  brought  to  the  Atlantic 
coast  of  Mexico.  It  seemed  improbable  that  they 
had  been  transported  around  the  continent,  especially 
when  it  was  remembered  that  the  only  commercial 
intercourse  with  the  Philippines  had  been  through 
the  Pacific  port  of  Tehuantepec  and  over  the  route 
established  by  Cortes.  This  trade-way  had  long 
since  been  abandoned,  but  interest  in  it  was  at  once 
revived  by  the  incident  which  has  been  recited,  and 


26  PANAMA. 

a  remembrance  of  its  former  importance  prompted 
the  viceroy  of  Mexico  to  institute  an  investigation. 

By  this  time  it  had  become  an  accepted  idea  that 
maritime  communication  between  the  oceans  could 
only  be  secured  by  the  creation  of  artificial  water- 
ways. Two  engineers  were  directed  to  explore  the 
country  from  the  mouth  of  the  Coatzacoalcos  to  Te- 
huantepec  with  a  view  to  ascertaining  the  practica- 
bility of  a  waterway  from  ocean  to  ocean.  This 
was  the  first  canal  project  entertained  for  this  re- 
gion. 

INVESTIGATION   OF   THE    NICARAGUA   ROUTE. 

The  report  on  this  exploration,  which  included  a 
cursory  survey,  was  not  such  as  to  encourage  the  in- 
stitution of  operations.  It  had  the  effect^  however, 
of  stimulating  the  interest  in  the  subject  and  in  1779 
the  feasibility  of  connecting  the  Nicaragua  lakes 
with  the  sea  was  investigated  by  royal  command. 
Manuel  Galisteo,  to  whom  the  task  had  been  in- 
trusted, passed  an  opinion  unfavorable  to  the  proj- 
ect. Nevertheless,  a  company  was  formed  in  Spain, 
with  the  patronage  of  the  Crown,  to  carry  out  the 
undertaking,  but  nothing  effective  ever  came  of  it. 

Galisteo's  expedition  had  been  accompanied  by  the 
British  agents  at  Belize  in  a  private  capacity.  Upon 
their  return  they  made  highly  favorable  representa- 
tions to  their  Government,  stating  that  the  project 


INVESTIGATION  OF  THE  NICARAGUA  ROUTE.     27 

was  entirely  feasible  and  not  accompanied  by  any 
difficulties  that  the  engineering  capabilities  of  the 
day  need  fear  to  encounter.  This  report  made  a 
deep  impression  in  England  and  when,  in  the  follow- 
ing year,  war  broke  out  between  that  country  and 
Spain  an  effort  was  made  to  gain  possession  of  the 
Nicaragua  country.  In  1780,  an  invading  force  was 
organized  at  Jamaica.  Captain  Horatio  Kelson  was 
in  command  of  the  naval  contingent,  and  in  his 
despatches  stated  the  general  purpose  of  the  expedi- 
tion as  follows :  "  In  order  to  give  facility  to  the 
great  object  of  the  government  I  intend  to  possess  the 
Lake  of  Nicaragua,  which  for  the  present  may  be 
looked  upon  as  the  inland  Gibraltar  of  Spanish 
America.  As  it  commands  the  only  water  pass  be- 
tween the  oceans,  its  situation  must  ever  render  it  a 
principal  post  to  insure  passage  to  the  Southern 
Ocean,  and  by  our  possession  of  it  Spanish  America 
is  divided  in  two."  The  English  were  successful  in 
their  encounters  with  the  Spaniards,  but  in  the  cli- 
mate they  found  an  irresistible  enemy  that  forced 
them  to  abandon  the  enterprise.  Of  the  crew  of  Nel- 
son's ship,  the  Hinchinbrook,  numbering  two  hun- 
dred, more  than  eighty  fell  sick  in  one  night,  and 
only  ten  survived  the  return  of  the  expedition  to 
Jamaica.  The  hero  of  Trafalgar  barely  escaped 
with  his  life  after  a  long  illness. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century  Spain 
retained  possession  of  the  entire  territory  embraced 


»  PANAMA. 

in  the  question  of  interocean  communication,  but 
she  had  made  no  practical  progress  towards  its  set- 
tlement. Neither  had  she  added  materially  to  the 
available  knowledge  of  the  world  on  the  subject, 
for  the  results  of  Spanish  exploration  and  survey 
in  this  direction  have  never  been  made  public.  With 
the  exception  of  the  re-opened  communication  by 
way  of  Tehuantepec  the  old  Spanish  overland  routes 
had  all  fallen  into  disuse,  and  traffic  between  the 
mother  country  and  the  possessions  on  the  west  coast 
of  America  and  in  the  Pacific  Ocean  was  maintained 
by  vessels^sailing  round  Cape  Horn  and  the  Cape  of 
Good  Hope.  Humboldt  visited  Mexico  at  about  this 
time  and  recorded  the  ignorance  that  prevailed 
amongst  the  local  authorities  regarding  the  interior 
of  the  country.  He  stated  that  there  was  not  a 
single  mountain,  plain,  or  city  from  Granada  to 
Mexico  of  which  the  elevation  above  the  sea  was 
known. 

DISINTEGRATION    OF    SPAIN'S    AMERICAN    COLONIES. 

Ere  this  the  entire  civilized  world  had  become 
keenly  interested  in  the  question  of  an  interoceanic 
canal,  and  the  investigations  of  Humboldt  com- 
manded wide  attention.  Amongst  other  effects,  they 
aroused  the  Spanish  Government  to  action  in  the 
matter.  In  1814  the  Cortes  passed  an  act  author- 
izing the  construction  of  a  canal  through  the  Isthmus 


SPAIN'S  LOST  OPPORTUNITY.  29 

and  providing  for  the  organization  of  a  company  to 
carry  out  the  enterprise.  Before  anything  of  im- 
portance had  been  accomplished  under  this  legisla- 
tion the  revolutions  occurred  which  wrested  from 
Spain  her  provinces  in  South  and  Central  America. 
With  the  loss  of  territory  went  the  opportunity  for 
profit  and  glory  by  connecting  the  oceans. 

In  1819,  the  states  of  New  Granada,  Ecuador,  and 
Venezuela  united  in  forming  the  Republic  of  Co- 
lumbia, under  Simon  Bolivar;  in  1831  they  sepa- 
rated into  three  independent  republics.  In  1823  the 
Federal  Republic  of  the  United  Provinces  of  Cen- 
tral America  was  formed  by  the  union  of  Guatemala, 
San  Salvador,  Honduras,  Nicaragua,  and  Costa 
Rica.  These  political  changes,  in  what  may  be 
termed  the  canal  region,  opened  up  new  possibilities 
in  connection  with  the  much-mooted  question  of  a 
waterway  and  claimed  the  attention  of  capitalists 
and  statesmen  of  all  the  commercial  nations.  From 
this  time  the  matter  is  taken  up  with  definiteness  of 
purpose  and  never  allowed  to  rest.  Plans  and  nego- 
tiations of  various  kinds  involving  all  the  possible 
routes  follow  fast  upon  each  other  until  we  arrive  at 
the  inception  of  the  work  by  the  United  States  Gov- 
ernment and  the  assurance  of  its  accomplishment. 


30 


PANAMA 


lOtM*  TI  nnuffan  m  suez  urn  uwr  i.mrt 
lotatt  n  turn*  M  ft/Mtu  c/uint.  t 

c 


SHORTER  COURSES  OF  TRANSPORTATION. 


Some  of  the  immense  advantages  to  be  conferred  on 
the  world  by  the  Panama  Canal  can  be  seen  by  a  glance 
at  the  map. 


II. 

PANAMA. 
CANAL  EXPLORATION. 

Concession  to  an  American  from  Nicaragua  —  Baily's  Explora- 
tion of  the  Nicaragua  Region  —  The  First  Survey  of  th« 
Panama  Line  —  Development  of  the  United  States  aa  a 
Factor  in  the  Canal  Question  —  The  Vanderbilt  Company 
in  Nicaragua  —  An  Able  Survey  of  the  Nicaragua  Route  — 
The  Construction  of  the  Panama  Railroad  —  An  Important 
Senate  Investigation  —  Establishment  of  the  Interoceanic 
Canal  Commission  —  Report  of  the  Interoceanic  Canal 
Commission  —  Various  Ship  Railway  Projects. 

Early  in  1825,  the  Republic  of  Central  America, 
through  its  representative  at  Washington,  conveyed 
to  Henry  Clay,  then  Secretary  of  State,  a  desire  for 
"  the  co-operation  of  the  American  people  in  the 
construction  of  a  canal  of  communication  through 
Nicaragua,  so  that  they  might  share,  not  only  in  the 
merit  of  the  enterprise,  but  also  in  the  great  advan- 
tages which  it  would  produce."  Clay  was  fully 
alive  to  the  importance  of  the  project,  the  execution 
of  which,  he  said,  "  will  form  a  great  epoch  in  the 
commercial  affairs  of  the  whole  world."  He  re- 
turned a  favorable  answer  to  the  proposition  and 
promised  an  investigation  on  the  part  of  the  United 

31 


PANAMA. 

States  of  the  claims  advanced  in  favor  of  the  Nic- 
aragua route. 

CONCESSION   TO   AN   AMERICAN   FROM   NICARAGUA. 

In  1826,  the  Republic  of  Central  America,  having 
grown  impatient  of  the  delay  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States,  entered  into  a  contract  with  Aaron 
H.  Palmer  of  !New  York  for  the  construction  of  a 
canal  capable  of  accommodating  the  largest  vessels 
afloat.  The  work  was  to  be  started  within  a  year 
from  the  date  of  the  agreement.  The  contract  was 
to  remain  in  force  as  long  as  might  be  necessary  for 
the  reimbursement  of  the  capitalists  engaged,  in  the 
amount  of  the  money  invested,  together  with  ten  per 
cent  per  annum,  and  for  seven  years  after  such  re- 
imbursement the  company  was  to  receive  one-half  of 
the  net  proceeds  of  the  canal.  At  the  expiration  of 
the  seven  years  in  question  the  property  was  to  be 
transferred  to  the  Republic.  It  was  expressly  stipu- 
lated in  this  contract  that  the  passage  should  at  all 
times  be  open  to  the  ships  of  friendly  and  neutral 
nations  without  favor  or  distinction. 

Having  secured  his  concession,  Palmer  endeavored 
to  organize  a  construction  company  with  a  capital  of 
five  million  dollars.  The  utter  inadequacy  of  this 
amount  is  illustrative  of  the  lack  of  explicit  informa- 
tion which  characterised  all  similar  enterprises  until 
quite  recent  times.  Palmer  failed  both  in  America 


BAILY'S  EXPLORATION.  33 

and  in  England  to  enlist  the  necessary  financial  aid 
and  the  contract  was  never  acted  upon.* 

After  an  abortive  attempt  to  complete  arrange- 
ments with  a  Dutch  company,  the  Central  American 
Republic  again  addressed  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  with  an  offer  to  grant  to  it  the  right  to 
construct  a  canal.  In  response  to  a  recommendation 
of  the  Senate  growing  out  of  these  overtures,  Presi- 
dent Jackson  commissioned  Charles  Biddle  to  visit 
Nicaragua  and  Panama,  with  instructions  to  examine 
the  different  routes  that  had  been  contemplated  and 
to  gather  all  the  information  and  documents  pro- 
curable bearing  upon  the  matters  in  interest.  No 
satisfactory  results  followed  this  mission.  A  mes- 
sage was  sent  to  the  Senate  to  the  effect  that  it  was 
not  expedient  at  that  time  to  enter  into  negotiations 
with  foreign  governments  with  reference  to  a  trans- 
isthmian  connection.  The  truth  is  that  the  Govern- 
ment and  its  agents  were  not  sufficiently  assured  as 
to  the  stability  of  the  new  republics  and  feared  to 
create  relations  that  might  lead  to  political  embroil- 
ment. 

BAILY'S  EXPLORATION   OF  THE    NICARAGUA  REOION. 

Meanwhile  the  active  interest  in  the  canal  question 
was  not  confined  to  the  United  States.  In  1826  an 


House  Report  No.  145,  30th  Cong.,  2nd  session. 
3 


34  PANAMA. 

English  corporation  sent  John  Baily  to  Nicaragua 
for  the  purpose  of  securing  a  concession.  In  this 
object  Baily  was  forestalled  by  the  American, 
Palmer,  but  he  remained  in  the  country,  and  about 
ten  years  later  was  employed  by  President  Morazin 
to  determine  the  most  favorable  location  for  a  cut- 
ting. 

Baily  threw  valuable  light  upon  the  Nicaragua 
route  and  made  a  very  able  report.  He  recommended 
a  route  from  Greytown  to  Lake  Nicaragua,  across 
the  lake  to  the  Lajas,  and  thence  to  San  Juan  del  Sur 
on  the  Pacific  coast.  With  the  termini  he  expressed 
himself  as  well  satisfied.  He  proposed  to  utilize  the 
entire  length  of  the  San  Juan,  which  would  necessi- 
tate blasting  the  rocks  at  the  rapids,  diverting  the 
Colorado  into  the  San  Juan  and  deepening  the  latter 
river.  He  found  the  four  principal  rapids  within 
a  stretch  of  twelve  miles,  formed  by  transverse  rocks, 
with  a  passage  on  either  side  affording  a  depth  of 
from  three  to  six  fathoms.  The  river  was  navigated 
at  the  time  by  piraguas,  large  flat-bottomed  boats  of 
as  much  as  eight  tons  burden,  which  passed  the  rap- 
ids without  serious  hazard. 

Baily's  line  from  the  mouth  of  the  Lajas,  which 
he  proposed  to  use  for  three  miles  of  its  length,  was 
seventeen  miles.  This  he  thought  might  be  reduced 
to  about  fifteen  and  a  half  miles.  His  summit  level 
was  487  feet  above  the  lake  and  the  canal  was  to 
accommodate  ships  of  twelve  hundred  tons  with  a 


FIRST  SURVEYS  OF  PANAMA  ROUTE.  35 

depth  of  eighteen  feet.  He  offered  an  alternative 
plan  which  would  reduce  the  summit  level  to  122  feet 
above  the  lake  but  would  necessitate  the  connection 
of  two  of  his  stations  by  a  tunnel  over  two  miles  in 
length.  The  report  frankly  estimated  the  difficulties 
involved  in  the  undertaking,  and  closed  with  the 
statement  that  although  he  could  not  speak  confi- 
dently as  to  the  feasibility  of  the  route,  which  had 
never  been  surveyed,  he  believed  that  a  continuation 
through  the  Tipitapa  into  Lake  Managua  and  thence 
to  the  port  of  Realejo  was  worthy  of  serious  consid- 
eration. Whilst  these  investigations  were  proceed- 
ing in  the  north,  examination  of  other  probable  routes 
was  being  made.  In  1827  President  Bolivar  com- 
missioned J.  A.  Lloyd  to  survey  the  Isthmus  of  Pan- 
ama with  special  regard  to  the  possibilities  of  rail 
and  water  communication.  Despite  the  fact  that 
this  was  the  first  transcontinental  route,  the  scientific 
knowledge  of  the  territory  was  most  insignificant. 
The  geography  of  the  strip  was  imperfectly  known 
and  the  relative  heights  of  the  oceans  or  the  altitude 
of  the  mountains  separating  them  had  never  been 
ascertained. 

THE   FIRST  SURVEYS   OF   THE   PANAMA  LINEv 

Lloyd  made  a  careful  survey  from  Panama  to  a 
point  within  a  few  miles  of  the  mouth  of  the 
Chagres.  He  seems  to  have  considered  plans  for  a 


36  PANAMA. 

canal  premature,  but  said  that  should  the  time  ar- 
rive when  such  a  mode  of  communication  might  be 
favorably  entertained  the  route  of  the  Trinidad 
River  would  probably  prove  the  most  desirable,  lie 
recommended  for  immediate  purposes  a  combination 
rail  and  water  route  to  take  the  place  of  the  roads 
then  in  use  from  Chagres  and  Porto  Bello  to  Pana- 
ma. His  plan  contemplated  a  short  canal  from  a 
point  on  the  Bay  of  Limon  to  the  Chagres,  the  use 
of  that  river  along  its  tributary,  the  Trinidad,  to  a 
favorable  spot  for  a  junction,  and  thence  a  railroad 
to  the  coast.  As  to  the  terminus  he  was  divided  in 
opinion  on  the  relative  advantages  of  Cherrera  and 
Panama.  The  former  had  the  merit  of  shortening 
the  distance,  whilst  the  latter  was  the  capital  and  an 
already  well-established  port 

The  Republic  of  Colombia  was  disrupted  in  the 
year  1831  and  the  Panama  region  became  a  part  of 
ISTew  Granada.  In  1838,  that  Republic  granted  a 
concession  to  a  French  company  authorizing  the  con- 
struction of  highways,  railroads,  or  canals  from  Pan- 
ama to  any  desired  point  on  the  Atlantic  coast.  This 
company  spent  several  years  in  making  surveys  and 
forming  plans.  The  results  were  submitted  to  the 
French  Government  with  a  view  to  enlisting  its  aid 
in  carrying  out  the  undertaking.  The  project  was 
presented  in  an  extremely  optimistic  light  and  as  one 
comparatively  easy  of  accomplishment.  The  conces- 
sionnaires  claimed  to  have  discovered  a  depression 


FIRST  SURVEYS  OF  PANAMA  ROUTE.  37 

in  the  mountain  range  which  would  permit  of  a  pas- 
sage at  no  greater  height  above  the  average  level  of 
the  Pacific  than  thirty-seven  feet.  The  company's 
statements  excited  extraordinary  interest,  and  in 
1843  Guizot,  then  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  in- 
structed Napolean  Garella  to  proceed  to  Panama,  to 
investigate  the  company's  statements,  and  to  make 
an  independent  examination  of.  the  entire  situation. 
Garella's  report,*  which  was  an  able  treatment  of 
the  subject,  heavily  discounted  the  claims  of  the  Sal- 
omon company  and  led  to  its  failure.  An  inter- 
oceanic  canal  was  recommended  as  the  only  means 
of  communication  that  could  adequately  meet  the 
future  demands  of  commerce.  Garella  agreed  with 
Lloyd  that  the  Atlantic  terminus  should  be  in  the  Bay 
of  Limon  rather  than  at  the  mouth  of  the  Chagres. 
That  river  would  be  met  by  his  canal  near  its  junc- 
tion with  the  Gatun.  The  reported  low  depression 
which  had  raised  hopes  of  the  practicability  of  a 
sea-level  canal  at  a  reasonable  cost,  could  not  be 
found.  Garella  suggested  the  passage  of  the  di- 
vide by  means  of  a  tunnel  more  than  three  miles  in 
length.  The  floor  of  this  tunnel  was  to  be  325  feet 
below  the  summit,  134  feet  above  the  ocean,  and  the 
water  level  158  feet  above  extreme  high  tide  at  Pan- 
ama. The  canal  was  to  have  a  guard  lock  at  each 
entrance  and  the  summit  level  was  to  be  reached 


Reprinted  in  House  Report  No.  322,  25th  Cong.  3d  session. 


38  PANAMA. 

by  eighteen  locks  On  the  Atlantic  slope  and  sixteen 
on  the  Pacific.  The  water  supply  was  to  be  de- 
rived from  the  Chagres  through  two  feed-canals. 
The  Pacific  terminus  was  placed  at  Vaca  de  Monte, 
about  twelve  miles  south  of  Panama.  Garella  esti- 
mated the  cost  of  a  canal  on  these  lines  at  about 
twenty-five  million  dollars.  At  the  cost  of  an  addi- 
tional three  millions  he  calculated  that  a  cut  might 
be  made  in  place  of  the  tunnel. 

DEVELOPMENT   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES  AS   A   FACTOB 
IN    THE    CANAL,    QUESTION. 

"  About  the  middle  of  the  century  a  succession  of 
great  events  vastly  increased  the  importance  of  a 
maritime  connection  between  the  two  oceans  to  the 
United  States.  The  dispute  with  Great  Britain  as 
to  the  boundary  line  west  of  the  Rocky  Mountains 
was  settled  by  the  Buchanan-Packenham  Treaty  in 
1846,  and  in  August,  1848,  an  act  of  Congress  was 
passed  under  which  Oregon  became  an  organized 
territory.  The  war  with  Mexico  was  commenced 
early  in  1846,  and  by  the  terms  of  the  Guadalupe- 
Hidalgo  Treaty,  which  closed  it  in  1848,  California 
was  ceded  to  the  United  States.  Before  the  treaty 
had  been  ratified  gold  was  discovered  there,  and  in  a 
few  months  many  thousands  from  the  eastern  part 
of  the  country  were  seeking  a  way  to  the  mining 
regions.  To  avoid  the  hardships  and  delays  of  the 


UNITED  STATES  AND  CANAL  QUESTION.         39 

journey  across  the  plains  or  the  voyage  around  the 
continent,  lines  of  steamers  and  packets  were  estab- 
lished from  New  York  to  Chagres  and  San  Juan  del 
Norte  and  from  Panama  to  San  Francisco,  some  of 
the  latter  touching  at  the  Pacific  ports  in  Nicaragua. 
For  a  while  those  travelling  by  these  routes  had  to 
make  arrangements  for  crossing  the  isthmus  after 
their  arrival  there,  and  were  often  subjected  to  seri- 
ous personal  inconveniences  and  suffering  as  well  as 
to  exorbitant  charges. 

THE  UNITED  STATES  INSTITUTES  NEGOTIATIONS  FOB  A 
RIGHT  OF  WAY. 

"  The  requirements  of  travel  and  commerce  de- 
manded better  methods  of  transportation  between 
the  Eastern  States  and  the  Pacific  coast,  but  there 
were  other  reasons  of  a  more  public  character  for 
bringing  these  sections  into  closer  communication. 
The  establishment  and  maintenance  of  army  posts 
and  naval  stations  in  the  newly  acquired  and  settled 
regions  in  the  Far  West,  the  extension  of  mail  facil- 
ities to  the  inhabitants,  and  the  discharge  of  .other 
governmental  functions,  all  required  a  connection 
in  the  shortest  time  and  at  the  least  distance  that 
was  possible  and  practicable.  The  importance  of 
this  connection  was  so  manifest  that  the  Government 
was  aroused  to  action  before  all  the  enumerated 
causes  had  come  into  operation,  and  negotiations 


40  »         PANAMA.      _ 

were  entered  into  with  the  Kepublic  of  New  Gra- 
nada to  secure  a  right  of  transit  across  the  Isthmus 
of  Panama."  *  This  object  was  effected  by  a  treaty, 
that  was  ratified  in  June,  1848. 

In  the  following  year,  Elijah  Hise,  the  representa- 
tive of  the  United  States  in  Nicaragua,  negotiated  a 
treaty  with  that  republic.  By  its  terms  Nicaragua 
undertook  to  confer  upon  the  Government  of  the 
United  States,  or  a  corporation  composed  of  its 
citizens,  the  exclusive  right  to  construct  and  operate 
roads,  railways,  or  canals,  or  any  other  medium  of 
communication  by  means  of  ships  or  vehicles,  be- 
tween the  Caribbean  Sea  and  the  Pacific  Ocean  and 
through  the  territory  of  the  former  state.  The  con- 
cessions made  by  this  treaty  were  extremely  liberal, 
but  in  consideration  of  them  it  was  required  that  the 
United  States  should  pledge  itself  to  the  protection  of 
Nicaragua  and  should  hold  its  army  and  navy  and 
any  other  effective  resources  it  might  be  able  to  com- 
mand available  for  the  defense  of  the  Latin-Amer- 
ican republic  against  foreign  aggression.  Nicara- 
gua was  prompted  in  this  negotiation  by  the  desire 
for  aid  in  withstanding  the  policy  of  Great  Britain, 
which  at  that  time  appeared  to  be  directed  toward 
extending  her  control  of  the  Mosquito  coast  to  the 
lower  waters  of  the  San  Juan. 


*  Report  of  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission.    Washington, 
1899-1901. 


o 


VANDERBILT  COMPANY  IN  NICARAGUA.          41 

The  United  States  Government  was  not  prepared 
to  assume  the  responsibility  involved  in  this  treaty, 
in  making  which  Hise  had  exceeded  his  authority, 
and  it  was  not  •  ratified.  Another  convention  was 
formulated  with  the  object  of  furthering  the  plans 
of  The  American,  Atlantic  and  Pacific  Ship  Canal 
Company,  composed  of  Cornelius  Vanderbilt  and 
others.  Although  this  fell  through,  its  purpose  was 
effected  by  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  of  1850. 

THE   VANDERBILT    COMPANY   IN   NICARAGUA. 

This  agreement  required  the  contracting  parties  to 
support  such  individuals  or  corporation  as  should 
first  commence  a  canal  through  Nicaragua.  It 
practically  insured  the  interests  of  the  company  in 
whose  behalf  the  negotiations  of  the  year  before  had 
been  conducted.  The  Republic  granted  to  the  Van- 
derbilt company  the  exclusive  right,  for  a  period  of 
eighty-five  years,  to  make  a  ship  canal  from  any 
point  of  the  Atlantic  coast  to  any  point  on  the  Pa- 
cific coast  of  Nicaragua,  and  by  any  route.  The 
contract  also  gave  to  the  company  the  exclusive  right 
to  construct  rail  or  carriage  roads  and  bridges  and 
to  establish  steamboats  and  other  vessels  on  the 
rivers  and  lakes  of  the  territory  as  accessories  to  its 
enterprise.  It  was  also  provided  that  in  case  the 
canal  or  any  part  of  it  should  be  found  to  be  im- 
practicable, then  the  company  should  be  privileged 


42  PANAMA. 

to  substitute  a  railroad  or  other  means  of  communi- 
cation subject  to  the  same  conditions.  In  order  to 
facilitate  the  operations,  the  company  was  incor- 
porated by  the  Republic  of  Nicaragua  in  March, 
1850.  In  the  following  year  the  arrangement  was 
modified  for  the  convenience  of  the  company,  by  the 
granting  of  a  new  charter  to  enable  the  subsidiary 
operations  on  the  inland  waters  to  be  separated  from 
those  connected  with  the  canal  proper.  Under  this 
charter  the  Accessory  Transit  Company  immedi- 
ately established  a  transportation  line  from  Grey- 
town  up  the  San  Juan  and  across  Lake  Nicaragua, 
by  steamboats,  to  Virgin  Bay  on  the  western  shore 
of  the  lake,  and  thence  by  stage  coaches,  over  thir- 
teen miles  of  good  road,  to  San  Juan  del  Sur.  Iji 
connection  with  this  route  regular  steamship  com' 
munication  was  maintained  with  New  York  on  one 
side  and  San  Francisco  on  the  other.  This  line 
proved  a  boon  to  the  gold-seekers  and  was  traveled 
by  thousands  on  their  way  to  and  from  California. 
It  was  obliged  to  close,  owing  to  the  disturbed  condi- 
tion created  by  the  Walker  expeditions,  but  at  a 
later  date  was  reopened  under  a  new  charter  by  an- 
other company. 

The  American,  Atlantic  and  Pacific  Ship  Canal 
Company  did  not  deem  any  of  the  surveys  or  re- 
ports that  had  previously  been  made  of  the  Nica- 
ragua country  sufficiently  reliable  to  determine 
their  route  upon,  and  Colonel  Orville  Childs 


SURVEY  OF  NICARAGUA  ROUTE.  43 

of  Philadelphia  was  engaged  to  direct  a  thorough 
instrumental  survey  of  the  entire  region. 

Atf   ABLE    SURVEY   OF    THE    NICARAGUA   ROUTE. 

Colonel  Childs'  report  was  submitted  to  President 
Filmore  in  March,  1852,  and  by  him  to  two  United 
States  army  engineers,  by  whom  the  plan  was  pro- 
nounced as  entirely  practicable,  although  they  rec- 
ommended some  modification  of  its  details.  In 
view  of  the  fact  that  the  British  Government  was 
jointly  pledged  with  the  United  States  to  protect 
the  enterprise,  the  plans  were  subjected  to  examina- 
tion by  English  experts.  These  concurred  in  the 
opinion  of  the  American  engineers. 

Nothing  further  was  done  by  the  Vanderbilt  com- 
pany towards  the  construction  of  a  canal,  but  the 
Childs'  report  has  always  been  of  great  value  to 
later  investigators  in  an  examination  of  the  subject. 
In  1856,  Nicaragua  declaring  that  the  company  had 
failed  in  the  performance  of  certain  clauses  of  the 
contract,  revoked  the  concession,  annulled  the  char- 
ters, and  abolished  the  corporation.  The  company 
disputed  the  right  of  the  Republic  to  take  this  action 
and  made  several  futile  attempts  to  re-establish  its 
status. 

In  1858,  despite  the  continued  protest  of  the  for- 
mer concessionaries,  the  Government  of  Nicaragua 
considered  itself  free  to  enter  into  a  new  contract. 


44  PANAMA. 

This  it  did  jointly  with  Costa  Rica.     The  grantee 
in  this  case  was  Felix  Belly,  a  citizen  of  France. 
The   rights  and  privileges   accorded  to  him  under 
this  agreement  were  very  similar  to  those  which  had 
been  enjoyed  by  the  Vanderbilt  company,  and  the 
organization  which  he   proposed  to  create   for   the 
purpose  of  accomplishing  the  work  was  to  be  sim- 
ilarly protected  by  the  terms  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty.     But  the  contract  with  Belly  contained   a 
clause  insuring  to  the  French  Government  the  right 
to  keep  two  ships  of  war  in  Lake  Nicaragua  as  long 
as  the  canal  remained  in  operation.     This  novel  fea- 
ture in  the  agreement  no  sooner  came  to  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  United  States  than  that  country  lodged 
an  emphatic  protest  with  the  Governments  of  Nic- 
aragua and  Costa  Rica.     The  proposed  arrangement 
was  characterised  as  obnoxious.     It  was  pointed  out 
that   "  the  neutrality  and  security   of  these   inter- 
oceanic   routes  constitute   a   great  portion  of  their 
value  to  the  world,  and  that  the  exclusive  right  to 
any  one  nation  to  exercise  armed  intervention  would 
be  just  ground  for  dissatisfaction  on  the  part  of  all 
others."     No  attempt  was  made  to  enforce  the  of- 
fensive clause  and,  as  the  company  failed  to  put  its 
project  into  execution,  the  grant  was  cancelled.     More 
than  once  negotiations  have  been  blocked  by  political 
obstructions  and  for  many  years  American  statesmen 
have  been  averse  to  the  idea  of  a  waterway  across  the 
American  Isthmus  under  foreign  control. 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  RAILROAD.  45 

In  the  meantime  the  demand  for  transcontinental 
transportation  created  by  the  discovery  of  the  gold- 
fields  of  California  led  to  the  building  of  the  rail- 
road across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama.  This  line  was 
opened  early  in  1855  and,  whilst  it  afforded  very 
valuable  service,  it  stimulated  rather  than  satisfied 
the  desire  for  a  ship  canal.  Exploration  and  survey 
were  actively  prosecuted  in  the  Darien  region  by  the 
governments  and  private  citizens  of  the  United 
States,  Great  Britain  and  France.  By  this  time 
precise  information  was  available  as  to  the  condi- 
tions obtaining  along  the  Nicaragua  and  Panama 
routes,  but  the  interior  of  the  eastern  section  of  the 
Isthmus  was  still  unknown  except  to  the  Indians, 
although  it  had  often  been  traversed  by  Spaniards. 

EXPLORATIONS    IN    THE    DARIEN    REGION. 

This  region  had  the  obvious  advantage  of  short  dis- 
tances between  the  oceans  and  there  were  good 
harbors  available  on  either  coast.  So,  when  the  diffi- 
culties of  the  tested  routes  had  been  proved,  atten- 
tion turned  to  the  southern  extreme  of,  what  may  be 
called,  the  canal  area,  in  the  hope  that  the  physical 
features  of  that  region  might  present  difficulties  of 
less  magnitude  than  those  existing  in  the  sections 
already  surveyed.  This  hope  found  justification  in 
the  common  report  that  the  mountains  of  the  in- 
terior offered  a  low  depression  which  had  long  been 


46  PANAMA. 

used  by  the  Indians  as  a  portage  for  their  canoes 
when  traveling  from  one  ocean  to  the  other.  In- 
deed, there  was  a  tradition  of  a  long-existing  unin- 
terrupted waterway  from  coast  to  coast  which  was 
said  to  have  been  effected  by  cutting  a  short  canal 
from  the  upper  reaches  of  the  Atrato  to  a  small 
stream,  the  San  Juan,  emptying  into  the  Pacific. 

In  the  examination  of  this  region  three  general 
lines  were  followed  —  those  of  San  Bias,  Caledonia 
Bay,  and  the  Atrato  River.  Each  of  these  names 
indicates  the  Atlantic  terminus  of  the  route,  but 
there  were  many  variations  in  the  courses  followed 
and  the  contemplated  points  of  termination  at  the 
Pacific  ranged  over  three  hundred  miles  of  coast. 
These  investigations,  in  which  the  United  States 
freely  lent  its  assistance  to  private  endeavors,  had 
good  results  in  the  extension  of  topographic  and 
geographic  knowledge  of  the  country  and  seemed  to 
warrant  further  efforts  in  the  same  direction.* 

AN    IMPOBTANT    SENATE    INVESTIGATION". 

In  the  year  1866,  the  Senate,  with  a  view  to  de- 
termining the  scope  and  direction  of  further  investi- 
gation of  the  interoceanic  canal  question,  requested 
the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  to  furnish  all  the  avail- 


*  Details  of  these  expeditions  in  the  Darien  district  may  be 
found  in  Senate  Ex.  Doc.  No.  1,  33rd  Cong.,  2nd  session,  and 
House  Ex.  Doc.  No.  107,  47th  Cong.,  2nd  session. 


IMPORTANT  SENATE  INVESTIGATION.  47 

able  information  pertaining  to  the  subject  and  to 
ascertain  whether  the  Isthmus  of  Darien  had  been 
sufficiently  explored. 

Secretary  Welles  responded,  in  the  following  year, 
with  a  voluminous  report  *  by  Admiral  Charles  H. 
Davis.  This  document  enumerates  nineteen  canal 
and  seven  railroad  projects  in  the  isthmian  country- 
extending  from  Tehuantepec  to  the  Atrato.  It  ex- 
cludes from  consideration  the  plans  relating  to  Te- 
huantepec and  Honduras  as  being  infeasible  and 
meritless. 

With  reference  to  the  eight  proposed  routes 
through  Nicaragua,  Admiral  Davis  says :  "  It  may 
safely  be  asserted  that  no  enterprise,  presenting  such 
formidable  difficulties,  will  ever  be  undertaken  with 
even  our  present  knowledge  of  the  American  isth- 
muses. Still  less  is  it  likely  to  be  entered  upon 
while  such  strong  and  well-founded  hopes  are  en- 
tertained by  the  promoters  of  the  union  of  the  At- 
lantic and  Pacific  oceans  of  finding  elsewhere  a 
very  much  easier,  cheaper,  and  more  practicable 
route  for  a  canal  in  every  way  suited  to  the  present 
demands  of  commerce  and  navigation." 

He  condemns  a  project  that  had  strong  advocates 
at  the  time,  with  these  words:  "The  examination 
of  the  headwaters  of  the  Atrato,* of  the  intervening 
watershed,  and  of  the  headwaters  of  the  San  Juan, 


*  Senate  Ex.  Doc.  No.  62,  39th  Cong.,  1st  session. 


48  PANAMA. 

satisfactorily  proved  that  nature  forbids  us  alto- 
gether to  entertain  an  idea  of  a  union  of  the  two 
oceans  in  this  direction."  The  Admiral  gives  a  gen- 
eral description  of  the  other  lines  in  Panama,  Da- 
rien,  and  the  Atrato  valley.  He  states  that  "  the 
Isthmus  of  Darien  *  has  not  been  satisfactorily  ex- 
plored "  and  that  "  it  is  to  the  Isthmus  of  Darien 
that  we  are  first  to  look  for  the  solution  of  the  great 
problem  of  an  interoceanic  canal.  For  these  rea- 
sons and  because  "  there  does  not  exist  in  the  libra- 
ries of  the  world  the  means  of  determining,  even 
approximately,  the  most  practicable  route  for  a  ship 
canal  across  the  isthmus,"  he  recommends  the  fur- 
ther investigation  of  the  subject  in  this  region. 

ESTABLISHMENT    OF    THE    INTEROCEANIC    CANAL 
COMMISSION. 

President  Grant,  in  his  first  message  to  Congress, 
recommended  an  American  canal.  That  body 
promptly  adopted  a  joint  resolution  providing  for 
more  extensive  exploration  by  officers  of  the  Navy, 
and  the  chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Navigation  was  au- 
thorized to  organize  and  send  out  expeditions  for 


*  Until  quite  recently  the  words  Darien  and  Panama  were 
used  interchangeably  with  reference  to  the  strip  of  land  now 
more  generally  designated  as  the  Isthmus  of  Panama.  It  is 
in  this  broader  sense  that  Admiral  Davis  uses  the  term 
"  Isthmus  of  Darien." 


INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  COMMISSION.  49 

this  purpose.  In  1872  the  Interoceanic  Canal  Com- 
mission was  established.  Its  members  were  Gen- 
eral A.  A.  Humphreys,  Chief  of  Engineers,  United 
States  Army;  C.  P.  Patterson,  Superintendent  of 
the  Coast  Survey;  and  Commodore  Daniel  Ammen, 
Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Navigation  of  the  Navy. 
Under  the  directions  of  this  commission  explorations 
were  conducted  in  various  parts  of  the  isthmian  ter- 
ritory. 

The  Tehuantepec  route  was  surveyed  by  a  party 
of  which  Captain  Shufeldt  had  charge.  It  was 
found  that  under  the  most  favorable  conditions  a 
canal  along  the  Tehuantepec  line  would  be  more 
than  one  hundred  miles  in  length,  with  a  summit 
level  at  least  732  feet  above  the  sea  and  requiring 
one  hundred  and  forty  locks.  This  report,  confirm- 
ing as  it  did  the  conclusions  of  Admiral  Davis  and 
other  experts,  put  the  Tehuantepec  route  out  of  the 
question  for  all  future  time. 

At  about  the  same  time  (1872),  an  expedition 
under  Commander  Edward  P.  Lull,  assisted  by 
A.  G.  Menocal,  as  chief  civil  engineer,  surveyed  the 
entire  Nicaragua  route,  following  the  line  taken  by 
Childs,  except  for  a  slight  deviation  in  the  passage 
of  the  divide  beyond  the  lake.  Commander  Lull's 
report  was  favorable.  It  included  a  detailed  plan 
for  a  canal  at  an  estimated  cost  of  $65,722,137. 

Whilst  this  work  was  progressing  in  the  north, 
Commander  Self  ridge  and  other  officers  of  the 


60  PANAMA. 

United  States  Navy  were  engaged  in  surveying  the 
most  promising  lines  in  the  Darien  region.  In  1875 
the  Panama  route  was  minutely  surveyed  by  Lull 
and  Menocal.  They  reported  in  favor  of  a  course 
41.7  miles  from  the  Bay  of  Limon  to  the  Chagres, 
ascending  its  valley  and  that  of  the  Obispo  to  the 
divide,  and  descending  the  Pacific  slope  by  the  val- 
ley of  the  Rio  Grande  to  the  Bay  of  Panama.  The 
line  as  marked  out  in  this  report  has  been  followed 
in  general  in  subsequent  plans. 

REPORT    OF    THE   INTEROCEANIC    CANAL    COMMISSION. 

The  Interoceanic  Commission  now  had  before  it 
the  reports  of  the  expeditions  which  have  been  men- 
tioned and,  in  addition,  plans  and  surveys  relating 
to  every  route  in  any  degree  practicable  from  one 
end  to  the  other  of  the  canal  country.  Its  report,* 
which  was  unanimous,  was  returned  in  February, 
1876,  and  embodied  the  following  conclusion: 
"  That  the  route  known  as  the  Nicaragua  route,  be- 
ginning on  the  Atlantic  side  at  or  near  Greytown ; 
running  by  canal  to  the  San  Juan  River,  thence 
.  .  .  to  ...  Lake  Nicaragua ;  from  thence 
across  the  lake  and  through  the  valleys  of  the  Rio 
del  Medio  and  the  Rio  Grande  to  ...  Brito, 
on  the  Pacific  coast,  possesses,  both  for  the  construc- 
tion and  maintenance  of  a  canal,  greater  advantages 


*  Senate  Ex.  Doc.  No.  15,  46th  Cong.,  1st  session. 


VARIOUS  SHIP  RAILWAY  PROJECTS.  51 

and  fewer  difficulties  from  engineering,  commercial, 
and  economic  points  of  view  than  any  one  of  the 
other  routes  shown  to  be  practicable  by  surveys  suf- 
ficient in  detail  to  enable  a  judgment  to  be  formed 
of  their  respective  merits." 

Meanwhile  Lieutenant  L.  N.  B.  Wyse,  as  the  rep- 
resentative of  a  French  syndicate,  was  negotiating 
with  the  Colombian  Government  for  a  concession, 
which  he  secured  in  1878.  An  account  of  this  im- 
portant contract  and  of  the  Panama  Canal  Com- 
pany, which  operated  under  it,  will  be  given  in  a 
later  chapter. 

\ 

VARIOUS  SHIP   RAILWAY   PROJECTS. 

Whilst  the  report  of  the  Interoceanic  Commission 
was  generally  accepted  with  regard  to  the  infeasi- 
bility  of  the  Tehuantcpec  route  for  a  ship  canal,  it 
appeared  to  James  B.  Eads  to  offer  special  advan- 
tages for  a  ship  railway,  and  in  1881  he  secured  a 
charter  from  the  Mexican  Government  conveying  to 
him  authority  to  utilize  it  for  that  purpose.  Eads' 
plan  was  entirely  feasible  and  no  doubt  would  have 
been  carried  to  a  successful  conclusion  had  he  lived, 
but  with  his  death  in  1887  the  project  was  aban- 
doned. 

In  1860  Sir  James  Brunless  and  E.  C.  Webb 
proposed  to  Napoleon  the  Third  a  ship  railway 
across  the  Suez  Isthmus  instead  of  the  projected 


52  PANAMA. 

canal,  but  the  proposition  was  rejected  by  de  Les- 
seps.  The  same  engineers  prepared  plans  for  the 
Government  of  Honduras,  in  1872,  for  a  similar 
transportation  line  from  Pureto  Caballos  to  Fon- 
seca  Bay,  to  carry  ships  of  twelve  hundred  tons. 
The  Republic  failed  to  obtain  the  money  necessary 
to  carry  out  the  plans. 

The  year  after  Eads'  death  the  celebrated  Chig- 
necto  Ship-railway  was  commenced,  after  years  of 
preparation.  It  is  now  in  successful  operation  over 
seventeen  miles  between  the  Bay  of  Fundy  and  the 
Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence.  The  projected  Hurontario 
Railway,  of  a  similar  character,  will  be  sixty-six 
miles  in  length.  Mere  distance,  however,  whilst  it 
enhances  the  cost  of  such  an  undertaking,  does  not 
necessarily  increase  the  difficulty  of  it. 

Eads'  proposed  line  adhered  in  general  to  the 
course  mapped  for  a  canal.  The  length  of  the  rail- 
way was  to  have  been  134  miles.  The  summit  of 
736  feet  is  reached  by  easy  grades,  the  heaviest  be- 
ing less  than  fifty-three  feet  in  the  mile.  The  rail- 
way was  designed  to  carry  vessels  up  to  seven 
thousand  tons,  and  the  total  cost  of  the  line,  lifting- 
docks,  harbors,  stations,  shops,  machinery  and  all 
other  equipment  was  estimated  at  less  than  fifty 
millions. 

In  1884  a  treaty  had  been  negotiated  between  the 
United  States  and  Nicaragua  for  the  construction 
of  a  canal  by  the  former,  to  be  owned  by  the  two 


VARIOUS  SHIP  RAILWAY  PROJECTS.  53 

states  jointly.  Whilst  it  was  under  consideration 
in  the  Senate  the  treaty  was  withdrawn  by  the  Presi- 
dent for  the  reason  that  it  proposed  a  perpetual 
alliance  with  Nicaragua  and,  like  the  Hise  treaty, 
imposed  obligations  on  the  United  States  for  the 
protection  of  the  former  country  which  it  was  inad- 
visable to  assume. 

In  April,  1887,  Nicaragua  granted  a  concession 
to  A.  G.  Menocal  for  the  construction  of  a  ship  canal 
from  Greytown  to  Brito.  Thus  far  the  story  has 
been  a  recital  of  plans,  projects,  and  theories. 
When  we  take  up  the  thread  of  it  in  a  later  chapter 
it  will  be  to  recount  active  operations. 


PANAMA. 


RAILEOAD    AND    CANAL. 


The  dotted  line  across  the  isthmus  indicates  the 
present  course  of  the  railroad;  the  heavy  line  shows  the 
course  of  the  Canal. 


III. 

PANAMA. 
THE  PANAMA  RAILROAD. 

The  Terms  of  the  Concession  —  The  Great  Difficulties  of  the 
Undertaking  —  Some  Features  of  the  Construction  —  The 
Course  of  the  Line  From  Coast  to  Coast  —  Extraordinary 
Labor  Difficulties  —  The  Canal  Company  Secures  the  Rail- 
road —  A  Monopolistic  Agreement  —  The  Assets  of  the  Rail- 
road and  Their  Value  —  Suggested  Railroad  and  Steamship 
Traffic  Reforms  —  A  New  Application  of  Our  Protective 
Policy. 

The  great  migration  to  the  Pacific  coast  following 
the  discovery  of  gold  in  "  Forty-nine  "  acted  as  a 
strong  incentive  to  the  immediate  establishment  of 
an  isthmian  route  by  which  the  long  and  hazardous 
journey  across  the  western  territories  of  the  United 
States  might  be  avoided.  In  the  last  chapter  a  brief 
account  was  given  of  the  enterprise  conducted  by  the 
American,  Atlantic  and  Pacific  Ship  Canal  Com- 
pany, which,  although  it  never  effected  its  original 
purpose  of  opening  a  waterway,  afforded  valuable 
service  to  the  gold-seekers  in  the  early  fifties  by 
maintaining  a  transportation  line  across  Nicaragua. 

At  the  outset  of  the  gold  movement  thousands 
made  their  way  to  California  by  way  of  the  Isthmus 

55 


56  PANAMA. 

of  Panama.  Steamships  carried  them  from  New 
York  to  the  mouth  of  the  Chagres.  The  journey 
thence  to  the  Pacific  coast,  although  no  more  than 
fifty  miles  by  the  trail,  occupied  from  five  to  ten  days 
and  was  accompanied  by  almost  as  much  hardship 
and  danger  as  in  the  days  of  Balboa.  The  emigrants 
were  rowed  or  towed  up  the  river  by  natives  to  a 
point  near  Cruces.  The  rest  of  the  way  to  Panama 
was  covered  on  foot  or  on  mules.  Women,  when 
means  would  permit,  were  carried  by  selleros. 
These  were  native  Indian  porters,  with  a  kind  of 
chair  strapped  to  their  backs.  There  was,  at  that 
time,  no  regular  steamship  line  between  California 
and  Panama.  The  travelers  were  often  subjected 
to  long  and  wearisome  waits  in  the  city.  The  old 
battery  and  the  adjacent  ramparts  were  favorite  re- 
sorts of  impatient  watchers  for  a  vessel  from  San 
Francisco,  and  their  names  and  initials  are  cut  in 
the  stones  by  hundreds.  On  more  than  one  occasion 
epidemic  made  serious  inroads  among  them.  Gen- 
eral Grant,  in  his  memoirs,  tells  us  that  he  was  with 
the  Seventh  United  States  Infantry  at  Panama  in 
1852,  en  route  to  California,  when  cholera  broke 
out.  Fifteen  per  cent  of  the  regiment  succumbed 
to  the  disease  and  more  than  five  hundred  emigrants 
died  of  it  Cholera  is  not  one  of  the  prevalent  dis- 
eases of  the  Isthmus.  An  influx  of  foreigners  to 
Panama  has  always  been  accompanied  by  an  outbreak 
of  yellow  fever,  to  which  the  natives  are  immune. 


TERMS  OF  THE  CONCESSION.  57 

This  transflux  of  travelers  determined  certain 
American  capitalists  to  undertake  the  construction 
of  a  railroad  across  the  Isthmus.  A  grant  for  the 
purpose  had  been  made  by  the  Government  of  New 
Granada  to  Mateo  Kline,  on  behalf  of  a  French  syn- 
dicate, in  1847,  but  it  had  expired  by  default  in 
1848.  In  the  following  year,  William  Henry  As- 
pinwall,  John  Lloyd  Stephens,  Henry  Chauncy,  of 
New  York,  and  their  associates  incorporated  under 
the  name  of  the  Panama  Railroad  Company. 

THE    TERMS    OF   THE    CONCESSION". 

Having  declared  all  former  similar  concessions 
null  and  void,  the  Government  of  New  Granada  ex- 
tended to  this  company  the  exclusive  privilege  of 
building  a  road  and  of  operating  it  for  a  period  of 
forty-nine  years  from  the  date  of  completion,  which 
was  to  be  not  later  than  six  years  after  the  signing 
of  the  contract. 

Subsequently  this  agreement  was  modified  in  im- 
portant particulars,  and  in  its  present  form  entitles 
the  company  to  "  the  use  and  possession  of  the  rail- 
road, the  telegraph  between  Colon  and  Panama,  the 
buildings,  warehouses,  and  wharves  belonging  to  the 
road,  and  in  general  all  the  dependencies  and  other 
works  now  in  its  possession  necessary  to  the  service 
and  development  of  the  enterprise  for  a  period  of 
ninety-nine  years  from  the  16th  day  of  August, 


53  PANAMA. 

1867.  At  the  expiration  of  this  term  the  Govern- 
ment is  to  be  substituted  in  all  the  rights  of  the  com- 
pany and  is  entitled  to  the  immediate  possession  of 
the  entire  property.  The  Republic  is  bound  to 
grant  no  privilege  during  this  term  to  any  other 
company  or  person  to  open  any  other  railroad  on  the 
isthmus,  nor  without  the  consent  of  the  company  to 
open  or  work  any  maritime  canal  there  to  the  west 
of  a  line  drawn  from  Cape  Tiburon,  on  the  Atlantic, 
to  Point  Garachine,  on  the  Pacific;  nor  to  establish 
any  such  communication  itself.  But  the  company 
can  not  oppose  the  construction  of  a  canal  except 
directly  along  the  route  of  its  road,  and  the  consent 
required  is  only  to  enable  it  to  exact  an  equitable 
price  for  the  privilege  and  as  indemnification  for 
the  damages  it  may  suffer  by  the  competition  of  the 
canal.  It  is  also  stipulated  that  the  company  shall 
forfeit  its  privilege  should  it  cede  or  transfer  its 
rights  to  any  foreign  government." 

THE  GREAT  DIFFICULTIES  OF  THE  UNDERTAKING. 

When  the  Republic  of  Colombia  superseded  the 
Government  of  New  Granada  (1867),  new  require- 
ments were  imposed  upon  the  Railroad  Company. 
It  was  compelled  to  pay  to  Colombia  a  quarter  of  a 
million  dollars  annually  and  to  "  transport  free  of 
charge  the  troops,  chiefs,  and  officers,  and  their 
equipage,  ammunition,  armament,  clothing,  and  all 


DIFFICULTIES  OF  THE  UNDERTAKING.  59 

similar  effects  that  may  belong  to,  are  or  may  be 
destined  for  the  immediate  service  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  Republic  or  the  State  of  Panama,  as 
also  their  officials  in  service  or  in  commission,  and 
those  individuals  who,  with  their  families  and  bag- 
gage, may  come  to  the  country  in  the  character  of 
emigrants,  and  of  new  settlers  with  the  permanent 
character  of  such,  for  account  of  the  Government  up 
to  the  number  of  2,000  annually."  This  agreement 
was  worked  by  the  Colombian  Government  to  the 
utmost,  and  the  tremendous  amount  of  "  deadhead- 
ing "  with  which  the  company  was  forced  to  put  up 
cut  into  its  profits  seriously.  Some  idea  of  the  ex- 
tent to  which  this  abuse  was  carried  may  be  inferred 
from  the  fact  that  during  the  year  1903  the  Com- 
pany carried  4,663  first-class  passengers  who  paid 
their  fares  and  11,098  passengers  and  6,601  troops 
free.  In  addition  a  considerable  amount  of  freight 
was  transported  gratis  under  the  agreement. 

The  Panama  Railroad  Company,  with  characteris- 
tic American  energy,  attacked  the  difficult  undertak- 
ing without  delay.  The  engineering  staff  was  on  the 
ground  in  the  autumn  of  1849.  "  Their  quarters 
were  on  board  a  sailing  ship.  They  worked  by  day, 
waist  deep  in  mud  and  slime,  making  surveys  and  cut- 
ting a  trail,  and  slept  at  night  on  their  floating  home. 
Nothing  but  the  indomitable  will  and  push  for 
which  Americans  are  justly  praised  could  have  over- 
come the  terrible  difficulties  that  met  them  at  every 


60  PANAMA. 

step.  The  country  was  a  howling  wilderness,  pesti- 
lential and  death-dealing;  the  forests  teemed  with 
poisonous  snakes  and  other  equally  unpleasant  in- 
habitants; night  was  made  hideous  by  the  large, 
broad-chested,  active  mosquitoes  of  that  part  of  the 
coast,  who  bite  through  clothing  most  successfully; 
the  country  produced  absolutely  nothing,  and  every 
mouthful  of  food  had  to  come  from  New  York.  De- 
spite these  obstacles,  that  brave  little  band  worked 
ahead,  and  kept  on  with  their  surveys.  At  the  very 
outset  they  encountered  the  difficulty  of  finding  a 
suitable  location  for  the  line  traversing  the  quick- 
sands and  swamps  between  Colon  of  to-day  and 
Gatun.  It  is  reported  that  in  some  of  the  swamps 
the  engineers  under  the  late  Colonel  George  M.  Tot- 
ten,  and  Mr.  Trautwine,  failed  to  find  bottom  at  180 
feet.  An  embankment  was  created  for  the  road  by 
throwing  in  hundreds  of  cords  of  wood,  rock,  and 
more  wood.  This  causeway,  as  it  may  be  called, 
cost  a  fabulous  sum  of  money;  but  at  last  it  was 
completed  and  they  floated  their  tracks,  so  to  speak, 
over  the  swamps."  * 

Despite  its  ample  resources  and  the  unflagging 
application  of  its  representatives  in  the  field,  the 
Company  at  the  end  of  two  years  had  completed  only 
about  one-half  of  the  permanent  way,  or,  to  be  more 


•  Five  Years  in  Panama.     Wolfred  Nelson,  M.D.,  New  York, 

1889. 


SOME  FEATURES  OF  CONSTRUCTION.      Gl 

exact,  the  twenty-three  miles  between  Colon  and 
Barbacoas.  The  transportation  of  passengers  and 
baggage  across  the  Isthmus  was,  however,  in  opera- 
tion. The  railway  line  was  used  as  far  as  it  was 
completed;  canoes  were  employed  upon  the  Chagrea 
to  Gorgona  or  Cruces;  and  the  remainder  of  the 
journey  was  performed  by  road. 

SOME  FEATURES  OF  THE  CONSTRUCTION. 

At  Paraiso,  thirty-eight  miles  from  the  Atlantic, 
the  line  attains  its  greatest  elevation,  being  263  feet 
above  the  mean  level  of  the  ocean.  Upon  the  west- 
ern side  of  the  divide  the  maximum  grade  is  one  in 
ninety;  upon  the  Pacific  slope  it  is  a  little  more. 
Twenty-three  miles  of  the  road  are  level  and  twenty- 
five  straight,  but  there  are  sharp  curves  in  places. 
There  are  no  fewer  than  one  hundred  and  thirty- 
four  culverts,  drains,  and  bridges  of  ten  feet  and 
less,  and  as  many  as  one  hundred  and  seventy 
bridges  from  a  twelve-foot  span  to  the  length  of  the 
Barbacoas.  The  line  is  a  single  one  with  five  sid- 
ings, but  it  is  the  intention  of  the  Canal  Commis- 
sion to  convert  it  into  a  double-track  road  at  an  early 
date.  The  railroad  is  paralleled  by  a  telegraph  line. 
Of  this,  Pirn,  in  his  "  Gateway  to  the  Pacific,"  says : 
"  There  are  twenty-six  posts  to  the  mile,  constructed 
in  the  following  manner:  A  scantling  four  inches 
square,  of  pitch-pine,  is  encased  in  cement,  molded 


62  PANAMA. 

in  a  cylindrical  form,  tapering  toward  the  top,  and 
sunk  four  feet  in  the  ground.  I  was  assured  that 
when  once  dry  these  posts  would  last  for  ages.  The 
cost  of  each  was  five  dollars.  They  have  the  ap- 
pearance of  hewn  stone  and  are  quite  an  ornament 
along  the  line." 

At  the  close  of  the  year  1854  the  construction 
had  arrived  at  the  divide.  The  Culebra  pass  af- 
forded the  greatest  depression  but  it  was  practically 
two  hundred  and  forty  feet  above  sea  level.  The 
rails  were  carried  over  at  this  point  and  down  the 
Pacific  slope  to  Panama.  On  the  27th  day  of  Jan- 
uary, 1855,  Colonel  Totten  went  over  the  line  upon 
the  first  locomotive  to  cross  the  American  continent 
from  ocean  to  ocean. 

The  utmost  credit  is  due  to  the  promoters  of  this 
great  enterprise  and  to  those  who  executed  it.  Aside 
from  the  important  services  the  road  has  rendered 
to  commerce  during  the  past  fifty  years,  its  efficacy 
as  a  pioneer  movement  has  been  inestimable.  The 
railroad  opened  the  way  over  the  Isthmus,  stimu- 
lated the  desire  for  a  canal,  and  affords  indispensable 
facilities  for  its  consummation. 

The  cost  of  the  road  was  considerably  in  excess  of 
the  original  estimate.  After  its  opening  to  through 
traffic,  many  improvements  were  carried  out,  includ- 
ing the  expensive  bridge  at  Barbacoas,  and  it  is 
probable  that  the  outlay  in  establishing  the  route 
exceeded  eight  million  dollars. 


COURSE  OF  LINE  FROM  COAST  TO  COAST.,'      G3 

From  Colon  the  road  runs  almost  due  south  by 
west  for  more  than  seven  miles  until  it  meets  the 
Chagres  at  Gatun.  Its  general  direction  thereafter 
is  south-easterly,  along  the  valley  of  the  river  as  far 
as  San  Pablo,  the  half-way  point  between  the  oceans. 

THE   FINE   BRIDGE   ACROSS   THE   CHAGRES. 

Here  the  Chagres  is  spanned  by  the  splendid  Bar- 
bacoas,  which  word  itself,  in  the  native  language, 
signifies  a  bridge.  It  is  an  iron  structure  over  six 
hundred  feet  long,  resting  upon  stone  piers.  It 
cost  upwards  of  half  a  million  dollars.  During  the 
dry  season  the  river  dwindles  to  a  shallow,  almost 
sluggish,  stream,  perhaps  less  than  two  hundred  feet 
in  width,  but  in  the  rains  it  becomes  a  torrent,  some- 
times far  exceeding  its  normal  bounds.  Thus  in 
1878  the  Chagres  flooded  its  valley  and  rose  to  a 
height  of  fifteen  feet  over  the  railway.  The  earth- 
quake of  1882  threw  the  bridge  slightly  out  of  align- 
ment but  apparently  without  seriously  damaging  it. 
From  San  Pablo  the  road  hugs  the  left  bank  of  the 
river  to  Obispo,  where  it  turns  off  suddenly  at  right 
angles  to  the  stream.  In  the  vicinity  of  Obispo  is 
Cerro  Gigante,  the  hill  from  v/hose  summit  Balboa 
is  said  to  have  gained  his  first  view  of  the  Pacific. 
There  is  no  historic  evidence  on  this  point,  and  ifi 
seems  more  probable  that  if  the  exact  spot  could  be 
ascertained  it  would  be  on  one  or  the  other  of  the 


64  PANAMA. 

heights  that  flank  the  Culebra  pass.  At  Paraiso,  on 
the  Pacific  slope,  the  company's  engineers  had  an 
experience  that  is  inseparable  from  excavation  works 
in  this  part  of  the  world.  A  cut  had  been  made 
forty  feet  in  depth  and  the  rails  laid  along  its  bot- 
tom, when  the  torrential  rain  swept  the  earth  back 
and  covered  the  track  at  a  depth  of  twenty  feet.  A 
similar  occurrence  befell  the  Panama  Canal  Com- 
pany more  than  once,  affording  a  warning  to  the 
American  engineers  which  they  have  carefully 
heeded. 

EXTRAORDINARY    LAJ3OR    DIFFICULTIES. 

Reference  has  been  made  to  some  of  the  diffi- 
culties which  were  encountered  in  what  Tomes 
("  Panama  in  1885  ")  characterises  as  the  "  almost 
superhuman "  task  of  building  the  railroad  across 
the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  Not  the  least  of  these  were 
involved  in  the  efforts  to  secure  an  adequate  supply 
of  labor.  It  was  soon  found  that  the  natives  could 
not  be  counted  upon  to  any  extent.  The  company 
concluded  to  import  Chinamen  and  a  ship  landed 
eight  hundred  of  them  at  Panama.  They  imme- 
diately began  to  fall  sick  and  in  a  week's  time  up- 
ward of  a  hundred  were  prostrated.  The  interpre- 
ters attributed  this  to  the  deprivation  of  their  ac- 
customed opium.  A  quantity  of  the  drug  was  dis- 
tributed to  them  and  had  a  marked  effect  for  the 


EXTRAORDINARY  LABOR  DIFFICULTIES.  65 

better,  but,  to  quote  Tomes,  "  a  Maine  opium  law 
was  soon  promulgated  on  the  score  of  the  immorali- 
ty of  administering  to  so  pernicious  a  habit,  and 
without  regard,  it  is  hoped,  to  the  expense,  which, 
however,  was  no  inconsiderable  item,  since  the 
daily  quota  of  each  Chinese  amounted  to  fifteen 
grains,  at  a  cost  of  at  least  fifteen  cents."  Deprived 
of  what  from  long  habit  had  become  a  necessary 
stimulant  and  subjected  to  the  depressing  effect  of 
the  unaccustomed  climate,  the  coolies  lost  all  vigor 
and  courage.  In  less  than  two  months  after  their 
arrival  there  was  hardly  one  of  the  original  number 
fit  to  yield  a  pick  or  shovel.  They  gave  themselves 
up  to  despair  and  sought  death  by  whatever  means 
came  nearest  to  hand.  Some  sat  on  the  shore  and 
stoically  awaited  the  rising  tide,  nor  did  they  stir 
until  the  sea  swallowed  them.  Some  hanged  them- 
selves by  their  queues  or  used  those  appendages  to 
strangle  themselves.  By  various  methods  hundreds 
put  an  end  to  the  misery  of  their  existence.  The 
remnant,  fewer  than  two  hundred,  sick  and  useless, 
were  shipped  to  Jamaica. 

The  next  experiment  of  the  Railroad  Company 
was  hardly  less  disastrous.  A  number  of  Irish 
laborers  were  imported  at  considerable  expense,  but, 
although  the  mortality  amongst  them  was  not  so 
great  as  that  experienced  from  the  Chinese,  it  is 
said  that  the  company  failed  to  secure  a  single  good 
day's  labor  from  one  of  them.  A  great  number 
5 


66  PANAMA. 

were  buried  on  the  Isthmus  and  the  remainder  were 
sent  to  New  York,  where  most  of  them  died  from 
the  effects  of  the  fever  contracted  in  the  south.* 

The  road  was  finally  completed  with  the  labor  of 
some  three  thousand  men  of  mixed  races,  but  chiefly 
negroes  from  Jamaica  and  East  Indian  coolies. 

THE    CANAL    COMPANY    SECURES    THE    RAILROAD. 

The  Panama  Canal  Company  learned  at  an  early 
stage  in  its  operations  that  control  of  the. railroad 
was  essential  to  the  success  of  its  project.  In  the 
fall  of  1879  the  stock  was  offered  to  de  Lesseps 
for  $14,000,000,  being  at  the  rate  of  $200  each  for 
70,000  shares.  This  would  appear  to  have  been  a 
very  fair  price  when  the  worth  of  the  line  to  the 
canal  company  is  considered  and  the  fact  that  its 
extremely  profitable  business,  which  had  returned 
profits  ranging  from  twelve  to  twenty-two  per  cent 


*  It  should  be  stated  that  the  late  Colonel  George  M.  Totten, 
chief  engineer  of  the  road,  threw  discredit  upon  these  state- 
ments of  excessive  mortality  which,  however,  have  emanated 
from  several  apparently  reliable  authorities.  Colonel  Totten 
repeatedly  stated  that  the  number  of  men  employed  in  the  con- 
struction of  the  railroad  at  no  time  exceeded  7,000  and  that 
the  total  deaths  among  the  laborers  during  the  five  years  of 
the  operation  were  not  in  excess  of  1,200.  If  we  assume  an 
average  of  5,000  laborers  per  annum,  probably  an  underesti- 
mate, we  have  a  mortality  of  48  per  thousand,  an  incredibly 
low  figure,  when  the  conditions  under  which  the  road  was  built 
and  the  later  experience  of  the  French  are  considered. 


CANAL  COMPANY  SECURES  RAILROAD.  67 

per  annum,  was  in  prospect  of  practical  annihilation 
on  the  completion  of  the  waterway.  De  Lesseps, 
however,  perhaps  hoping  to  secure  better  terms,  de- 
clined the  proposition.  The  construction  of  the 
canal  was  commenced  early  in  the  following  year 
but  the  operations  were  obstructed  at  every  step  by 
the  Railroad  Company,  which  instituted  a  system- 
atic scheme  of  delay  in  the  delivery  of  goods  to  the 
Canal  Company.  At  length  it  was  forced  upon  de 
Lesseps  that  the  American  corporation  commanded 
the  situation,  and  he  decided  to  buy  the  company's 
shares.  But  in  the  meanwhile  they  had  been  stead- 
ily advancing,  and  when  the  transfer  was  effected 
the  price  had  risen  to  $250  a  share.  Six-sevenths  of 
the  entire  stock  was  sold  to  the  Panama  Canal  Com- 
pany,* the  remainder  being  retained  in  American 
hands  for  the  purpose  of  keeping  the  charter  alive. 

With  the  opening  of  the  railroad  a  large  traffic 
across  the  Isthmus  sprang  into  existence  and  grew 
rapidly  with  the  advance  of  time.  The  products  of 
Asia  and  the  countries  upon  the  Pacific  coast  of 
America  were  carried  from  Panama  to  Colon,  there 
to  be  distributed  amongst  steamships  making  the 
ports  of  Europe,  Canada,  the  United  States  and  the 
West  Indies.  Moving  in  the  reverse  direction, 


*  The  company  has  been  generally  known  in  America  by  this 
name,  but  its  corporate  title  was  "  La  Compagnie  Universelle 
du  Canal  Interoceanique  de  Panama." 
26 


G8  PANAMA. 

goods  from  these  countries  reached,  by  the  same 
transisthmian  route,  South  and  Central  America 
and  San  Francisco.  From  the  last  named  port  re- 
shipment  was  made  to  the  Pacific  islands  and  points 
on  the  Asian  mainland.  A  number  of  steamship 
lines  made  regular  calls  at  the  terminal  ports  of  the 
railroad.  The  line  occupied  a  commanding  position 
as  the  essential  link  in  this  chain  of  traffic,  and  took 
full  advantage  of  the  fact.  Its  charges  were  exor- 
bitant and  its  profits  enormous  for  many  years.  Its 
rates  were  based  on,  in  general,  fifty  per  cent  of  the 
through  tariff.  For  instance,  of  the  total  cost  of 
shipping  goods  from  New  York  to  Valparaiso,  one 
half  represented  the  charge  of  the  Railroad  Com- 
pany for  its  share  of  the  carriage.  In  some  in- 
stances this  policy  of  mulcting  the  shipper  excess- 
ively resulted  in  loss  of  business.  For  many  years 
the  road  carried  enormous  quantities  of  coffee  to 
Europe.  The  through  rate  was  about  thirty  dollars 
per  ton.  The  Railroad  Company  received  fifteen 
dollars  and  the  two  steamship  companies  that  han- 
dled the  goods  divided  a  similar  sum.  In  the  early 
eighties  a  German  line  commenced  to  run  to  South 
and  Central  American  ports  by  way  of  the  Straits 
of  Magellan.  In  a  very  short  while  this  line  had 
secured  all  the  coffee  shipments  and  much  other 
freight  that  had  previously  been  sent  across  the 
Isthmus. 

However,    the  Railroad    Company   was   not   seri- 


A  MONOPOLISTIC  AGREEMENT.  69 

ously  affected  by  these  diversions,  and  in  the  course 
of  time  it  entered  into  an  agreement  with  the  Pacific 
Steamship  Company  which  created  a  condition  in 
the  nature  of  a  monopoly,  to  which  reference  will  be 
had  again. 

THE  LOISTG   CALMS  ON  THE  PACIFIC   COAST. 

Tramp  steamers  often  make  the  ports  on  either  side 
of  the  Isthmus,  and  many  sailing  vessels  put  in  at 
Colon.  The  latter  are  less  frequent  visitors  at  Pan- 
ama on  account  of  the  calm  that  prevails  on  that 
coast.  Such  craft  have  been  known  to  leave  the 
latter  port  and  return  for  fresh  supplies  after  lying 
in  the  doldrums  for  weeks  without  being  able  to  get 
away.  There  was  the  case  of  the  British  bark 
Straun,  which  cleared  from  Panama  in  May  of  the 
year  1884.  After  getting  out  of  the  Gulf  she  beat 
about  between  latitudes  four  and  six  for  months  and 
finally  put  back  to  port  after  being  out  one  hundred 
and  five  days. 

When  the  United  States  Government  purchased 
the  property  of  the  Panama  Canal  Company  it  ac- 
quired 08,887  of  the  70,000  shares  of  the  Railroad 
Company.  Since  then  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commis- 
sion has  bought  a  few  more  shares  in  the  open  mar- 
ket, and  stands  ready  to  pay  par  for  the  remainder. 
The  offer  is  a  fair  one,  considering  that  with  the 
completion  of  the  canal  the  property  will  deteriorate 


70  PANAMA. 

greatly  in  value.  The  holders  of  the  minority  stock 
do  not,  however,  evince  any  eagerness  to  part  with 
their  holdings.  They  know  that  the  Government  is 
anxious  to  secure  entire  possession,  and  moreover 
the  business  of  the  line  has  increased  and  will  con- 
tinue to  do  so  during  the  canal  operations.  The 
situation  places  the  Government  in  something  of  a 
dilemma.  So  long  as  any  stock  is  outstanding  in 
the  hands  of  private  individuals  the  Commission 
may  not  neglect  the  interests  of  the  minority  share- 
holders and  must  conduct  the  line  on  strictly  busi- 
ness principles  and  hold  commercial  considerations 
paramount  to  the  convenience  of  the  canal  construc- 
tion. Secretary  Taft,  in  his  letter  of  transmission 
to  the  President,  accompanying  the  annual  report  of 
the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  for  1904,  suggests 
two  ways  of  solving  the  difficulty  and  securing  the 
desideratum  of  having  the  road  "  wholly  under  the 
control  and  use  of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States."  The  first  suggestion  is  to  condemn  the 
stock  and  pay  a  reasonable  price  to  the  holders. 
The  Secretary  thinks  "  this  method  is  a  possible  one 
and  that  the  condemnation  proceedings  under  a  stat- 
ute of  the  United  States  might  be  pursued  in  the 
State  of  New  York,  which  incorporated  the  com- 
pany and  where  its  chief  office  now  is.  It  would 
require  special  legislation  by  Congress."  The  sec- 
ond means  suggested  is  "  to  use  the  power  that  the 
United  States  has  "  (by  reason  of  its  majority  in- 


ASSETS  OF  RAILROAD.  71 

terest)  "  to  elect  directors  who  will  lease  the  rail- 
road to  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  at  a  rental 
which  will  involve  the  payment  of  the"  fixed  charges 
upon  the  railroad  and  a  reasonable  dividend  upon 
all  the  stock.  Of  course  the  dividend  earned  upon 
the  stock  belonging  to  the  United  States  need  not  be 
paid.  In  this  way  the  Isthmian  Canal  Company 
will  become  the  lessee  of  the  railroad,  and,  provided 
it  does  not  injure  the  property  and  discharges  the 
obligations  of  the  original  company  under  its  fran- 
chise, can  use  the  railroad  for  the  purposes  of  con- 
structing the  canal  without  embarrassment."  * 

THE  ASSETS  OF  THE  RAILROAD  AND  THEIR  VALUE. 

The  property  of  the  Railroad  Company  transferred 
to  the  United  States  Government  consists  of  about 
forty-eight  miles  of  single  track  with  twenty-six 
miles  of  sidings;  thirty-five  locomotives,  thirty  pas- 
senger cars,  more  than  nine  hundred  freight  cars 
and  a  quantity  of  miscellaneous  rolling  stock.  The 
equipment,  like  everything  else  that  came  from  the 
hands  of  the  French  company,  was  in  a  condition  of 
unnecessary  deterioration.  The  railroad  company 
owns  repair  shops,  wharves  and  buildings  at  both 
Panama  and  Colon,  and  almost  the  entire  island  of 
Manzanillo,  upon  which  the  latter  city  stands,  is  its 

*The  United  States  Government  now  owns  all  the  stock  of 
the  Panama  Railroad.  The  bonds  are  mostly  held  by  private 
individuals. 


72  PANAMA. 

property.  It  holds  large  parcels  of  real  estate  along 
the  line,  aside  from  the  land  actually  occupied  by 
the  road,  and  has,  with  the  Pacific  Mail  Steamship 
Company,  an  undivided  half  interest  in  the  islands  of 
Kaos,  Culebra,  Perico,  and  Flamenco,  all  in  Panama 
Bay.  It  is  also  the  proprietor  of  three  steamships 
having  an  average  tonnage  of  about  twenty-seven 
thousand.  The  entire  property,  "  cost  of  road,  real 
estate,  and  equipment,"  including  the  steamships, 
tugs,  lighters,  etc.,  is  carried  on  the  books  at  what 
would  seem  to  be  the  conservative  valuation  of  a  little 
over  twelve  millions  and  a  half.  The  company's  bal- 
ances have  not  varied  greatly  in  the  past  ten  years, 
and  the  figures  for  1903  are  very  near  an  average. 
The  gross  receipts  were:  railroad,  $1,743,636; 
steamers,  $920,414;  total,  $2,644,051.  Operating 
expenses,  railroad,  $886,482 ;  steamers,  $873,885 ; 
total,  $1,760,337.  Earnings  over  expenses,  $903,- 
713. 

As  soon  as  the  Government  assumed  charge  of 
the  railroad,  complaints  of  the  traffic  monopoly  were 
made  by  shippers  who  had  been  without  means  of 
redress  under  the  old  conditions.  The  justice  of 
these  complaints  was  fully  recognized  by  the  au- 
thorities. General  Davis,  the  first  governor  of  the 
Canal  Zone,  severely  criticised  the  management  of 
the  road,  and  Secretary  Taft,  in  the  report  to  which 
reference  has  already  been  made,  says:  "... 
Whatever  may  have  justified  the  rates  charged  by 


O 


SUGGESTED  TRAFFIC  REFORM.        73 

the  railroad  company,  the  salaries  paid  by  it,  and 
the  character  of  its  corporate  organization,  and  the 
expenses  of  the  office  in  New  York,  certainly  for  the 
purposes  and  under  the  control  of  the  United  States, 
radical  changes  must  be  made." 

SUGGESTED    RAILROAD    AND    STEAMSHIP    TRAFFIC 
REFORMS. 

A  contract  existed  between  the  railroad  company 
and  the  Pacific  Mail  Steamship  Company,  which 
secured  to  the  latter  concern  the  exclusive  privilege 
of  issuing  through  bills  of  lading  on  freight  from 
San  Francisco  to  New  York.  Mr.  Taft  expressed 
the  opinion  that  this  contract  was  "  invalid  under 
the  laws  of  Colombia  and  the  laws  of  Panama." 
The  Panama  Railroad  Company  ran  three  cargo 
steamers  on  the  Atlantic  side,  between  New  York 
and  Colon,  and  would  recognize  no  through  bills  of 
lading  except  those  issued  from  its  office  in  New 
York.  Goods  shipped  across  the  Isthmus  by  any 
other  line  were  charged  the  heavy  local  freight  rates 
in  force  between  Panama  and  Colon.  This  arrange- 
ment, together  with  its  control  of  the  docking  facil- 
ities at  Colon,  most  effectually  enabled  the  company 
to  shut  out  any  competition  in  the  Atlantic  carrying 
trade. 

Early  in  1905,  Joseph  W.  Bristow  was  commis- 
sioned to  investigate  the  situation  under  considera- 
tion. After  an  examination  extending  over  several 


V4  PANAMA. 

months  he  substantiated  the  foregoing  facts  and 
made  the  following  recommendations:  That  the 
road  should  be  continued  as  a  commercial  line,  that 
it  should  be  double-tracked,  equipped  with  modem 
rolling  stock,  and  supplied  with  additional  wharves 
and  other  improvements ;  that  the  rates  for  through 
freight  should  be  made  as  low  as  the  cost  of  the 
service  and  provision  for  a  fair  dividend  will  per- 
mit ;  that  the  steamship  line  maintained  by  the  road 
between  Colon  and  New  York  should  be  continued 
by  the  Government;  that  the  exclusive  contracts 
with  the  Pacific  Mail  Steamship  Company  and  the 
two  South  American  west  coast  lines  should  be  can- 
celled "  and  the  ports  of  Colon  and  Panama  be 
opened  to  the  use  of  all  steamship  lines  on  equal 
terms ;  "  that  in  case  a  new  steamship  line  be  not 
established  within  reasonable  time  by  private  capital 
between  Colon  and  the  Gulf  ports,  the  Railroad  Com- 
pany should  establish  and  maintain  such  a  line  (It 
is  cheaper  and  more  convenient  to  move  the  products 
of  the  Mississippi  Valley  by  way  of  these  ports  than 
through  New  York)  ;  that  in  the  event  of  the  Pacific 
Mail  Steamship  Company  discontinuing  its  service 
between  San  Francisco  and  Panama  some  other  pri- 
vate corporation  should  be  encouraged  to  take  its 
place,  but  failing  this,  the  Panama  Railroad  Com- 
pany should  run  a  line  of  steamers  over  the  route. 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  report  contemplates  a  con- 
siderable extension  of  the  Government's  commercial 


PURCHASE  OF  SUPPLIES.  75 

operations,  but  only  as  alternative  measures  to  be 
resorted  to  in  case  the  desired  objects  can  not  be 
attained  through  private  enterprise.  Mr.  Bristow 
recommends  favoring  American  ships  in  traffic  re- 
lations as  far  as  may  be  consistent  with  treaty  obli- 
gations, but,  upon  the  theory  that  the  railroad  is 
performing  the  functions  of  a  canal,  he  does  not 
deem  it  practicable  to  discriminate  to  the  advantage 
of  American  bottoms  at  the  ports  of  Panama  and 
Colon. 

The  report  met  with  the  approval  of  the  Govern- 
ment, and  its  recommendations  in  general  will  be 
earned  out.  As  a  first  step  in  that  direction  the 
exclusive  contract  with  the  Pacific  Mail  Company 
was  cancelled,  June  the  12th,  1905. 

A  NEW  APPLICATION  OF  OUR  PROTECTIVE  POLICY. 

At  the  outset  of  the  Government's  operations  in 
connection  with  the  railroad  and  canal  a  serious 
question  arose  which  will  demand  the  attention  of 
the  next  Congress  and  may  have  an  important  bear- 
ing upon  general  tariff  legislation.  When  the  Com- 
mission was  called  upon  to  purchase  supplies,  the 
engineers  in  charge  of  the  works  drew  its  attention 
to  the  fact  a  great  deal  of  the  necessary  material  could 
be  bought  in  foreign  markets  at  a  substantially  lower 
figure  than  the  lowest  quotations  of  American  bid- 
ders. The  significant  point  was  that  these  varia- 


7G  PANAMA. 

tions  obtained  where  American-manufactured  goods 
only  were  under  consideration.  !For  instance,  steel 
rails  were  needed  for  the  railroad.  The  fixed  price 
of  these  rails  in  the  United  States  was  $28  per  ton 
at  the  rolling  mill.  Freight  charges  to  the  Isthmus 
would  increase  the  figures  to  $33.  At  the  same  time 
the  Steel  Trust  was  selling  identically  similar  goods 
in  foreign  countries  all  over  the  world  at  $20  and  $22 
and  paying  the  freight,  amounting  to  as  much  as  $8 
per  ton  in  some  cases.  In  other  words,  a  Mexican 
railroad  might  secure  for  $16  rails  that  the  Panama 
Railroad,  simply  because  it  was  an  American  cor- 
poration, was  required  to  pay  $33  for.  It  was  found 
that  from  30  to  40  per  cent  excess  over  foreign  prices 
must  be  paid  for  the  steel  cars  used  in  excavating. 
Two  ships  were  required,  and  inquiry  established  the 
fact  that  one-half  of  the  outlay  involved,  ($750,000), 
could  be  saved  by  purchasing  from  British  owners. 
Many  other  requisitions  could  only  be  filled  at  the 
price  of  an  exorbitant  profit  to  different  trusts. 

President  Roosevelt,  who  has  been  invested  by 
Congress  with  full  authority  for  the  construction  of 
the  canal,  and  upon  whom  full  responsibility  must 
necessarily  fall,  feels  bound  to  conduct  the  operation 
with  all  reasonable  economy,  particularly  at  a  time 
when  the  Government's  expenditures  are  so  largely 
in  excess  of  its  revenues  as  to  suggest  the  imposition 
of  additional  taxes  upon  the  people.  The  President 
prefers  that  the  material  used  in  the  construction  of 


THE  FUTURE  RAILROAD.  77 

the  canal  should  be  purchased  from  American  man- 
ufacturers, but  he  insists  that  the  United  States 
Government  should  not  be  required  to  pay  higher 
prices  than  those  at  -which  the  same  manufacturers 
are  glad  to  sell  the  same  goods  to  foreign  buyers. 
Mr.  Roosevelt's  decision  that  the  Panama  Canal 
Commission  shall  buy  material  and  supplies  where 
they  can  be  obtained  at  the  lowest  price  is  likely  to 
have  far-reaching  effect.  It  will  lead  to  a  discus- 
sion of  the  tariff  by  Congress,  which,  unless  their 
supporters  in  the  Senate  prove  strong  enough  to 
withstand  it,  will  probably  result  in  legislation  ad- 
verse to  the  trusts. 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  state  that  as  an  adjunct  to 
the  canal  operation  the  railroad  is  of  the  highest 
importance  —  indeed,  it  is  a  sine  qua  nan.  With 
the  completion  of  the  waterway,  the  road  will  lapse 
into  the  condition  of  a  mere  local  line  between  Colon 
and  Panama.  It  should,  nevertheless,  continue  to 
be  a  valuable  property  in  the  hands  of  either  the 
Government  or  a  private  corporation.  As  a  means 
of  transporting  men  and  material  employed  in  the 
operation  of  the  completed  canal  it  will  always  be  of 
service.  It  is  probable  that  a  considerable  amount  of 
freight  will  be  reshipped  even  after  the  canal  is 
opened.  Many  voyagers  will  leave  vessels  at  the 
point  of  entering  the  canal  in  order  to  avoid  what  will 
generally  be  an  unpleasant  passage  and  secure  the  op- 
portunity of  spending  a  few  hours  in  Panama  by 


78  PANAMA. 

making  the  transit  by  rail.  Both  the  terminal  ports, 
but  especially  Panama,  must  grow  rapidly  under  the 
influences  of  future  traffic  and  the  local  business  of 
the  railroad  will  be  proportionately  increased. 


IV. 

PANAMA. 
THE  ISTHMIAN  COUNTRY. 

Political  Changes  in  Panama  and  Columbia  —  The  Recent  Rev- 
olution in  Panama  —  A  Comic  Opera  Coup  d'  etat  —  The 
American  Part  in  the  Affair  —  United  States  Marines  Are 
Landed  —  Nerve  a  More  Potent  Factor  than  Numbers  — 
The  President's  Denial  of  Official  Complicity  —  Columbia's 
Tardy  Appreciation  of  Her  Interests  —  The  Ancient  Graves 
of  Chiriqui  —  Curious  Ornaments  of  a  By-gone  Race  —  The 
Mystic  Frog  of  the  Early  Indians  —  The  Mineral  Resources 
of  Panama  —  The  Famous  Pearl  Islands  of  Panama  Bay  — 
Climatic  Conditions  on  the  Isthmus. 

During  recent  years  the  ribbon  of  land  that  joins 
the  continents  of  ISTorth  and  South  America  has 
loomed  large  in  the  public  eye. 

Since  the  days  of  Greece's  glory  no  such  small 
strip  of  soil  as  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  has  gained 
equal  distinction.  It  has  been  the  scene  of  stirring 
adventure  and  the  site  of  the  wealthiest  city  in  the 
world.  It  has  been  the  subject  of  epoch-making  dip- 
lomacy and  a  sphere  for  political  disturbances.  It  is 
the  seat  of  the  greatest  engineering  enterprise  in  his- 
tory; an  enterprise  which  is  destined  to  largely  revo- 
lutionize the  commerce  of  the  earth  and,  more  than 

79 


80  PANAMA. 

any  other  modern  factor,  to  influence  the  fortunes  of 
nations. 

In  the  second  decade  of  the  sixteenth  century 
Angel  Saavedra  mooted  the  idea  of  a  canal  through 
this  narrow  neck  of  inter-ocean  territority.  Since 
that  time  the  thought  could  not  be  banished  from 
the  minds  of  men  though  a  King  of  Spain  decreed 
death  to  any  who  should  voice  it.  Tor  two  hun- 
dred years  and  more  plans  and  projects  for  the 
great  waterway  have  been  advanced.  The  first  at- 
tempt to  construct  it  ended  in  a  cataclysmal  failure. 
In  these  early  years  of  the  twentieth  century  the 
opening  of  a  passage  is  at  length  assured  and  it 
will  be  available  to  the  traffic  of  the  world  almost, 
perhaps  exactly,  four  hundred  years  from  the  dis- 
covery of  the  Pacific. 

THE   ISTHMUS   OF  PANAMA. 

The  neck  of  land  separating  the  two  great  oceans 
of  the  globe,  which  is  called  the  Isthmus  of  Panama, 
forms  the  southern  termination  of  the  great  Ameri- 
can isthmus  extending  north  to  Mexico.  This  strip 
of  land  curving  about  four  hundred  and  seventy 
miles  from  west  to  east  has  commonly  been  styled 
the  Isthmus  of  Darien,  but  that  name  is  more 
properly  applied  to  the  section  of  country  between 
the  Gulfs  of  Uraba  and  San  Miguel.  The  Isthmus 
of  Panama  is  traversed  along  its  entire  length  by  the 


THE  ISTHMUS  OF  PANAMA.  81 

Cordillera  de  Baudo,  separated  from  the  Andes  by 
the  Valley  of  the  Atrato  which  marks  the  northern 
limit  of  South  America.  Erroneous  impressions  are 
apt  to  be  created  by  the  usual  practice  of  studying 
geography  with  the  aid  of  the  ordinary  flat  maps, 
which  have  the  effect  of  exaggerating  the  size  of 
countries  in  high  latitudes  and  diminishing  the  equa- 
torial areas.  One  thousand  miles  in  latitude  60  de- 
grees occupies  upon  the  ordinary  map  twice  as  much 
space  as  does  one  thousand  miles  along  the  equator. 
It  is  a  revelation  to  many  a  well-informed  person 
to  learn  that  South  America  is  very  nearly  as  large 
as  North  America.  For  the  study  of  the  Panama 
Canal  in  its  relations  to  the  rest  of  the  world  the  use 
of  a  globe,  or  a  map  on  the  polyconic  projection  is 
recommended.  Another  point  worth  noticing  in  this 
connection  is  that  the  most  pronounced  diversion 
from  the  general  north  and  south  trend  of  the  Ameri- 
cas is  found  in  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  which  takes  a 
lateral  direction  east  and  west  and  throws  the  south- 
ern continent,  so  to  speak,  to  the  east  of  the  northern, 
so  that  a  line  dropt  due  south  from  New  York  would 
pass  through  the  Pacific  Ocean  off  the  coast  of  Chile. 
In  looking  at  a  map  of  the  western  hemisphere 
we  are  accustomed  to  finding  the  Atlantic  Ocean  to 
the  east  or  on  the  right  hand.  For  this  reason  a 
sectional  map  of  the  Canal  region  is  likely  to  be  a 
little  confusing  at  first,  glance.  It  will  show  the 
Pacific  on  the  right  and  the  Atlantic  on  the  opposite 
(S 


PANAMA. 

siHe  of  the  page.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
Isthmus  makes  a  northerly  loop  in  the  portion  con- 
taining the  Canal  Zone,  and  Panama  is  actually  east 
of  Colon,  from  which  port  the  Canal  will  take  a 
south-easterly  direction  to  its  Pacific  terminus.  A 
line  from  Buffalo  continued  south  would  bisect  the 
Canal  and  leave  Panama  on  the  right  and  Colon  on 
the  left 

The  writer  finds  an  excuse  for  these  explanations 
in  the  knowledge  that  many  intelligent  persons  have 
been  puzzled  by  the  unfamiliar  geographical  condi- 
tions involved  in  an  examination  of  the  Canal  project 
and  related  subjects. 

POLITICAL  CHANGES  IN   PANAMA  AND  COLUMBIA. 

Having  secured  their  independence  from  Spain, 
the  provinces  of  \renezuela,  Ecuador,  Colombia,  and 
Panama  formed  a  republican  federation.  Subse- 
quently, the  two  first-named  seceded,  and  Panama 
with  Colombia  established  the  United  Sovereign 
States  of  New  Granada.  Although  each  of  the  states 
combined  in  this  political  union  exercised  sovereign 
powers,  the  paramount  authority  in  the  territory  be- 
came gradually  centralized  at  Bogota.  In  1861, 
against  the  wishes  of  the  leading  citizens  of  Panama, 
the  United  States  of  Colombia  were  organized  with 
a  new  constitution  conferring  greater  powers  on  the 
government  at  Bogota.  Twenty-five  years  later,  after 


RECENT  REVOLUTION  IN  PANAMA.       83 

a  civil  war  in  which  many  lives  were  lost,  Colombia 
succeeded  in  establishing  the  republic  which  took  her 
name.  By  this  measure  Panama  lapsed  to  the  con- 
dition of  a  mere  department  with  a  governor  ap- 
pointed by  the  Colombian  president  and  vested  with 
little  independent  authority.  The  Panamans,  whilst 
forced  to  submit  to  this  degradation,  have  always 
protested  against  it  and  have  consistently  declared 
their  right  to  the  position  of  a  constitutional  state. 
The  government  of  Panama  by  the  corrupt  Colom- 
bian politicians  had  always  been  bad,  and  the  people 
of  the  Isthmus  had  entertained  the  design  of  inde- 
pendence for  years  before  America  opened  negotia- 
tions for  the  Canal  and,  indeed,  had  enjoyed  it  for 
three  years  following  1857. 

THE   RECENT    REVOLUTION    IN   PANAMA. 

Panama  threw  off  the  yoke  of  Colombia  at  an 
extremely  opportune  time  as  regards  the  plans  of  the 
United  States  for  the  construction  of  the  Isthmian 
Canal.  The  coincidence  of  the  event  was  the  only 
basis  for  the  utter  nonsense  written  in  this  country 
upon  the  subject  at  the  time.  Even  recently  certain 
papers  have  published  a  silly  story  by  a  syndicate 
writer  which  purports  to  give  the  "  inside  "  history 
of  the  rebellion.  There  is  absolutely  no  ground  for 
the  accusation  that  the  American  authorities  insti- 
gated the  coup  which  gave  independence  to  the  Isth- 


84  PANAMA. 

mus,  but,  on  the  contrary,  sufficient  evidence  that, 
although  they  may  have  had  some  inkling  of  the  at- 
tempt before  its  occurrence,  they  were  entirely  free 
from  participation  in  it.  The  suspected  representa- 
tives of  our  Government  have  denied  that  any  Amer- 
ican official  instigated  or  assisted  in  the  revolt.  In 
this  they  are  borne  out  by  the  statements  of  the  lead- 
ing Panaman  revolutionists  and  by  Doctor  Herran, 
the  Colombian  Minister  to  Washington  at  the  time. 
The  Hay-IIerran  Treaty  was  negotiated  at  Wash- 
ington in  1903  between  the  representatives  of  the 
Governments  of  the  United  States  and  the  Republic 
of  Colombia.  Its  purpose  was  to  secure  to  the  form- 
er state  the  privilege  of  making  a  canal  through  the 
Isthmus  of  Panama,  and  amongst  its  provisions  was 
one  guaranteeing  to  Colombia  the  payment  of  ten 
millions  of  dollars  upon  the  completion  of  the  con- 
vention. The  national  legislature  of  the  latter  coun- 
try, moved  it  is  believed  by  the  hope  of  inducing  us 
to  pay  a  higher  price,  failed  to  ratify  the  treaty. 

A  COMIC  OPERA  COUP  D'ETAT. 

The  Panamans  are  much  more  astute  than  is  gen- 
erally supposed.  They  had  realized  fully  the  enor- 
mous advantages  that  would  accrue  to  their  country 
from  the  operation  of  the  Canal  by  America,  and 
when  the  opportunity  seemed  to  be 'in  danger  of  de- 
struction by  the  action  of  the  Colombian  politicians 


COMIC  OPERA  COUP  D'ETAT.  85 

the  leading  men  in  Panama  who,  as  has  been  said, 
have  harbored  thoughts  of  independence  for  years, 
determined  to  take  matters  into  their  own  hands. 
!No  doubt  they  calculated,  as  they  reasonably  might, 
upon  the  United  States  acknowledging  them  as  soon 
as  they  had  knocked  off  the  shackles.  The  revolution 
was  bloodless  and  savoured  of  opera  bouffe  in  the 
absurdity  of  its  details.  The  Government  of  Bogota 
learned  of  the  plot  before  it  was  put  into  execution 
and  despatched  several  hundreds  of  the  ragamuffins 
that  composed  its  "  army  "  to  Panama  under  Gen- 
erals Tobal  and  Amaya,  with  orders  to  arrest  the 
conspirators  and  carry  them  to  the  capital.  When 
the  detachment  arrived  at  Colon  the  generals  hur- 
ried forward  over  the  railroad  with  their  warrants 
and  were  promptly  placed  in  confinement  by  the  rev- 
olutionary leaders. 

Meanwhile,  Colonel  Shaler,  the  Superintendent  of 
the  Panama  Railroad,  unquestionably  placed  imped- 
iments in  the  way  of  the  further  progress  of  the 
troops.  It  must  be  remembered,  however,  that  Col- 
onel Shaler,  although  an  American,  was  not  an  offi- 
cial and  acted  as  the  representative  of  the  corporation 
which  was  interested  in  the  sale  of  the  canal  property 
to  the  United  States,  for  the  Panama  Canal  Company 
owned  the  railway. 

The  sympathy  of  the  American  Government  and 
people  was  unquestionably  with  the  Panamans,  but 
they  received  no  official  aid  from  this  country. 


86  PANAMA. 

Marines  were  landed  from  an  American  gunboat 
and  two  days  later  the  Colombian  troops  took  ship 
for  Cartagena.  Panama  immediately  declared  itself 
an  independent  republic  and  was  recognized  by  the 
United  States  without  delay. 

THE  AMERICAN  PART  IN  THE  AFFAIR. 

There  is  reason  to  believe  that  the  Colombian  sol- 
diers were  bribed  —  at  the  rate  of  about  five  dollars 
apiece  —  by  friends  of  Panama,  but  the  statement 
that  the  money  was  distributed  or  handled  by  an 
officer  of  the  American  Navy  is  a  gross  and  stupid 
libel.  The  presence  of  the  marines  was  without 
doubt  a  decisive  factor  in  the  accomplishment  of  the 
revolution,  but  that  it  was  not  premeditated  and  had 
no  other  purpose  than  the  protection  of  American 
lives  is  proved  by  the  following  official  report  of  the 
officer  commanding  the  Nashville: 

"  II.  S.  S.  Nashville,  Third  Rate. 
"  Colon,  U.  S.  Colombia,  November  5,  1903. 
"  Sir :     Pending  a  complete  report  of  the  occur- 
rences of  the  last  three  days  in  Colon,  Colombia,  I 
most  respectfully  invite  the  Department's  attention 
to  those  of  the  date  of  Wednesday,   November   4, 
which  amounted  to  practically  the  making  of  war 
against  the  United  States  by  the  officer  in  command 
of  the  Colombian  troops  in  Colon.    At  1  o'clock  p.  m. 


UNITED  STATES  MARINES  LANDED.  87 

on  that  date  I  was  summoned  on  shore  by  a  precon- 
certed signal,  and  on  landing  met  the  United  States 
consul,  vice-consul,  and  Colonel  Shaler,  the  general 
superintendent  of  the  Panama  Railroad. 

"  The  consul  informed  me  that  he  had  received 
notice  from  the  officer  commanding  the  Colom- 
bian troops,  Colonel  Torres,  through  the  prefect  of 
Colon,  to  the  effect  that  if  the  Colombian  officers, 
Generals  Tobal  and  Amaya,  who  had  been  seized  in 
Panama  on  the  evening  of  November  3,  by  the  inde- 
pendents, and  held  as  prisoners,  were  not  released  by 
2  o'clock  p.  in.,  he,  Torres,  would  open  fire  on  the 
town  of  Colon  and  kill  every  United  States  citizen 
in  the  place,  and  my  advice  and  action  were  re- 
quested. I  advised  that  all  the  United  States  citi- 
zens should  take  refuge  in  the  shed  of  the  Panama 
Railroad  Company,  a  stone  building  susceptible  of 
being  put  into  good  state  for  defense,  and  that  I 
would  immediately  land  such  body  of  men,  with  ex- 
tra arms  for  arming  the  citizens,  as  the  complement 
of  the  ship  would  permit. 

UNITED   STATES   MARINES   AHE  LANDED. 

"  This  was  agreed  to,  and  I  immediately  returned 
on  board,  arriving  at  1 :15  p.  m.  The  order  for  land- 
ing was  immediately  given,  and  at  1 :30  p.  m.  the 
boats  left  the  ship  with  a  party  of  forty-two  men 
under  the  command  of  Lieutenant-Commander  II. 


88  PANAMA. 

M.  Witzel,  with  Midshipman  J.  P.  Jackson  as  sec- 
ond in  command.  Time  being  pressing,  I  gave  ver- 
bal orders  to  Mr.  Witzel  to  take  the  building  referred 
to  above,  to  put  it  into  the  best  state  of  defense  pos- 
sible, and  protect  the  lives  of  the  citizens  assembled 
there  —  not  firing  unless  fired  upon.  The  women 
and  children  took  refuge  on  the  German  steamer 
Marcomania  and  the  Panama  Railroad  steamer  City 
of  Washington,  both  ready  to  haul  out  from  dock  if 
necessary. 

"  The  Nashville  got  under  way  and  patrolled  along 
the  water-front  close  in  and  ready  to  use  either 
small  arm  or  shrapnel  fire.  The  Colombians  sur- 
rounded the  building  of  the  railroad  company  al- 
most immediately  after  we  had  taken  possession,  and 
for  about  one  and  a  half  hours  their  attitude  was 
most  threatening,  it  being  seemingly  their  purpose 
to  provoke  an  attack.  Happily  our  men  were  cool 
and  steady,  and  while  the  tension  was  very  great  no 
shot  was  fired. 

"  At  about  3 :15  p.  m.  Colonel  Torres  came  into 
the  building  for  an  interview  and  expressed  himself 
as  most  friendly  to  the  Americans,  claiming  that  the 
whole  affair  was  a  misapprehension,  and  that  he 
would  like  to  send  the  alcalde  of  Colon  to  Panama 
to  see  General  Tobal  and  have  him  direct  the  dis- 
continuance of  the  show  of  force.  A  special  train 
was  furnished  and  safe  conduct  guaranteed.  At 
about  5:30  p.  m.  Colonel  Torres  made  the  proposi- 


*  , 

m 

• 
•'.       -      .'     .jffA. 


NERVE  MORE  POTENT  THAN  NUMBERS.  89 

tion  of  withdrawing  his  troops  to  Monkey  Hill  if  I 
would  withdraw  the  Nashville's  force  and  leave  the 
town  in  possession  of  the  police  until  the  return  of 
the  alcalde  on  the  morning  of  the  5th. 

THE  NERVE  OF  AMERICAN  MARINES  PREVENTS  A  CON- 
FLICT WITH  COLOMBIA. 

"  After  an  interview  with  the  United  States  con- 
sul and  Colonel  Shaler  as  to  the  probability  of  good 
faith  in  the  matter,  I  decided  to  accept  the  proposi- 
tion and  brought  my  men  on  board,  the  disparity  in 
numbers  between  my  force  and  that  of  the  Colom- 
bians — •  nearly  ten  to  one  —  making  me  desirous  of 
avoiding  a  conflict  so  long  as  the  object  in  view  — 
the  protection  of  American  citizens  —  was  not  im- 
periled. 

"  I  am  positive  that  the  determined  attitude  of 
our  men,  their  coolness  and  evident  intention  of 
standing  their  ground,  had  a  most  salutary  and  de- 
cisive effect  on  the  immediate  situation,  and  was  the 
initial  step  in  the  ultimate  abandoning  of  Colon  by 
these  troops  and  their  return  to  Cartagena  the  fol- 
lowing day.  Lieutenant-Commander  Witzel  is  enti- 
tled to  much  praise  for  his  admirable  work  in  com- 
mand on  the  spot. 

"  I  feel  that  I  can  not  sufficiently  represent  to  the 
Department  the  grossness  of  this  outrage  and  the 


90  PANAMA. 

insult  to  our  dignity,  even  apart  from  the  savagery 
of  the  threat. 

"  Very  respectfully, 

"  JOHN  HUBBARD, 

"  Commander,  United  States  Navy,  Commanding. 
"  The   Secretary   of   the   Navy,   Navy   Department, 
Washington,  D.  C." 

In  his  more  detailed  report  Commander  Hubbard 
stated :  "  I  beg  to  assure  the  Department  that  I  had 
no  part  whatever  in  the  negotiations  that  were  car- 
ried on  between  Colonel  Torres  and  the  representa- 
tives of  the  provisional  government;  that  I  landed 
an  armed  force  only  when  the  lives  of  American 
citizens  were  threatened,  and  withdrew  this  force  as 
soon  as  there  seemed  to  be  no  grounds  for  further 
apprehension  of  injury  to  American  lives  or  prop- 
erty ;  that  I  relanded  an  armed  force  because  of  the 
failure  of  Colonel  Torres  to  carry  out  his  agreement 
to  withdraw  and  announced  intention  of  returning; 
and  that  my  attitude  throughout  was  strictly  neutral 
as  between  the  two  parties,  my  only  purpose  being 
to  protect  the  lives  and  property  of  American  citi- 
zens and  to  preserve  the  free  and  uninterrupted 
transit  of  the  isthmus." 

THE  PRESIDENT'S  DENIAL.  OF  OFFICIAL  COMPLICITY. 

President  Roosevelt,  referring  to  the  foregoing  re- 
ports, says :  "  This  plain  official  account  of  the  oc- 


DENIAL  OF  OFFICIAL  COMPLICITY.  91 

currences  of  November  4  shows  that  instead  of  there 
having  been  too  much  prevision,  by  the  American 
Government  for  the  maintenance  of  order  and  the 
protection  of  life  and  property  on  the  isthmus,  the 
orders  for  the  movement  of  the  American  warships 
had  been  too  long  delayed:  so  long,  in  fact,  that 
there  were  but  forty-two  marines  and  sailors  avail- 
able to  land  and  protect  the  lives  of  American  men 
and  women.  ...  At  Panama,  when  the  revo- 
lution broke  out,  there  was  no  American  man-of-war 
and  no  American  troops  or  sailors.  At  Colon  Com- 
mander Hubbard  acted  with  entire  impartiality 
toward  both  sides,  preventing  any  movement,  whether 
by  the  Colombians  or  the  Panamanians,  which  would 
tend  to  produce  bloodshed.  On  November  9  he  pre- 
vented a  body  of  the  revolutionists  from  landing  at 
Colon." 

In  his  message  to  Congress  the  President  made  the 
following  reference  to  the  treaty  and  the  complica- 
tions which  grew  out  of  it :  "  During  all  the  years 
of  negotiation  and  discussion  that  preceded  the  con^ 
elusion  of  the  Hay-Herran  treaty,  Colombia  never 
intimated  that  the  requirement  by  the  United  States 
of  control  over  the  canal  strip  would  render  unat- 
tainable the  construction  of  a  canal  by  way  of  the 
Isthmus  of  Panama ;  nor  were  we  advised,  during 
the  months  when  legislation  of  1902  was  pending 
before  the  Congress,  that  the  terms  which  it  em- 
bodied would  render  negotiations  with  Colombia  im- 


92  PANAMA. 

practicable.  It  is  plain  that  no  nation  could  con- 
struct and  guarantee  the  neutrality  of  the  canal  with 
a  less  degree  of  control  than  was  stipulated  for  in 
the  Hay-Herran  treaty.  A  refusal  to  grant  such 
degree  of  control  was  necessarily  a  refusal  to  make 
any  practicable  treaty  at  all.  Such  refusal  there- 
fore squarely  raised  the  question  whether  Colombia 
was  entitled  to  bar  the  transit  of  the  world's  traffic 
across  the  isthmus.  .  .  .  Colombia,  after  having 
rejected  the  treaty  in  spite  of  our  protests  and  warn- 
ings when  it  was  in  her  power  to  accept  it,  has  since 
shown  the  utmost  eagerness  to  accept  the  same  treaty 
if  only  the  status  quo  could  be  restored.  One  of  the 
men  standing  highest  in  the  official  circles  of  Colom- 
bia on  November  6  addressed  the  American  minister 
at  Bogota,  saying  that  if  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  would  land  troops  to  preserve  Colom- 
bian sovereignty  and  the  transit,  the  Colombian  Gov- 
ernment would  '  declare  martial  law,  and,  by  virtue 
of  vested  constitutional  authority,  when  public  order 
is  disturbed,  (would)  approve  by  decree  the  ratifi- 
cation of  the  canal  treaty  as  signed ;  or,  if  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  prefers,  (would)  call 
an  extra  session  of  the  Congress  —  with  new  and 
friendly  members  —  next  May  to  approve  the  treaty.' 
"  Having  these  facts  in  view,  there  is  no  shadow 
of  a  question  that  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  proposed  a  treaty  that  was  not  only  just,  but 


COLOMBIA'S  TARDY  APPRECIATION.  83 

generous  to  Colombia,  which  our  people  regarded  as 
erring,  if  at  all,  on  the  side  of  overgenerosity,  which 
was  hailed  with  delight  by  the  people  of  the  imme- 
diate locality  through  which  the  canal  was  to  pass, 
who  were  most  concerned  as  to  the  new  order  of 
things,  and  which  the  Colombian  authorities  now 
recognize  as  being  so  good  that  they  are  willing  to 
promise  its  unconditional  ratification  if  only  we  will 
desert  those  who  have  shown  themselves  our  friends 
and  restore  to  those  who  have  shown  themselves  un- 
friendly the  power  to  undo  what  they  did.  I  pass 
by  the  question  as  to  what  assurance  we  have  that 
they  would  now  keep  their  pledge  and  not  again  re- 
fuse to  ratify  the  treaty  if  they  had  the  power ;  for, 
of  course,  I  will  not  for  one  moment  discuss  the  pos- 
sibility of  the  United  States  committing  an  act  of 
such  baseness  as  to  abandon  the  new  Kepublic  of 
Panama." 

DESCRIPTION   OF   THE  ISTHMUS   OF  PANAMA. 

The  recognition  of  the  independence  of  Panama 
by  the  United  States  was  followed  by  a  treaty  be- 
tween the  two  countries  which  will  be  referred  to  in 
a  succeeding  chapter. 

The  physical  features  of  the  Isthmus  of  Panama 
are  very  diversified.  The  center  of  the  country  is 
occupied  by  mountains  and  hills.  In  some  parts 
these  elevations  extend  to  the  coast,  but  usually  they 


04  PANAMA. 

are  flanked  by  alluvial  plains  or  gently  rolling  coun- 
try. This  again  is  fringed  by  a  strip  of  costal 
swamp  covered  with  mangroves.  Heavy  forest  and 
dense  jungle  clothe  the  mountain  districts.  The 
growth  is  so  strong  and  rapid  that  the  railroad  com- 
pany has  to  maintain  a  constant  fight  against  its 
inroads.  If  not  checked  it  would  in  six  months  bury 
the  line.  The  Chagres  is  the  principal  river  in  every 
respect,  but  there  are  a  number  of  smaller  streams. 
The  territory  of  the  Republic  of  Panama  is  di- 
vided into  provinces  and  these  into  municipal  dis- 
tricts. The  canal  route  traverses  two  of  these  prov- 
inces —  those  of  Colon  and  Panama.  Their 
prosperity  is  assured  by  the  American  enterprise  now 
in  process  of  development 

THE    INHOSPITABLE    SAN    BLAS    COUNTRY. 

The  province  of  Darien  is  not  a  promising  region. 
It  is  largely  made  up  of  mountainous  wilderness  and 
impassable  swamps.  Rumor  has  persistently  cred- 
ited the  San  Bias  district  with  rich  gold  deposits, 
but  verification  is  rendered  difficult  by  the  unfriendly 
attitude  of  the  Indians  there,  who  have  always  dis- 
played an  unconquerable  objection  to  the  presence 
of  white  men.  The  San  Bias  Indians  occasionally 
visit  Panama  on  trading  or  marketing  excursions, 
but  they  are  reticent  about  their  country  and  their 
affairs  and  decidedly  averse  to  any  but  the  most  tern- 


THE  ANCIENT  GRAVES  OF  CHIRIQUI.  95 

porary  relations  with  foreigners.  The  provinces  of 
Chiriqui  and  Veragua  support  industries  of  consider- 
able importance  and  appear  to  be  capable  of  much 
greater  development  under  favorable  conditions. 
David,  the  capital  of  Chiriqui,  occupies  an  extremely 
picturesque  site  upon  a  well-wooded  coast.  Behind 
the  town  stretches  a  fertile  savanna  backed  by  a  range 
of  mountains  from  two  to  three  thousand  feet  in 
height.  It  is  one  of  those  quaint  old  settlements  with 
which  the  traveler  in  Spanish-America  becomes  fa- 
miliar, but  he  never  tires  of  the  air  of  restful  sim- 
plicity that  pervades  them.  The  houses,  generally 
one  story  in  height,  are  square  whitewashed  struc- 
tures with  roofs  of  red  tile  and  front  verandahs. 
The  inhabitants  are  hospitable,  contented  and  in- 
clined to  take  life  easily.  Several  of  them  are  well- 
to-do  and  not  a  few  highly  cultured. 

THE   ANCIENT  GRAVES  OF  CHIRIQUI. 

Chiriqui  became  suddenly  famous  several  years 
ago  on  account  of  the  interesting  relics  that  were 
unearthed  there  from  the  guacas,  or  graves,  of  the 
ancient  inhabitants.  A  great  number  of  these  treas- 
ures were  found  in  the  district  of  David.  "  History 
is  silent  about  the  people  who  are  buried  in  thou- 
sands there.  The  discovery  of  these  old  cemeteries 
came  about  in  this  wise :  Many,  many  years  ago  in 
cutting  a  trench  through  a  peaceful  forest  to  drain 


96  PANAMA. 

off  water,  the  Indian  diggers  came  across  an  image 
of  gold.  Great  was  their  surprise  and  the  execrable 
sedd'ore,  or  '  the  cursed  thirst  of  gold/  settled  upon 
that  primitive  people  like  a  nightmare.  They  kept 
on  digging,  and  unearthed  quantities  of  golden  orna- 
ments and  images  of  various  kinds.  Soon  hundreds 
were  digging  in  the  forest,  and  it  has  been  estimated 
that  gold  ornaments  were  uncovered  to  a  value  ex- 
ceeding $400,000  in  a  space  of  five  or  six  years. 
They  were  sold  for  their  weight,  or  value  in  coin, 
and  went  into  the  melting  pot.  Later,  some  archaeol- 
ogists took  an  interest  in  the  matter,  and  some  sys- 
tematic work  was  done,  they  directing  and  the 
natives  doing  the  digging.  It  would  seem  that  in 
the  majority  of  cases  the  graves  first  were  dug,  their 
sides  lined  with  pieces  of  stone,  and  then  cross  pieces 
were  laid  over  these.  Inside,  the  pottery  was  placed, 
together  with  ornaments  of  gold,  cooking  utensils,  etc. 
The  graves  of  the  poorer  class  contained  nothing  but 
cooking  utensils  and  no  gold  ornaments  were  found 
in  them. 

A  native  locates  a  grave  by  tapping  the  earth  as 
he  walks  along.  As  soon  as  he  gets  a  hollow  sound 
familiar  to  his  expert  ear  he  commences  digging  and 
digs  down.  The  contents  are  stone  implements,  pot- 
tery implements,  ornaments  and  pure  gold,  and  orna- 
ments of  gold  gilt,  a  species  of  pinchbeck,  called  by 
the  natives  here  lumbago.  There  are  also  ornaments 
in  copper,  and  a  few  bone  instruments. 


ORNAMENTS  OF  BY-GONE  RACE.  97 

"  There  are  a  number  of  small  idols  in  stone,  vary- 
ing from  nine  to  eighteen  inches  high.  There  is  also 
a  species  of  grinding  stone,  on  which  they  evidently 
ground  their  corn,  or  its  equivalent.  The  better  class 
of  these  grinding  stones  were  from  eighteen  to  twen- 
ty-four inches  in  length,  and  from  twelve  to  fifteen 
inches  in  width.  I  am  now  speaking  of  some  of  the 
largest.  They  were  concave  on  top,  and  in  the  graves 
were  found  stone  rollers  fitting  the  upper  surface. 
Generally  they  were  made  to  represent  some  animal. 

CUKIOUS   IMPLEMENTS   OF   A    BY-GONE  RACE. 

There  were  some  with  tiger-shaped  heads  and  four 
legs.  The  tail  generally  folded  around  and  rested 
on  the  left  hind  leg.  A  commoner  type  of  grinding 
stone  resembled  a  low  stool  of  stone  without  any 
ornamentation.  In  the  graves  were  found  an  endless 
variety  of  stone  chisels  and  stone  hatchets.  Some  of 
these  chisels  and  hatchets  were  beautifully  propor- 
tioned, presenting  various  planes  and  surfaces  for 
examination,  and  their  edges  in  many  instances  were 
sharp  even  after  having  been  exposed  for  long  cen- 
turies to  the  effects  of  that  humid  soil.  These  were 
the  implements  with  which  the  people  did  all  their 
carving. 

"  In  the  pottery  implements  the  variety  was  al- 
most endless,    not  only  suggesting  considerable   in- 
genuity, but  also  some  knowledge  of  the  anatomy  of 
7 


03  PANAMA. 

the  human  body.  Between  many  of  these  pieces  of 
pottery  and  the  male  angels  on  the  doors  of  La  Mer- 
ced, at  Panama,  there  was  a  striking  analogy.  .  .  . 
Roughly  classifying  the  pottery  utensils,  they  were 
of  two  kinds,  glazed  and  unglazed,  and  many  of  the 
markings  on  them  had  been  made  in  black  and  red 
pigments.  Many  of  the  borders,  while  crude,  were 
very  suggestive.  There  was  a  series  of  gods,  little 
squat  figures  with  triangular  faces;  nearly  all  of 
which  had  been  glazed  and  were  ornamental.  Their 
pectoral  development  was  remarkable.  It  is  sup- 
posed that  they  were  a  kind  of  idol.  .  .  .  Then 
there  were  rattles  of  ingenious  construction,  with 
which  they  soothed  the  gentle  baby  in  early  days. 
There  was  a  series  of  whistles  (it  is  supposed  that 
they  were  bird  calls)  producing  all  sorts  of  notes, 
from  a  full  rich  sound  to  a  gentle  twitter.  .  .  . 

THE   MYSTIC   FROG  OF   THE   EARLY  INDIANS. 

"  Among  the  gold  ornaments  found  in  the  gua-cas  at 
Chiriqui  were  many  frogs.  The  frog  seems  to  have 
been  a  favorite  type  of  ornament  with  those  early 
races.  The  largest  frog  of  pure  gold  uncovered  there 
weighed  eighteen  ounces.  .  .  .  Another  thing 
that  seemed  very  strange  to  me  was  a  kind  of  bell. 
It  was  of  gold,  and  an  exact  counterpart  of  the  old- 
time  sleigh-bells,  or  those  with  a  slot.  It  had  a  han- 
dle and  within  were  little  pieces  of  metal,  and  these 


MINERAL  RESOURCES  OF  PANAMA.  90 

little  bells,  when  shaken,  emitted  quite  a  musical 
sound.  .  .  .  Among  the  tumbago  ornaments  the 
majority  represented  birds  or  frogs.  From  a  care- 
ful examination  of  a  number  of  them  the  body 
seemed  to  be  made  of  copper  covered  with  a  film  of 
gold.  How  it  was  put  on  I  am  unable  to  say,  but 
certainly  gold  it  was.  ...  I  saw  another  speci- 
men which  caused  me  a  deal  of  speculation.  It  evi- 
dently was  intended  for  the  figure  of  a  king.  It  was 
in  bronze,  and  that  surprised  me  greatly,  because  the 
art  of  casting  in  bronze  is  deemed  an  art  to  this 
day."  * 

THE   MINERAL  RESOURCES   OF   PANAMA. 

It  is  very  probable  that  with  the  exploitation  that 
is  likely  to  follow  the  opening  of  the  Canal,  the  Isth- 
mus will  prove  to  have  rich  and  extensive  mineral 
resources.  Gold,  copper,  manganese,  and  coal  are 
known  to  exist  in  different  parts,  but  the  greater 
portion  of  the  country  is  yet  to  be  subjected  to  geo- 
logical surveys.  When  the  waterway  comes  into  use 
a  great  market  for  coal  will  be  established  at  Panama 
and  the  demand  will  doubtless  lead  to  the  operation 
of  local  mines.  The  island  of  Muerto,  near  David, 
is  said  to  be  almost  a  solid  mass  of  coal  covered  with 
a  stratum  of  clay.  As  early  as  1851  the  geologists, 
Whiting  and  Schuman,  made  a  report  on  this  deposit 


VVolfred  Nelson. 


100  PANAMA. 

which  was  published  in  London.  Here  would  seem 
to  be  a  favorable  opportunity  for  American  capital 
and  enterprise. 

There  are  large  areas  of  good  grazing  ground  in 
the  western  provinces,  and  the  industry  has  been  pur- 
sued to  some  extent.  When  the  Canal  is  in  use  there 
will  be  a  ready  and  profitable  market  for  meat  at 
Panama  and  cattle  raising  should  become  one  of  the 
chief  industries  of  this  section. 

The  country  about  the  Chiriqui  Bay  already  has  a 
large  and  flourishing  fruit  trade.  The  entire  region 
in  the  neighborhood  of  the  Costa  Rica  border  is  ex- 
ceeding rich  — •  as  rich  as  any  in  the  tropics,  perhaps. 
It  might  be  developed  with  comparative  ease.  It 
has  a  pleasant  and  salubrious  climate.  The  people 
are  genial  and  hospitable;  well-disposed  towards 
Americans  and  eager  for  improvement. 

THE    FAMOUS    PEARL    ISLANDS    OF    PANAMA    BAY. 

The  famous  Pearl  Islands  lie  in  the  Gulf  about 
forty  miles  off  the  city  of  Panama.  By  the  Span- 
iards they  were  called  the  King's  Archipelago.  The 
pearl  fisheries  are  of  very  ancient  origin.  Balboa 
secured  a  number  of  the  gems  from  the  Indians  and 
was  told  by  them  that  the  pearl  oyster  had  been 
sought  in  these  waters  during  uncountable  ages.  At 
one  time  these  fisheries  were  probably  as  rich  as  any 
in  the  world,  but  reckless  methods  injured  them,  and 


PEARL  ISLANDS  OF  PANAMA  BAY.  101 

whilst  they  are  still  worked  in  a  desultory  fashion,  it 
may  be  said  that  the  old  beds  are  practically  ex- 
hausted. 

The  pearls  of  Panama  have  always  been  noted  for 
their  size.  It  is  said  that  specimens  as  large  as  fil- 
berts have  been  found.  They  are  very  lustrous  and 
have  a  silvery  sheen,  differing  from  the  creamy  shade 
of  the  pearl  of  Ceylon. 

The  native  Panamans  are  a  more  attractive  people 
thaii  one  would  be  led  to  suppose  from  the  accounts  of 
travelers  who  have  only  come  in  contact  with  the 
lower  classes  in  the  city  of  Panama  who  are  a 
mixed  and  far  from  representative  lot. 

It  has  long  been  a  practice  with  the  well-to-do 
Creole  families  to  send  their  children  of  both  sexes  to 
the  best  colleges  of  Europe  and  America.  Conse- 
quently the  upper  class  is  distinguished  by  refine- 
ment and  culture  as  well  as  many  natural  qualities 
of  an  admirable  character.  They  entertain  the 
strongest  feelings  of  admiration  and  respect  for  the 
American  people,  and,  if  we  may  judge  from  recent 
experiences,  our  relations  to  the  Panamans  will  con- 
tinue without  difficulty  or  friction. 

The  disbandment  of  the  army  by  President  Amaclor 
was  effected  with  little  trouble  because  of  the  kindly 
intervention  of  the  American  minister,  whose  advice 
was  accepted  by  both  sides  in  a  friendly  spirit.  It  is 
doubtful  if  any  other  South  American  Republic 
could  attempt  the  retirement  of  the  entire  military 


102  PANAMA. 

force,  no  matter  how  weak,  without  precipitating  a 
revolution. 

The  rancheros  of  the  country  districts  are  peace- 
fully inclined  and  contented  with  their  simple  pas- 
toral life.  They  live  in  huts  of  the  simplest  con- 
struction and  till  a  few  acres  of  ground.  Their 
wants  are  very  few  and  easily  supplied.  The  con- 
dition of  the  peon  will  be  improved  with  the  general 
prosperity  that  is  in  store  for  the  Isthmus. 

CLIMATIC   CONDITIONS   ON   THE   ISTHMUS. 

Except  upon  the  coasts  the  climate  of  the  Isthmus 
is  not  worse  than  that  of  the  average  tropical  region 
and  in  some  parts  of  the  territory  it  is  quite  health- 
ful and  pleasant.  Hundreds  of  Americans  have  been 
employed  by  the  railroad  and  many  of  them  have 
enjoyed  excellent  health  during  residences  extending 
from  ten  to  twenty  years.  The  average  temperature 
is  about  eighty  degrees  and  there  is  generally  a  re- 
freshing breeze  from  the  north.  The  humidity  in 
the  rainy  season  is  great  and  its  effect  very  enervating 
to  natives  of  higher  latitudes.  There  are  two  seasons. 
The  wet  season  commences  about  the  middle  of  April 
and  lasts  for  eight  months.  The  dry  season  from  the 
middle  of  December  is  generally  considered  healthy 
even  in  the  canal  region.  During  this  period  the  sky 
is  a  cloudless  blue  by  day  and  at  night  the  moon  and 
stars  are  sublime. 


V. 

PANAMA. 
COLON  AND  PANAMA. 

Porto  Bello  —  Colon  an  Unattractive  City  —  The  Departed 
Glory  of  Panama  Viejo  —  Panama's  Wealth  Attracts  the 
Buccaneers  —  Morgan's  Expedition  to  Isthmus  of  Darien 
—  The  Pirates  Attack  the  City  of  Panama  —  The  City  Is 
Sacked  and  Put  to  the  Torch  —  New  Panama  Built  With 
Regard  to  Defense  —  The  Houses  and  Churches  Convertible 
Into  Forts  —  The  Interesting  Church  of  Modern  Panama  — 
The  Famous  Flat  Arch  of  St.  Dominic  —  The  Dead  Are 
Temporary  Tenants  of  Their  Graves  —  In  Spanish-America 
Graft  Extends  to  the  Grave  —  American  Authority  in  The 
Panaman  Republic  —  Panama  Enjoys  the  Boon  of  Good 
Water. 

In  the  days  when  Spain  maintained  a  great  trade 
route  across  the  Isthmus,  the  Atlantic  terminus  was 
Porto  Bello,  about  twenty  miles  east  of  the  mouth  of 
the  Canal.  A  cluster  of  Indian  shacks  upon  a  low 
beach  now  marks  the  place  where  the  Spanish  gal- 
leons were  wont  to  land  their  cargoes  of  merchandise 
and  take  on  board  the  pearls  and  precious  metals  con- 
signed to  the  king's  treasury.  The  ruins  of  the  old 
city  are  shut  in  by  heavy  woods  and  lost  in  a  tangle 
of  dense  undergrowth. 

The  construction  of  the  railway  gave  "birth  to  the 
103 


104  PANAMA. 

modern  port.  The  Americans  called  it  Aspimvall, 
after  one  of  the  chief  promoters.  By  the  French  it 
was  named  Colon.  The  city  is  built  upon  the  Island 
of  Manzanillo,  a  sand-covered  coraline  formation, 
three-quarters  of  a  mile  in  length  and  not  more  than 
six  hundred  yards  broad.  It  stands  a  very  few  feet 
above  the  ocean  at  high  tide  and  is  connected  with 
the  mainland  by  the  railway  embankment.  The 
original  town  was  anything  but  a  pleasant  or  healthy 
place  of  residence.  The  railroad  buildings,  dwell- 
ings, laborers'  quarters,  and  shops,  mostly  of  wood, 
were  scattered  about  without  any  particular  system 
or  order.  The  center  of  the  island  was  occupied  by 
an  almost  stagnant  lagoon,  creating  a  most  undesir- 
able condition. 

During  the  disturbances  incident  to  the  revolution 
of  1885,  Colon  was  completely  destroyed  by  fire.  It 
was  reconstructed  with  somewhat  more  regard  for 
convenience  and  sanitation,  but  still  leaving  much 
to  be  desired  in  both  respects. 

COLON  AN   UNATTRACTIVE  CITY. 

The  Colon  of  today  is  a  straggling,  unattractive  city 
with  some  redeeming  features,  however,  and  a 
promise  of  more  in  the  near  future.  The  railroad 
company  occupies  the  greater  part  of  the  water-front 
with  its  various  buildings,  including  wharves  and 
docks.  Parallel  with  these  is  the  main  street,  com- 


o 


<  It  ' 


COLON  AN  UNSANITARY  TOWN.  105 

posed  almost  entirely  of  frame  buildings.  There  are 
some  good  shops  and  a  number  of  conscienceless  deal- 
ers in  spurious  curios  who,  together  with  the  ente^ 
prising  money  changers,  reap  a  royal  harvest  from 
unsophisticated  travelers.  From  the  moment  of 
landing  the  stranger  is  beset  by  a  howling  crowd  of 
nondescripts  who  contend  with  one  another  for  the 
privilege  of  fleecing  him.  His  baggage  is  dis- 
tributed amongst  as  many  different  individuals  as 
possible,  and  upon  his  arrival  at  the  hotel  he  is  called 
upon  to  pay  each  one  an  exorbitant  fee  for  his  serv- 
ice, although  it  may  have  consisted  in  carrying  a 
newspaper  only.  Before  the  American  advent  there 
^•;is  no  escape  from  this  imposition.  If  a  victim 
refused  to  be  mulcted  he  was  haled  before  a  magis- 
trate who  invariably  supported  the  extortioners.  In 
those  days  a  man  dared  not  ask  a  native  the  name 
of  a  street  unless  he  was  prepared  to  pay  for  the 
information.  This  system  of  bleeding  the  helpless 
foreigner  is  now  confined  within  the  bounds  of  semi- 
decency  and  an  American,  at  least,  is  treated  with 
a  show  of  honesty. 

COLON  ALWAYS   AN  UNSANITARY  TOWN. 

Along  the  beach  to  the  east  of  the  town  is  the 
foreign  quarter,  containing  some  comfortable  resi- 
dences, an  Episcopal  church  built  of  stone,  and  a 
tolerable  hotel.  On  the  west  side,  fronting  the 


106  PANAMA. 

ocean,  stand  the  handsome  houses  of  the  old  French 
officials.  They  are  grouped  in  a  park  beautifully 
laid  out  and  convey  the  impression  that  our  predeces- 
sors of  the  Canal  did  not  neglect  their  personal  com- 
fort. The  residence  of  de  Lesseps  is  a  particularly 
attractive  structure  of  two  stories  surrounded  by  a 
double  pier  of  verandahs.  Back  of  the  city  upon 
the  mainland  is  Mount  Hope,  or  Monkey  Hill,  whose 
cemetery  has  a  population  greatly  in  excess  of  that 
of  Colon.  A  small  portion  of  the  city  has  enjoyed 
the  comparative  advantage  of  a  water  supply  de- 
rived through  a  small  iron  pipe  from  a  reservoir  near 
Mount  Hope.  The  water  is  of  indifferent  quality 
and  the  quantity  is  often  insufficient  even  for  the 
needs  of  officials  and  employees  of  the  Panama  Rail- 
road. Aside  from  these  favored  few,  the  inhabit- 
ants of  Colon  depended  for  their  drinking  water  upon 
rain  that  was  stored  in  iron  tanks.  At  times  in  the 
dry  season  this  was  very  far  from  fresh  and  the  stag- 
nant water  in  the  cisterns  afforded  the  most  perfect 
breeding  places  for  disease-dealing  mosquitoes.  The 
Panama  Canal  Commission  is  eradicating  this  con- 
dition with  as  little  delay  as  need  be,  but  it  has 
encountered  serious  difficulties  in  the  matter.  There 
is  not  anywhere  in  the  vicinity  of  Colon  a  suitable 
and  sufficient  surface  water  supply  available,  but  it 
is  hoped  that  a  subsurface  supply  may  be  secured 
from  the  deep  strata  of  sands  and  gravels  transversed 
by  the  canal  line  to  the  south  of  the  city. 


COLON  AN  UNSANITARY  TOWN.  107 

In  the  matter  of  sewerage  Colon  has  been  even 
more  deficient,  and  the  low  site  upon  which  the  city 
is  built  renders  the  problem  of  establishing  a  system 
a  difficult  one.  The  Commission  has  decided  that 
the  lowest  portions  of  the  town  must  be  elevated 
and  the  material  excavated  from  the  inner  harbor 
will  be  used  as  filling  for  this  purpose.  In  other 
places  it  is  designed  to  cut  channels,  through  which 
the  tidal  water  may  ebb  and  flow.  The  work  upon 
these  much-needed  improvements  is  in  active  prog- 
ress and  will  be  completed  before  long.  When 
these  sanitary  measures  are  in  effect  Colon  should 
be  a  not  unhealthy  place.  The  splendid  work  that 
has  been  done  by  the  medical  corps  under  Colonel 
Gorgas,  the  redeemer  of  Havana,  will  be  described 
in  another  place. 

A  COMPARATIVELY  HEALTHY  TOWN. 

Despite  its  known  disadvantages  and  extremely 
forbidding  aspect  Colon  has  a  record  in  the  matters 
of  health  and  mortality  that  compares  favorably  with 
that  of  Panama  and  belies  the  apparent  conditions. 
Yellow  fever  has  rarely  appeared  at  Colon  and  ma- 
laria is  seldom  contracted  there.  Perhaps  the  city 
owes  its  comparative  healthfulness  to  its  situation  on 
an  island  and  the  fact  that  a  considerable  portion  of 
its  surface  is  washed  by  sea  water  in  which,  it  is  said, 
mosquitos  will  not  breed. 


108  PANAMA. 

Time  was  when  the  word  Panama  suggested  un- 
told wealth  and  voluptuous  luxury.  That  was  in 
the  halycon  days  when  the  old  city,  designated  the 
Key  to  the  Pacific  and  the  Gate  of  the  Universe, 
was  the  receiving  point  for  the  gold  of  Darien,  the 
pearls  of  the  Gulf  islands,  and  the  silver  from  the 
mines  of  South  America.  Fabulous  treasure  was 
often  stored  in  "  Panama,  the  Golden,"  awaiting 
a  favorable  opportunity  for  carriage  by  the  king's 
horses  over  that  splendid  engineering  achievement, 
the  paved  way  that  crossed  the  Isthmus  to  Porto 
Bello. 

THE    DEPARTED    GLORY    OF    PANAMA    VIE  JO. 

Panama  Viejo  was  a  beautiful  city.  On  either 
side  stretched  a  picturesque  tree-lined  coast.  In  the 
background  the  mountains  reared  their  rugged  heads 
and  between  them  and  the  city  rolled  a  noble  savanna 
laid  out  in  fertile  fields  and  lovely  drives.  The  city 
contained  twelve  thousand  or  more  buildings.  Many 
of  the  grand  mansions  were  built  of  stone  and  others 
of  aromatic  cedar.  There  were  palatial  public  build- 
ings; a  handsome  stable  for  the  king's  horses,  and  a 
castellated  depository  for  the  king's  treasure.  The 
churches  were  gorgeous  and  their  plate  and  fittings 
world-famous.  There  were  no  fewer  than  eight 
monasteries  and  a  magnificent  hospital.  The  viceroy 
maintained  a  regal  splendor;  his  suite  and  the  many 


WEALTH  ATTRACTS  BUCCANEERS.  109 

other  wealthy  inhabitants  lived  in  the  greatest  lux- 
ury. The  natives  were  their  slaves.  Money  poured 
into  their  coffers  without  any  exertion  on  their 
part.  They  merely  took  their  ease  and  collected 
toll  of  the  minerals  going  to  the  east  and  of  the 
merchandise  passing  through  Panama  on  its  way  to 
Asia  and  the  Pacific  islands. 

PANAMA'S  WEALTH  ATTRACTS  THE  BUCCANEERS. 

There  was  no  wall  around  Old  Panama ;  no  need 
appeared  to  exist  for  any.  Spain  was  supreme  upon 
Tierra  Firma,  and  no  enemy  was  to  be  looked  for 
from  the  Pacific  side.  The  situation  seemed  secure 
and  the  Spaniards  are  to  be  excused  for  not  antici- 
pating the  audacious  enterprise  of  the  buccaneers. 

The  wealth  and  prosperity  of  Panama  was  at  once 
the  wonder  and  the  envy  of  the  world.  It  excited  the 
cupidity  of  the  adventurous  privateers  whose  base 
was  the  West  Indies,  and  the  boldest  among  them, 
Henry  Morgan,  planned  an  expedition  against  the 
golden  city. 

A  writer  says  of  this  extraordinary  ruffian,  that 
he  was  "  brave  and  daring  "  (his  sole  redeeming  qual- 
ities), "of  a  sordid  and  brutal  character,  selfish  and 
cunning,  and  without  any  spark  of  the  reckless  gen- 
erosity which  sometimes  graced  the  freebooter  and 
contrasted  with  his  crimes.  He  was  a  native  of 
Wales,  and  the  son  of  a  respectable  yeoman.  Early 


110  PANAMA. 

inclination  led  him  to  the  sea;  and  embarking  for 
Barbadoes,  by  a  fate  common  to  all  unprotected  ad- 
venturers, he  was  sold  for  a  term  of  years.  After 
effecting  his  escape,  or  emancipation,  Morgan  joined 
the  buccaneers,  and  in  a  short  time  saved  a  little 
money,  with  which,  in  concert  with  a  few  comrades, 
he  equipped  a  bark,  of  which  he  was  chosen  com- 
mander." 

AIOEGAN'S  EXPEDITION  TO  THE  ISTHMUS. 

Having  assembled  nine  ships  and  boats,  with  four 
hundred  and  sixty  men  of  all  nations,  Morgan  set 
out  to  take  Porto  Bello  as  a  preliminary  step  to  the 
greater  enterprise.  Porto  Bello  was  a  fortified  strong- 
hold, but  it  was  captured  after  a  fierce  fight.  A 
number  of  nuns  and  friars  were  seized  before  they 
could  find  refuge  within  the  walls  and  they  were 
compelled  by  the  buccaneers  to  advance  before  them 
and  place  the  scaling  ladders.  For  fifteen  days  the 
freebooters  gave  themselves  up  to  the  demoniac  li- 
cense that  always  marked  their  success  on  such  oc- 
casions. At  the  end  of  that  time,  having  thoroughly 
pillaged  and  sacked  the  city,  Morgan  withdrew  in  his 
ships,  after  sending  a  message  to  the  Governor  of 
Panama,  assuring  him  that  he  might  expect  a  visit 
from  the  buccaneer  chieftain  at  no  distant  date. 

Toward  the  close  of  1670,  Henry  Morgan  had  com- 
pleted his  preparations  for  another  expedition  to  the 


MORGAN'S  EXPEDITION.  Ill 

Spanish  Main,  with  Panama  as  the  ultimate  ob- 
jective. The  force  under  the  command  of  the  pirate 
on  this  occasion  consisted  of  thirty-seven  vessels,  well 
armed  and  provisioned,  and  two  thousand  desperate 
cutthroats  eager  for  plunder  and  ready  to  dare  any 
danger.  They  set  out  with  a  grim  determination  that 
no  power  on  earth  should  stay  their  advance  on 
Panama. 

Port  Bello  was  recaptured  and  the  castle  of 
Chagres  at  the  mouth  of  that  river  was  reduced 
with  much  slaughter,  less  than  ten  per  cent  of  the 
garrison  of  more  than  three  hundred  being  left  alive. 
In  starting  across  the  Isthmus,  Morgan  made  the 
great  mistake  of  failing  to  take  more  than  one  day's 
provisions.  He  expected  to  be  able  to  forage  upon 
the  country,  but  in  this  he  was  deceived,  and  the 
party  was  reduced  to  the  utmost  straits  in  the  weary 
nine  days'  journey.  "  Throughout  the  whole  track 
to  Panama  the  Spaniards  had  taken  care  not  to  leave 
the  smallest  quantity  of  provisions,  and  any  other 
soldiers  than  the  buccaneers  must  have  perished  long 
before  even  the  distant  view  of  the  city  was  obtained, 
but  their  powers  of  endurance,  from  their  hardy 
modes  of  life,  were  become  almost  superhuman.  At 
nightfall,  when  they  reached  their  halting  place, 
happy  was  he  who  had  reserved  since  morn  any  small 
piece  of  leather  whereof  to  make  his  supper,  drink- 
ing after  it  a  good  draught  of  water  for  his  greatest 
comfort." 


112  PANAMA. 

At  length  they  stood  upon  the  summit  of  the  Pa- 
cific slope  and  shouted  with  joy  at  the  sight  that  met 
their  eyes.  In  the  distance  was  the  South  Sea,  and 
on  its  placid  waters  ships  sailing  in  and  out  of  the 
port  of  Panama,  whose  city  was  still  hidden  by  in- 
tervening elevations.  In  a  valley  below  the  emi- 
nence upon  which  they  stood,  herds  of  cattle  peace- 
fully grazed.  The  pirates  rushed  among  the  animals 
and,  slaughtering  them,  devoured  their  flesh  raw. 
After  this  savage  feast  they  pushed  on  and  soon  the 
plain  of  Panama  lay  before  them  with  the  city  on 
the  farther  side. 

THE  PIRATES  ATTACK  THE  CITY  OF  PAXAMA. 

The  strange  battle  commenced  in  the  early  morn- 
ing of  the  following  day.  The  Governor  of  Panama, 
who  commanded  in  person,  had  drawn*  up,  on  the 
savanna,  a  force  composed  of  two  hundred  cavalry, 
four  regiments  of  infantry  and  a  number  of  Indian 
auxiliaries.  The  buccaneers  were  posted  in  a  well- 
selected  position  on  an  eminence  protected  in  front 
by  a  swamp,  into  which  the  cavalry  floundered  at 
the  outset  of  the  engagement.  In  the  force  of  the 
freebooters  were  two  hundred  picked  marksmen  who 
did  excellent  service.  At  the  end  of  two  hours  the 
horsemen  broke  and  fled,  followed  by  the  infantry, 
who  threw  away  their  muskets  in  the  panic.  The 
city  was  yet  to  be  taken,  and,  after  a  brief  rest,  the 


THE  SACK  OF  PANAMA.  113 

buccaneers  advanced  to  the  assault  in  the  face  of 
big  guns,  that  were  posted  at  the  main  approaches. 
The  fighting  was  desperate  on  both  sides,  and  the 
slaughter  terrible.  Six  hundred  Spaniards  are  said 
to  have  fallen  during  the  day,  and  the  loss  of  the 
buccaneers  could  not  have  been  less.  After  a  savage 
struggle  of  three  hours,  maintained  in  the  streets, 
the  pirates  gained  completed  control  of  the  city. 

THE  CITY  IS  SACKED  AND  PUT   TO  THE  TOUCH. 

The  horrors  of  the  sack  may  be  left  to  the  imagina- 
tion of  the  reader.  The  beautiful  city  was  put  to 
the  torch  and  most  of  its  finest  buildings  were  gutted 
by  the  flames,  whilst  those  of  wood  were  entirely  de- 
stroyed. The  plunder  secured  by  the  pirates  was 
much  less  than  they  had  anticipated.  Many  of  the 
inhabitants  had  concealed  their  valuables  and  the 
priests  had  deposited  the  church  plate  and  jewels  in 
places  of  safety.  Several  vessels  had  put  to  sea 
laden  with  property  and  a  galleon  had  escaped  with 
the  king's  treasure. 

Today  one  must  look  for  the  ruins  of  Pana-nia 
Viejo  amidst  a  rank  growth  of  tropical  vegetation, 
above  which  rears  the  sturdy  tower  of  St.  Augustin, 
at  whose  altar  Pizarro  made  votive  supplication  be- 
fore setting  out  upon  his  momentous  voyage  to  the 
south.  The  sudden  and  tragic  fall  of  the  old  city, 
in  the  pride  of  its  beauty  and  strength,  had  a  de- 
8 


114  PANAMA. 

pressing  effect  upon  the  Spaniards  and  left  them  with 
no  heart  to  resurrect  it.  They  transferred  the  capital 
to  a  site  about  six  miles  to  the  west,  but  the  glory 
of  "  Panama  the  Golden  "  was  never  revived  in  its 
adumbrant  successor. 

NEW  PANAMA  BUILT   WITH  REGARD   TO  DEFENSE. 

In  building  the  new  Pacific  port  the  Spaniards 
were  not  unmindful  of  the  lesson  taught  by  the  buc- 
caneer raid.  The  city  was  laid  out  upon  a  rocky  penin- 
sula, the  whole  of  which  is  occupied  by  it.  A  wall, 
thirty  to  forty  feet  in  height  and  of  solid  masonry, 
in  places  sixty  feet  broad,  skirted  the  entire  shore. 
Along  the  bay-front  the  outer  wall  was  reinforced  by 
another,  and  the  intervening  space  formed  a  moat. 
This  wall  and  its  accessories  cost  more  than  eleven 
millions  of  dollars,  despite  the  fact  that  the  natives 
were  forced  to  render  almost  gratuitous  service  in  its 
construction.  Much  of  the  wall  still  remains  in  a 
good  condition  of  preservation.  It  is  used  as  a 
promenade  by  the  citizens  and  as  a  playground  by 
their  children.  The  moat  has  long  been  dry  and 
some  of  the  poorer  dwellings  have  been  raised  within 
it.  There  is  a  story  of  a  king  of  Spain  who  was 
noticed  one  day  to  be  looking  out  toward  the  west 
from  a  high  window  of  his  palace.  A  minister,  who 
remarked  the  strained  expression  of  the  monarch's 
eyes,  ventured  to  enquire  what  might  be  the  object 


I 
BUILDINGS  CONVERTIBLE  INTO  FORTS.         115 

of  his  anxiety.  "  I  am  looking,"  said  the  king, 
"  for  those  costly  walls  of  Panama.  They  ought  to 
be  discernible  even  at  this  distance." 

THE  HOUSES  AND   CHURCHES   CONVERTIBLE  INTO 
FORTS. 

All  the  old  buildings  of  Panama  were  designed  for 
use  as  forts  in  case  of  need.  The  houses  have  walls 
of  stone,  three  feet  thick,  with  heavy  doors,  often 
iron-clad,  and  windows  only  in  the  second  story. 
Similar  precautions  were  observed  in  the  construc- 
tion of  the  churches.  Their  sides  were  made  to  re- 
sist the  heaviest  artillery  of  the  day,  and  their  win- 
dows stand  sixteen  or  twenty  feet  above  the  ground. 
These  defensive  measures  were  justified  by  after 
events,  for,  although  Panama  the  later  never  fell 
into  the  hands  of  an  enemy  during  the  Spanish  do- 
minion, its  strength  alone  saved  it  from  attack  on 
more  than  one  occasion.  Shortly  after  its  founda- 
tion an  unsuccessful  attempt  to  take  it  was  made  by 
a  force  of  buccaneers.  That  extraordinary  man, 
Captain  Dampier,  took  part  in  this  enterprise. 

The  substantial  houses  of  Panama  are  much  like 
those  of  the  old  Spanish  colonies  in  other  parts  of 
the  world  —  solid,  heavy,  forbidding  structures,  the 
upper  story  of  which  alone  is  occupied  by  the  own- 
ers. In  Panama,  as  in  San  Juan  and  Manila,  the 
best  families  are  to  be  found  living  over  a  herd  of 


116  PANAMA. 

natives,  or  negroes,  unless  the  ground  floor  is  given 
up  to  a  store,  or  workshop.  The  lower  portions  of 
the  houses  seldom  have  any  windows  in  front,  and 
if  any  exist,  they  are  strongly  barred.  A  verandah, 
overhanging  the  sidewalk,  is  the  evening  resort  of 
the  occupants  of  the  upper  half  of  the  dwelling. 

The  streets,  paved  with  cobble-stones,  are  tortuous 
and  often  very  narrow.  There  is  too  much  conges- 
tion for  health,  or  convenience,  and  the  proposed  im- 
provements in  this  direction  will  be  a  boon  to  the  in- 
habitants. It  is  gratifying  that,  unlike  the  people 
of  other  Spanish-American  cities  which  have  been 
treated  to  a  clean-up  by  us,  the  Panamans  are  im- 
mediately appreciative  of  our  efforts  in  their  behalf. 

THE    INTERESTING    CHURCHES    OF    MODERN    PANAMA. 

The  churches  and  ecclesiastical  ruins  of  Panama 
present  a  rich  field  for  the  research  of  the  antiquarian 
and  the  architect,  and  a  capable  writer  might  find 
material  for  a  highly  interesting  volume  in  them. 
"  The  oldest  church  is  that  of  San  Felipe  Neri,  in 
the  long  past  the  parish  church  of  the  city  within 
the  walls.  Its  side  is  on  a  narrow  street,  and  over 
the  sole  entrance  one  reads,  '  San  Felipe  Xeri,  1688,' 
cut  in  a  shield."  The  early  Spaniards  were  famous 
for  making  cements,  both  colored  and  uncolored.  So 
hard  were  they  that  they  have  stood  the  effects  of 
the  heat  and  moisture  of  that  destructive  climate 


CHURCHES  OF  MODERN  PANAMA.  ^7 

without  damage.  This  old-time  cement  today  is  as 
hard  as  stone.  Over  the  entrance  to  public  build- 
ings and  churches  they  made  their  inscriptions  in 
these  cements,  in  many  instances  filling  in  odd  space* 
with  ornamental  work  made  of  the  large  pearl  shells 
from  the  famous  Islas  de  Perlas,  or  Pearl  Islands,  in 
the  Gulf  of  Panama.  Such  designs  when  new  must 
have  been  chaste  and  beautiful,  as  the  smooth  mother- 
of-pearl  surfaces  of  the  large  shells  on  a  background 
of  reddish  cement  must  have  made  a  beautiful  con- 
trast, the  shells  reflecting  the  sun  rays  in  a  thousand 
directions.  "  This  quaint  and  most  substantial  old 
edifice  faces  on  a  small  street.  At  one  time  it  made 
the  corner  of  the  Plaza  San  Francisco.  The  large 
door  is  reached  by  a  few  stone  steps  on  either  side 
of  which  are  plain  columns,  while  there  are  a  few 
lancet  shaped  windows  above.  Its  front  is  very 
plain.  The  whole  is  surmounted  by  a  quaint  old 
tower  of  the  true  Moorish  type.  It  is  built  wholly 
of  stone  with  a  rounded  cupola  of  the  same  material. 
Lashed  to  cross-pieces  are  the  old-time  bells.  The 
door  is  a  huge  affair  of  most  substantial  mako, 
studded  with  huge  brazen  heads  or  knobs.  When 
closed  from  within,  persons  in  the  church  could  stand 
a  siege  very  successfully.  The  side  windows  of  the 
church  are  fully  twenty-five  feet  above  the  street, 
and  they  were  purposely  so  made  in  case  of  attack. 
The  walls  of  San  "Felipe  Neri  are  nearly  five  feet 
thick,  and  the  windows  are  so  deeply  recessed  as  to 


US  PANAMA. 

remind  one  of  an  ancient  fortress  or  prison."  A 
larger,  and  not  less  interesting  church  is  that  of  San 
Francisco,  facing  upon  the  square  of  the  same  name. 
It  was  built  early  in  the  eighteenth  century.  The 
interior  is  very  imposing  with  its  gracefully  arched 
roof  and  fine  supporting  columns,  dividing  the  en- 
tire length  of  the  edifice.  The  altar  is  an  exceed- 
ingly large  and  beautiful  structure  of  carved  hard- 
wood. 

THE    FAMOUS    FLAT    ARCH    OF    ST.    DOMINIC. 

A  strange  story  attaches  to  the  ruins  of  St.  Domi- 
nic. When  intact,  it  must  have  been  an  extremely 
handsome  edifice,  but  its  noble  towers  and  grand 
facade  are  things  of  the  past,  and  the  massive  re- 
mains of  the  old  church  are  now  overrun  by  vege- 
tation. The  most  striking  portion  of  the  building 
has  survived  the  attacks  of  fire  and  the  shocks  of 
earthquake.  It  is  one  of  the  most  peculiar  arches 
in  the  world.  It  stands  complete  near  what  was 
the  main  entrance.  It  is  a  single  span  of  about 
sixty  feet,  its  chord  so  flattened  as  to  be  almost  hori- 
zontal. Architects  are  puzzled  to  account  for  this 
arch  standing  without  further  support  than  the  ter- 
minal columns.  Legend  has  it  that  this  curious 
structure  was  erected  three  times  and  each  time 'fell. 
A  fourth  time  it  was  set  up  and  the  monk  who  de- 
signed it  stood  beneath  the  arch  and  declared  that 


CATHEDRAL  OF  PANAMA.  119 

if  it  should  not  fall  upon  his  head  the  work  was 
good  and  would  endure. 

The  churches  of  La  Merced,  San  Juan  de  Dios, 
St.  Ana,  and  the  Cathedral,  deserve  description  if 
space  permitted.  ISTelson  makes  an  interesting  state- 
ment with  regard  to  the  origin  of  the  last-named 
building :  "  The  cathedral  of  Panama  was  built 
at  the  sole  expense  of  one  of  the  bishops  of  Panama, 
and  was  completed  about  128  years  ago.  The 
bishop's  father  was  a  Panamanian  by  birth  —  a  col- 
ored man.  He  made  charcoal  near  La  Boca  de  la 
Rio  Grande,  or  the  mouth  of  the  Grand  River,  a 
stream  entering  the  Bay  of  Panama  some  two  miles 
from  the  Panama  City  of  today.  This  colored  man 
made  his  charcoal  and  brought  it  on  his  back  from 
house  to  house  to  sell  —  a  custom  that  obtains  to  this 
day.  He  gave  his  son,  the  future  bishop,  as  good 
an  education  as  was  possible.  In  due  time  he  be- 
came a  deacon,  priest,  and  finally  bishop  of  Panama 
—  a  bishop  of  proud  Panama,  for  in  those  days  it 
was  a  wealthy  city.  He  was  the  first  colored  bishop 
of  Panama.  This  son  of  a  charcoal  burner  devel' 
oped  into  a  grand  man,  and  in  time  crowned  a  life 
of  usefulness  by  building  the  cathedral  from  his 
private  means."  Much  of  the  stone  used  in  its  con- 
struction is  from  the  highlands  of  the  interior,  and 
was  brought  many  leagues  on  the  backs  of  men.  Af- 
ter long  years  the  building  was  completed  in  1760. 

The  churches  of  Panama  are  both  numerous  and 


120  PANAMA. 

noisy,  facts  that  are  impressed  upon  the  stranger  by 
the  almost  incessant  clanging  of  their  bells.  Panama 
has  been  the  scene  of  three  or  four  great  fires,  in 
which  several  ecclesiastical  buildings  were  damaged 
or  destroyed. 

THE  DEAD   ARE    TEMPORARY    TENANTS    OF    THEIR 
GRAVES. 

The  city  has  several  cemeteries,  but  the  system 
of  temporary  tenancy  forbids  any  calculation  of 
the  number  of  past  occupants.  When  a  graveyard 
becomes  crowded  the  coffins  are  taken  up,  the 
bones  shaken  out  in  a  heap,  and  the.  empty  recep- 
tacles offered  for  sale,  or  hire.  The  same  system 
of  leasing  space  is  in  force  in  the  boveda  enclosures. 
A  boveda  is  a  niche  just  large  enough  to  accom- 
modate the  coffin  of  an  adult  The  cemetery  is 
formed  of  a  quadrangle  surrounded  by  three  tiers 
of  bovedas.  These  are  rented  for  a  term  of  eighteen 
months,  and  after  a  coffin  is  deposited  in  one,  the 
opening  is  closed  with  a  slab,  or  bricked  up.  Where 
the  space  has  been  permanently  secured,  a  memorial 
tablet  often  seals  the  aperture.  When  the  rent  of 
one  of  these  sepulchers  is  overdue  its  contents  are 
thrown  out  in  just  as  business-like  a  manner  as  that 
in  which  a  harsh  landlord  might  evict  a  delinquent 
tenant.  Perhaps  the  foregoing  statements  ought  to 
have  been  made  in  the  past  tense,  for  the  Canal  Com- 


CHURCH  OF  SAN  FRANCISCO,  PANAMA. 


GRAFT  IN  SPANISH  AMERICA.  121 

mission,  in  the  exercise  of  its  right  of  control  in  san- 
itary matters,  will  doubtless  strictly  prohibit  all  such 
practices.  There  has  been  an  abatement  of  the  evil 
in  recent  years  as  a  result  of  the  protests  of  for- 
eigners. This  disgraceful  custom  of  disturbing  the 
dead  was  confined  to  the  natives.  In  the  Chinese 
cemetery  and  in  that  of  the  Jews,  corpses  have  been 
permitted  to  rest  in  peace,  and  it  goes  without  say- 
ing that  such  has  been  the  case  in  the  burial  grounds 
controlled  by  the  railroad  and  canal  companies. 

IN  SPANISH-AMERICA  GRAFT  EXTENDS   TO  THE  GRAVE. 

One  would  naturally  infer  from  the  conditions, 
that  the  Panamans  entertained  no  respect  for  the 
memory,  or  bones,  of  their  deceased  relatives,  but 
such  is  not  the  case.  The  truth  is  that  the  system 
of  renting  graves  is  an  exhibition  of  the  "  graft  "  that 
has  for  ages  pervaded  every  rood  of  territory  under 
Spanish  rule.  The  right  to  conduct  a  cemetery,  like 
the  privilege  of  running  a  gambling  establishment, 
was  farmed  out  to  the  highest  bidder,  and  the  con- 
cesionero  might  regulate  his  business  in  almost  any 
manner  he  pleased.  The  price  of  a  permanent  grave 
was  placed  so  high  that  the  poorer  classes  could  af- 
ford no  more  than  a  temporary  lease,  and  when  that 
had  expired  often  found  themselves  unable  to  re- 
new it.  The  fact  that  they  did  not  dispense  with 
consecrated  ground,  as  they  might  have  been  excused 


122  PANAMA. 

for  doing  under  the  circumstances,  is  sufficient  evi- 
dence of  their  regard  for  the  welfare  of  their  dead. 
The  stranger  in  Panama  is  struck  by  the  large 
number  of  saloons  and  low  groggeries.  They  are 
on  every  hand  and  remind  one  of  Port  Said  in  the 
seventies.  These  places  are  well  patronized  by  the 
mixed  lower  class  of  the  city  who  account  for  fully 
two-thirds  of  its  population  of  eighteen  thousand. 
There  are  dissipated  Indians,  vicious  negroes,  half- 
castes  of  various  combinations,  an  occasional  China- 
man, and  even  a  few  European  loafers.  Alcohol 
is  poison  in  this  climate  and  the  alcohol  they  drink 
would  be  poison  anywhere.  The  liquor  traffic  was 
encouraged  by  the  Colombian  Government,  which  had 
a  monopoly  of  the  wholesale  business.  Gambling 
also  enjoyed  the  friendly  countenance  of  the  clique 
of  politicians  at  Bogota,  who  received  tribute  from 
it.  There  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  Panama, 
under  American  guidance,  will  redeem  its  reputation 
in  this  and  other  undesirable  respects.  The  Com- 
mission has  instituted  a  high  license  within  the  Zone 
with  markedly  good  effects. 

AMERICAN    AUTHORITY    IN    THE    PANAMAN    REPUBLIC. 

The  recently  effected  treaty  with  the  Republic  of 
Panama  gave  to  the  United  States  jurisdiction  in 
the  matter  of  sanitation  and  order,  beyond  the  limits 
of  the  Canal  Zone,  into  the  cities  of  Colon  and  Pan- 


PANAMA  ENJOYS  GOOD  WATER.  123 

ama  and  over  the  adjacent  waters.  The  Commisr- 
sion  has  in  mind  to  make  Panama  a  clean  and,  at 
least,  moderately  healthy  city,  and  there  is  no  doubt 
whatever  about  the  ultimate  accomplishment  of  its 
purpose.  The  task  is  a  stupendous  one,  and  the  diffi- 
culties involved  by  it  are  fully  appreciated,  but  it  has 
already  been  attacked,  and  plans  are  laid  for  a 
thorough  transformation  of  the  capital.  Panama  has 
existed  without  a  water  supply,  or  a.  sewerage  system, 
for  more  than  three  centuries,  and  a  magazine  writer 
recently  remarked  that  it  would  not  ceem  to  matter 
greatly  if  it  were  left  in  the  same  condition  for  anoth- 
er decade  or  so.  That,  however,  is  not  the  way  in 
which  the  Commission  views  the  matter.  These  de- 
fects will  be  immediately  remedied  and,  indeed,  a 
great  deal  toward  their  removal  has  already  been 
accomplished. 

PANAMA  ENJOYS  THE  BOON  OF  GOOD  WATER. 

By  the  enlargement  of  a  dam,  which  the  Panama 
Canal  Company  had  constructed  at  the  headwaters  ol 
the  Rio  Grande,  an  extensive  reservoir  has  been 
formed.  The  water  will  .3e  piped  from  this  to  another 
reservoir,  on  the  summit  of  a  small  hill  at  Ancon,  hav- 
ing a  capacity  of  one  million  gallons.  Thence  it  will 
flow  by  gravity  to  the  city.  The  system  is  designed  to 
furnish  sixty  gallons  a  day  per  head  to  a  population 
of  thirty  thousand.  At  points  on  the  streets,  or  other 


124  PANAMA. 

public  places,  where  portions  of  the  population  may 
not  have  sufficient  means  to  make  house  connections, 
hydrants  have  been  placed,  so  that  an  unlimited  sup- 
ply of  good  water  may  be  obtained  without  cost  or 
difficulty.  Before  deciding  upon  the  source  of  the 
supply,  the  Commission  submitted  samples  of  the 
water  from  the  upper,  or  Rio  Grande,  reservoir  to 
expert  bacteriologists  and  chemical  analyzers.  After 
thorough  tests  the  water  was  pronounced  satisfactory 
before  even  the  banks  and  bed  of  the  reservoir  had 
been  cleaned  of  vegetation. 

The  city  has  a  few  surface  drains,  but  as  they  have 
been  laid  for  the  most  part  without  regard  to  grade 
they  are  in  many  instances  worse  than  none.  The 
water  in  these  conduits  is  frequently  stagnant,  or 
almost  so,  and  impregnated  with  decaying  vegetable 
and  animal  matter. 

A  system  of  sewerage  is  in  course  of  installation 
which  will  care  for  sixty  gallons  per  head  of  the 
population  per  day  and,  in  addition,  one  inch  of 
rainfall  per  hour.  This  does  not  provide  for  the 
disposal  of  the  maximum  precipitation  in  the  rainy 
season,  but  any  excess  over  the  capacity  of  the  sew- 
ers will  be  carried  through  surface  channels.  The 
sewerage  system,  with  a  total  length  of  nearly  eight- 
een miles,  will  serve  every  portion  of  the  city,  and 
may  be  readily  extended  to  the  proposed  addition,  or 
to  outlying  districts. 


VI. 

PANAMA. 
THE  PANAMA  CANAL  COMPANY. 

Columbia's  Concession  to  the  French  Promoters  —  Conclusion 
of  the  International  Conference  —  Ferdinand  de  Lesseps 
Diplomatist  and  Promoter  —  Froude's  Characterization  of 
the  French  Management  —  Ruinous  Financing  From  the 
Outset  —  The  Promoters  Feathered  Their  Nests  Comfortably 
—  The  Organization  of  the  Panama  Canal  Company  —  Reck- 
less Estimates  of  the  Cost  of  Construction  —  The  Stock  Is 
Oversubscribed  by  the  Public  —  The  Company  Commences 
the  Work  of  Construction  —  A  Simple  Undertaking  Accord- 
ing to  de  Lesseps  —  The  Company  Seeks  Authority  to  Issue 
Lottery  Bonds  —  De  Lesseps  Weakens  Under  the  Pressure 
of  Difficulties  —  An  American  Officer  Inspects  the  Operation 
—  Signs  of  Collapse  Begin  to  Be  Evident  —  The  French 
Public  Refuses  to  Subscribe  Further  Funds  —  A  Receiver 
Takes  Over  the  Panama  Canal  Company. 

Whilst  the  American  Inter-oceanic  Canal  Commis- 
sion was  investigating  the  comparative  merits  of  the 
various  isthmian  routes,  a  project  for  a  waterway 
through  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  was  set  on  foot 
in  France. 

In  1875  the  subject  was  discussed  at  length  by 
the  Congres  des  Sciences  Geographiqnes  at  Paris, 
which  strongly  recommended  the  immediate  prose- 

125 


126  PANAMA. 

cution  of  surveys  with  a  view  to  decisive  action. 
Following  the  session  of  the  Congress  a  provisional 
company  was  formed  by  General  Tiirr  and  other  in- 
dividuals for  the  purpose  of  securing  a  concession 
from  the  Republic  of  Colombia.  This  syndicate  was 
composed  of  speculators  whose  sole  motives  were  of 
a  commercial  nature.  They  despatched  to  the  Isth- 
mus Lieutenant  L.  N.  B.  Wyse,  an  officer  of  the 
French  Navy  and  a  brother-in-law  of  General  Tiirr, 
with  instructions  to  select  a  route  and  negotiate  with 
the  Colombian  Government  for  a  concession.  In 
making  his  selection  the  Lieutenant  was  to  be  guided 
by  a  consideration  for  the  prime  object  of  the  syndi- 
cate, which  was  to  make  as  large  a  profit  as  possible 
from  the  sale  of  whatever  interests  it  might  acquire. 
Wyse  and  his  employers  were  not  actuated  by  any 
utilitarian  sentiments,  but  merely  by  a  desire  to  make 
money  out  of  the  scheme  regardless  of  ultimate  con- 
sequences. The  spirit  that  moved  them  in  the  pro- 
motion was  exhibited  by  their  successors  in  the  con- 
duct of  the  enterprise,  the  management  of  which  was 
"  characterized  by  a  degree  of  extravagance,  and 
corruption  that  have  had  few  if  any  equals  in  the 
history  of  the  world." 

COLOMBIA'S  CONCESSION  TO  THE  FRENCH  PROMOTERS. 

Lieutenant  Wyse  made  a  perfunctory  survey,  com- 
mencing at  Panama  and  extending  only  about  two- 


COLOMBIA'S  CONCESSION.  127. 

thirds  of  the  way  to  the  Atlantic  coast.  Neverthe- 
less, he  calculated  the  cost  in  detail  and  claimed  that 
his  estimate  might  be  depended  upon  to  come  within 
ten  per  cent  of  the  actual  figures.  The  Colombian 
Government  entered  into  a  dontract  with  the  Lieu- 
tenant which  in  its  final  form  was  signed  two  years 
later.  It  gave  to  the  promoters  the  exclusive  privi- 
lege of  constructing  and  operating  a  canal  through 
the  territory  of  the  Republic  without  any  restrictive 
conditions,  excepting  that  if  the  route  adopted  trav- 
ersed any  portion  of  the  land  embraced  in  the  con- 
cession to  the  Panama  Railroad  the  promoters  should 
arrive  at  an  amicable  arrangement  with  that  cor- 
poration before  proceeding  with  their  operations. 
On  the  part  of  the  concessionaires  it  was  agreed  that 
the  course  of  the  canal  should  be  determined  by  an 
international  congress  of  engineers. 

The  concession  was  transferred  to  La  Compagnie 
Universelle  du  Canal  Interoceanique  de  Panama, 
generally  known  as  the  "  Panama  Canal  Company," 
and  on  the  fifteenth  day  of  May,  1879,  the  Interna- 
tional Conference  met  to  determine  the  route.  It  was 
composed  of  one  hundred  and  sixty-four  members, 
of  whom  more  than  half  were  French  and  the  re- 
mainder of  various  nationalities.  Forty-two  of  the 
members  only  were  engineers.  The  proceedings 
were  pre-arranged  and  those  who  knew  most  about 
the  subject  in  hand  found  that  their  opinions  were 
least  in  demand.  The  folloAving  conclusion  was  put 


128  PANAMA. 

to  the  vote  and  carried  by  a  small  margin,  the  en- 
gineers who  voted  affirmatively  being  in  a  minority: 

• 

CONCLUSION  OF  THE  INTERNATIONAL  CONFERENCE. 

4 

"  The  conference  deems  that  the  construction  of  an 
interoceanic  canal,  so  desirable  in  the  interests  of 
commerce  and  navigation,  is  possible  and,  in  order 
to  have  the  indispensable  facilities  and  ease  of  access 
and  of  use  which  a  work  of  this  kind  should  offer 
above  all  others,  it  should  be  built  from  the  Gulf  of 
Limon  (Colon)  to  the  Bay  of  Panama ;  and  it  particu- 
larly recommends  the  construction  of  a  ship  canal  on 
a  level  in  that  direction." 

It  was  at  this  meeting  that  Ferdinand  de  Lesseps 
made  his  first  public  appearance  in  connection  with 
the  enterprise.  He  took  the  chair  and  dominated 
the  sessions  of  the  Conference,  and  there  is  no  doubt 
that  his  will  was  the  most  potent  influence  in  bring- 
ing about  its  decision.  Several  members,  who  were 
radically  opposed  to  the  conclusions,  rather  than  de- 
clare their  difference  from  the  opinions  of  a  man  of 
the  great  distinction  and  high  reputation  that  de 
Lesseps  enjoyed  at  the  time,  absented  themselves 
when  the  final  vote  was  taken. 

FERDINAND  DE  LESSEPS,  DIPLOMATIST  AND  PROMOTER. 

Ferdinand  de  Lesseps  was  born  in  France  in  1805. 
At  an  early  age  he  entered  the  consular  service  of 


FERDINAND  DE  LESSEP&.  129 

his  country  and  on  more  than  one  occasion  distin- 
guished himself  in  critical  emergencies.  In  1854, 
he  visited  Egypt  and  conceived  the  idea  of  the  Suez 
Canal.  For  several  years  the  opposition  of  the  Brit- 
ish Government  obstructed  his  efforts  to  carry  out 
the  great  undertaking  which  was  eventually  brought 
to  a  successful  conclusion  by  him.  He  also  promot- 
ed the  construction  of  the  Corinth  Canal. 

De  Lesseps  was  at  the  height  of  his  reputation 
when  he  assumed  the  direction  of  the  ill-fated  Pan- 
ama venture.  His  great  intellect  may  have  been 
on  the  wane,  but  it  is  certain  that  his  self-confidence 
and  boundless  belief  in  his  own  abilities  were  never 
greater  than  when  he  made  the  declaration,  that  "  the 
Panama  Canal  will  be  more  easily  begun,  finished 
and  maintained  than  the  Suez  Canal."  The  dis- 
graceful failure  that  resulted  must  be  attributed 
largely  to  de  Lesseps  himself.  He  publicly  assumed 
the  responsibility  for  the  enterprise  and  its  manage- 
ment from  the  outset.  Although  he  was  not  an  en- 
gineer and  had  but  a  very  limited  knowledge  of  the 
science  of  engineering,  he  considered  himself  better 
informed  than  men  who  had  the  advantage  of  tech- 
nical training  and  experience.  He  laid  out  the  work, 
acting  upon  data  which  a  professional  engineer 
would  have  deemed  insufficient  or  unreliable.  With 
fatuous  disregard  for  the  opinions  of  experts,  he  al- 
tered plans  and  estimates  to  conform  with  his  own 
unsupported  ideas  and,  in,  short,  exercised  an  ar- 
9 


130  PANAMA. 

bitrary  and  unwise  control  over  every  feature  of  the 
undertaking.  Almost  to  the  last  he  cherished  the 
belief  that  he  enjoyed  the  unbounded  confidence  of 
the  French  people  and  that  their  purses  would  never 
be  closed  to  his  demands.  Although  his  plans  were 
fatally  faulty  and  largely  impracticable,  there  is  no 
reason  to  doubt  de  Lesseps's  good  faith  in  the  earlier 
stages  of  the  enterprise.  As  it  advanced  and  the 
errors  of  his  basic  calculations  were  forced  upon  him, 
he  resorted  to  deception  and,  with  the  constantly  in- 
creasing difficulties  of  the  situation,  his  words  and 
actions  took  an  ever  increasing  divergence  from  the 
direction  of  truth  and  honesty. 

Notwithstanding  that  the  project  was  essentially 
a  French  one,  and  the  money  absorbed  in  it  was  sub- 
scribed in  France,  the  interest  in  it  was  universal, 
and  the  collapse  of  the  Company  caused  widespread 
excitement.  Not  the  least  serious  of  the  results  was 
the  discredit  cast  upon  the  whole  question  of  inter- 
oceanic  communication  and  especially  upon  the  Pan- 
aman  phase  of  it.  Exaggerated  pessimism  succeeded 
to  the  optimistic  hopes  which  attended  the  launching 
of  the  venture  and  even  after  this  lapse  of  time 
doubts  of  its  practicability  are  extensively  enter- 
tained. Such  doubts,  however,  can  not  find  a  logical 
basis  in  the  fiasco  produced  by  the  Panama  Canal 
Company.  Its  entire  enterprise  was  built  upon  an  un- 
stable foundation.  The  plans  were  conceived  in  er- 
ror and  in  ignorance  of  some  of  the  most  potent 


FRENCH  MISMANAGEMENT.  131 

factors  in  the  problem  to  be  solved.  Important  cir- 
cumstances were  overlooked  or  inadequately  pro- 
vided for.  Available  knowledge  was  neglected  and 
past  experience  disregarded.  One  man's  precon- 
ceived ideas  were  applied  to  the  situation  in  substi- 
tution of  a  scientific  study  of  the  conditions.  The 
original  miscalculations  were  followed  by  a  series 
of  avoidable  mistakes,  the  inevitable  consequence 
of  which  was  the  final  disaster. 

The  mismanagement  of  the  undertaking  amply 
sufficed  to  insure  its  failure,  but  the  catastrophe  that 
ensued  was  rendered  greater  by  the  insane  extrava- 
gance and  the  unbounded  corruption  which  charao 
terized  the  conduct  of  the  Company.  Froude,  in  his 
book  on  the  West  Indies,  says : 

FROUDE'S   CHARACTERIZATION  OF  THE  FRENCH  MIS- 
MANAGEMENT. 

"  In  all  the  world  there  is  not,  perhaps,  now  con- 
centrated in  any  single  spot  so  much  swindling  and 
villainy,  so  much  foul  disease,  such  a  hideous  dung 
heap  of  moral  and  physical  abomination,  as  in  the 
scene  of  this  far-famed  undertaking  of  nineteenth 
century  engineering.  By  the  scheme,  as  it  was  first 
propounded,*  six  and  twenty  millions  of  English 


*  The  noted  author  meant  to  say,  the  equivalent  of  "  six  and 
twenty  millions,  etc."  Very  little  English  money  was  invested 
in  the  scheme. 


132  PANAMA. 

money  were  to  unite  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific 
oceans,  to  form  a  highway  for  the  commerce  of  the 
globe  and  enrich,  with  untold  wealth,  the  happy  own- 
ers of  original  shares.  The  thrifty  French  peasantry 
were  tempted  by  the  golden  bait  and  poured  their 
savings  into  M.  de  Lesseps's  money  box." 

Commenting  upon  the  causes  that  contributed  to 
the  failure,  a  writer  in  the  Forum  stated  that  "  fol- 
lowing his  acknowledged  principles  of  being  sole  ar- 
biter of  the  companies  which  he  founded,  M.  de 
Lesseps  has  directed  every  step  without  counsel,  con- 
trol or,  it  may  be  added,  knowledge  of  what  was  re- 
quired. His  eyes  has  been  bent  steadily  upon  the 
Bourse.  He  has  never  put  forward  a  single  esti- 
mate that  has  not  been  falsified  by  the  event.  For 
the  work  of  a  responsible  engineer  he  has  substituted 
the  action  of  what  he  called  consultative  commit- 
tees, superior  councils,  and  the  like,  which  have  been, 
for  the  most  part,  little  more  than  picnic  parties  at 
public  cost,  and  with  the  recommendations  of  which 
he  has  dealt  as  he  thought  fit" 

RUINOUS    FINANCING    FROM    THE   OUTSET. 

The  first  and  a  continuous  drain  upon  the  finan- 
cial resources  of  the  Company  was  in  the  form  of 
"  founders'  profits."  At  the  initial  meeting  of 
the  shareholders,  when  they  all  fondly  imagined  that 
the  venture  was  a  bonanza,  they  were  informed  that 


RUINOUS  FINANCING.  133 

they  had  to  pay  the  following  claims,  and  accepted 
the  statement  without  a  murmur : 

ESTABLISHMENT    EXPENSES    OF    THE    PANAMA    CANAL 
COMPANY. 

For  the  Concession $2,000,000 

Preliminary    Expenses 2,160,000 

Profit  on  Preliminary  Expenses 2,360,000 

American   Financial   Group 2,400,000 


Total $8,920,000 

The  greater  part  of  this  sum  was  taken  by  the 
founders  out  of  the  first  $20,000,000  paid  in.  It  is 
doubtful  if  any  of  the  outside  shareholders  knew 
precisely,  or  even  approximately,  what  these  figures 
represented.  They  were  too  absorbed  in  visions  of 
vast  prospective  profits  to  concern  themselves  over- 
much with  present  expenditures. 

In  addition  to  the  immediate  cash  benefits  the 
founders  were  to  receive  fifteen  per  cent  of  the  net 
profits  of  the  Company.  These  prospective  pay- 
ments were  capitalized  under  the  name  of  parts  de 
fondateur  in  "  parts  "  of  5,000  francs  each.  There 
were  originally  five  hundred  and  later  nine  hundred 
of  these  "  parts,"  which  attained  a  price  of  80,000 
francs  each.  De  Lesseps  is  authority  for  the  state- 
ment that  in  November,  1880,  they  sold  at  380,000 
francs  each. 


134  PANAMA. 

In  1883  the  promoters  netted  $716,900  and  the 
directors  and  staff,  $186,900,  out  of  the  "  profits  " 
of  the  undertaking.  The  directors  were  allowed  a 
further  three  per  cent  of  the  profits,  which  contingent 
benefit  they  commuted  into  a  present  payment  of 
$48,000. 

KECKLESS  EXTRAVAGANCE  ON  THE  ISTHMUS. 

Dr.  Nelson,  who  was  upon  the  ground  whilst  the 
Panama  Company's  operations  were  an  progress, 
makes  the  following  statement :  "  The  famous 
Bureau  System  is  what  has  obtained  in  the  Isthmus 
up  to  the  present  time,  with  changes  and  amplifica- 
tions without  number.  There  is  enough  bureau- 
cratic work,  and  there  are  enough  officers  on  the 
Isthmus  to  furnish  at  least  one  dozen  first-class  re- 
publics with  officials  for  all  their  departments,  Tho 
expenditure  has  been  something  simply  colossal. 
One  Director  General  lived  in  a  mansion  that  cost 
over  $100,000;  his  pay  was  $50,000  a  year;  and 
every  time  he  went  out  on  the  line  he  had  his  de- 
placement,  which  gave  him  the  liberal  sum  of  fifty 
dollars  a  day  additional.  He  travelled  in  a  hand- 
some Pullman  car,  especially  constructed,  which 
was  reported  to  have  cost  some  $42,000.  Later, 
wishing  a  summer  residence,  a  most  expensive  build- 
ing was  put  up  near  La  Boca.  The  preparation  of 
the  grounds,  the  building,  and  the  roads  thereto,  cost 


PANAMA  CANAL  COMPANY  FORMED.  135 


npwards  of  $150,000.  .  .  .  Another  man  had 
built  a  large  bath-house  on  the  most  approved  prin- 
ciples. This  cost  $40,000.  Thousands  and  tens  of 
thousands  have  been  frittered  away  in  ornamental 
grounds,  for  all  had  to  be  beau,  utility  being  a  sec- 
ondary consideration." 

THE  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL  COMPANY. 

We  will  now  resume  the  history  of  the  Panama 
Canal  Company.  It  was  capitalized  at  400,000,000 
francs  in  shares  of  500  francs  each,  wrhich  were 
opened  to  public  subscription  in  Europe  and  Amer- 
ica in  August,  1879.  Less  than  one-tenth  of  the 
amount  was  taken  up  and  the  organization  of 
the  corporation  was  indefinitely  postponed.  In  the 
criminal  trial  that  followed  the  failure  of  the  Com- 
pany, Charles  de  Lesseps  stated  that  after  the  abor- 
tive effort  to  float  the  Company  his  father  placed 
the  financial  arrangements  connected  with  the  dis- 
posal of  the  shares  in  the  hands  of  an  influential 
group  of  financiers  and  journalists,  who  undertook  to 
mould  public  opinion  to  a  favorable  form.  Hero 
we  find  the  explanation  of  three  of  the  enormous 
items  of  preliminary  expense  which  are  given  above. 
Early  in  1880  M.  de  Lesseps  arrived  at  Colon,  ac- 
companied by  an  international  technical  commis- 
sion which  was  charged  with  the  work  of  making 
the  final  surveys  and  marking  the  precise  line  to  be 


13G  '  PANAMA. 

followed  by  the  Canal.  This  highly  important  task, 
like  all  the  other  preliminary  steps  of  the  undertak- 
ing, was  performed  in  haste  and  the  party  left  the 
Isthmus  before  the  close  of  February. 

RECKLESS  ESTIMATES  OF  THEi  COST  OF  CONSTRUCTION. 

The  Paris  Congress  had  estimated  the  cost  of  con- 
structing the  Canal  at  1,070,000,000  francs  and  the 
time  necessary  for  its  completion  at  twelve  years. 
The  technical  commission  expressed  the  opinion  that 
the  entire  operation  might  be  finished  in  eight  years 
at  a  cost  of  843,000,000  francs.  In  view  of  the 
fact  that  several  of  the  engineer-members  of  the  con- 
gress considered  the  former  estimate  too  low,  it  is 
difficult  to  understand  how  the  commission  arrived 
at  its  figures.  The  reduction  was  not,  however,  suf- 
ficiently great  to  satisfy  the  purpose  of  de  Lesseps, 
which  was  to  present  to  the  public  a  proposition  so 
attractive  as  to  be  irresistible.  In  order  to  promote 
this  object,  he  took  upon  himself  to  alter  the  sum 
fixed  by  the  commission  to  658,000,000  francs,  which 
he  declared  would  be  sufficient  to  provide  for  the  en- 
tire expenses  of  the  operation.  The  first  year's 
traffic  was  estimated  at  6,000,000  tons  assuring  a 
revenue  of  90,000,000  francs  and  this  was  claimed  to 
be  a  very  conservative  assumption,  whereas,  it  was  in 


*  An  approximate  equivalent  of  this   sum  in  dollars   may 
be  arrived  at  by  calculating  five  francs  to  the  dollar. 


FERDINAND  DE  LESSEES 
Promoter  of  the  French   Enterprise. 


STOCK  OVERSUBSCRIBED.  137 

reality  almost  beyond  the  possibility  of  realization. 
The  limit  of  fanciful  prediction  had  not,  however, 
been  reached.  In  May,  1880,  Mr.  A.  Couvreux,  Jr., 
a  member  of  a  large  contracting  firm,  publicly  stated 
that  his  house  was  prepared  to  undertake  the  entire 
work  at  a  cost  of  only  512,000,000!  In  the  light 
of  our  present  knowledge  the  absurdity  of  these  state- 
ments is  patent,  but  we  must  remember  that  at  the 
time  the  whole  proposition  rested  upon  a  basis  of 
theory.  The  fact  should  have  been  an  incentive  to 
conservatism  and,  although  there  may  not  be  suffi- 
cient ground  at  this  stage  of  the  enterprise  to  impugn 
the  honesty  of  the  promoters,  the  recklessness  with 
which  M.  de  Lesseps  submitted  his  inexpert  calcula- 
tions to  the  public  was  little  short  of  criminal. 

THE  STOCK   IS   OVERSUBSCRIBED  BY  THE  PUBLIC. 

Having  prepared  his  new  financial  prospectus  on 
the  alluring  lines  indicated  M.  de  Lesseps  made  a 
tour  of  the  United  States,  England,  Belgium,  Hol- 
land, and  France,  delivering  speeches  in  which  the 
enormous  profits  to  accrue  to  the  fortunate  investors 
in  the  Panama  Canal  project  were  depicted  in  the 
seductive  rhetoric  that  was  always  at  his  command. 
Following  this  campaign  of  words,  300,000,000 
francs  in  shares  of  500  francs  denomination  were 
offered  to  the  public  and  doubly  subscribed  for. 

It  was  agreed  that  the  first  two  years  should  be 


I38  PANAMA. 

a  period  of  organization  to  be  devoted  largely  to  sur- 
veying and  ascertaining  from  actual  experience  some- 
thing of  the  cost  of  excavation  and  other  features  of  the 
operation.  In  other  words,  the  public  having  invested 
its  money  upon  the  strength  of  certain  wild  guesses 
advanced  with  all  the  assurance  of  conviction  it  was 
now  proposed  to  investigate  the  facts.  Later  devel- 
opments proved  that  even  the  surveys  of  the  line  were 
unreliable.  Three  years  after  the  engineering  force 
had  been  at  work  upon  the  ground  it  was  discovered 
that  what  they  supposed  to  be  an  almost  fathomless 
swamp  was  composed  of  solid  rock  a  few  feet  below 
the  surface  and  this  was  only  one  of  a  number  of 
similar  misapprehensions  which  from  time  to  time 
necessitated  changes  in  the  plans. 

The  second  period,  of  six  years,  was  to  be  occupied 
with  the  actual  work  of  construction  under  contract. 

THE  COMPANY  COMMENCES  THE  WORK  OF  CONSTRUC- 
TION. 

In  February,  1883,  the  latter  stage  was  entered 
upon  with  Mr.  Dingier  as  engineer  in  chief.  His 
plan  for  a  sea  level  canal  made  the  following  pro- 
visions :  The  canal,  which  had  its  origin  at  Colon, 
in  Limon  Bay,  was  to  follow  the  bottom  of  the 
Chagres  Valley  for  a  distance  of  about  45  kilometers, 
to  Obispo;  it  was  then  to  cross  the  Cordilleras,  the 
passage  accounting  for  about  11  further  kilometers  of 


FRENCH  SEA-LEVEL  PLAN.  139 

its  length;  continuing  thence,  the  line  traversed  the 
Valley  of  the  Rio  Grande  and  terminated  in  deep 
water  near  the  Island  of  Naos,  in  the  Bay  of  Pan- 
ama. The  full  length  of  the  proposed  cut  was  74- 
kilometers.  The  depth  of  the  canal  was  to  be  9 
meters  and  its  width  at  bottom  22  meters. 

For  the  regulation  of  the  waters  of  the  Chagres, 
which  vary  from  20  cubic  meters  at  low  water  to 
2,000  cubic  meters  in  flood,  it  was  proposed  to  con- 
struct a  large  storage  reservoir  at  Gamboa  by 
damming  the  river  and  deflecting  its  affluents  to  the 
sea  on  either  side  of  the  Isthmus. 

The  cube  of  the  excavations  provided  for  by  this 
plan  was  a  minimum  of  120,000,000  meters,  being 
45,000,000  more  than  had  been  estimated  by  the 
commission  and  75,000,000  more  than  the  congress 
had  indicated. 

This  plan  was  accepted  and,  despite  the  enormous 
increase  of  work  entailed  by  it,  de  Lesseps  adhered 
for  a  year  longer  to  his  original  estimate  of  cost 
and  time  of  construction.  It  was  not  until  a  meet- 
ing of  the  shareholders  in  1885,  that  he  increased 
the  former  to  $120,000,000,  and  extended  the  latter 
to  July,  1889. 

A    SIMPLE    UNDERTAKING   ACCORDING    TO    DE   LESSEPS. 

At  the  inception  of  the  enterprise  M.  de  Lesseps 
established  a  Bulletin  which  became  the  medium  for 


14U  PANAMA. 

the  dessemination  among  the  shareholders  and  the 
general  public  of  the  most  exaggerated  reports  and 
the  most  reckless  misstatements.  In  March,  1881, 
de  Lesseps  stated  in  this  publication:  "But  two 
things  need  be  done:  to  remove  a  mass  of  earth  and 
stones,  and  to  control  the  river  Chagres.  .  .  . 
The  canal  is,  therefore,  an  exact  mathematical  op- 
eration." This  statement  alone  betrays  the  promot- 
er's ignorance  of  the  great  engineering  problems  in- 
separably connected  with  the  undertaking;  for  the 
control  of  the  Chagres  involves  the  most  intricate  and 
difficult  calculations  and  engineering  works  imag- 
inable. 

By  the  middle  of  1885,  hardly  one-tenth  of  the 
estimated  minimum  excavation  had  been  done,  and  it 
became  evident,  even  to  the  non-professional  observer 
that  the  program  could  not  be  carried  out  in  accord- 
ance with  the  assurances  repeatedly  given  by  de 
Lesseps.  The  enterprise  began  to  be  severely  criti- 
cised and  passionately  discussed  in  the  press  of 
France.  The  credit  of  the  Company  was  seriously 
affected  by  these  assaults  and  it  became  necessary  to 
adopt  drastic  measures  for  the  restoration  of  public 
confidence  in  order  to  secure  the  additional  funds 
that  were  already  needed.  At  this  critical  juncture, 
the  promoter,  for  M.  de  Lesseps  had  long  since  taken 
the  whole  affair  into  his  own  hands,  sought  the  aid 
of  the  Government,  which  had  been  extended  to  him 
during  the  Suez  Canal  operation.  He  applied  for 


SUEZ  AND  PANAMA  CANALS.  141 

permission  to  issue  lottery  bonds,  but  the  desired  au- 
thority was  not  granted  at  that  time. 

By  this  time  it  was  widely  recognized  that,  de 
Lesseps's  declaration  to  the  contrary  notwithstand- 
ing, the  Panama  project  involved  immeasurably 
greater  difficulties  than  those  encountered  in  the  Suez 
undertaking.  In  fact,  the  two  operations  were  so 
dissimilar  in  every  essential  respect  that  the  latter 
afforded  no  criteria  by  which  to  judge  the  former. 
At  Suez,  the  entire  line  lay  along  low  ground  and 
most  of  the  way  traversed  lakes,  marshes,  and 
swamps.  One  of  the  chief  difficulties  rose  from  the 
softness  and  instability  of  the  material  to  be  dealt 
with.  In  Panama  the  main  problems  are  the  passage 
of  a  chain  of  mountains  and  the  disposition  of  a 
number  of  streams.  At  Suez,  the  tides  are  the  same 
at  each  end  of  the  Canal ;  at  Panama  there  is  a  dif- 
ference of  twenty  feet  between  the  Atlantic  and  Pa- 
cific extreme  oscillations.  In  the  earlier  enterprise 
neither  climate  nor  labor  entailed  unfavorable  con- 
ditions, whereas  in  all  the  operations  upon  the  Amer- 
ican Isthmus  they  have  been  among  the  most 
vexatious  factors  entering  into  the  situation.  The  con- 
structors of  the  Suez  Canal  had  the  support  of  the 
French  Government  and  of  the  Khedive  of  Egypt, 
and  the  encouragement  of  the  whole  world.  In  his 
later  venture  de  Lesseps  started  with  well-founded 
opposition  against  his  plans  and  which  steadily  in- 
creased as  the  attempted  execution  of  them  betrayed 


142  PANAMA. 

their  futility.  The  comparison  admits  of  extension 
were  that  necessary. 

In  his  letter  of  August  the  first,  1885,  to  the  Min- 
ister of  the  Interior,  praying  for  authority  to  raise 
a  loan  of  600,000,000  francs  on  lottery  bonds,  Ferdi- 
nand de  Lesseps  stated : 

"  The  organization  of  the  working  camps,  the 
installation  along  the  whole  line  of  twenty-seven  con- 
tractors piercing  the  isthmus  at  their  own  risk  and 
peril,  an  immense  stock  on  working  footing,  is  such 
as  to  allow  the  canal  to  be  completed  and  inaugu- 
rated in  1888." 

TIIE    SEA-LEVEL     PROJECT     INVESTIGATED    BY    THREE 
PROMINENT   ENGINEERS. 

The  Chamber  of  Deputies  recommended  that  the 
desired  permission  should  be  granted  to  the  Com- 
pany without  delay,  but  the  Government  decided  be- 
fore complying  to  send  a  competent  engineer  to  the 
Isthmus  with  instructions  to  investigate  and  report 
upon  the  situation.  At  the  time  that  this  official 
was  conducting  his  examination,  two  other  engineers 
were  similarly  engaged.  Each  proceeded  independ- 
ently of  the  others,  but  all  arrived  at  one  conclu- 
sion, which  is  the  more  remarkable  since  two  of  them 
were  in  the  employ  of  the  Company.  In  the  fore- 
part of  188G  the  reports  were  submitted  to  the  re- 
spective principals. 


SEA  LEVEL  PROJECT  CONDEMNED.  143 

Armand  Rousseau,  the  Government  commissioner, 
found  that  the  completion  of  the  Canal  with  the  re- 
sources available  and  in  prospect  was  practically  im- 
possible unless  the  plan  was  changed  to  one  involving 
the  use  of  locks. 

M.  Jacquet  declared  that  after  a  thorough  investi- 
gation of  the  work  in  all  its  details  he  was  convinced 
of  the  necessity  of  abandoning  the  original  design  and 
he  recommended  the  construction  of  a  lock  canal 
along  the  precise  line  adopted  for  the  sea  level  proj- 
ect. Leon  Boyer,  who  held  the  position  of  Director 
of  Works  upon  the  Isthmus,  stated  that  the  completion 
of  a  canal  on  a  level  was  impossible  with  the  money 
at  command  and  in  the  time  stipulated.  lie  sug- 
gested a  temporary  waterway,  to  be  operated  by  locks 
and  to  be  replaced  by  a  sea  level  canal  as  soon  as 
possible. 

This  weight  of  expert  opinion,  which  it  must  be 
remembered  was  in  corroboration  of  similar  expres- 
sions voiced  by  eminent  engineers  on  previous  occa- 
sions, de  Lesseps  discarded  in  his  usual  high-handed 
manner.  lie  would  not  listen  to  a  word  against  the 
sea  level  project,  but  declared  in  the  most  emphatic 
terms  his  intention  to  pursue  it  to  the  end.  lie 
had  "  promised  the  world  a  canal  at  the  level  of  the 
oceans,"  and  he  proposed  to  keep  his  word  despite 
all  opposition.  At  this  stage  of  the  proceedings  the 
"  Great  Undertaker,"  as  he  began  to  be  dubbed,  as- 
sumed the  role  of  the  persecuted  philanthropist. 


144  PANAMA. 

The  shareholders  of  the  Company  were  frequently 
informed  henceforth  that  all  kinds  of  powerful  in- 
terests were  in  league  against  their  enterprise, 
but  at  the  same  time  they  were  assured  that 
he,  de  Lesseps,  might  be  depended  upon  to  cir- 
cumvent the  machinations  of  these  wicked  plotters. 

Lest  the  reader  should  fall  into  misapprehension, 
as  to  the  true  significance  of  the  recommendations 
of  the  engineers  which  have  been  cited,  it  may  be 
well  to  remind  him  that  the  undertaking  of  the  Pan- 
ama Canal  Company  was  a  purely  commercial  en- 
terprise, and  that  the  reports  and  suggestions  of  the 
experts  in  question  were  made  with  that  fact  con- 
stantly in  mind.  None  of  them  expresses  the  opin- 
ion that  a  sea  level  canal  is  impracticable,  nor  is  the 
question  taken  into  consideration  by  either  of  them 
directly.  The  point  of  their  decision  was  whether  a 
sea  level  canal  could  be  constructed  at  a  cost  and  in 
such  time  as  to  make  its  after  operation  a  profitable 
business  for  the  shareholders.  Time,  of  course,  is 
a  great  factor  in  the  cost  of  an  operation  involving 
hundreds  of  millions.  Interest  increases  at  an  enor- 
mous rate  during  the  later  years.  Therefore,  con- 
siderations which  would  preclude  the  pursuit  of  a 
project  solely  contemplating  commercial  results 
might  not  be  of  sufficient  weight  to  deter  a  govern- 
ment from  following  the  same  lines.  The  United 
States,  observing  business  principles  to  the  utmost 
reasonable  extent,  might  justifiably  construct  a  sea 


INCREASING  DIFFICULTIES.  145 

level  canal  at  an  expense  that  would  entail  the  ruin 
of  a  private  corporation.  Even  though  the  opera- 
tion of  the  canal  should  fail  to  return  any  interest 
upon  the  money  invested  the  Government  might  well 
consider  itself  fully  compensated  for  the  outlay  by 
the  political  advantages  secured,  the  great  savings  in 
the  movements  of  warships,  and  other  desiderata 
which  will  be  noticed  in  detail  in  later  chapters. 

FURTHER  EFFORTS    TO   RESTORE   TUB   WANING    CONFI- 
DENCE  OF   THE   PUBLIC. 

Whilst  the  engineer  reports  to  which  reference 
has  been  made  above  were  in  course  of  preparation, 
de  Lesseps  visited  the  Isthmus  with  a  large  party  of 
individuals,  many  of  whom  were  influential  in  the 
commercial  and  financial  circles  of  France.  Few  of 
them  had  any  technical  knowledge,  but  the  majority 
seem  to  have  been  susceptible  to  the  persuasive  elo- 
quence of  the  great  promoter,  for  upon  their  return 
the  enterprise  received  the  endorsements  of  various 
chambers  of  commerce  and  general  boards.  In  July, 
1886,  the  Government  declared  its  intention  of  post- 
poning for  several  months  the  decision  in  the  matter 
of  the  lottery  bonds.  De  Lesseps  took  umbrage  at 
this  action  and,  relying  upon  the  effect  of  the  moral 
support  of  the  powerful  commercial  bodies,  with- 
drew his  request.  He  received  from  the  stockhold- 
ers permission  to  issue  a  new  series  of  bonds,  and 
10 


146  PANAMA. 

did  so  with  success,  but  the  enterprise  had  passed  be- 
yond the  stage  of  possible  salvation. 

AN    AMERICAN     OFFICER     INSPECTS     THE    OPERATION. 

In  March,  1887,  Lieutenant  C.  C.  Rogers,  U.  S. 
N.,  was  ordered  by  the  Navy  Department  to  inspect 
the  canal  work.  He  took  three  weeks  to  the  task, 
and  went  thoroughly  over  the  line.  He  found  the 
hospitals  and  quarters  for  officers  and  laborers  clean, 
well-ventilated  frame  buildings,  admirably  suited  to 
the  climate.  The  canteens  were  kept  by  Chinamen, 
who  boarded  laborers  at  reasonable  rates.  There 
were  upwards  of  10,000  workmen,  employed  by  con- 
tractors, who,  with  the  number  of  the  Company's 
employees,  made  up  a  total  of  11,566.  The  labor- 
ers were  chiefly  importations  from  the  West  Indies, 
with  a  few  negroes  from  the  Southern  States  of 
America.  The  standard  wage  was  $1.50  in  silver 
a  day.  The  laborers  were  paid  every  Saturday. 
Sunday  was  spent  in  drinking;  Monday  in  recupera*- 
tion;  and  on  Tuesday  they  returned  to  work; 
"  hence,"  says  the  lieutenant,  "  the  number  of  work- 
ing days  in  a  month  seldom  exceed  twenty  or  twenty- 
two."  The  Company  endeavored  to  put  20,000  la- 
borers upon  the  ground  and,  as  they  could  not  be  had 
from  the  West  Indies,  tried  to  get  them  from  West- 
ern Africa  and  Southern  China,  but  without  success. 

The  hospital  records  of  the  Company  showed  a  death 


SIGNS  OF  COLLAPSE.  147 

rate  of  seven  per  cent  of  those  employed  on  the  work 
from  its  inception  to  July,  1887,  but  this  did  not 
include  the  great  number  who  contracted  disease  on 
the  Isthmus  and  died  elsewhere. 

SIGNS  OF  COLLAPSE  BEGIN  TO  BE  EVIDENT. 

By  this  time  the  work  had  become  seriously  dis- 
organized. There  had  been  changes  of  contractors. 
Some  had  thrown  up  their  contracts,  others  had 
brought  suits  against  the  Company.  There  had 
been  frequent  alterations  in  the  working  plans  and 
there  was  a  general  feeling  of  uncertainty  as  to  the 
character  of  the  future  operations. 

In  the  meanwhile  de  Lesseps  had  found  his  atti- 
tude on  the  sea  level  question  untenable  and,  after  a 
considerable  amount  of  beating  about  the  bush,  he 
consented  to  what  he  called  "  a  provisional  lock 
canal." 

The  new  plans  were  hurriedly  prepared  and  adopt- 
ed. The  estimates  of  the  expenditure  of  money  and 
time  that  would  be  necessary  to  carry  them  out 
were  made  low  enough  to  create  some  hope  that  the 
public  would  advance  further  financial  assistance  to 
the  scheme.  The  new  route  was  to  follow  the  exist- 
ing line  of  the  Company's  work.  The  surface  of 
the  canal  at  its  summit  was  to  be  forty-nine  meters 
above  the  level  of  the  oceans.  For  the  sake  of  econ- 
omy the  depth  of  the  cut  was  so  far  reduced  that 


148  PANAMA. 

had  the  work  been  carried  to  a  conclusion  it  must 
have  prohibited  the  passage  of  a  large  proportion  of 
ocean-going  vessels.  The  summit  was  to  be  reached 
by  the  use  of  hydraulic  elevating  machinery. 

THE  FRENCH  PUBLIC  REFUSES  TO  SUBSCRIBE  FURTHER 
FUNDS. 

The  next  step  was  to  procure  the  necessary  funds. 
Application  was  again  made  to  the  Government  for 
authority  to  issue  lottery  bonds  and  the  Company  was 
granted  permission  to  raise  800,000,000  francs  in 
this  manner.  The  bonds  of  400  francs  denomina- 
tion were  offered  at  360  francs  each.  They  were  to 
bear  four  per  cent  interest  and  to  be  redeemed  by  a 
civil  amortization  association  and  to  share  in  semi- 
monthly drawings.  The  proposition,  backed  by  bet- 
ter security,  would  have  been  an  extremely  attractive 
one  but,  to  so  low  an  ebb  had  the  Company's  credit 
fallen  that  only  800,000  bonds  were  subscribed  for. 
A  second  attempt  to  float  the  bonds,  with  extra  in- 
ducements to  subscribers,  only  proved  the  futility  of 
the  effort. 

The  Company  had  already  issued  shares  and  obli- 
gations approximating  the  immense  sum  of  $350,- 
000,000  for  an  undertaking  which  it  had  promised 
to  complete  at  a  cost  of  $120,000,000.  It  now 
asked  for  an  additional  amount  of  upwards  of  $133,- 
000,000  for  the  purpose  of  constructing  a  "  tern- 


FRENCH  PUBLIC  REFUSES  TO  SUBSCRIBE.     149 

poraiy  "  waterway  with  a  very  limited  capacity.  Of 
the  vast  sums  which  the  Company  had  expended, 
$105,000,000  went  for  interest,  administration  ex- 
penses, bankers'  commissions,  etc.,  and  less  than 
half  was  made  available  for  the  actual  work.  The 
annual  interest  charge  was  running  in  excess  of  $16,- 
000,000  and  at  this  time  the  Company  had  in  hand 
barely  sufficient  cash  to  cover  one  month's  current 
expenses. 

Before  the  close  of  1887  a  general  belief  pre- 
vailed in  England  and  America,  and,  perhaps,  every- 
where but  in  France,  that  de  Lesseps  would  never 
complete  the  Panama  Canal.  The  failure  to  place 
the  lottery  bonds  in  the  following  year  showed 
plainly  that  at  length  the  French  public  had  lost  all 
confidence  in  the  scheme  and  its  chief  promoter, 
whose  statements  and  estimates  had  been  so  greatly, 
and  so  often,  changed.  Bankers  could  not  be  in- 
duced to  handle  the  loan  issues  on  any  terms.  The 
Government  was  not  disposed  to  advance  money  to 
the  Company  and  was  itself  so  involved  financially 
as  to  put  the  question  of  its  finishing  the  canal  be- 
yond consideration.  It  was  universally  doubted 
whether  the  Company  could  complete  the  waterway 
even  though  it  received  the  money  asked  for  and  it 
was  shown  that,  in  the  event  that  it  did  succeed,  its 
fixed  charges  would  be  in  the  neighborhood  of  $30,- 
000,000,  a  sum  far  in  excess  of  the  maximum  traffic 
returns  of  a  sea  level  canal  according  to  de  Lesseps'3 


150  PANAMA. 

largest  estimate.  So  that  upon  his  own  showing  the 
project  under  the  most  favorable  circumstances 
would  be  a  financial  failure. 

A  RECEIVES.  TAKES  OVER  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 
COMPANY. 

On  the  fourth  day  of  February,  1889,  the  civil 
court  of  the  Seine  appointed  Joseph  Brunet  judicial 
receiver  of  La  Universelle  Compagnie  du  Canal  Inr 
tervceanique  de  Panama. 

We  will  give  a  brief  statement  of  the  receipts  and 
expenditures  of  the  Panama  Canal  Company  from 
the  date  of  its  organization  until  the  end  of  the 
year  1889.* 

RECEIPTS. 

Francs. 
Proceeds    from    the    Capital    Stock, 

various  loans  and  bond  issues.  . .  .t  1,271, 682,637 
Other  receipts  from  sundry  sources.  .  39,666,589 
Expenses  incurred  but  not  paid 18,343,851 


Total  amount  collected  and  due  by 

the   Company 1,329,693,078 


*  A  few  comparatively  small  sums  should  strictly  come  with- 
in the  account  of  1890,  but,  for  the  present  purpose,  may  with- 
out impropriety  be  included  in  the  above  statement. 

f  Fractions  have  been  discarded  throughout. 


FINANCIAL  STATEMENT.  151 


EXPENDITURES. 

(Outlay  on  the  Isthmus.") 

Salaries  and  expenses  of  management.  .    82,704,415 
Rents  and  maintenance  of  leased  prop- 
erty     16,505,352 

Purchase    of   articles    and   material   for 

consumption    29,239,602 

Purchase  and  transportation  of  machin- 
ery,   etc 119,374,679 

Surveys  and  preparatory  work 1,354,733 

Central  workshops  and  management.  .  .    29,947,885 
Various    constructions,     buildings,     and 

general    installation 47,038,528 

Work  of  excavation  and  works  of  con- 
struction     447,171,124 

Purchase  of  lands 4,753,275 

Sanitary  and  religious  service 9,183,841 


Total  expenditures  on  the  Isthmus.  .783,273,438 

(Outlay  at  Paris.) 

Paid  for  the  Concession 10,000,000 

Paid  to  the  Colombian  Government.  .  .  .         750,000 
Various  expenses  incurred  before  organ- 
ization     .  .  .  . 23,061,221 

Paid  to  American  Financial  Group.  .  .  .    12,000,000 

Interest  on  various  obligations 215,621,361 

Amortization   transactions 22,528,085 


152  PANAMA. 

Expenses  of  floating  bonds,  loans,  etc., 

commission,  advertising,  printing,  etc.  83,084,203 
Paid  to  agents  of  the  Colombian    Gov- 
ernment    213,800 

Boards  of  management  and  direction.  .  6,212,291 

Salaries  of  employees. 5,117,221 

Sundries    3,713,393 

Home  Office  and  furniture 2,087,397 

Compensation  to  contractors  on  cancella- 
tion of  contracts 1,200,000 


Total  expenditures  at  Paris .390,701,648 

SUMMARY. 

Receipts     from     all 

sources    1,329,693,000 

Expenditures — 

At  Panama 783,273,438 

At  Paris 390,701,648 

Paid     for     Railroad 

shares    93,268,186 

In     connection     with 

Lottery   bonds 32,264,680 

Advance    to  the    Co- 
lombian  Gov't 2,455,075 

Various  debtor  accts.  11,455,801 
Cash    and   negotiable 

paper  in  hand 16,274,238 

Total  equal  to  receipts  1,329,693,000 


VII. 

PANAMA. 
THE  NEW  PANAMA  CANAL  COMPANY. 

An  Effort  to  Restore  to  Public  Confidence  —  Steps  Towards  the 
Reorganization  of  the  Company  —  Well-calculated  Action  by 
the  New  Company  —  Report  of  the  Committee  of  Inter- 
national Engineers  —  The  Plan  of  the  New  Panama  Canal 
Company  —  General  Abbot's  Estimate  of  the  Task  at 
,  Culebra  —  French  Estimates  of  Cost  of  Excavation  —  The 
Dam  and  Lock  Constructions  at  Bohio  —  Alhajuela  and 
Gamboa  Dam  Sites  Compared  —  Crystalization  of  Amer- 
ican Interest  —  Appointment  of  the  First  Isthmian  Canal 
Commission  —  The  Report  of  the  Commission  Favors  the 
Nicaragua  Route  —  French  Company  Meets  Our  Bid  —  The 
Senate  Investigates  the  Question  of  Route  —  The  Nicara- 
guan  Route  Compared  With  that  of  Panama  —  Nicaragua 
Route  Presents  Many  Extraordinary  Difficulties  —  Control 
of  Lake  Nicaragua  a  Serious  Problem  —  The  Conditions  at 
Panama  Are  Thoroughly  Understood. 

The  task  entrusted  to  the  receiver  of  the  Panama 
Canal  Company  was  an  extremely  difficult  one.  If 
the  affairs  of  the  Company  should  be  wound  up  it 
would  be  impossible  to  save  the  shareholders  from 
total,  or  almost  total,  loss  of  their  investments,  for 
the  property  and  work  which  was  estimated  as  worth 
450,000,000  francs  depended  for  its  value  upon  a 
continuation  of  the  operation. 

153 


154  PANAMA. 

The  gravity  of  the  situation,  in  which  two  hundred 
thousand  persons,  the  majority  of  them  in  moderate 
circumstances,  were  involved,  was  fully  appreciated 
by  the  Government  and  special  legislation  was  effect- 
ed for  the  purpose  of  affording  the  Company  tempo- 
rary relief  from  the  pressure  of  its  liabilities. 

Several  circumstances  militated  against  the  en- 
deavors of  the  receiver  to  reorganize  the  enterprise. 
The  most  serious  of  these  was  the  public  scepticism 
which  had  followed  the  failure  of  de  Lesseps  to  make 
even  a  respectable  approach  towards  the  achievement 
of  his  undertaking.  The  shareholders  had  learned 
at  last  that  systematic  deception  had  been  practised 
upon  them  for  years,  and  they  felt  that  they  had  no 
reliable  knowledge  as  to  the  state  of  affairs  at  the 
Isthmus. 

AN  EFFORT  TO  RESTORE   PUBLIC    CONFIDENCE,. 

The  first  step  in  the  process  of  restoring  public 
confidence  was  the  investigation  of  the  commission 
to  which  reference  was  made  in  the  preceding  chap- 
ter. In  addition  to  the  statement  of  the  amount  of 
work  done  and  the  value  of  the  plant,  the  commis- 
sion gave  an  opinion  that  a  lock  canal  might  be  com- 
pleted in  eight  years  at  a  further  cost  of  500,000,- 
000  francs. 

Any  hope  that  might  have  been  derived  from  this 
report  was,  however,  dependent  upon  the  success 


STEPS  TOWARDS  REORGANIZATION.  155 

of  the  receiver  in  negotiating  new  concessions  witli 
the  Colombian  Government,  for  the  time  limit,  under 
the  contract,  for  the  completion  of  the  canal,  neared 
its  termination.  Lieutenant  Wyse,  who  had  secured 
the  original  grant,  was  sent  to  Bogota  immediately 
following  the  submission  of  the  commission's  report. 
After  pourparlers  that  extended  over  four  months,  a 
new  agreement  was  signed  December  the  tenth,  1890, 
providing  for  an  extension  of  ten  years. 

In  the  meanwhile  Joseph  Brunet  had  died  and  was 
succeeded  by  Achille  Monchicourt.  The  new  re- 
ceiver applied  himself  with  remarkable  energy  and 
acumen  to  the  organization  of  an  active  company. 
He  had  contrived  to  keep  the  work  going  upon  the 
Isthmus,  although  the  scale  of  operations  was  greatly 
reduced.  During  the  years  1891-3,  he  settled,  by 
a  series  of  compromises,  most  of  the  lawsuits  exist- 
ing with  the  old  company  and  successfully  resisted 
certain  creditors  and  bondholders  who  would  other- 
wise have  ruined  the  interests  of  all  concerned. 

STEPS    TOWARDS    TTIE.    REORGANIZATION    OP    THE 
COMPANY. 

In  April,  1803,  Colombia  made  a  further  conces- 
sion to  the  receiver,  by  granting  an  extension  until 
October  the  thirty-first,  1894,  for  the  organization 
of  a  new  company  and  ton  years  from  that  date  for 
the  completion  of  a  canal.  A  few  months  later  i{  a 


15G  PANAMA. 

special  law  for  the  liquidation  of  the  Interoceanic 
Canal  Company  "  was  passed  and  had  the  effect  of 
suspending  the  most  obstructive  actions  before  the 
courts.  Early  in  the  following  year,  death  relieved 
Achille  Monchicourt  and  his  place  was  filled  by  M. 
Gautron.  There  remained  but  a  few  months  in 
which  to  effect  the  organization  of  the  new  company 
and,  with  the  co-operation  of  the  attorney  for  the 
bondholders,  the  receiver  bent  his  energies  to  the 
task.  They  secured  the  co-operation  of  the  managers 
of  the  old  company,  the  contractors,  and  certain 
other  interested  persons,  in  the  new  enterprise,  in  the 
form  of  abatements  of  their  claims,  and  subscriptions 
to  the  capital  of  the  reorganization.  The  amount 
necessary  to  complete  the  full  sum  was  to  be  asked 
of  the  old  bondholders  and  shareholders. 

The  by-laws  of  the  New  Panama  Canal  Company 
were  filed  towards  the  close  of  June,  1894.  The 
capital  of  the  company  consisted  of  650,000  shares 
of  100  francs  each,  600,000  of  which  were  to  be 
subscribed  for,  whilst  50,000,  absolutely  unencum- 
bered, were  to  be  given  to  the  Colombian  Govern- 
ment in  consideration  of  the  contracts  granting  ex- 
tensions. Thus,  five  years  after  the  appointment  of 
a  receiver  for  the  Interoceanic  Canal  Company,  what 
was  generally  known  as  the  "  New  Panama  Canal 
Company  "  was  definitely  established. 

The  new  company,  like  its  predecessor,  was  a  com- 
mercial concern,  pure  and  simple.  Although  the 


WELL-CALCULATED  ACTION.  1ST 

French  Government,  by  the  exercise  of  extraor- 
dinary legislation,  had  been  largely  instrumental 
in  the  creation  of  the  company,  neither  govern- 
mental patronage  nor  responsibility  were  extended 
to  it. 

The  directors  of  the  new  company  appointed  a 
Comite  Technique  to  thoroughly  examine  the  whole 
problem  of  the  canal.  This  was  a  wise  determina- 
tion, for  the  surveys  made  under  the  direction  of 
the  old  company  had  been  of  such  a  cursory  character 
that  little  reliance  could  be  placed  upon  them. 

WELL-CALCULATED    ACTION    BY    THE    NEW    COMPANY. 

The  Comite  Technique  was  composed  of  seven 
French  engineers  and  an  equal  number  of  foreign 
experts,  including  several  who  had  the  special  ad- 
vantage of  experience  in  canal  work.  Whilst  making 
careful  surveys  and  maturing  plans  for  the  ulti- 
mate operations^  the  committee  directed  the  continu- 
ance of  excavations  in  places  where  they  were  certain 
to  come  within  the  specifications  of  any  plan  that 
might  eventually  be  adopted.  In  addition  to  its 
original  investigations  the  Comite  Technique  verified 
nnd  rectified  the  surveys  and  measurements  of  the 
old  company.  In  short  the  technical  committee  per- 
formed the  most  valuable  scientific  work  that  has 
yet  been  done  in  connection  with  the  Isthmus  and 
handed  over  to  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission 


158  PANAMA. 

maps    and    documents   which   Admiral   Walker   de- 
clared to  be  worth  at  least  a  million  dollars. 

BEPOET  OF  THE   COMMITTEE  OF  INTERNATIONAL 
ENGINEEKS. 

The  final  report  of  the  Comite  Technique  was 
submitted  at  the  close  of  the  year  1898.  It  esti- 
mated the  cost  of  a  canal,  which  could  be  completed 
in  ten  years,  and  would  be  equal  to  all  the  demands 
of  commerce,  at  one  hundred  million  dollars.  Aside 
from  the  question  of  health  the  Comite  recognized 
two  principal  difficulties  to  be  overcome  —  the  cut 
through  the  divide  and  the  control  of  the  Chagres. 
The  former,  whilst  a  stupendous  task,  is  merely  a 
matter  of  excavation  and  involves  no  serious  engi- 
neering problem ;  the  latter,  on  the  contrary,  presents 
features  sufficiently  intricate  and  perplexing  to  tax 
to  the  utmost  the  available  technical  ingenuity  of  the 
world.  The  solution  appears  to  be  susceptible  of 
achievement  by  several  different  methods  and  numer- 
ous plans  have  emanated  from  sources  that  command 
respectful  attention. 

"  The  studies  of  the  ISTew  Company  were  based 
on  three  fundamental  principles:  (1)  To  reject 
any  plan  that  did  not,  independently  of  considera- 
tions of  time  and  expense,  offer  every  guarantee  of 
a  serviceable  canal.  (2)  To  reject  any  fanciful 
scheme  depending  on  the  application  of  new  and  un- 


THE  CANAL  ZONE. 


159 


THE   CANAL  ZONE. 

This  map  shows  the  line  which  has  been  adopted, 
with  slight  variations,  in  all  canal  projects  for  this 
region.  Both  the  sea-level  and  lock  plans  of  the 
Consulting  Board  of  Engineers  also  conform  to  this 
route.  The  profile  chart  shows  the  relative  eleva- 
tions. 


160  PANAMA. 

tried  devices  not  justified  by  experience;  and  (3) 
to  give  due  weight  to  the  peculiar  tropical  condi- 
tions under  which  the  work  must  be  executed.  These 
must  compel  the  employment  of  a  class  of  laborers 
inferior  to  those  available  in  better  climates,  and 
the  work  will  be  exhausting  to  those  supervising  "the 
constructions.  Ro  technical  details  should  there- 
fore be  admitted  involving  operations  of  exceptional 
difficulty."  * 

THE  PLAN  OF  THE  NEW.  PANAMA  CANAL  COMPANY. 

The  plan  provided  for  the  impounding  of  the 
floods  of  the  Chagres  to  about  the  quantity  of 
250,000,000  cubic  metres.  For  this  purpose  it 
was  proposed  to  increase  the  area  of  Lake  Bohio  to 
twenty-four  square  miles.t  As  this  would  not,  how- 
ever, accommodate  the  desired  volume,  it  became  nec- 
essary to  provide  for  another  reservoir.  The  old 
company  had  selected  Gamboa  as  the  site  of  a  dam 
for  this  purpose,  and  it  has  been  favored  by  a  recent 
Isthmian  Canal  Commission,  but  the  Comite  decided 
that  the  location  is  "  one  of  the  most  unfit  that  can 
be  chosen,"  and  found  that  the  topography  of  Al- 


*  Problems  of  the  Panama  Canal.  Brig.-Gen.  Henry  L.  Ab- 
bott, U.  S.  Army  (retired).  Late  Member  of  the  Comite" 
Technique.  New  York,  1905. 

f  It  has  been  deemed  advisable,  where  exactness  is  not  es-  / 
scntial,  to  reject  fractions  and  give  closely  approximate  figures. 


PLAN  OF  NEW  COMPANY.  161 

hajuela,  about  ten  miles  higher  up  the  river,  lends 
itself  admirably  to  all  the  requirements  of  the  case. 
A.  lake  of  about  twelve  miles  may  be  formed  there, 
which  will  hold  up  to  150,000,000  cubic  metres  of 
reserve  waters. 

The  report  of  the  Comite  includes  two  plans  con- 
templating two  summit  levels,  of  which  the  bottom 
of  the  canal  was  respectively  sixty-eight  and  thirty- 
two  feet  above  mean  tide.  The  relative  costs  of 
construction  were  nearly  the  same,  but  the  fact  that 
a  canal  at  the  higher  level  could  be  completed  in 
much  less  time  decided  the  Comite  to  recommend 
that  plan. 

General  Abbott  intimates  that  but  for  this  consid- 
eration it  is  certain  that  the  conclusion  of  the  Comite 
would  have  been  different  He  declares  that  in  the 
hands  of  the  American  Government,  with  expense  a 
minor  condition,  "  there  can  be  no  question  that  the 
low  level  variant  should  be  preferred."  Since  the 
prospect  at  the  time  of  writing  (February,  1906)  is 
that  the  canal  will  be  completed  at  an  eighty-five  foot 
level,  it  is  useless  to  -consider  the  details  of  tho 
Comite 's  pro  jet,  to  which  the  plan  recommended 
by  the  first  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  closely  con- 
formed. The  line  follows  closely  that  adopted  by 
the  old  company,  which,  with  slight  variations  has 
been  accepted  by  all  subsequent  technical  surveys. 
Thus  the  excavations  already  made  will  be  included 

in  any  future  operation.     More  than  half  the  dis- 
11 


1G2  PANAMA. 

tance  follows  straight  lines,  and  in  the  remainder  of 
the  route  the  highly  important  feature  of  curvature 
leaves  nothing  to  be  desired.  This  is  a  detail  of  the 
utmost  consequence  as  affecting  safety  of  transit  and 
speed  of  passage.  "  Experience  on  the  Suez  Canal 
has  compelled,  since  the  route  was  opened  to  traffic, 
a  costly  increase  from  the  original  minimum  radius 
of  700  metres  (2,300  feet)  to  1,800  metres  (5,905 
feet).  On  the  Panama  pro  jet  the  ruling  radius  is 
3,000  meters  (9,842  feet),  falling  occasionally  to 
2,500  meters  (8,202  feet),  the  minimum  being  1,700 
meters  (5,577  feet),  and  this  latter  only  for  about 
half  a  mile  in  approaching  Obispo,  where  the  width 
is  sufficiently  increased  to  justify  the  reduction." 

GENEEAL  ABBOTT'S  ESTIMATE  OF  TASK  AT  CULEBRA. 

The  old  company's  excavations  in  the  Culebra  cut 
were  mainly  in  disintegrated  material  near  the  sur- 
face, and  they  occasioned  serious  trouble  by  caving 
and  sliding,  much  of  which  might,  in  the  opinion 
of  engineers,  have  been  prevented  by  proper  drain- 
age. The  Comite  made  a  careful  examination  of 
this  section  and  by  means  of  extensive  boring  and 
tunneling  at  a  low  level  established  the  fact  that  the 
dangerous  material  has  already  been  passed  and  with 
ordinary  precautions  there  need  be  no  fear  of  a  re- 
currence of  the  disasters  to  which  we  have  referred. 
General  Abbott  remarks  that  the  "  remaining  exca- 


GENERAL  ABBOTT'S  ESTIMATE  OF  TASK.      163 

vation  is  greatly  exaggerated  in  popular  estimation, 
the  fact  being  ignored  that  a  large  volume  has  already 
been  taken  out.  Thus  the  height  of  the  continental 
divide  on  this  route  is  constantly  stated  at  its  original 
figures,  which  on  the  line  of  the  axis  of  the  canal  was 
really  345  feet  above  tide.  The  narrow  bottom  of 
the  cut  there  has  now  attained  a  level  but  little  over 
100  feet.  In  fine,  the  old  phantom 'of  a  sliding 
mountain  and  an  impassable  continental  divide  has 
been  definitely  laid  at  rest  by  the  operations  of  the 
New  Company.  .  .  .  The  locus  of  maximum 
difficulty,*  lying  between  points  54.1  and  55.3  kilo- 
meters from  Colon,  and  only  about  three-quarters  of 
a  mile  in  length,  is  what  will  cause  the  greatest  delay 
in  execution  and  which,  therefore,  demands  the  clos- 
est study.  .  .  .  The  facts  make  it  clear  that  to 
complete  the  work  as  soon  as  possible  the  point  of  at- 
tack must  be  this  length  of  three-quarters  of  a  mile, 
and  that  here  every  effort  must  be  made  to  gain 
time.  .  .  .  All  the  spoil  must  be  transported 
either  to  the  northerly  dump  at  the  Lirio  or  to  the 
southerly  dump  at  the  Mallejon,  distant  three  or  more 
miles  apart.  Any  general  plan  of  operations  must 
therefore  deal  with  two  problems  —  how  locally  to 
concentrate  the  work  .  .  .  and  how  to  provide 


*  That  is  to  say.  "  the  locus  of  maximum  difficulty  "  in  the 
divide.  General  Abbott  agrees  with  all  other  authorities  that 
the  Chagres  presents  the  greatest  difficulties  involved  in  the 
enterprise. 


164  PANAMA. 

for  running  the  trains  to  and  from  the  dumps  with- 
out interference  and  without  needless  shifting  of 
rails.  .  .  -  »•  The  study  of  the  local  conditions 
makes  it  evident  that  the  prompt  completion  of  the 
cut  at  the  Culebra  lies  not  so  much  in  extreme  effi- 
ciency of  the  excavating  machines  as  in  the  rapidity 
of  transporting  the  material  to  the  dumps.  The  fre- 
quent shifting  of  tracks  under  the  heavy  rainfall  that 
prevails  during  seven  months  of  the  year,  aggravated 
by  the  weight  of  locomotives  causes  derailments  and 
other  delays.  The  early  completion  of  the  Alhajuela 
dam,  permitting  the  electrical  transmission  of  the 
water  power  there  developed,  would  dispense  with 
the  use  of  steam  at  the  cut  and  thus  serve  an  excel- 
lent purpose. 

FRENCH  ESTIMATES  ON   THE   COST  OF  EXCA- 
VATION. 

M.  Choron,  the  Chief  Engineer  of  the  New  Pan- 
ama Canal  Company,  made  the  following  estimate 
of  probable  future  work  in  the  cut.  He  calculated 
that  one  excavator  working  continuously  for  ten  hours 
per  day  would  take  out  994  cubic  yards,  measured 
in  place,  or  1,570  cubic  yards  measured  in  bulk. 
But  he  considered  a  reduction  of  forty  per  cent  neces- 
sary in  order  to  allow  for  the  loss  of  time  in  remov- 
ing the  material.  A  further  allowance  was  made  for 
the  delays  and  complications  incidental  to  the  opera- 


DAM  AND  LOCK  AT  BOHIO.  165 

tions  in  the  rainy  season  and  experience  had  proved 
that  twenty-five  per  cent  discount  was  not  too  great  a 
reduction  on  this  account.  Thus  the  basic  figure, 
994  cubic  yards,  was  brought  down  to  445  cubic 
yards  per  day.  The  American  engineers,  into  whose 
hands  the  problem  has  come,  whilst  they  have  not 
agreed  in  their  estimates,  have  all  reached  figures 
greatly  in  excess  of  M.  Choron's  result,  without  dis- 
puting the  general  correctness  of  his  calculations. 
The  former  arrive  at  their  conclusions  from  entirely 
different  bases.  In  the  first  place,  they  find  that 
they  can  employ  American  steam  shovels,  which  will 
perform  considerably  more  work  per  day  than  the 
machines  used  by  the  French  company.  They  have 
devised  more  than  one  scheme  for  the  disposal  of  the 
spoil  in  a  much  more  rapid  manner  than  that  con- 
templated by  M.  Choron.  Again,  the  American 
plans  include  the  early  utilization  of  the  available 
water  power  for  the  generation  of  electric  light,  by 
means  of  which  the  work  may  be  continued  day  and 
night  without  cessation,  save  for  a  twenty-four  hours' 
interval  on  the  Sabbath  day 

THE    DAM   AND    LOCK   CONSTRUCTIONS   AT   BOHIO. 

The  most  important  group  of  construction  em- 
braced in  the  plans  of  the  Comiie  Technique 
consists  of  the  dam,  spillway,  and  locks  at 
Bohio. 


166  PANAMA. 

It  is  not  considered  necessary  to  give  the  details 
of  this  dam  projet,  but  General  Abbott's  concluding 
remarks  upon  the  subject  are  worth  special  attention 
in  view  of  the  divergence  of  opinions  as  to  the  most 
desirable  method  of  regulating  the  Chagres.  "  This 
construction  (the  Bohio  dam)  was  approved  unani- 
mously by  all  the  engineers  of  the  New  Company,  as 
meeting  all  the  requirements  of  the  case;  and  the 
fact  that  Mr.  Fteley,  past  President  of  our  Society 
of  Engineers,  whose  experience  in  dam  construction 
had  been  second  to  none  in  the  United  States,  cor- 
dially concurred  with  his  colleagues  in  this  opinion, 
should  have  weight  with  American  engineers.  The 
difficulty  of  successfully  damming  the  Chagres  at 
this  locality  has  been  unduly  exaggerated  by  oppo- 
nents of  the  route." 

ALIIAJUELA  AND  GAMBOA  DAM  SITES   COMPARED. 

Of  the  proposed  Alhajuela  dam,  the  same  author- 
ity states :  "  This  site  is  so  much  superior  to  that 
at  Gamboa,  or  to  any  other  between  them,  that  un- 
less the  visionary  scheme  of  a  sea  level  canal  be 
contemplated  there  can  be  no  question  that  it  should 
be  preferred  for  the  necessary  upper  lake. 
There  are  no  engineering  difficulties  in  construction, 
or  in  conducting  the  operations  at  Alhajuela."  The 
foregoing  sentence  illustrates  the  striking  differences 
of  opinion  entertained  by  the  foremost  engineers  of 


AMERICAN  INTEREST  ACUTE. '  1C7 

the  world  about  the  most  important  features  of  the 
canal  problem.  Mr.  Williams,  one  of  the  American 
engineers-in-chief,  after  ample  examination  of  the 
rival  sites,  has  given  his  decisive  preference  to  the 
Gamboa  dam  and  the  Advisory  Board  of  Engineers 
has  decided  in  favor  of  the  sea  level  project  which 
General  Abbott,  and  not  he  alone  by  any  means, 
characterizes  as  "  visionary." 

The  scientific  information  accumulated  by  the 
Comite's  Technique  is  amongst  the  most  valuable  data 
relating  to  the  Panama  Canal  extant,  and  its  in- 
vestigations will  undoubtedly  afford  much  of  the  data 
for  any  course  that  may  ultimately  be  followed  in  the 
completion  of  the  work,  except  in  the  improbable  con- 
tingency of  a  sea  level  canal  being  decided  upon. 

CKYSTALIZATION  OF  AMERICAN  INTEEESTS. 

By  the  time  the  Comite  Technique  had  made  its 
report,  public  sentiment  in  this  country  had  become 
strongly  impressed  with  the  desirability  of  a  trans- 
isthmian  canal  under  American  control,  and  a  ma- 
jority in  Congress  favored  immediate  action  to  that 
end.  The  Nicaragua  route  appeared  to  be  the  best 
available  at  the  time  and  general  opinion  favored 
it.  The  situation  thus  created  caused  extreme  anxi- 
ety to  those  interested  in  the  welfare  of  the  ISTew 
Panama  Canal  Company.  It  had  reached  precisely 
the  stage  where  the  directors  proposed  to  appeal  to 


1C8  PANAMA. 

the  financiers  of  the  world,  when  its  prospects  were 
thus  suddenly  overshadowed.  Although  firmly  con- 
vinced that  the  Nicaragua  route  was  greatly  inferior 
to  their  own,  the  company  realized  that  should  the 
United  States  construct  a  waterway  there,  or  else- 
where, commercial  competition  would  be  impossible. 
This  and  other  considerations  would  surely  deter  in- 
vestors from  backing  the  private  enterprise.  Fur- 
thermore, with  the  American  Government  in  the 
field,  the  completion  of  the  Panama  Canal  would  be 
retarded,  if  not  prevented,  by  the  difficulty  in  se- 
curing labor. 

In  this  dilemma  the  directors  decided  upon  a 
course  calculated  to  bring  the  comparative  merits  of 
the  Nicaragua  and  Panama  routes  squarely  before 
the  American  Government.  Since  the  report  of  the 
Comite  had  not  been  made  public,  the  directors  were 
satisfied  that  the  United  States  authorities  could  not 
possibly  have  anything  like  adequate  knowledge  or 
appreciation  of  the  superior  advantages  of  their 
proposition. 

The  full  report  of  the  Comite  Technique,  including 
details  of  the  projet  recommended  by  it,  was  oc- 
cordingly  placed  in  the  hands  of  President  McKin- 
ley  during  the  first  week  of  December,  1898.  On 
the  twenty-first  day  of  that  month  the  Senate,  by  a 
large  majority,  passed  a  bill  providing  for  govern- 
ment support  of  the  Maritime  Canal  Company  in  its 
Nicaraguan  enterprise,  but  the  House  adjourned 


THEODORE    P.    SHONTS 
Chairman  of  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission 


FIRST  ISTHMIAN  CANAL  COMMISSION.          169 

without  taking  action  upon  the  measure.  On  the  re- 
assembling of  Congress  the  French  Company  se- 
cured a  hearing  before  the  Rivers  and  Harbors  Com- 
mittee of  the  lower  house,  to  whom  the  Senate  bill 
had  been  referred  on  an  amendment.  The  Com- 
pany's representatives  frankly  explained  their 
project  and  expressed  the  willingness  of  the  Com- 
pany to  re-incorporate  under  American  laws  in  case 
the  Panama  route  should  be  decided  upon.  The 
Senate  amendment  was  defeated  and,  in  March, 
1899,  Congress  authorized  the  President  to  make  an 
exhaustive  investigation  as  to  the  most  practicable 
and  feasible  isthmian  route  for  a  canal  that  should 
be  under  the  complete  control  of  the  United  States 
and  the  absolute  property  of  the  nation. 

APPOINTMENT   OF   THE  FIRST   ISTHMIAN   CANAL  COM- 
MISSION. 

In  accordance  with  these  instructions  President 
McKinley  placed  the  work  of  investigation  in  the 
hands  of  a  body  which  was  officially  styled  "  The 
Isthmian  Canal  Commission,"  and  which  was  com- 
posed of  the  following  members:  Rear-Admiral 
John  C.  Walker,  U.  S.  K  (retired)  ;  Hon.  Samuel 
Pasco;  George  S.  Morison;  Lieutenant-Colonel  Os- 
wald IT.  Ernst,  Corps  of  Engineers,  TJ.  S.  A. ;  Lewis 
M.  Haupt,  C.  E.;  Alfred  Noble,  C.  E. ;  Colonel 
P.  C.  Hams,  Corps  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  A. ;  Wm.  H. 


170  PANAMA. 

Burr,  0.  E. ;  Prof.  Emory  R.  Johnson.  The  Com- 
mission made  an  examination  of  the  New  Panama 
Canal  Company's  project,  both  in  Paris  and  on  the 
Isthmus,  and  then  proceeded  to  ascertain  upon  what 
terms  and  conditions  the  property  and  rights  of  the 
Company  might  be  transferred  to  the  United  States, 
for  the  law  under  which  the  Commission  was  acting 
forbade  the  consideration  of  government  support  to  a 
private  enterprise.  The  Republic  of  Colombia  hav- 
ing signified  its  willingness  to  consent  to  the  aliena- 
tion of  the  concession,  it  only  remained  for  the  Com- 
mission to  learn  the  purchase  price  in  order  to  make 
its  report  to  the  President  There  was  considerable 
delay  and  some  misunderstanding  about  this  last 
detail.  The  Company  was  naturally  reluctant  to 
submit  a  definite  figure  to  a  body  which  "  had  no  au- 
thority to  accept  or  reject  any  terms,"  but  proposed 
instead  to  make  a  tentative  offer  subject  to  an  item- 
ized valuation  and  arbitration  where  necessary.  To 
this  the  Commission  would  not  listen,  but  insisted 
upon  a  statement  of  the  Company's  price  in  a  lump 
sum  without  reservation. 

THE   EEPOET   OF    THE    COMMISSION    FAVOKS    THE 
NICABAGUA  EOUTE. 

The  report  of  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission 
was  presented  to  the  President  in  November,  1901. 
It  discarded  altogether  the  detailed  memorandum  of 


NICARAGUA  ROUTE  RECOMMENDED.  171 

valuations  submitted  by  the  Company  and  briefly  de- 
clared that  the  "  total  amount  for  which  the  Com- 
pany offers  to  sell  and  transfer  its  canal  property  to 
the  United  States  "  is  $109,141,500.  The  value  set 
upon  it  by  the  Commission  was  $40,000,000.  It 
needs  no  extensive  calculation  to  determine  that  this 
was  an  underestimate,  even  when  due  allowance  is 
made  for  the  usual  depreciation  of  second-hand  prop- 
erty. It  will  be  remembered  that  the  receiver  of  the 
old  company  valued  the  assets  that  passed  into  his 
hands  at  about  $90,000,000,  and  several  millions  had 
been  expended  in  a  judicious  manner  by  the  new 
company. 

The  report  closed  with  the  following  recommenda- 
tion :  "  After  considering  all  the  facts  developed  by 
the  investigations  made  by  the  Commission  and  the 
actual  situation  as  it  now  stands,  and  having  in  view 
the  terms  offered  by  the  ISTew  Panama  Canal  Com- 
pany, this  Commission  is  of  the  opinion  that  l  the 
most  practicable  and  feasible  route  '  for  an  Isthmian 
canal,  to  be  '  under  the  control,  management,  and 
ownership  of  the  United  States '  is  that  known  as  the 
Nicaragua  route." 

THE    FRENCH    COMPANY    MEETS    OUR   BID. 

When  this  finding  became  known  at  Paris  the  di- 
rectors of  the  New  Panama  Canal  Company  immedi- 
ately resigned  and  at  a  general  meeting  of  stockhold- 


172  PANAMA. 

ers  held  in  the  last  days  of  the  year  it  was  decided 
to  meet  the  terms  of  the  Commission's  estimate.  Ac- 
cordingly an  offer  to  sell  out  all  assets,  rights,  and 
interests  for  the  sum  of  $40,000,000  was  telegraphed, 
the  owners  realizing  that  with  only  one  possible  pur- 
chaser and  the  certainty  of  the  property  becoming 
practically  valueless  unless  taken  by  that  purchaser, 
no  alternative  existed.  The  Company's  change  of 
base  impelled  the  Commission  to  make  a  supple- 
mentary report,  in  which  it  stated  that  "  the  unrea- 
sonable sum  asked  for  the  property  and  rights  of  the 
New  Panama  Canal  Company  when  the  Commission 
reached  its  former  conclusion  overbalanced  that 
route,  and  now  that  the  estimates  by  the  two  routes 
had  been  nearly  equalized  the  Commission  can  form, 
its  judgment  by  weighing  the  advantages  of  each  and 
determining  which  is  the  more  practicable  and  feasi- 
ble. .  .  .  After  considering  the  changed  condi- 
tions that  now  exist,  the  Commission  is  of  the  opin- 
ion that  '  the  most  practicable  and  feasible  route ' 
for  an  Isthmian  canal  to  be  '  under  the  control,  man- 
agement, and  ownership  of  the  United  States '  is 
that  known  as  the  Panama  route." 

THE  SENATE  INVESTIGATES  THE  QUESTION  OF   ROUTE. 

In  the  meanwhile,  and  before  the  Isthmian  Canal 
Commission  had  filed  its  report,  an  ill-considered  bill 
had  been  passed  by  the  House,  authorizing  the  Presi- 


QUESTION  OF  ROUTE  INVESTIGATED.  173 

dent  to  secure  a  concession  from  Nicaragua  and  to 
proceed  at  once  to  the  construction  of  a  waterway 
by  that  route.  Fortunately  the  Hepburn  Bill  was 
not  hastily  disposed  of  in  the  Senate.  The  matter 
was  thoroughly  investigated  in  committee  and  ex- 
tensively debated  in  the  chamber.  The  weight  of 
engineering  opinion  was  overwhelmingly  in  favor  of 
the  Panama  route,  but,  perhaps,  the  most  effective 
statement  in  its  favor  was  delivered  by  Senator  Han- 
na,  who  had  made  a  close  personal  investigation  of 
the  question.  A  series  of  practical  enquiries  sub- 
mitted by  him  to  eighty  shipowners,  shipmasters,  of- 
ficers and  pilots  engaged  in  operating  the  most  im- 
portant intercontinental  steamship  lines  and  sailing 
vessels  elicited  replies  which  were  without  exception 
strongly  in  favor  of  the  Panama  route.  More  than 
ten  per  cent  of  these  emanated  from  persons  inter- 
ested in  sailing  ships  and  familiar  with  the  naviga- 
tion of  them,  a  result  especially  significant  in  view 
of  the  fact  that  one  of  the  very  strongest  objections 
advanced  against  the  more  southerly  location  is  its 
assumed  disadvantage  to  sailing  craft.*  The  debate 
in  the  Senate  was  followed  by  the  passage  in  both 
branches  of  Congress  of  the  Spooner  Bill.  This 
measure  authorized  the  President  to  acquire  the 
rights  and  property  of  the  New  Panama  Canal  Com- 


*  Full  details  of  this  interesting  information  will  be  found 
in  the  Congressional  Record,  June  9,  1902. 


174  PANAMA. 

pany  for  a  sum  not  to  exceed  $40,000,000  and  to 
secure  by  treaty  with  the  Republic  of  Colombia  the 
perpetual  control  of  the  territory  needful  for  oper- 
ating the  canal;  it  also  provided  for  the  prosecution 
of  the  work  by  an  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  con- 
sisting of  seven  members  to  be  appointed  by  the  Pres- 
ident. 

We  have  already  recited  briefly  the  incidents  of 
the  imbroglio  that  followed  the  failure  of  the  Colom- 
bian Legislature  to  ratify  the  Hay-Herran  Treaty 
and  culminated  in  the  independence  of  Panama. 
Sufficient  has  been  said  to  show  how  nearly  the  Amer- 
ican people  came  to  being  committed  to  the  Nica- 
ragua route.  What,  "in  such  an  event,  would  have 
been  the  actual  outcome  it  is  impossible  to  conjec- 
ture, but  there  is  ample  ground  for  the  belief  that 
the  undertaking  would  have  proved  more  hazardous, 
more  difficult,  and  less  satisfactory  when  completed, 
than  the  Panama  project. 

It  will  be  convenient  at  this  point  to  consider 
briefly  the  most  important  features  of  difference  be- 
tween the  two  routes.  In  the  first  place,  the  verified 
data  upon  which  to  work  is  very  much  greater  in  the 
case  of  Panama,  not  to  mention  the  fact  that  a  con- 
siderable proportion  of  the  task  has  already  been 
accomplished  at  that  point.  In  fact  the  Nicaragua 
project  is  still  a  mass  of  theory  which  application 
might  prove  to  be  infinitely  erroneous,  whilst  at  Pan- 
ama the  stage  of  uncertainty  has  been  virtually 


TWO  ROUTES  COMPARED.  175 

passed  and  the  operation  presents  definite  and  cal- 
culable tasks. 

THE   NICARAGUA^    ROUTE    COMPARED    WITH    THAT    OF 
PANAMA. 

The  American  Isthmus  does  not  contain  a  single 
natural  harbor  on  the  Nicaraguan  coast.  A  satis- 
factory approach  to  a  canal  might  be  excavated  upon 
the  Pacific  side,  but  the  Atlantic  littoral  offers  no  such, 
facility.  The  harbor  of  Greytown,  which  was  once 
a  good  one,  has  long  since  been  closed  by  the  forma- 
tion of  banks  whose  material  is  constantly  carried 
down  by  the  San  Carlos  and  Serapiqui  Rivers.. 
These  obstructions  could  be  cleared,  but  only  at  great 
expense  and  the  maintenance  of  the  necessary  chan- 
nel would  involve  incessant  dredging.  At  Panama, 
an  excellent  entrance  is  available  at  either  end  of  the 
canal. 

Whilst  both  routes  lie  within  the  zone  of  seismic 
disturbances,  there  is  no  recorded  convulsion,  nor 
any  physical  evidence  of  one,  in  the  Isthmus  of  suffi- 
cient force  to  have  seriously  damaged  a  lock  level 
canal,  much  less  one  upon  the  sea  level.  Nicaragua, 
on  the  other  hand,  presents  volcanic  features,  includ- 
ing Lake  Nicaragua  itself,  which  betoken  tremendous 
upheavals  in  the  past.  The  earthquake  that  oc- 
curred in  that  region  in  1844  must  have  caused  great 
destruction  to  a  canal  had  one  been  in  existence  at 


176  PANAMA. 

the  time,  as  well  as  to  the  shipping  on  it.  The  pro- 
posed line  passes  close  to  the  active  volcano  Ome- 
tepe,  which  was  in  violent  eruption  as  late  as  1883. 
The  great  volcano,  Momotombo,  on  the  edge  of  Lake 
Managua,  after  fifty  years  of  inactivity,  burst  out 
with  great  violence  in  the  month  of  February,  1905. 
This  eruption  was  preceded  by  earthquakes. 

NICARAGUA^  ROUTE  PRESENTS  MANY  EXTRAORDINARY 
DIFFICULTIES. 

The  region  traversed  by  the  Nicaraguan  route  is 
subject  to  strong  winds  and  heavy  rainfall,  which 
would  militate  against  the  safe  navigation  of  a  canal. 
The  latter  preventing  clear  observation  would  tend 
to  delay  or  prevent  passage  at  night.  It  is  true  that 
Panama  is  also  subject  to  heavy  rainfall,  but  it  is 
neither  so  continuous  nor  so  great  as  upon  the  At- 
lantic coast  of  Nicaragua,  which  has  no  definite  dry 
season.  Moreover,  any  delays  occasioned  from  this 
cause  would  be  of  shorter  duration  and  of  less  con- 
sequence in  Panama  owing  to  the  difference  in  length 
of  passage. 

Serious  difficulties  in  the  case  of  the  Nicaragua 
construction  would  be  created  by  the  San  Juan  River, 
which  may  be  considered  as  at  least  equal  to  those 
involved  in  the  regulation  of  the  Chagres.  The 
course  of  the  former  stream  is  extremely  tortuous, 
and  expert  opinion  holds  that  it  would  be  impossible 


DIFFICULTIES  OF  NICARAGUA^  ROUTE.        177 

to  reduce  it  to  a  safe  curvature.  General  Abbott 
says :  "  This  long  river  route,  exceeding  in  length 
the  entire  distance  from  ocean  to  ocean  by  the  Pan- 
ama line,  must  remain  subject  to  the  combined  effects 
of  strong  winds,  sharp  curvature,  and  longitudinal 
and  cross  currents,  to  say  nothing  of  the  obscuration 
due  to  heavy  rainfall.  It  may  well  be  doubted 
whether  any  system  of  artificial  lighting  could  ren- 
der night  transit  safe  for  large  ships,  and  without 
it  delays  and  possible  congestion  could  hardly  be 
avoided."  A  popular  idea  prevails  that  the  Nica- 
ragua route  offers  a  great  advantage  in  the  seventy 
miles  of  lake  section,  but  this  is  fallacy.  Something 
like  one-half  of  the  distance  is  over  bottom  that  pre- 
sents a  similar  problem  to  that  encountered  at  Lake 
Menzeleh  in  the  construction  of  the  Suez  Canal,  to 
wit,  the  opening  and  maintenance  of  a  channel 
through  soft  mud.  The  Isthmian  Canal  Commis- 
sion estimated  the  cost  of  this  portion  of  the  opera- 
tion at  $8,000,000.  Even  when  made,  this  expen- 
sive and  difficult  channel  would  be  a  source  of 
frequent  danger,  for  Lake  Nicaragua  is  subject  to 
violent  storms,  during  which  there  would  be  serious 
liability  of  vessels  grounding.  To  quote  General 
Abbott :  "  It  remains  to  refer  to  what  from  an  en- 
gineering point  of  view  would  be  perhaps  the  most 
serious  objection  to  the  Nicaragua  route  if  com- 
pleted and  opened  to  traffic.  This  would  be  the  risk 

of   longer  or  shorter  interruptions  liable   to   result 
12 


173  PANAMA. 

from  the  complicated  systems  of  water  supply  in  sea- 
sons of  drought  of  long  duration;  and  the  lake  lies 
in  a  district  where  they  are  far  from  uncommon.  It 
has  been  claimed  that  a  vast  lake  about  3,000  square 
miles  in  extent  must  furnish  an  ideal  source  of  sup- 
ply, but  the  matter  will  bear  a  little  examination. 

CONTROL    OF    LAKE-   NICARAGUA    A   SERIOUS    PROBLEM. 

By  the  dam  on  the  lower  San  Juan  river  the  chan- 
nel of  the  present  stream  would  be  transformed  into 
an  arm  of  the  lake,  maintained  sensibly  at  the  same 
level,  and  through  this  arm  all  shipping  must  pass, 
the  depth  of  water  depending  wholly  on  the  stand 
of  the  lake.  This  stand  is  now  subject  to  a  natural 
oscillation  of  about  13  feet  Under  the  projected 
conditions  the  entire  outflow  must  pass  over  the  dam 
at  a  distance  of  50  miles  from  the  main  lake,  and  if 
the  level  is  allowed  to  rise  above  the  present  high 
water  stand,  valuable  lands  under  cultivation  on  the 
west  shore  of  the  lake  would  be  flooded  and  claims 
for  damages  would  result  On  the  other  hand  the 
bed  of  the  river  is  crossed  by  many  ledges  of  rock, 
and  the  cost  of  excavation  fixes  a  limit  to  the  depth 
economically  practicable.  .  .  .  The  level  of  the 
lake  must  be  held  approximately  between  111  feet 
and  104  feet  above  tide  and  the  bed  of  the  present 
river  must  be  excavated  sufficiently  to  afford  a  sail- 
:jig  depth  of  35  feet  at  all  times.  But  the  records 


CONDITIONS  UNDERSTOOD.  179 

establish  that  years  of  high  lake  and  years  of  low 
lake  follow  in  no  regular  succession.  As  it  is  im- 
possible to  provide  a  reserve  sufficient  to  control  the 
level  of  an  immense  body  of  water  3,000  square 
miles  in  extent,  the  regulation  of  this  vital  element 
must  be  left  to  the  foresight  and  good  judgment  of 
the  operator  controlling  the  outflow  of  the  dam. 
Carelessness  or  bad  judgment  on  the  part  of 
the  operator  at  the  dam,  or  an  abnormal  season, 
might  therefore  involve  the  stoppage  of  traffic  for  an 
indefinite  period.  A  really  desirable  canal  should  be 
subject  to  no  such  contingency." 

THE   CONDITIONS   AT   PANAMA   ARE   THOROUGHLY 
UNDERSTOOD. 

The  work  of  construction  will  be  carried  on  at 
Panama  with  very  much  greater  facility  than  it  pos- 
sibly could  at  Nicaragua.  In  the  former  location 
the  Panama  Railroad  and  the  tracks  to  the  dumps 
will  afford  ideal  facilities  when  the  latter  are  put  in 
a  satisfactory  condition.  The  Isthmian  Canal  Com- 
mission called  attention  to  some  of  the  difficulties  in 
this  respect  that  might  be  expected  at  Nicaragua. 
The  forty  mile  stretch  between  Greytown  and  the 
San  Juan  is  a  swamp  throughout,  and  as  one  of  the 
members  of  the  Commission  stated :  "  There  are  no 
roads  in  it  You  cannot  make  any  roads  except  by 
hauling  in  material  to  make  them.  .  .  .  There 


180  PANAMA. 

is  a  very  uncertain  element  as  to  how  much  timber 
you  will  find  to  interfere  with  your  dredges  while 
working  in  that  swamp." 

The  Nicaragua  route  shows  some  savings  in  dis- 
tances between  important  shipping  points  as  meas- 
ured upon  the  map,  but  these  would  almost  certainly 
be  made  up  for  by  the  much  shorter  time  of  passage 
through  the  Panama  Canal. 

It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  decision  of  the 
Isthmian  Canal  Commission  in  favor  of  Nicaragua 
was  prompted  by  the  price  asked  by  the  Company 
for  its  interests  in  the  Panama  enterprise  and  that 
decision  was  promptly  reversed  as  soon  as  the  Com- 
mission's estimate  was  accepted.  As  the  cost  of 
constructing  and  maintaining  the  respective  water- 
ways was  practically  equal  in  the  Commission's  opin- 
ion, it  is  evident  that  the  alacrity  with  which  they 
turned  to  the  Panama  proposition  when  tKe  terms 
were  favorable  was  due  to  a  conviction  of  the  superior 
merits  of  that  project.  There  is  not  in  fact  any  re- 
spectable opinion  to  the  contrary  and  the  support  of 
the  Nicaragua  route  and  the  antagonism  of  the 
Panama  enterprise  in  Congress  and  elsewhere  is  not 
based  at  all  upon  scientific  or  utilitarian  considera- 
tions but  has  its  existence  in  a  desire  to  conserve 
certain  commercial  interests. 


VIII. 

PANAMA. 
THE  AMERICAN  ENTERPRISE. 

United  States  Authority  in  Colon  and  Panama  —  The  Price 
of  the  Concession  —  The  Canal  to  be  Neutral  Forever  — 
Instructions  Regarding  the  Inhabitants  of  the  Zone  —  Atti- 
tude of  the  United  States  Towards  Panama  —  A  Futile 
Revolutionary  Movement  —  The  Commission  Visits  the 
Isthmus  —  The  Plan  of  the  Walker  Commission  —  The  Ob- 
jections to  the  Commission  —  Wallace  Resigns  and  Stevens 
Steps  In  —  The  President's  Address  to  the  Consulting  En- 
gineers —  A  Disappointing  Conclusion  —  Consideration  of 
the  Rival  Projects. 

The  Hay-Bunau-Varilla  Treaty  was  negotiated  be- 
tween the  respective  representatives  of  the  United 
States  and  Panama  in  the  autumn  of  1903  and  fully 
ratified  February,  1904.  The  most  important  fea- 
tures of  this  convention  are  as  follows : 

Article  1.  "  The  United  States  guarantees  and 
will  maintain  the  independence  of  the  Republic  of 
Panama." 

Article  2.  "  The  Republic  of  Panama  grants  to 
the  United  States  in  perpetuity  the  use,  occupation 
and  control  of  a  zone  of  land,  and  land  under  water 

181 


182  PANAMA. 

for  the  construction,  maintenance,  operation,  sanita- 
tion and  protection  of  said  canal,  of  the  width  of  ten 
miles,  extending  to  the  distance  of  five  miles  on  each 
side  of  the  centre  line  of  the  canal  to  be  con- 
structed; the  said  zone  beginning  in  the  Caribbean 
Sea  three  marine  miles  from  mean  low-water  mark 
and  extending  to  and  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama 
into  the  Pacific  Ocean  to  a  distance  of  three  marine 
miles  from  mean  low-water  mark,  with  the  proviso 
that  the  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon  and  the  harbors 
adjacent  to  said  cities,  which  are  included  within 
the  boundaries  of  the  zone  above  described,  shall  not 
be  included  within  this  grant  .  .  .  The  Repub- 
lic of  Panama  further  grants  in  like  manner  to  the 
United  States  in  perpetuity  all  islands  within  the 
limits  of  the  Zone  above  described  and,  in  addition 
thereto,  the  group  of  small  islands  in  the  Bay  of 
Panama,  named  Perico,  Naos,  Culebra  and  Flam- 
enco." 

Article  3.  "  The  Republic  of  Panama  grants  to 
the  United  States  all  the  rights,  power,  and  authority 
within  the  Zone  mentioned  and  described  in  Article 
2  of  this  agreement  .  .  .  which  the  United 
States  would  possess  and  exercise  if  it  were  the 
sovereign  of  the  territory  within  which  said  lands 
and  waters  are  located,  to  the  entire  exclusion  of  the 
exercise  by  the  Republic  of  Panama  of  any  such 
sovereign  rights,  power  or  authority." 

Article  6  provides    for  compensation    to  private 


UNITED  STATES  AUTHORITY.  183 

property  owners,  by  the  United  States,  for  any 
damage  to  private  property  occasioned  by  the  canal 
operations  and  for  the  assessment  of  such  compensa- 
tion by  arbitration. 

UNITED   STATES   AUTHORITY    IN   COLON    AND    PANAMA. 

Article  7.  "...  The  Republic  of  Panama 
agrees  that  the  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon  shall 
comply  in  perpetuity  with  the  sanitary  ordinances, 
whether  of  a  preventive  or  curative  character,  pre- 
scribed by  the  United  States  and,  in  case  the  Govern- 
ment of  Panama  is  unable,  or  fails  in  its  duty,  to 
enforce  this  compliance  by  the  cities  of  Panama  and 
Colon  with  the  sanitary  ordinances  of  the  United 
States,  the  Republic  of  Panama  grants  to  the  United 
States  the  right  and  authority  to  enforce  the  same. 

"  The  same  right  and  authority  are  granted  to  the 
United  States  for  the  maintenance  of  public  order 
in  the  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon  and  the  territories 
and  harbors  adjacent  thereto  in  case  the  Republic  of 
Panama  should  not  be,  in  the  judgment  of  the 
United  States,  able  to  maintain  such  order." 

Provision  is  made  in  this  article  for  the  reimburse- 
ment of  the  United  States  for  any  outlay  it  may 
make,  under  the  discretionary  authority  referred  to 
above,  in  "  works  of  sanitation,  collection  and  dis- 
position of  sewage,  and  distribution  of  water,  in  tho 
cities  of  Panama  and  Colon." 


184  PANAMA. 

Article  9.  "  The  United  States  agrees  that  the 
ports  at  either  entrance  of  the  canal  and  the  waters 
thereof,  and  the  Republic  of  Panama  agrees  that  the 
towns  of  Panama  and  Colon  shall  be  free  for  all 
time,  so  that  there  shall  not  be  imposed,  or  collected, 
custom-house  tolls,  tonnage,  anchorage,  light-house, 
wharf,  pilot,  or  quarantine  dues,  or  any  other  charges, 
or  taxes  of  any  kind  upon  any  vessel  using,  or  pass- 
ing through  the  canal,  or  belonging  to,  or  employed 
by,  the  United  States,  directly  or  indirectly,  in  con- 
nection with  the  construction,  maintenance,  opera- 
tion, sanitation  and  protection  of  the  main  canal,  or 
auxiliary  works,  or  upon  the  cargo,  officers,  crew,  or 
passengers,  of  any  such  vessels,  except  such  tolls  and 
charges  as  may  be  imposed  by  the  United  States  for 
the  use  of  the  canal  and  other  works,  and  except  tolls 
and  charges  imposed  by  the  Republic  of  Panama 
upon  merchandise  destined  to  be  introduced  for  the 
consumption  of  the  rest  of  the  Republic  of  Panama, 
and  upon  vessels  touching  at  the  ports  of  Panama 
and  Colon  and  which  do  not  cross  the  canal." 

/ 

THE    PRICE   OF    THE    CONCESSION. 

Article  14.  "  As  the  price  of  compensation  for  the 
rights,  powers,  and  privileges  granted  in  this  conven- 
tion by  the  Republic  of  Panama  to  the  United 
States,  the  Government  of  the  United  States  agrees 
to  pay  to  the  Republic  of  Panama  the  sum  of  ten 
million  dollars  ($10,000,000) '  in  gold  coin  of  the 


CANAL  TO  BE  NEUTRAL.  185 

United  States  on  the  exchange  of  the  ratification  of 
this  convention  and  also  an  annual  payment,  during 
the  life  of  this  convention,  of  two  hundred  and  fifty 
thousand  dollars  ($250,000)  in  like  gold  coin,  be- 
ginning nine  years  after  the  date  aforesaid.  .  .  ." 

THE  CANAL  TO  BE  NEUTRAL  FOREVER. 

Article  18.  "  The  canal,  when  constructed,  and  the 
entrances  thereto,  shall  be  neutral  in  perpetuity,  and 
shall  be  open  upon  the  terms  provided  for  by  section 
1  of  article  three  of,  and  in  conformity  with  all  the 
stipulations  of,  the  treaty  entered  into  by  the  Govern- 
ments of  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  on 
November  18,  1901."  * 

In  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  Spooner 
Bill,  the  President  appointed  a  commission  of  seven 
members  to  prosecute  the  canal  operations.  They 
were:  Rear-Admiral  John  G.  Walker,  U.  S.  1ST.  (re- 
tired), Chairman;  Major-General  George  W.  Davis, 
U.  S.  A.  (retired),  Governor  of  the  Canal  Zone;  Wil- 
liam Barclay  Parsons,  C.  E. ;  William  II.  Burr, 
C.  E. ;  Benjamin  M.  Harrod,  C.  E. ;  Carl  E.  Grun- 
sky,  C.  E. ;  Frank  J.  Ilecker.  John  F.  Wallace,  an 
engineer  of  experience  and  ability,  was  appointed 
Engineer-in-Chief,  and  Surgeon-Colonel  W.  C.  Gor- 
gas,  of  the  United  States  Army,  whose  splendid  rec- 


*The  reference  is  to  the  Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty,  which  was 
designed  to  facilitate  the  construction  of  the  Panama  Canal. 


18G  PANAMA. 

ord  in  Cuba  marked  him  as  pre-eminently  fitted  for 
the  task,  was  placed  in  charge  of  the  Sanitary  De- 
partment 

In  a  letter  dated  May  the  ninth,  1904,  the  Presi- 
dent directed  the  Honorable  William  H.  Taft,  Secre- 
tary of  War,  to  assume  supervision  of  the  work  of  the 
Isthmian  Canal  Commission.  The  same  document 
defines  the  duties  of  the  Commission,  which  are,  in 
general,  to  make  all  needful  regulations  for  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  Zone ;  and  "  to  make,  or  cause  to  be 
made,  all  needful  surveys,  borings,  designs,  plans,  and 
specifications  of  the  engineering,  hydraulic,  and  san- 
itary works  required  and  to  supervise  and  execute  the 
same." 

INSTRUCTIONS  REGARDING  THE  INHABITANTS  OF  THE 
ZONE. 

This  letter  goes  on  to  instruct  the  Secretary  that 
'"  the  inhabitants  of  the  Isthmian  Canal  Zone  are 
entitled  to  security  in  their  persons,  property,  and  re- 
ligion, and  in  all  their  private  rights  and  relations. 
They  should  be  so  informed  by  public  proclamation. 
The  people  should  be  disturbed  as  little  as  possible 
in  their  customs  and  avocations  that  are  in  harmony 
with  principles  of  well-ordered  and  decent  living. 

"  The  municipal  laws  of  the  Zone  are  to  be  admin- 
istered by  the  ordinary  tribunals  Substantially  as  they 
were  before  the  change.  Police  magistrates  and  jus- 


OUR  ATTITUDE  TOWARDS  PANAMA.  187 

tices  of  the  peace  and  other  officers  discharging  duties 
usually  devolving  upon  these  officers  of  the  law,  will 
be  continued  in  office  if  they  are  suitable  persons. 
.  .  .  The  laws  of  the  land,  with  which  the  inhab- 
itants are  familiar,  and  which  were  in  force  on  Feb- 
ruary 26,  1904,  will  continue  in  force  in  the  Canal 
Zone  and  in  other  places  on  the  Isthmus  over  which 
the  United  States  has  jurisdiction  until  altered  or  an- 
nulled by  the  said  Commission,"  but  the  principles  of 
government  set  forth  in  the  Constitution  of  the  Unit- 
ed States  are  to  be  observed  in  the  administration  of 
the  Zone. 

In  a  later  letter  to  the  Secretary,  the  President 
makes  an  important  declaration  of  the  broader  pol- 
icy of  the  United  States  towards  the  Republic  of 
Panama  as  follows: 

ATTITUDE  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES  TOWARDS  PANAMA. 

"  The  United  States  is  about  to  confer  on  the 
people  of  the  State  of  Panama  a  great  benefit  by  the 
expenditure  of  millions  of  dollars  in  the  construction 
of  the  canal :  but  this  fact  must  not  blind  us  to  the 
importance  of  so  exercising  the  authority  given  us 
under  the  treaty  with  Panama  as  to  avoid  creating 
any  suspicion,  however  unfounded,  of  our  intentions 
as  to  the  future.  We  have  not  the  slightest  inten- 
tion of  establishing  an  independent  colony  in  the 
middle  of  the  State  of  Panama,  or  of  exercising  any 


188  PANAMA. 

greater  governmental  functions  than  are  necessary 
to  enable  us  conveniently  and  safely  to  construct, 
maintain,  and  operate  the  canal  under  the  rights 
given  us  by  the  treaty.  Least  of  all  do  we  wish  to 
interfere  with  the  business  and  prosperity  of  the 
people  of  Panama.  However  far  a  just  construction 
of  the  treaty  might  enable  us  to  go,  did  the  exigencies 
of  the  case  require  it,  in  asserting  the  equivalent  of 
sovereignty  over  the  Canal  Strip,*  it  is  our  full  in- 
tention that  the  rights  which  we  exercise  shall  be 
exercised  with  all  proper  care  for  the  honor  and  in- 
terests of  the  people  of  Panama.  The  exercise  of 
such  powers  as  are  given  us  by  the  treaty  within  the 
geographical  boundaries  of  the  Republic  of  Pana- 
ma may  easily,  if  a  real  sympathy  for  both  the  pres- 
ent and  future  welfare  of  the  people  of  Panama,  is 
not  shown,  create  distrust  of  the  American  govern- 
ment." 

It  is  not  our  purpose  to  enter  into  a  discussion  of 
the  political  aspects  of  the  treaty,  but  a  careful  read- 
ing of  the  portions  which  have  been  reproduced  will 
give  an  idea  of  the  great  scope  of  this  convention. 
To  draw  attention  to  but  one  direction  in  which  its 
potency  extends,  the  provision  for  the  maintenance 
of  order  by  the  United  States  in  the  cities  of  Colon 
and  Panama  is  a  practical  preventive  of  future  revo- 
lution in  the  Republic. 


See  article  3,  of  the  treaty  quoted  above. 


SUPPLEMENTARY  AGREEMENTS.  189 

At  the  close  of  the  year  Secretary  Taft  visited 
the  Isthmus  and  entered  into  an  agreement  with 
President  Amador,  covering  several  supplementary 
matters  of  importance.  A  tariff  adjustment,  satis- 
factory to  the  Panamans,  was  effected.  It  was  ar- 
ranged that  only  supplies  for  the  canal,  and  goods  in 
transit,  were  in  future  to  be  entered  at  the  Zone 
ports,  thus  assuring  the  Government  of  Panama  of 
all  customs  receipts  and  port  dues.  The  Republic 
agreed  to  reduce  its  tariff  from  fifteen  to  ten  per 
cent,  except  upon  wines  and  alcohol,  and  to  place  its 
postal  rates  upon  the  two-cent  basis.  Panama  also 
agreed  to  adopt  the  gold  standard,  a  very  necessary 
measure  for  the  welfare  of  that  republic,  as  well  as 
for  the  facility  of  transactions  between  the  two  na- 
tions. At  the  time  this  understanding  was  arrived 
at,  the  Colombian  currency  had  become  so  debased 
that  a  five-dollar  bill  was  exchangeable  for  an  Amer- 
ican nickel,  and  there  was  one  cent  change  due  at 
that. 

A    FUTILE    REVOLUTIONARY    MOVEMENT. 

Just  before  the  arrival  of  Secretary  Taft,  General 
Iluertas  had  planned  one  of  the  puny  revolutions 
which  have  furnished  librettists  with  inexhaustible 
material.  He  had  mobilized  the  army  of  182  half- 
clad  men  and  boys,  with  the  design  of  subverting 
the  Amador  government.  The  threat  of  calling  upon 


190  PANAMA. 

half  a  dozen  American  marines  who  happened  to  be 
in  the  city  with  their  side-arms  on,  induced  him  to 
give  up  the  idea.  He  was  placed  upon  the  retired 
list  and  the  army  of  the  Republic  was  disbanded. 

At  a  banquet  given  in  his  honor  by  the  Panaman 
President  the  Secretary  delivered  a  timely  homily  on 
the  subject  of  revolutions  and  urged  upon  his  audi- 
tors the  necessity  of  the  government  preserving  the 
rights  of  the  minority.  The  speech,  which  was  in 
the  nature  of  a  friendly  warning  and  an  intimation 
that  the  United  States  expected  the  Republic  to  re- 
frain from  any  revolutionary  disturbances  in  the 
future,  was  well  received  by  the  representatives  of 
both  political  parties,  and  doubtless  had  a  salutary 
effect. 

THE  COMMISSION  VISITS  THE  ISTHMUS. 

The  Canal  Commission  arrived  at  the  Isthmus  in 
April,  1904.  The  only  work  in  progress  at  the  time 
•was  the  excavation  of  the  Culebra  Cut,  where  a  few 
French  machines  were  employed  with  a  force  of 
about  seven  hundred  men.  Owing  to  the  long  lapse 
of  time  since  the  New  Panama  Canal  Company 
ceased  operations,  a  chaotic  condition  prevailed  along 
the  entire  line  of  the  canal  and  the  plant  and  equip- 
ment transferred  by  that  Company  was  in  such  a 
deteriorated  and  scattered  state  as  to  require  months 
for  its  collection  and  repair.  Whilst  the  task  of 


PLAN  OF  WALKER  COMMISSION.  191 

straightening  up  was  being  carried  out  Engineer 
Wallace  tested  some  American  steam  excavators  and 
established  important  data  as  to  units  of  cost  and  ex- 
penditure of  time.  Meanwhile  the  Commission  pro- 
ceeded, by  means  of  new  surveys  and  examinations, 
to  gain  such  information  as  might  afford  a  satisfac- 
tory basis  for  the  ultimate  plans.  As  has  been  stated, 
the  French  companies  performed  a  great  deal  of 
accurate  scientific  work  along  the  same  lines,  but 
much  of  the  data  secured  from  them  needed  to  be 
modified  in  order  to  bring  it  into  harmony  with  the 
more  extensive  scheme  of  the  American  project  The 
Commission  was  not  restricted  by  the  limitations 
which  governed  the  plans  of  the  purely  commercial 
enterprises,  and  whilst  its  work  was  entirely  of  a 
tentative  nature,  a  waterway  much  larger  than  any 
contemplated  by  the  French  companies  was  a  fore- 
gone conclusion. 

THE   PLAN   OF   THE   WALKER  COMMISSION. 

The  Commission  formulated  a  plan  for  a  lock 
canal  at  an  85-foot  level  with  a  dam  at  Bohio  and 
a  lake  38.5  square  miles  extending  from  that  point 
to  Obispo.  The  Commission  rejected  the  sea-level 
plan,  prefacing  its  conclusion  with  the  following 
statement :  "  If  a  sea-level  canal  be  constructed, 
either  the  canal  itself  must  be  made  of  such  dimen- 
sions that  maximum  floods,  modified  to  some  extent 


192  PANAMA. 

by  a  reservoir  in  the  Upper  Chagres,  could  pass 
down  its  channel  without  injury,  or  independent 
channels  must  be  provided  to  carry  off  these  floods. 
As  the  canal  lies  in  the  lowest  part  of  the  valley,  the 
construction  of  such  channels  would  be  a  matter  of 
serious  difficulty,  and  the  simplest  solution  would 
be  to  make  the  canal  prism  large  enough  to  take  the 
full  discharge.  This  would  have  the  advantage, 
also,  of  furnishing  a  very  large  canal,  in  which  navi- 
gation under  ordinary  circumstances  would  be  ex- 
ceptionally easy.  It  would  involve  a  cross  section 
from  Obispo  to  the  Atlantic,  having  an  area  of  at 
least  15,000  square  feet  below  the  water  line,  which 
would  give  a  bottom  width  of  at  least  400  feet.  The 
quantity  of  excavation  required  for  such  a  canal  has 
been  roughly  computed,  and  is  found  to  be  about 
266,228,000  cubic  yards.  The  cost  of  such  a  canal, 
including  a  dam  at  Alhajuela  and  a  tide  lock  at 
Miraflores,  near  the  Pacific  end,  is  estimated  at  not 
less  than  $240,000,000.  Its  construction  would 
probably  take  at  least  twenty  years." 

The  investigations  of  the  Commission  were  neces- 
sarily directed  chiefly  to  the  various  suggestions  for 
the  control  of  the  Chagres.  The  question  had  to  be 
considered  from  the  point  of  view  of  a  sea  level 
canal  as  well  as  that  of  a  waterway  with  locks.  In 
the  former  case  the  flood  waters  of  the  river,  if  ad- 
mitted into  the  canal,  would  create  dangerous  cur- 
rents and  carry  in  heavy  deposits,  necessitating  ex- 


OBJECTIONS  TO  COMMISSION.  193 

tensive  dredging.  The  various  dam  projects  were 
examined  by  the  Commission  as  well  as  the  plans 
of  the  French  Companies  for  diverting  the  river 
through  a  tunnel  to  the  Pacific  Ocean. 

Before  the  Commission  closed  the  first  year  of  its 
existence  the  question  of  its  efficiency  and  adaptabil- 
ity to  the  work  in  hand  was  widely  raised.  Secre- 
tary Taft,  upon  his  return  from  the  Isthmus  in  De- 
cember, 1904,  had  expressed  to  the  President  an 
opinion  that  the  Commission,  whilst  it  had  "  made 
as  much  progress  in  the  necessary  preparations  for 
the  building  of  the  canal  as  could  be  expected  in  the 
short  time  since  its  appointment,"  was  unwieldy  and 
so  constituted  as  to  render  difficult  the  apportion- 
ment of  specific  work  and  responsibility  among  its 
members.  Chief  Engineer  Wallace  complained  that 
his  plans  were  repeatedly  changed  and  that  he  was 
hampered  in  the  effort  to  carry  them  out. 

THE    OBJECTIONS   TO    THE    COMMISSION. 

In  a  message  sent  to  Congress  on  the  13th  of  Jan- 
uary, 1905,  President  Roosevelt  plainly  expressed 
his  objections  to  the  existing  arrangement.  He  asked 
for  "  greater  discretion  in  the  organization  of  the 
personnel "  to  be  employed  in  the  management  of 
the  enterprise. 

"  Actual  experience  has  convinced  me,"  he  said, 

"  that  it  \vill  be  impossible  to  obtain  the  best  and 
13 


194  PANAMA. 

most  effective  service  tinder  the  limitations  prescribed 
by  law.  The  general  plans  for  the  work  must  be 
agreed  upon  with  the  aid  of  the  best  engineers  of  the 
country,  who  should  act  as  an  advisory  or  consulting 
body.  The  consulting  engineers  should  not  be  put 
upon  the  Commission,  which  should  be  used  only  as 
an  executive  instrument  for  the  executive  and  ad- 
ministrative work.  The  actual  work  of  executing  the 
general  plans  agreed  upon  by  the  Commission,  after 
receiving  the  conclusions  of  the  advising  engineers, 
must  be  done  by  an  engineer  in  charge ;  and  we  now 
have  an  excellent  engineer."  The  President  went  on 
to  state  that  the  Commission  should  consist  at  most 
of  five  members  and  preferably  of  three. 

In  response  to  this  message,  the  House  passed  a 
bill  to  abolish  the  Commission  and  place  the  govern- 
ment of  the  Zone  and  the  construction  of  the  canal 
entirely  in  the  hands  of  the  President,  but  the  meas- 
ure was  defeated  in  the  Senate.  Failing  Congres- 
sional relief  the  President  determined,  in  his  charac- 
teristic way,  to  deal  with  the  situation  himself.  He 
secured  the  resignation  of  the  entire  Isthmian  Canal 
Commission  and  reformed  that  body,  placing  the 
control  of  affairs  definitely  in  the  hands  of  an  Ex- 
ecutive Committee  composed  of  three  of  the  seven 
members  required  by  law  to  constitute  the  whole. 
Each  of  the  executive  members  had  distinct  duties 
assigned  to  him.  Chairman  Shonts  was  placed  in 
charge  of  the  entire  enterprise,  with  powers  resemb- 


WALLACE  RESIGNS,  STEVENS  STEPS  IN.       195 

ling  those  of  a  railroad  president.  Engineer  Wal- 
lace was  made  field  manager,  with  full  control  of  the 
construction.  Judge  Magoon  was  created  Govemor 
of  the  Canal  Zone  and  United  States  Minister  to 
Panama. 

WALLACE   RESIGNS    AND   STEVENS    STEPS   IN. 

The  new  arrangement  had  been  in  force  less  than 
sixty  days  when  the  Chief  Engineer,  for  some  cause 
which  has  never  been  fully  explained,  resigned  his 
position.  The  resignation,  coming  as  it  did  without 
warning  or  adequate  explanation,  naturally  aroused 
resentment  on  the  part  of  Secretary  Taft,  and  Mr. 
Wallace  retired  from  the  service  under  a  cloud.  The 
place  thus  made  vacant  was  promptly  and  satisfac- 
torily filled  by  the  selection  of  John  F.  Stevens,  who 
had  been  engaged  by  the  War  Department  to  super- 
vise the  construction  of  the  new  railroads  in  the 
Philippines.  Mr.  Stevens  assumed  charge  of  the 
canal  operations  in  August,  1905. 

On  the  first  day  of  the  following  month  the  In- 
ternational Board  of  Consulting  Engineers  met  in 
Washington.  This  body  had  been  formed  with  the 
co-operation  of  several  foreign  governments  for  the 
purpose  mainly  of  examining  the  principal  problems 
involved  in  the  construction  of  the  canal.  The  most 
important  matters  considered  by  the  Board  pertain 
to  the  form  of  the  waterwav.  The  members  of  the 


196  PANAMA. 

Board  are:  Henry  Hunter,  Chief  Engineer  of  the 
Manchester  Ship  Canal  (nominated  by  the  British 
Government)  ;  Adolph  Guerard  (nominated  by  the 
French  Government),  Eugene  Tincauser  (nominated 
by  the  German  Government),  J.  W.  Welcker  (nomi- 
nated by  the  Government  of  the  Netherlands),  M.  L. 
Quellenec,  Consulting  Engineer  of  the  Suez  Canal; 
Gen.  George  W.  Davis,  U.  S.  A.  (retired)  ;  Alfred 
Noble,  Chief  Engineer  of  the  Pennsylvania  Rail- 
road ;  William  Barclay  Parsons,  formerly  of  the  New 
York  Rapid  Transit  Commission ;  William  H.  Burr, 
of  Columbia  University;  Frederick  P.  Stearns,  hy- 
draulic engineer  of  Boston;  Gen.  Henry  L.  Abbott, 
U.  S.  A.  (retired) ;  Joseph  Ripley,  engineer  of  the 
Sault  Ste.  Marie  Canal;  Isham  Randolph,  engineer 
of  the  Chicago  Drainage  Canal.  These  men  are 
eminently  qualified  to  exercise  the  important  advis- 
ory functions  entrusted  to  them,  not  only  by  reason 
of  technical  knowledge,  but  also  on  account  of  spe- 
cial experience.  General  Abbott  and  Mr.  Hunter 
had  been  members  of  the  Comite  Technique;  Gen- 
eral Davis,  Mr.  Parsons  and  Professor  Burr,  of  a 
former  Isthmian  Canal  Commission. 

THE  PRESIDENT'S  ADDRESS  TO  THE  CONSULTING 
ENGINEERS. 

The  President  addressed  the  assembled  Board  at 
length,  explaining  that  his  remarks  were  to  be  taken 


THE  PRESIDENT'S  ADDRESS.  197 

as  suggestions  rather  than  as  instructions.  "  I  hope," 
he  said,  "  that  ultimately  it  will  prove  possible  to 
build  a  sea-level  canal.  Such  a  canal  would  un- 
doubtly  be  best  in  the  end,  if  feasible,  and  I  feel 
that  one  of  the  chief  advantages  of  the  Panama  Route 
is  that  ultimately  a  sea-level  canal  will  be  a  pos- 
sibility. But,  while  paying  due  heed  to  the  ideal 
perfectibility  of  the  scheme  from  an  engineer's  stand- 
point, remember  the  need  of  having  a  plan  which 
shall  provide  for  the  immediate  building  of  the 
canal  on  the  safest  terms  and  in  the  shortest  possible 
time. 

"  If  to  build  a  sea-level  canal  will  but  slightly 
increase  the  risk,  then,  of  course,  it  is  preferable. 
But  if  to  adopt  a  plan  of  a  sea-level  canal  means 
to  incur  hazard,  and  to  insure  indefinite  delay,  then 
it  is  not  preferable.  If  the  advantages  and  disad- 
vantages are  closely  balanced  I  expect  you  to  say  so. 

"  I  desire  also  to  know  whether,  if  you  recom- 
mend a  high-level  multi-lock  canal,  it  will  be  possi- 
ble after  it  is  completed  to  turn  it  into,  or  substi- 
tute for  it,  in  time,  a  sea-level  canal,  without  inter- 
rupting the  traffic  upon  it  Two  of  the  prime  con- 
siderations to  be  kept  steadily  in  mind  are:  1.  The 
utmost  practicable  speed  of  construction.  2.  Prac- 
tical certainty  that  the  plan  proposed  will  be  feasible  ; 
that,  it  can  be  carried  out  with  the  minimum  risk." 

After  a  thorough  study  of  the  maps  and  docu- 
ments in  the  possession  of  the  Isthmian  Canal  Com- 


198  PANAMA. 

mission,  the  Board  of  Consulting  Engineers  spent 
three  weeks  on  the  Isthmus.  Upon  the  return  of 
the  Board  to  the  United  States  early  in  December, 
it  was  given  out  that  their  report  would  not  be  signed 
and  submitted  until  February,  or  March,  of  1906. 
It  was,  however,  allowed  to  be  known  that  the  final 
recommendation  of  the  Board  would  favor  a  sea-level 
canal.  The  majority  which  reached  this  decision 
was  made  up  of  the  five  foreign  members,  together 
with  General  Davis,  Professor  Burr  and  Mr.  Par- 
sons. The  remaining  five  members,  all  Americans, 
advocated  a  lock  canal.  This  conclusion  of  the  ad- 
visory engineers  was  received  with  disappointment 
throughout  the  country  and  especially  in  adminis- 
tration circles. 

A   DISAPPOINTING    CONCLUSION. 

The  Walker  Commission,  after  detailing  the  re- 
quirements of  a  sea-level  canal,  had  stated :  "  Whilst 
such  a  plan  would  be  physically  practicable  and 
might  be  adopted  if  no  other  solution  were  available, 
the  difficulties  of  all  kinds,  and  especially  those  of 
time  and  cost,  Avould  be  so  great  that  a  canal  with 
a  summit  level  reached  by  locks  is  to  be  preferred." 
It  was  upon  this  testimony,  arrived  at  by  the  ex- 
penditure of  much  time  and  a  million  dollars,  that 
Congress  made  its  appropriation  for  a  lock  canal. 
The  people  had  formed  an  idea  that  it  was  an  ac- 


A  DISAPPOINTING  CONCLUSION.  199 

cepted  matter,  and  they  were  not  inclined  to  be  easily 
reconciled  to  a  contrary  decision  on  the  part  of  a 
majority  of  the  engineers,  no  matter  how  eminent, 
who  were  foreigners  and  therefore  might  be  supposed 
to  have  less  concern  than  Americans  regarding  the 
cost  and  delay  entailed  by  following  their  proposal. 
At  the  present  time  it  is  impossible  to  tell  what 
may  be  the  outcome  of  the  report  of  the  Advisory 
Board.  The  body  acted  in  a  purely  consultative 
capacity  and  there  is  no  obligation,  implied  or  other- 
wise, to  heed  its  recommendations.  The  President 
is  known  to  be  strongly  averse  to  changing  the  plans 
in  any  manner  that  would  involve  serious  uncertainty 
as  to  money  and  time  that  will  be  required  for  the 
completion  of  the  undertaking.  The  Secretary  of 
War  and  a  majority  in  Congress  are  in  accord  with 
his  sentiments,.  The  law  gives  him  unquestionable 
authority  to  proceed  with  the  canal  in  the  way  he 
thinks  fit  He  may,  if  he  chooses,  entirely  disre- 
gard the  advice  of  the  Board  as  to  the  form  of  the 
waterway  and  continue  the  work  on  the  present  lines 
with  a  view  to  the  completion  of  the  canal  with  locks. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  President  should  adopt 
the  recommendation  of  the  Board  it  would  be  neces- 
sary for  him  to  secure  the  endorsement  of  Congress 
in  the  form  of  a  further  appropriation  to  meet  the 
additional  cost  of  sea-level  construction.  It  is  proba- 
ble that  the  President  will  formally  submit  the  re- 
port of  the  Board  to  Congress,  accompanied  by  a 


200  PANAMA. 

message  arguing  the  desirability  of  adhering  to  the 
lock-level  project. 

CONSIDERATION    OF    THE    EIVAX,    PROJECTS. 

It  is  universally  admitted  that  a  sea-level  canal  is 
the  ideal  waterway.  It  would  involve  few  engineer- 
ing problems  of  consequence  that  would  be  absent 
from  the  plans  for  a  lock  canal.  The  two  important 
elements  of  construction  are  the  same  in  either  case 
—  the  control  of  the  Chagres  and  the  passage  of  the 
divide.  In  both  cases  it  would  be  necessary  to  pro- 
vide for  one  or  more  dams  and  spillways  to  accommo- 
date the  flood  waters  of  the  river  and  the  diversion 
of  its  lower  course  is  also  a  feature  of  each  project. 
The  construction  of  a  sea-level  canal  would  require 
a  much  deeper  cut  at  the  Culebra  pass  and  other 
points,  but  it  might  not  entail  any  greater  difficul- 
ties in  excavation  than  may  be  expected  in  digging 
a  lock  level,  though  the  task  of  transportation  to  the 
dumps,  a  very  serious  one  under  any  circumstances, 
would  be  greatly  enhanced  by  the  greater  excavation. 

As  to  the  time  that  should  be  estimated  for  mak- 
ing a  waterway  at  the  level  of  the  oceans,  expert  opin- 
ions differ.  It  is  believed  that  the  Board  will  place 
it  at  fifteen  years,  whilst  many  authorities  are  in- 
clined to  the  belief  that  twenty  would  be  a  more 
reasonable  figure. 


IX. 

PANAMA. 
THE  PLAN  OF  THE  CANAL. 

Sea-level  Plan  Recommended  by  the  Board  —  The  Starting 
Point  of  the  Canal  —  Accommodation  for  the  Largest  Ves- 
sels—  The  Question  of  Time  —  The  Great  Culebra  Cut 

—  The   Board's   Estimate  of  Time  —  Cost  of  Maintenance 

—  Lock    Canal    Project    of    the    Minority  —  The    Config- 
uration   of    the    Canal    Line  —  Excavation    in    the    Cut  — 
The  Lake  and  Dam  at  Gatun  —  Dimensions  of  the  Dam  — 
Enormous   Weight   of   the   Dam  —  The   Advantages  of   the 
Gatun  Dam  —  Important  Matter  of  Water  Supply  —  The 
Summit  Level  —  Lake  Sosa  —  Early   Suggestions  Adopted 

—  The  Gatun   Locks  —  Differences  of  Opinion  as   to  Type 
of  Canal  —  The  Board  Depreciated  the  "  Soo  "  Canal. 

The  report  of  the  International  Board  of  Consult- 
ing Engineers  was  transmitted  to  Congress  by  the 
President,  February  19,  1906.  The  report  was 
accompanied  by  letters  of  comment  and  advice  from 
the  President,  Secretary  Taft,  Chairman  Shonts  and 
Chief  Engineer  Stevens,  all  of  whom  substantially 
agree  in  their  criticisms  and  suggestions. 

As  had  been  anticipated,  a  majority  of  the  Board, 
composed  of  the  following  members,  recommended 

the  construction  of  the  canal  on  the  so-called  "  sea- 

201 


202  PANAMA. 

level " :  Messrs.  Hunter,  Tincauser,  Guerard,  Quel- 
lenec,  Welcker,  being  all  the  foreigners,  and  the  three 
Americans,  Messrs.  Davis,  Parsons  and  Burr.  The 
Board  made  a  close  study  of  the  question  in  all  its 
aspects,  both  at  Washington  and  upon  the  Isthmus. 
The  plan  of  a  former  Isthmian  Canal  Commission, 
that  of  the  Comite  Technique,  and  several  plans  sub- 
mitted by  individual  engineers,  were  carefully  exam- 
ined. 

SEA-LEVEL  PLAN   RECOMMENDED  BY  THE  BOARD. 

The  report  is  prefaced  by  a  statement  of  the  rea- 
sons why  a  sea-level  canal  is  feasible  only  in  the 
Panama  region.  The  width  of  the  Isthmus  of  Pan- 
ama is  less  than  at  any  other  point  that  may  be  con- 
sidered. It  is  but  thirty-six  miles  from  sea  to  sea 
as  the  crow  flies.  This  is  five  miles  greater  than  the 
distance  at  San  Bias,  but  there  an  open  cut,  or,  in- 
deed, any  kind  of  canal  is  impracticable  on  several 
accounts.  The  original  summit  on  the  Panama  route 
was  no  more  than  333  feet  above  the  sea,  and  this  is 
lower  than  the  summit  of  the  divide  at  any  other 
point  on  either  continent,  with  the  exception  of  Nic- 
aragua, where  a  sea-level  canal  has  never  been  within 
the  bounds  of  consideration. 

The  general  direction  of  the  Isthmus  of  Panama 
is  nearly  northeast  and  southwest  and  the  general 
route  for  the  canal  nearly  northwest  and  south- 


THE  CANAL  ROUTE.  203 

east  The  summit  at  Culebra  lies  about  nine  miles 
from  Panama  Bay,  and  the  distance  between  the 
point  on  the  northern  approach  to  this  summit,  where 
the  present  elevation  on  the  proposed  canal  axis  is 
100  feet  above  sea  level,  to  the  point  on  the  southern 
approach  to  Culebra  at  the  same  height,  is  nearly 
nine  miles.  Within  this  distance  will  be  found  nearly 
one-half  the  total  excavation  required  to  make  an 
open  channel  at  the  sea  level  adequate  in  dimensions 
and  capacity  to  pass  not  only  the  largest  existing 
commercial  and  naval  vessels,  but  the  largest  which 
may  be  expected  to  require  transfer  between  the  At- 
lantic and  Pacific  oceans  for  many  years  to  come. 

For  the  ultimate  construction  of  the  proposed  sea- 
level  canal  the  Board  approves  in  general  the  align- 
ment adopted  by  the  two  French  companies,  to  which 
later  plans  have  conformed  more  or  less.  Some 
slight  changes  of  direction  are,  however,  recom- 
mended for  the  purpose  of  reducing  curvature  and 
minimizing  excavation. 

Colon  and  La  Boca  are  retained  as  the  terminals, 
but  extensive  improvements  at  each  entrance  are  sug- 
gested. 

THE   STARTING    POINT   OF    THE    CANAI/. 

The  initial  point  of  the  axis  of  the  canal  is  located' 
about  one  mile  northwest  of  Manzanillo  light. 
Thence  the  line  runs  direct  to  the  mouth  of  the  River 


204  PANAMA. 

Hindi,  where  it  connects  with  the  centre  line  of  the 
canal  as  partially  excavated  by  the  Panama  Canal 
Company.  From  Mindi  the  proposed  line  is  along 
the  cutting  in  question  nearly  as  far  as  Bohio,  a  dis- 
tance of  12  miles.  The  canal  first  meets  the  Chagres 
at  Gatun  and  repeatedly  cuts  its  course  between  that 
town  and  Bohio. 

After  passing  Bohio  the  ground  gradually  rises 
toward  the  divide.  The  bed  of  the  Chagres  is  prac- 
tically at  sea  level  at  Bohio,  whilst  at  Obispo,  14 
miles  distant,  it  is  50  feet  above  sea  level.  Between 
these  two  points  the  canal  follows  the  general  course 
of  the  river,  coinciding  with  it  or  cutting  it  at  many 
points.  At  Obispo,  or  Gamboa,  which  are  less  than  a 
mile  apart,  the  trend  of  the  Chagres  valley  is  to  the 
northeast  almost  at  right  angles  to  its  former  course, 
but  the  canal  maintains  the  southeasterly  direction 
followed  by  it  from  Colon  to  Obispo.  The  project 
contemplates  a  dam  at  Gamboa  to  control  the  floods 
of  the  Chagres.  The  waters  escaping  from  the  reser- 
voir through  regulating  sluices  would  enter  the  canal 
prism  about  a  mile  below  Obispo. 

Obispo  may  be  considered  the  northern  entrance 
to  the  great  cut  through  the  divide;  from  this  point 
the  ground  rises  abruptly.  Between  Obispo  and  Pe- 
dro Miguel  the  greater  part  of  the  material  to  be  ex- 
cavated in  accordance  with  this  plan  would  be  rock. 
A  sea-level  canal  would  require  a  cut  to  a  depth  of 
373  feet  from  the  original  summit  The  present 


CAPACITY  OF  CANAL.  205 

excavation  has,  however,  reached  a  depth  of  160  feet, 
so  that  213  feet  would  be  the  maximum  of  future  ex- 
cavation required  for  a  sea-level  canal  with  a  depth 
of  40  feet.  The  length  of  the  cut  between  Obispo 
and  Pedro  Miguel  is  nearly  nine  miles. 

The  line  of  the  canal  reaches  low  marshy  ground 
about  two  miles  below  Pedro  Miguel.  Thence  to 
deep  water  in  Panama  Bay  the  Board  has  adopted  a 
different  alignment  from  that  of  the  French  plan. 
The  latter  closely  conformed  to  the  course  of  the  Rio 
Grande  to  its  mouth  at  La  Boca.  This  line  avoids  a 
considerable  amount  of  rock  excavation,  but  involves 
two  curves,  in  order  to  exclude  which  the  line  of  the 
Board  takes  a  straight  direction  from  Miraflores 
through  the  Rio  Grande  swamp.  The  canal  con- 
tinues in  a  straight  line  to  and  through  the  saddle 
between  Ancon  and  Sosa  hills,  where  the  tidal  lock 
is  to  be  placed,  and  thence  to  deep  water  off  Isla  Fla- 
menco. The  plan  provides  for  levees  from  Mira- 
flores to  the  lock  so  as  to  prevent  the  tidal  flow  from 
entering  the  canal.  The  French  plan  required  a 
tidal  lock  at  Miraflores,  about  five  miles  from  the 
coast 

ACCOMMODATION    FOR    THE    LARGEST   VESSELS. 

The  proposed  dimensions  of  the  sea-level  canal  are 
calculated  to  facilitate  the  passage  of  the  largest  ves- 
sels afloat  and  to  allow  for  some  increase  of  size  and 


206  PANAMA. 

draft  in  the  future.  It  is  believed  by  the  Board 
that  a  canal  constructed  on  the  plan  suggested  might 
be  traversed  by  a  ship  of  90  feet  beam  and  38  feet 
draft  at  a  speed  of  four  or  five  miles  an  hour.  The 
largest  existing  vessels  might  make  six  miles  an  hour 
and  the  average  craft  eight.  These  speeds  would 
permit  of  passages  ranging  from  five  to  ten  hours  in 
time. 

Summarized,  the  sea-level  canal  as  recommended 
by  the  Board  is  a  channel  commencing  at  the  41-foot 
contour  in  Limon  Bay,  about  5,000  feet  northerly  of 
a  line  between  Toro  and  Manzanillo  lights,  protected 
by  two  converging  jetties  with  a  width  of  opening  of 
1,000  feet;  thence  with  a  straight  channel  500  feet 
in  width  at  the  bottom  and  a  depth  of  40  feet,  pro- 
tected by  a  parallel  jetty  on  the  west  and  by  Man- 
zanillo Island  on  the  east,  to  Mindi,  whence  the  land 
canal  commences.  This  canal  is  designed  with  a 
depth  of  40  feet  and  a  bottom  width  of  150  feet  in 
earth,  with  side  slopes  adjusted  to  the  nature  of  the 
ground  so  as  to  give  a  surface  width  of  from  302 
feet  to  437  feet.  In  rock  the  section  is  to  be  altered 
so  as  to  have  a  bottom  width  of  200  feet  and  a  sur- 
face width  of  208  feet.  At  the  Pacific  end,  the 
canal  is  to  be  furnished  with  a  tidal  lock  located 
between  Ancon  and  Sosa  hills.  Beyond  this  lock  a 
straight  channel  is  to  project  into  the  Bay  of  Panama 
with  a  bottom  width  of  300  feet  and  extending  for 
a  distance  of  three  and  three-fourths  miles  to  the  45- 


QUESTION  OF'  TIME.  207 

foot  contour.*  The  width  adopted  for  the  canal  will 
be  sufficient  to  permit  steamers  to  maintain  a  speed 
of  six  to  eight  knots  per  hour,  and  to  allow  two  ordi- 
nary steamers  to  pass  each  other  on  the  line  of  the 
canal  without  stopping. 

At  Gamboa  there  is  to  be  located  a  dam,  either  of 
masonry  or  of  earth  and  masonry  combined,  for  the 
control  of  the  Chagres,  and  at  Corozal,  sluices  by 
which,  during  half  the  tide  period  when  the  level  in 
the  Pacific  is  lower  than  that  in  the  Atlantic,  water 
can  be  discharged  from  the  canal  into  Panama  Bay. 

The  entire  length  of  the  line  between  shores  is  a 
little  over  40  miles,  while  the  total  distance,  includ- 
ing harbor  channels,  is  49.35  miles.  The  total  length 
of  curves  is  19.17  miles,  leaving  30.18  miles  of  tan- 
gents, or  straight  stretches. 

THE    QUESTION   OF   TIME. 

In  proceeding  to  its  estimate  of  the  time  necessary 
for  the  construction  of  a  canal,  which  "  is  one  of  the 
main  elements  of  the  whole  question,"  the  Board 
confidently  assumes  that  its  plan  is  superior  to  the 
lock-level  project  On  this  assumption  it  concludes 
that  "  if  the  work  required  under  the  less  desirable 
plan  can  be  finished  within  ten  or  twelve  years,  while 
that  under  the  more  desirable  plan  would  require  but 


*  Contours  refer  to  mean  sea  level. 


208  PANAMA. 

two  years  longer,  the  small  delay  in  the  passage  of 
the  first  vessel  through  the  waterway  might  easily 
be  neglected  in  comparison  with  the  advantages  se- 
cured under  the  better  plan."  The  plan  involves 
three  great  tasks  —  the  installation  of  the  locks,  the 
construction  of  the  dam  at  Gamboa  and  the  excava- 
tion at  the  summit.  The  last  is  considered  the  con- 
trolling factor  in  the  expenditure  of  time,  as  it  will 
consume  greatly  more  than  any  other  portion  of  the 
work.  The  final  estimate  then  is  based  upon  a  calcu- 
lation of  the  length  of  time  necessary  to  complete  the 
great  cut. 

THE    GftEAT   CULEBEA   CUT. 

The  Board  is  of  the  opinion,  derived  from  a  study 
of  the  work  already  accomplished  upon  the  prism, 
that  "  from  80  to  100  steam  shovels  of  the  most  effect 
tive  type  now  in  use  on  the  Isthmus  can  be  efficiently 
employed  continually  on  this  work  after  complete 
organization.  It  will  require  from  two  to  two  and  a 
half  years  to  install  and  put  in  operation  this  exca- 
vating plant.  The  independent  studies  by  the  Board 
of  the  arrangement  of  railroad  tracks  and  of  com- 
plete systems  of  attack  at  both  ends  of  this  summit 
cut  completely  confirm  the  conservatism  of  the  evi- 
dence given  before  it  It  is  as  clearly  demonstrable 
as  any  estimate  of  rate  of  progress  and  time  for  the 
completion  of  any  great  engineering  work  can  be 


TRANSPORTATION  PROBLEM.  209 

that  after  the  full  installation  of  plant  not  less  than 
100  steam  shovels  may  be  continuously  engaged  be- 
tween Obispo  and  Pedro  Miguel  until  the  amount  of 
work  remaining  to  be  done  becomes  too  small  to 
afford  space  for  the  operation  of  the  whole  plant. 

"  The  Board  recognizes  that  the  removal  of  the 
material  in  the  summit  cut  is  in  reality  a  problem 
of  transportation.  It  is  a  comparatively  simple  mat- 
ter to  excavate  the  material  within  a  much  shorter 
time  than  that  allowed  for  the  work,  even  on  the  sup- 
position that  all  of  it  except  the  clay  near  the  surface 
must  be  shattered  by  preliminary  blasting.  The 
whole  difficulty  attending  this  part  of  the  construc- 
tion of  the  canal  is  attached  to  the  removal  of  the 
material  from  the  shovels  or  other  excavators  to  the 
spoil  banks.  This  problem  of  transportation  is  in 
reality  the  substance  of  the  problem  of  building  the 
transisthmian  canal,  and,  in  treating  this  part  of  the 
project,  the  Board  realizes  and  has  considered  the 
large  amount  of  railroad  track  and  the  extensive 
transportation  organization  required  for  the  dispo- 
sition of  the  waste  material.  It  is  probable,  as  has 
been  estimated,  that  not  less  than  three  miles  of  stand- 
ard track  will  be  required  for  each  shovel  employed, 
making  a  total  of  300  miles  of  trackage  for  100 
shovels. 

"  If  it  be  assumed  that  100  shovels  are  available 
for  continuous  work,  there  being  a  sufficient  surplus 

above  that  number  undergoing  repairs  whenever  nec- 
14 


210  PANAMA. 

essary  to  maintain  the  working  complement,  it  can 
be  demonstrated  that  as  much  as  20,000,000  cubic 
yards  of  material  classed  as  rock  may  be  annually 
removed  from   the   summit   cut.     This  estimate   is 
based  upon  an  average  number  of  working  days  of 
not  less  than   20  per  month  throughout  the  year, 
which  is  an  underestimate  on  the  basis  of  the  experi- 
ence of  the  French  companies  and  of  that  which  has 
accrued  since  American  occupation  began  in  May, 
1904.     In  this  estimate  the  capacity  of  one  shovel 
is  taken  as  materially  less  than  would  be  justified 
by  the  actual  operation  of  steam  shovels  in  the  Cule- 
bra  Cut  during  the  past  year,  both  in  wet  and  dry 
seasons.     Furthermore,  it  has  been  supposed  that  the 
working  day  is  to  be  but  eight  hours  long  and  that 
one  shift  only  of  laborers  would  be  employed  per  day, 
whereas  it  is  perfectly  feasible  to  work  two  shifts  in 
twenty-four  hours   during  the  greater   part  of  the 
year  and  possibly   during  the  whole  year.     Using 
these  estimates  for  the  period  of  what  may  be  as- 
sumed to  be  the  maximum  annual  output  in  the  Cule- 
bra  Cut,  and  allowing  at  least  two  and  a  half  years 
to  attain  this  maximum  rate  at  the  beginning  of  the 
work  and  a  period  of  not  less  than  three  years  for  a 
decreasing  output  in  the  more  contracted  space  in 
the  lower   portions   of  the  cut  during  the   closing 
period  of  the  operations,  it  is  found  that  the  entire 
quantity  of  110,000,000  cubic  yards  of  material  in 
the  divide  can  be  removed  within  ten  years. 


ARGUMENT  FOR  SEA-LEVEL.  211 

"  Although  the  preceding  estimate  of  time  has 
been  based  upon  ample  allowances  for  the  effect  of 
the  rainy  seasons,  for  the  low  grade  of  labor  availa- 
ble on  the  Isthmus,  and  for  climatic  conditions  in 
general,  the  Board  has  added  about  25  per  cent  to  it 
for  other  contingent  causes  of  delay,  either  similar 
to  those  already  provided  for  or  of  any  other  charac- 
ter. It  is  therefore  the  judgment  of  the  Board  that 
a  ship  canal  on  the  sea-level  plan  outlined  in  this  re- 
port can  be  completed  within  a  period  of  time  not  ex- 
ceeding twelve  or  thirteen  years." 

ARGUMENT  FOE   SEA-LEVEL    CANAL. 

The  report  goes  on  to  a  statement  of  the  reasons  for 
preferring  a  sea-level  canal  to  one  on  the  lock  plan. 
Many  of  these  reasons  are  vigorously  disputed  by  the 
minority  section  of  the  Board  who  have  the  support 
of  a  number  of  engineers  thoroughly  conversant  with 
the  subject 

The  chief  argument  of  the  Board  for  the  adoption 
of  its  plan  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  any  type 
of  canal  involving  lift  locks  as  an  essential  feature 
must  entail  a  degree  of  hazard  in  the  matter  of  ob- 
structions and  accidents  that  would  be  absent  from 
a  waterway  at  sea  level.  A  large  proportion  of  the 
report  is  devoted  to  the  advancement  of  this  propo- 
sition which,  as  we  shall  see  later,  is  open  to  question, 
to  say  the  least  of  it.  In  the  opinion  of  the  Board 


212  PANAMA. 

the  "  locks  constitute  a  restriction  or  limit  to  the 
capacity  for  traffic  of  the  waterway  in  which  they  are 
found,  i.  e.,  they  are  in  a  substantial  measure  ob- 
structions to  navigation.  There  is  a  limit  to  the 
number  of  lockages  per  day  which  may  be  made,  per- 
haps not  to  exceed  ten  per  lock  or  twenty  per  pair 
in  any  of  the  lock  plans  hitherto  considered.  The 
maintenance  and  operation  of  locks  is  also  expensive. 

COST    OF    MAINTENANCE. 

"  If  of  such  great  dimensions  as  those  considered 
necessary  by  the  Board  under  the  Spooner  Act,  they 
require  the  installation,  maintenance,  and  operation 
of  an  extensive  power  plant  for  the  working  of  the 
gates.  It  is  not  easy  to  estimate  what  the  annual 
cost  of  maintenance,  including  renewals  and  opera- 
tion, of  these  would  be,  but,  using  the  estimates  of  the 
Isthmian  Canal  Commission  of  1899-1901,  it  is 
probable  that  the  annual  cost  of  operation  of  the  six 
locks  contemplated  in  the  project  brought  before  the 
Board  would  be  about  $525,000.  This  annual  charge 
capitalized  at  three  per  cent  would  make  a  sum  of 
$17,500,000  to  be  added  to  the  cost  of  the  lock  canal. 
The  corresponding  item  in  the  sea-level  plan  would  be 
the  capitalized  annual  cost  of  operating  the  tidal 
locks  near  Panama. 


COST  OF  SEA-LEVEL.  213 

"  It  has  already  been  stated  as  the  opinion  of  the 
Board  that  the  time  required  for  the  construction  of 
the  Panama  Canal  with  a  summit  level  at  60  feet 
above  mean  sea  level  will  at  best  be  only  two  years 
less  than  required  for  the  construction  of  the  sea- 
level  canal.  But,  as  affecting  this  question  of  time, 
it  should  be  observed  that  accidents  during  construc- 
tion leading  to  an  extension  of  the  time  required  to 
complete  the  canal  would  be  more  likely  to  occur  in 
the  more  numerous  structures  involved  in  the  build- 
ing of  the  lock  canal  than  in  the  works  of  the  sea- 
level  canal.  It  has  further  been  shown  that  the  dif- 
ference in  cost  between  the  two  plans  will  not  exceed 
about  $71,000,000  in  favor  of  the  former,  which 
must  be  reduced  by  the  capitalized  cost  of  the  main- 
tenance and  operation  of  locks  and  by  the  cost  of  the 
overflowed  lands." 

The  report  closes  with  an  expression  of  the  belief 
of  the  Board  that  "  the  essential  and  the  indispensa- 
ble features  of  a  convenient  and  safe  ship  canal  at 
the  American  Isthmus  are  now  known;  that  such  a 
canal  can  be  constructed  in  twelve  or  thirteen  years' 
time ;  that  the  cost  will  be  less  than  $250,000,000 ; 
that  it  will  endure  for  all  time." 

The  minority  report  was  signed  by  Messrs.  Noble, 
Abbot,  Stearns,  Ripley  and  Randolph.  The  project 
proposed  by  it  is  set  forth  more  exhaustively  and 
with  greater  precision  than  is  the  plan  recommended 
by  the  majority. 


214  PANAMA. 

The  minority  "believe  a  lock  canal  the  better  one 
for  the  United  States  to  construct,  for  the  following 
reasons:  1.  Greater  capacity  for  traffic  than  af- 
forded by  the  narrow  waterway  proposed  by  the 
Board.  2.  Greater  safety  for  ships  and  less  danger 
of  interruption  to  traffic  by  reason  of  the  wider  and 
deeper  channels  which  the  lock  canal  makes  possible 
at  small  cost.  3.  Quicker  passage  across  the  Isth- 
mus for  large  ships  or  a  large  traffic.  4.  Materially 
less  time  required  for  construction.  5.  Materially 
less  cost."  It  will  be  noted  that  the  most  important 
of  these  considerations  are  precisely  the  advantages 
which  the  Board  claims  for  the  sea-level  over  the 
lock  type  of  waterway,  but,  it  may  be  added,  the 
minority  has  made  out  a  strong  enough  case  on  its 
side  to  gain  the  support  of  the  Canal  Commission  and 
of  the  Administration. 

LOCK  CANAL  PROJECT  OF  THE  MINORITY. 

The  project  is  a  modification  of  that  proposed  by 
the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  of  1899-1901,  which 
was  itself  based  upon  a  number  of  preceding  plans. 
The  summit  level  is  practically  the  same  in  each  case. 
The  minority  plan  provides  for  greater  dimensions 
than  did  that  of  the  Commission,  and  recommends  a 
dam  at  Gatun  in  place  of  that  proposed  at  Bohio  and 
places  the  terminal  lock  at  Sosa  instead  of  at  Mira- 
flores. 


THE  CANAL  ROUTE.  215 

A  brief  description  of  the  configuration  of  the  land 
along  the  canal  line  will  conduce  to  a  clearer  under- 
standing of  the  plan  proposed  by  the  minority, 
which  may  safely  be  assumed  to  be  that  on  which 
the  waterway  will  be  ultimately  built. 

THE    CONFIGURATION    OF    THE    CANAL    LINE. 

The  Island  of  Manzanillo,  off  the  northwestern 
point  of  which  the  harbor  entrance  to  the  canal  is 
located,  lies  to  a  considerable  extent  below  the  level 
of  the  ocean.  Whilst  the  harbor  entrance  to  the  chan- 
nel is  located  off  the  northwestern  point  of  the  Island 
of  Manzanillo,  it  is  at  the  mouth  of  the  River  Mindi, 
four  and  a  half  miles  beyond,  that  the  land  canal  be- 
gins. Here  the  surface  of  the  ground  is  slightly  above 
the  ocean  level.  Three  miles  farther  on  it  attains  a 
height  of  85  feet  in  the  vicinity  of  Gatun.  It  then 
dips  abruptly  and  from  Gatun  to  Obispo,  a  distance 
of  23  miles,  lies  at  a  general  elevation  of  40  feet 
above  the  mean  level  of  the  Atlantic.  Obispo  may 
be  called  the  northern  entrance  to  the  divide  and 
Pedro  Miguel  its  southern  exit.  The  Culebra  Cut, 
which  extends  between  these  points,  is  at  present  at 
an  elevation  of  173  feet,  being  160  feet  lower  than 
the  original  crest.  The  cut  as  defined  extends  ap- 
proximately from  point  31  to  point  39.*  From  Pe- 


*  See  profile  map  of  the  Canal  line. 


216  PANAMA. 

idro  Miguel  to  Sosa  Hill,  on  the  shore  of  Panama 
Bay,  is  a  stretch  of  six  miles,  throughout  which  the 
land  hardly  anywhere  exceeds  an  elevation  of  more 
than  10  feet  above  the  mean  level  of  the  Pacific 
Ocean.  From  Sosa  Hill  to  the  7-fathom  contour  in 
the  Bay,  near  Isla  Perico  where  the  channel  termi- 
nates at  point  49.72,  is  a  distance  of  about  five  miles. 
Thus  we  have  the  canal  line  divided  into  four  dis~ 
tinct  sections:  1.  The  Atlantic  Ocean  Level,  length 
7.15  miles.  2.  The  Summit  Level,  length  31.64 
miles.  3.  The  Pedro  Miguel-Sosa  Level,  length 
5.47  miles.  4.  The  Pacific  Ocean  Level,  length 
4.23  miles.  The  sum  of  these  sections  gives  us  an 
aggregate  of  48.49  miles,  and  if  we  add  to  this  the 
total  measurements  of  the  locks,  we  shall  have  49.72 
miles,  being  the  exact  length  of  the  axis  of  the  canal. 

The  project  of  the  85-foot  lock-level  waterway  is 
as  simple  as  it  is  practicable.  It  consists  briefly  in 
damming  the  Chagres  on  one  side  of  the  divide  and 
the  Rio  Grande  on  the  other,  and  so  forming  two 
large  artificial  lakes.  One  of  these  will  extend  the 
full  length  of  Section  2  and  the  other  of  Section  3. 
The  two  outer  sections  will  be  tidal  channels  at  sea 
level. 

A  glance  at  the  profile  map  will  show  that  in  order 
to  secure  a  depth  of  45  feet  throughout  the  canal, 
under  this  plan  very  little  dredging  and  excavation 
will  be  required  as  compared  with  the  amount  neces- 
sary to  the  construction  of  a  waterway  at  sea  level. 


o 


EXCAVATION  IN  THE  CUT.  2171 

The  former  has  its  bottom  at  elevation  40  above  sea 
level;  the  latter  at  40  below.  It  is,  however,  only 
where  the  ground  stands  at  elevation  40  or  over,  that 
there  will  be  a  clear  saving  of  80  feet  in  this  respect. 
In  places,  such  as  the  terminal  channels,  the  depth 
of  excavation  requisite  will  be  the  same  in  each  case 
and  the  fact  that  the  lock  plan  contemplates  a  much 
broader  channel  through  much  of  the  course  tends  to 
decrease  the  disparity  in  the  respective  excavations. 

EXCAVATION    IN    THE    CTJT. 

Between  points  8  and  25  there  is  practically  no 
elevation  exceeding  40,  and  consequently  the  natural 
bottom  is  at  or  below  the  desired  level.  From  San 
Pablo,  point  25,  to  Obispo,  point  31  plus,  some  small 
material  must  be  removed,  but  the  work  involved  will 
be  insignificant  The  Cut  must  be  reduced  by  133 
feet  to  reach  the  standard  level  of  the  bottom  of  the 
lock  canal.  For  the  sea-level  construction  it  would 
be  necessary  to  go  80  feet  deeper  and  the  extra  depth 
would  be  through  hard  rock  requiring  to  be  blasted. 
In  Lake  Sosa,  which  will  have  a  water  level  at  55 
feet,  no  work  worth  mentioning  will  be  needed  to 
secure  the  45-foot  depth,  because,  as  has  been  stated, 
the  ground  lies,  with  insignificant  exception,  below 
elevation  10. 

In  general  the  minority  approves  the  Board's  plans 
for  the  Colon  entrance,  but  suggests  that  the  break- 


218  PANAMA. 

water  might  be  altogether  dispensed  with  as  expen- 
sive and  unnecessary,  and  the  channel  widened  to 
1,000  or  more  feet,  with  advantage  to  navigation  and 
with  a  reduction  in  cost. 

From  the  point  where  the  land  canal  commences, 
near  the  mouth  of  the  Mindi,  a  500-foot  channel  is 
to  be  continued  2.6  miles  to  the  locks  at  Gatun. 

THE   LAKE  ANT>  DAM   AT    GATUN. 

The  controlling  feature  of  the  project,  with  sum- 
mit level  at  elevation  85,  is  the  earth  dam  across  the 
Chagres  at  Gatun.  The  object  of  this  dam  is  to 
form  a  great  reservoir,  or  inland  lake,  in  which  the 
floods  of  the  Chagres  may  be  received  and  from 
which  the  surplus  water  will  be  discharged  through 
sluices  and  the  height  of  water  in  the  reservoir  regu- 
lated. Lake  Gatun  will  be  about  110  square  miles 
in  area  and  will  form  the  summit  level  of  the  canal. 
The  lake  will  also  serve  to  impound  water  for  lock- 
age and  other  purposes  during  the  dry  season  and 
to  give  free,  open  navigation  in  a  broad  waterway 
all  the  way  from  Gatun  to  Obispo. 

Every  plan  for  a  lock  canal  at  Panama  has  in- 
cluded a  dam  across  the  Chagres.  Various  sites 
for  the  structure  have  been  suggested,  the  most  fa- 
vored being  Gamboa,  Bohio,  and  Gatun.  The  plan 
of  the  Commission,  which  has  been  referred  to,  con- 
templated a  dam  at  Bohio,  forming  a  lake  32  square 


GATUN  DAM.  219 

miles  in  extent.  The  minority  report  presents  forci- 
ble reasons  for  substituting  the  Gatun  dam.  The 
project  when  put  into  effect  will  transform  the  canal 
prism-  into  two  lakes  practically  extending  from  coast 
to  coast  and  joined  by  the  channel  through  the  divide. 
The  conclusions  of  the  minority  in  this  matter  are 
based  upon  a  great  number  of  borings  and  recent 
topographical  surveys.  From  these  it  is  apparent 
that  Gatun  affords  not  only  an  entirely  suitable  loca- 
tion for  the  dam  but  also  an  excellent  site,  on  the 
neighboring  high  ground,  for  locks.  Investigation 
along  these  lines  seems  to  establish  the  fact,  which 
is  of  the  greatest  importance,  that  there  would  be 
no  appreciable  seepage  under  the  dam,  owing  to  the 
practically  impervious  nature  of  the  material  on 
which  it  would  rest.  In  places  where  material  of  a 
somewhat  less  favorable  character  is  found,  it  is 
covered  with  a  blanket  of  practically  impervious 
material  200  feet  in  thickness.  The  plans  for  the 
dam  contemplate  a  structure  of  earth  which  could 
not  be  destroyed  by  the  forces  of  nature  and  "  could 
only  be  destroyed  by  making  excavations  which  would 
require  a  large  force  working  for  a  long  time." 

DIMENSIONS  OF  THE  DAM. 

The  top  of  the  dam  is  100  feet  wide  and  stands 
50  feet  above  the  normal  level  of  the  lake;  at  water 
level  the  distance  through  the  dam  is  374  feet,  and 


PANAMA. 


GATUNDAM 


GATUN    DAM. 

The  embankment,  with  its  great  sluice,  extends 
across  the  map,  with  the  Locks  upon  the  extreme 
right. 

The  Panama  Railroad  will  be  diverted  to  a  line 
east  of  the  Locks  and  will  cross  an  arm  of  Lake 
Gatun  over  a  causeway,  via  Tiger  Hill,  to  dry  ground 
near  Ahorca  Lagarto. 


DIMENSIONS  OF  DAM.  221 

at  sea  level  the  corresponding  distance  is  2,625  feet, 
or  one-half  mile.  For  the  upstream  slope,  rock  ob- 
tained from  canal  excavations  will  be  dumped  as 
riprap,  with  a  special  thickness  about  the  level  at 
which  the  dam  will  be  exposed  to  wave  action. 
Above  elevation  80  the  dam  will  be  built  of  imper- 
vious material  to  a  few  feet  above  the  water  level, 
and  the  higher  portions  will  be  made  of  whatever 
materials  may  be  most  convenient,  it  being  expected 
that  spoil  from  the  Culebra  Cut  will  be  used  to  a 
great  extent. 

ENORMOUS    WEIGHT   OF   THE  DAM. 

A  dam  such  as  the  one  proposed  is  enormously 
heavy,  the  weight  upon  its  foundation  being  about 
one  ton  per  square  foot  for  each  20  feet  in  height  of 
embankment:  Under  the  highest  part  of  the  em- 
bankment the  pressure  would  be  six  and  one-half  tons 
per  square  foot.  It  is  believed  that  this  dam  will 
be  earthquake  proof.  It  is  designed  to  be  veiy  much 
stronger  than  the  greatest  existing  earth  dams  in  the 
world,  those  of  San  Leandro  and  Pilarcitos,  con- 
nected respectively  with  the  waterworks  systems  of 
Oakland  and  San  Francisco. 

The  total  length  of  the  dam  from  the  locks  to  the 
westerly  end  is  1,700  feet.  About  midway  in  its 
length  is  rising  ground  through  which  it  is  proposed 
to  excavate  a  diversion  channel  to  carry  the  Chagres 


222  PANAMA. 

during  the  construction  of  the  dam.  The  regulating 
works,  which  will  be  described  hereafter,  are  to  be 
located  on  each  side  of  the  diversion  channel  and 
partly  within  it.  On  either  flank  of  the  rising 
ground  to  which  reference  has  been  made,  and  ex- 
tending from  it  westerly  to  the  high  ground  and 
easterly  to  the  locks  at  the  back  of  Gatun,  there  will 
be  great  earth  embankments  of  the  cross  section  al- 
ready described,  which  will  together  contain  21,200,- 
000  cubic  yards  of  material.  The  westerly  embank- 
ment will  cross  a  French  diversion  channel.  The 
easterly  embankment  will  cross  the  French  canal  and 
the  Chagres. 

The  regulating  works  are  thus  designed.  The  cen- 
tral 150  feet  of  their  length,  which  will  be  built 
from  the  bottom  of  the  diversion  channel,  is  to  be  a 
solid  mass  of  concrete,  having  its  crest  at  elevation 
69.  On  the  top  of  the  crest,  piers  eight  feet  in  thick- 
ness, grooved  for  Stoney  sluice  gates,  are  to  be  built, 
38  feet  from  centre  to  centre,  having  clear  openings 
of  30  feet.  The  gates,  as  proposed,  are  almost  exact 
counterparts  of  the  gates  provided  for  controlling  the 
flow  from  the  lower  end  of  the  Chicago  Drainage 
Canal.  For  the  whole  length  of  the  regulating  works 
the  design  is  the  same  as  for  the  central  portion,  ex- 
cept that  the  concrete  rests"  upon  the  surface  of  the 
rock  or  upon  excavations  made  in  the  rock.  The 
water  passing  through  the  central  sluices  will  flow 
directly  out  through  the  diversion  channel  to  the 


ADVANTAGES  OF  DAM.  223 

Chagres.  The  regulating  works  are  capable  of  dis- 
charging 140,000  cubic  feet  per  second  when  the 
water  of  the  lake  is  no  more  than  one  foot  above  the 
normal  level. 

Despite  the  great  quantity  of  material  to  be  placed 
in  the  Gatun  dam,  the  report  shows  that  a  large 
saving  will  be  effected  by  the  structure.  The  project 
of  the  Commission  included  a  dam  at  Bohio,  a  spill- 
way, an  outlet  from  the  Pena  Blanca  swamp,  diver- 
sion channels  for  the  Chagres  and  Gatun  rivers,  and 
a  stretch  of  canal  between  Gatun  and  Bohio.  All 
these  works,  which  were  estimated  to  cost  $23,640,- 
221,  are  avoided  by  the  scheme  of  the  Gatun  dam,  and 
its  construction,  together  with  a  necessary  diversion 
of  the  Panama  Railroad,  will  be  effected  with  an  ex- 
penditure of  less  than  $12,000,000.  The  calcula- 
tion takes  no  account  of  locks,  however.  The  Com- 
mission's plan  provided  for  only  two  locks  at  Bohio, 
of  comparatively  small  size.  The  requirement  of  the 
Spooner  Act  makes  it  necessary  to  provide  locks  of 
greater  dimensions  and  the  minority  members  of  the 
Board  deem  it  advisable  to  make  the  ascent  to  the 
85-foot  summit  level  with  three  flights.  These  will 
cost  more  than  the  two  proposed  for  the  Bohio  dam. 

THE   ADVANTAGES    OF    THE    GATUN   DAM. 

"  The  adoption  of  Gatun  as  a  site  for  a  dam  not 
only  provides  for  reduced  cost  and  a  better  lock 


224  PANAMA. 

but,  as  compared  with  Boliio,  it  affords  several  advan- 
tages. The  first  of  these  is  a  large  addition  to  the 
drainage  area  tributary  to  the  summit  level  and  to 
the  amount  of  water  available  for  canal  uses,  which 
is  of  special  value  during  dry  seasons;  the  second  is 
the  great  increase  in  the  reservoir  area,  Lake  Gatun 
having  three  times  the  area  of  a  lake  formed  by  a 
dam  at  Bohio ;  this  permits  storing  water  for  the  dry 
season  and  the  reception  of  floods  with  a  maximum 
variation  of  lake  level  of  only  about  one-half  of  that 
taken  by  the  first  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  for 
Lake  Bohio.  A  third  advantage  is  the  extension  of 
lake  navigation  nine  and  one-half  miles  toward  the 
Atlantic  from  Bohio;  a  fourth  is  that  the  Chagree 
and  all  its  important  tributaries  will  be  received  into 
the  lake  at  points  so  distant  from  the  canal  route  that 
no  deposit  of  suspended  matter  will  occur  along  it, 
and  a  fifth  is  that  the  water  discharged  from  the  lake 
will  enter  the  Chagres  at  the  point  where  it  finally 
diverges  from  the  canal  so  that  no  diversion  chan- 
nels or  heavy  protecting  embankments  will  be  re- 
quired along  the  canal  line." 

IMPORTANT    MATTER   OF    WATER    SUPPLY. 

The  highly  important  subject  of  water  supply 
has  been  treated  by  General  Henry  L.  Abbot  in  a 
paper  which  forms  an  appendix  to  the  report.  Re- 
corded measurements  of  flow  covering  a  period  of 


WATER  SUPPLY.  225 

fifteen  years  give  1,250  feet  per  second  during  the 
three  driest  months.  In  order  to  make  their  calcu- 
lation entirely  safe  the  minority  has  accepted  80  per 
cent  of  this  volume  as  a  basis.  The  lake  can,  towards 
the  end  of  the  wet  season,  be  safely  raised  one  foot 
above  the  normal  level  and  provision  has  been  made 
in  the  plans  for  drawing  the  water  three  feet  below 
this  mark.  Therefore  the  equivalent  of  four  feet 
of  depth  in  the  lake,  or  12,270,000,000  cubic  feet, 
will  be  available  for  water  supply  purposes  in  the 
dry  season.  This  quantity  will  furnish  a  steady 
flow  of  1,577  cubic  feet  per  second  for  ninety  days, 
making  the  total  quantity  of  water  after  adding  the 
inflow,  2,577  cubic  feet  per  second.  After  allowing 
for  evaporation,  infiltration,  power  for  operating 
gates  and  for  lighting,  etc.,  there  remains  1,350 
cubic  feet  per  second  available  for  lockage. 

"  To  determine  the  number  of  lockages  which  this 
quantity  of  water  will  provide  for,  the  following  pro- 
visions and  assumptions  have  been  made: 

"  Intermediate  gates  are  to  be  provided  for  the 
locks  at  Pedro  Miguel  and  Sosa,  so  as  to  give  a 
chamber  length  of  600  feet,*  and  it  is  assumed  that 
the  intermediate  gates  will  be  used  for  eight-tenths 
of  the  lockages.  .  .  .  It  is  further  assumed  that 
all  ships  passing  in  one  direction  will  use  one  set  of 
locks  and  all  ships  passing  in  the  other  another  set. 


*  Tlie  full  length  of  locks  is  900  feet  clear. 
15 


226  PANAMA. 

On  this  assumption  the  same  quantity  of  water  is 
used  whether  a  ship  passes  through  a  single  lock  or 
through  two  or  three  in  flight.  The  lift  to  the  nor- 
mal level  at  Pedro  Miguel  is  30  feet  and  at  Gatun 
28.50  feet  per  lock.  The  quantity  of  water  required 
per  lockage  at  Pedro  Miguel,  on  the  assumption  that 
intermediate  gates  will  be  used  eight-tenths  of  the 
time,  is  22.13  cubic  feet  per  second,  and  the  quan- 
tity per  lockage  at  Gatun  29.77  cubic  feet  per  second, 
making  a  total  of  51.90  cubic  feet  per  second.  The 
net  available  quantity  of  water  is,  as  already  stated, 
1,350  cubic  feet  per  second,  and  will  therefore  pro- 
vide for  26  lockages  per  day  at  each  lock  in  the  driest 
season." 

When  the  time  comes  that  a  greater  number  of 
daily  lockages  must  be  provided  for  there  will  be  no 
difficulty  about  compassing  the  requirement  The 
Alhajnela  dam  and  reservoir  as  proposed  by  the 
ComUe  Technique,  will  supply  enough  water  for  at 
least  27  additional  lockages  per  day. 

In  order  to  ascertain  the  amount  of  tonnage  that 
may  be  accommodated  by  the  canal  as  planned,  with- 
out the  contingent  Alhajuela  addition,  the  traffic  of 
the  Suez  Canal  has  been  taken  as  a  basis.  The  size 
of  the  vessels  passing  through  that  waterway  has 
steadily  increased  during  the  past  decade:  in  1894 
they  averaged  2,398,  and  ten  years  later  3,163.  The 
system  of  measuring  tonnage  at  the  canal,  however, 
gives  figures  about  one-sixth  in  excess  of  Lloyd's 


THE  SUMMIT-LEVEL.  227 

net  register.  It  seems  propable  that  when  the  traffic 
at  the  Isthmus  requires  26  lockages  per  day,  in  view 
of  the  growth  in  the  size  of  ships  and  of  the  fact  that 
two  ships  of  ordinary  size  can  pass  through  a  lock 
at  the  same  time,  the  amount  of  tonnage  per  lock  will 
be  as  much  as  5,000.  On  this  assumption  the  canal, 
as  planned  by  the  minority,  will  accommodate  up- 
wards of  47,000,000  tons  without  the  Alhajuela  reser- 
voir and  twice  as  much  with  the  aid  of  its  water 
supply. 

THE    SUMMIT    LEVEL. 

Three  flights  of  locks  at  Gatun  will  give  access  to 
the  summit  level.  These  locks  will  be  in  duplicate, 
thereby  admitting  of  the  temporary  disuse  of  one 
flight  on  account  of  accident  or  repairs  without  seri- 
ous impediment  to  traffic.  The  dimensions  of  locks 
throughout  the  canal  will  be  length  clear,  900  feet; 
usable  width,  95  feet;  depth  over  the  miter  sill,  40 
feet. 

Of  the  total  length  of  the  lake  —  30  miles  —  23 
miles  will  be  included  in  the  line  of  the  canal.  At 
Gatun,  and  as  far  thence  as  Bohio,  the  depth  will  be 
75  feet  or  thereabouts,  gradually  reducing  until  at 
Obispo  it  will  be  45  feet.  For  a  distance  of  nearly 
sixteen  miles  from  the  Gatun  locks  the  deep  portion 
of  the  lake  will  have  a  width  generally  exceeding 
half  a  mile  and,  with  only  a  small  amount  of  exca- 


228  PANAMA. 

vation,  a  channel  may  be  provided  having  a  width 
nowhere  less  than  1,000  feet  at  the  bottom  and  with 
a  minimum  depth  of  45  feet.  Farther  up  the  lake, 
as  the  amount  of  excavation  needed  to  secure  a  sim- 
ilar depth  increases,  the  channel  will  narrow,  first 
to  800  feet  for  a  distance  of  almost  four  miles,  from 
San  Pablo  to  Juan  Grande,  then  for  about  the  same 
distance  to  500  feet  until  Obispo  is  reached.  For 
one  and  a  half  miles,  from  Obispo  to  Las  Cascadas, 
the  width  of  the  channel  at  bottom  will  be  300  feet 
and  through  the  remaining  distance  of  the  Culebra 
Cut  it  will  be  200  feet.  Thus  the  23-mile  stretch 
from  Gatun  to  the  entrance  of  the  great  cut  will  be 
through  a  channel  nowhere  less  than  500  feet  wide. 
This  broad  waterway  will  actually  furnish  lake  navi- 
gation very  similar  to  that  of  the  chain  of  small 
lakes  that  connects  Lake  Superior  with  Lake  Huron, 
and  which  is  styled  St.  Mary's  River.  This  channel, 
from  300  to  600  feet  in  width,  is  traversed  monthly 
by  a  tonnage  approximating  3,500,000,  at  a  speed 
which  is  limited  by  regulation  to  nine  miles  an  hour 
only  on  account  of  the  density  of  the  traffic. 

The  projected  canal  is  designed  to  follow  straight 
lines  in  the  main.  Where  changes  of  direction  oc- 
cur, the  outer  channel  lines  of  adjacent  courses  are 
to  be  carried  to  an  intersection,  which  may  be  done 
with  little  additional  excavation;  the  point  of  the 
inner  angle  will  be  dredged  off  so  that  a  curve  of 
8,000  feet  or  more  radius  can  be  laid  down  wholly 


LAKE  SOSA.       .  229 

within  the  channel  limits.  All  the  changes  of  direc- 
tion in  the  stretch  above  described  will  be  in  a  chan- 
nel at  least  600  feet  broad  above  the  turn  and  300 
feet  below  it. 

Following  the  200-foot  channel  through  the  deep 
portion  of  the  Culebra  Cut  will  come  a  stretch  of 
close  on  two  miles,  with  a  width  of  300  feet,  to  the 
locks  at  Pedro  Miguel,  where  the  summit  level  ter- 
minates. The  duplicate  locks  at  this  point  will  have" 
one  lift  of  31  feet 

LAKE    SOSA. 

On  the  farther  side  of  the  Pedro  Miguel  locks  will 
b©  formed  an  artificial  lake  by  the  construction  of 
three  dams.  This  lake  will  have  an  area  of  about 
eight  square  miles  and  will  extend  from  Pedro  Mi- 
guel to  Sosa  Hill  where  duplicate  flights  of  two 
locks  each  will  be  placed.  The  channel  through 
Lake  Sosa  will  be  500  feet  wide  for  a  distance  of 
more  than  a  mile  and  a-  half  from  the  Pedro  Miguel 
locks ;  it  will  then  open  out  to  1,000  feet  or  more  for 
the  remainder  of  the^distance. 

The  principal  dam  is  the  one  at  La  Boca  which 
extends  from  the  locks  at  Sosa  Hill  across  the  mouth 
of  the  Rio  Grande  to  San  Juan  Hill.  The  other 
dams  extend  from  Sosa  Hill  to  Ancon  Hill  and  from 
Ancon  Hill  in  the  direction  of  Corozal  to  high  land 
across  the  Panama  Railroad.  In  order  to  provide 


230  PANAMA. 

for  the  discharge  of  the  Rio  Grande  and  other  rivers 
entering  the  lake  during  the  construction  of  the  earth 
dams,  a  diversion  channel  about  50  feet  wide  is  ttf 
be  cut  through  the  slope  of  Sosa  Hill,  near  the  end 
of  the  Ancon-Sosa  dam,  and  sluices  or  regulating 
works,  similar  to  those  designed  for  the  Gatun  dam, 
but  of  much  less  extent,  are  to  be  subsequently  built 
in  the  channel. 

EARLY  SUGGESTIONS  ADOPTED. 

The  idea  of  building  dams  at,  or  near,  the  ends  of 
the  canal  and  forming  artificial  lakes  is  not  a  new 
one ;  in  fact  it  was  amongst  the  very  earliest  sugges- 
tions made  in  connection  with  the  canal  enterprise! 
It  was  presented  by  Mr.  Klietz  to  the  International 
Congress  of  Engineers  at  Paris  in  18T9,  but  that 
body  decided  in  favor  of  a  sea-level  waterway.  The 
Gatun  dam  was  suggested  in  a  discussion  of  inter- 
oceanic  canal  projects  by  Mr.  Ashbel  Welch  in  1880, 
before  the  American  Society  of  Civil  Engineers. 
Both  the  Gatun  and  Pacific  dam  projects  were  ad- 
vanced in  a  paper  read  before  that  society  by  Mr. 
C.  D.  Ward  in  1904,  and  were  included  by  Mr.  Lin- 
don  Bates  in  the  plan  submitted  by  him  to  the  Con- 
sulting Board  of  Engineers. 

The  advantages  of  the  terminal  lake  on  the  Pacific 
side  are  a  saving  of  about  $8,000,000  in  the  cost  of 
the  canal  and  greatly  improved  navigation  secured 


ESTIMATES  OF  LOCK  CANAL  231 

by  the  introduction  of  more  than  five  miles  of  chan- 
nel not  less  than  500  feet  wide  and  45  feet  deep. 
It  also  dispenses  with  the  sea-level  cut  from  La  Boca 
to  Miraflores  which  involved  several  objectionable 
features. 

From  the  Sosa  lock  to  the  seven-fathom  curve  in 
Panama  Bay  the  distance  is  four  miles.  The  chan- 
nel along  this  stretch  will  be  300  feet  wide  and  45 
feet  deep  below  mean  tide.  These  are  the  dimen- 
sions adopted  by  the  Board  for  the  sea-level  project, 
and  whilst  accepting  them,  the  minority  take  occasion 
to  express  their  opinion,  that  they  might  be  increased 
in  both  respects  with  advantage  to  navigation.  As, 
however,  frequent  dredging  will  be  necessary  to  the 
maintenance  of  this  channel,  it  is  more  than  probable 
that  it  will  become  gradually  enlarged. 

Only  about  one-seventh  of  the  entire  channel,  ac- 
cording to  this  project,  having  a  length  of  49.72 
miles,  is  less  than  300  feet  in  width,  while  more 
than  two-thirds  of  it  is  500  feet  wide  or  over.  The 
estimated  cost  of  the  canal  to  be  built  in  accordance 
with  this  plan  is  "  in  round  numbers,"  $140,000,000. 

The  estimated  time  required  for  the  completion  of 
the  minority  project  is  calculated  upon  much  the 
same  bases  as  those  employed  by  the  Board  in  making 
its  time  estimate,  but  the  minority  expresses  the 
opinion  that  the  allowance  of  their  confreres  for  the 
completion  of  the  Culebra  Cut  to  40  feet  below  sea 
level  is  much  too  low  and  that  it  should  be  not  less 


232  PANAMA. 

than  fifteen  years.  Upon  the  assumption  that  it  will 
require  fifteen  years  to  excavate  the  110,000,000 
cubic  yards  involved  in  the  sea-level  project,  it  is  de- 
cided that  the  "  time  required  for  the  lock  canal 
with  summit  level  at  elevation  85,  which  requires  the 
excavation  of  53,800,000  cubic  yards  from  the  cen- 
tral mass,  would  be  about  seven  and  one-half  years, 
a  conclusion  which  is  verified  by  a  study  of  conditions 
in  the  heaviest,  portion;  but  before  accepting  this 
period  as  the  time  required  to  build  the  canal,  con- 
sideration must  be  given  to  the  question  of  time  re- 
quired to  build  the  locks." 

THE.   GATTTN    LOCKS. 

Under  the  minority  plan  the  greatest  amount  of 
lock  construction  will  be  needed  at  Gatun.  The 
amount  of  excavation  for  this  lock,  embracing  a  dis- 
tance of  3,136  linear  feet,  measured  along  the  canal 
axis,  will  be  3,600,000  cubic  yards,  and  the  average 
width  of  the  excavation  will  not  differ  greatly  from 
the  average  width  of  the  Culebra  Cut  in  the  heaviest 
section.  Applying  the  standard  of  measurement  that 
has  been  accepted  for  the  latter  operation,  the  Gatun 
excavation  should  be  completed  in  four  years.  This 
is  a  conservative  estimate,  for,  whilst  the  material  at 
Gatun  is  at  least  as  easy  to  excavate  as  that  of  Cule- 
bra, the  general  conditions  at  the  former  point  are 
much  more  favorable  to  expedition.  . 


GATUN  LOCKS.  233 

The  enormous  amount  of  concrete  masonry  re- 
quired, for  the  Gatun  locks  — 1,300,000  cubic  yards 
—  is  unparalleled  in  the  building  operations  of  mod- 
ern times.  If  the  plant  and  materials  are  deposited 
and  arranged  upon  the  ground  whilst  the  preliminary 
work  of  excavation  is  in  progress,  rapidity  of  con- 
struction will  be  greatly  facilitated.  Judging  from 
the  experience  in  similar  work  on  a  much  smaller 
scale  and  with  fewer  facilities,  the  report  concludes 
that  8,000  cubic  yards  per  day  might  be  attained  at 
Gatun.  This  calculation  contemplates  the  simultane- 
ous employment  of  20  mixing  plants  distributed 
along  the  9,000  linear  feet  of  the  main  walls  of  the 
locks.  The  final  estimate  of  time  required  for  this 
work  is,  however,  based,  for  the  sake  of  conservatism, 
on  a  daily  output  of  only  2,500  cubic  yards.  At 
this  rate  the  entire  concrete  would  be  placed  in  two 
and  a  quarter  years.  The  materials  consumed  in  this 
daily  output  would  amount  to  4,000  tons.  This 
quantity,  large  as  it  is,  does  not  exceed  one-fifteenth 
of  the  weight  of  the  material  to  be  daily  removed 
from  the  Culebra  Cut,  and  its  transportation  should 
not  create  any  great  difficulty.  The  only  remaining 
work  of  magnitude  connected  with  the  installation 
of  the  locks  is  the  erection  of  the  gates,  of  which 
fourteen  pairs  will  bo  required  for  the  duplicate 
flights.  Making  a  very  conservative  estimate,  based 
upon  the  experience  at  the  Poe  lock  in  the  St.  Mary's 
Canal,  where  the  climatic  conditions  and  the  facili- 


234  PANAMA. 

ties  were  inferior,  the  report  allows  one  year  for  this 
portion  of  the  task. 

The  periods  included  in  the  preceding  estimates 
aggregate  about  seven  and  one-half  years,  which  is 
a  shorter  time  than  that  calculated  for  the  excavation 
of  the  Culebra  Cut;  but  this  lock  calculation  is  made 
on  the  assumption  that  each  of  the  three  stages  of  tlje 
operation  under  consideration  would  be  entered  upon 
at  the  termination  of  that  preceding,  whereas  they 
would  in  fact  overlap  and  to  a  considerable  extent 
be  carried  on  simultaneously,  thus  effecting  a  con- 
siderable reduction  in  the  total  expenditure  of  time. 
The  locks  at  Pedro  Miguel  and  those  at  Sosa  are  of 
less  magnitude  than  the  structures  at  Gatun  and 
would  occupy  a  shorter  time  in  erection.  There  is 
no  other  single  work  which  will  entail  anything  like 
the  time  needed  for  the  cut  through  the  divide. 

Making  ample  allowance  for  possible  delays,  the 
minority  members  of  the  Board  feel  assured  that  the 
canal  as  projected  by  them  may  be  completed  in  all 
its  details  within  nine  years  from  the  time  that  opera- 
tions are  commenced. 

DIFFERENCES  OF  OPINION  AS  TO  TYPE  OF  CANAL'. 

There  has  been  much  diversity  of  opinion  amongst 
experts  on  the  subject  of  the  type  of  canal.  The  pre- 
ponderance of  public  sentiment  is  in  favor  of  the  so- 
called  "  sea-level  "  waterway,  but  it  is  generally  based 


WEIGHT  OF  OPINION.  235 

upon  a  misconception.  The  idea  that  the  sea-level 
canal  recommended  by  the  Board  would  be  a  wide 
channel  that  could  be  freely  navigated  by  ocean  ves- 
sels at  comparatively  high  speed  is  altogether  errone- 
ous. There  is  unanimous  agreement  amongst  engin- 
eers that  the  ideal  waterway  would  be  one  of  the 
dimensions  of  straits,  which  might  receive  the  waters 
of  the  Chagres  and  be  subjected  to  the  full  action  of 
the  Pacific  tide  without  serious  impediment  to  traf- 
fic. Such  a  waterway  is,  however,  entirely  infeasible. 
Its  completion  would  occupy  fifty  or  more  years  and 
its  cost  would  not  be  less  than  $500,000,000.  In  the 
sea-level  canal  contemplated  by  the  majority  of  the 
Board,  one-half  of  the  distance  the  bottom  width  of 
the  channel  is  only  150  feet  and  for  about  the  same 
distance  it  is  200  feet.  These  lateral  dimensions 
with  a  depth  of  'about  40  feet  are  considered  the 
greatest  economically  permissible.  The  question  at 
issue  is  the  choice  between  such  a  canal  and  one  at  a 
high  level  with  locks. 

The  weight  of  expert  opinion  is  decidedly  in  favor 
of  a  lock  canal.  The  Panama  Canal  Company  was 
forced  to  abandon  its  sea-level  project  and  the  con- 
clusions of  the  Comite  Technique  support  the  lock 
plan,  but,  since  the  French  companies  were  influ- 
enced by  restrictive  conditions  from  which  the 
American  Government  is  free,  we  may  leave  their  ex- 
perience out  of  consideration.  The  first  Walker  Com- 
mission favored  a  lock  canal,  although  its  chief  en- 


236  PANAMA. 

gineer,  Mr.  Wallace,  entertained  a  belief  that  the 
sea-level  construction  would  be  preferable.  With  one 
exception,  the  present  Commission  supports  the  rec- 
ommendation of  the  five  American  members  who 
made  up  the  minority  of  the  Consulting  Board  of 
Engineers.  The  President,  Secretary  Taft  and 
Chief  Engineer  Stevens  have  lined  themselves  upon 
the  same  side  and  the  weight  of  expert  opinion,  in 
this  country  at  least,  is,  without  doubt,  similarly 
disposed. 

THE  BOAKD  DEPRECIATED  THE  "  SOO  "CANAL. 

In  reaching  their  decision,  the  majority  of  the 
Board  failed  to  give  to  the  experience  of  the  Sault 
Ste.  Marie  Canal  the  degree  of  consideration  which, 
in  the  opinion  of  American  authorities,  it  should 
have  excited.  Nevertheless,  the  St.  Mary  Canal  is, 
measured  by  traffic,  the  most  important  ship  canal  in 
the  world.  Although  navigation  through  it  is  sus- 
pended during  the  winter  months,  the  annual  tonnage 
it  accommodates  is  in  excess  of  the  combined  tonnage 
of  the  Suez,  Manchester,  Kiel  and  Amsterdam  canals 
and  the  Poe  lock  alone  has  three  times  the  traffic  of 
the  Suez  Canal  during  the  season  of  navigation. 

The  difficulties  and  extent  of  construction  would  be 
much  greater  in  the  case  of  the  sea-level  canal  than  in 
that  of  the  high  level.  Aside  from  the  much  greater 
excavation  which  would  be  for  the  most  part  in  hard 


CAPACITIES  OF  CANALS.  237 

rock,  a  large  dam  at  Gamboa  is  provided  for  and 
tunnels  and  diversion  channels  to  accommodate  the 
superfluous  waters  of  various  streams.  The  plan  of 
the  lock  canal  is  based  on  well-understood  and  tested 
conditions,  whilst  it  is  quite  possible  that  unforeseen 
problems  and  difficulties  might  arise  in  the  construc- 
tion of  a  waterway  at  sea  level.  In  other  words,  one 
form  of  canal  involves  less  hazard  than  the  other. 

In  the  matter  of  permanency  the  project  of  the 
minority  has  a  decided  advantage.  The  high-level 
waterway  may  be  deepened*  and  enlarged  and  its 
locks  replaced  by  others  of  larger  dimensions,  at  com- 
paratively small  cost  and  without  serious  obstruction 
to  traffic,  but  increase  in  the  size  of  the  channel  at  sea 
level  could  only  be  effected  at  great  cost,  together  with 
interruption  to  navigation. 

In  the  comparison  of  capacity  the  difference  be- 
tween the  forms  of  canal  under  consideration  is  par- 
ticularly marked.  Vessels  of  the  largest  size  could 
not  pass  each  other  in  the  narrower  waterway  and 
there  are  two  ships  at  present  on  the  stocks  whose 
load  draft  would  bring  their  keels  to  within  two  feet 
of  its  bottom.  It  is  doubted  whether  the  largest  type 
of  ships  could  safely  traverse  the  sea-level  canal  un- 
der their  own  steam  and  it  is  certain  that  they  could 


*  Increased  depth  in  Lakes  Gatun  and  Sosa  could  be  effected 
by  the  simple  process  of  elevating  the  dams  and  spillways  and 
admitting  a  larger  volume  of  water,  of  which  the  supply  is 
practically  unlimited. 


238  PANAMA. 

not  exceed  a  epeed  of  four  miles  an  hour,  whilst  twice 
that  rate  would  be  quite  practicable  in  the  lakes  form- 
ing the  greater  part  of  the  lock  canal.  This  advan- 
tage would  more  than  compensate  for  the  loss  of  time 
entailed  in  locking  and  would  permit  large  vessels  to 
make  the  transit  by  the  high-level  route  in  the  shorter 
time.  On  the  other  hand,  ships  of  smaller  types 
would  make  the  passage  through  the  canal  at  sea 
level  with  about  half  an  hour's  saving  in  time. 

The  majority  of  the  Board  seem  to  have  entertained 
fears  of  the  safety  of  the  locks  which  the  American 
authorities,  whose  experience  in  this  respect  is  un- 
equalled, consider  unwarranted.  The  latter  express 
the  utmost  confidence  in  the  locks  and  declare  that 
the  danger  of  blocking  is  much  greater  in  the  case  of 
the  narrow  waterway  than  in  that  of  the  other.  It 
is  admitted  by  the  advocates  of  the  lock  project  that 
the  mechanical  structures  in  a  canal  of  that  type 
would  be  easily  damaged  or  destroyed  by  an  enemy, 
but  they  deem  the  commercial  advantages  paramount 
to  military  considerations. 

In  regard  to  time  and  cost  of  construction,  the 
high-level  canal  has  altogether  the  better  of  the  argu- 
ment, and  especially  so  since  the  Commission  seems 
to  have  demonstrated  that  the  sea-level  canal  cannot 
be  completed  at  a  smaller  outlay  than  $272,000,000 
and  in  less  time  than  eighteen  or  twenty  years. 

In  passing  the  Spooner  Act,  Congress  had  in  mind 
a  canal  such  as  was  planned  by  the  Walker  Commis- 


EARTHQUAKE  SCARE.  239 

sion:  that  recommended  by  the  Administration  and 
the  present  Commission  conforms  to  the  former  in 
the  essential  features  and  departs  from  it  only  in  the 
direction  of  improvements.  ]STo  further  Congres- 
sional action  is  necessary  in  order  to  proceed  on  these 
lines,  but  new  legislation,  including  an  increased 
appropriation,  would  be  needed  for  the  prosecution  of 
the  sea-level  project. 

NOTE. —  Almost  at  the  moment  of  going  to  press,  it  is  learned 
tbat  the  Senate  Committee  on  Interoceanic  Canals  has,  by  a 
majority  of  one,  decided  to  report  in  favor  of  the  so-called 
"  sea-level  "  canal.  This  decision  is  believed  to  be  attributable 
to  nervous  apprehension,  excited  by  the  recent  San  Francisco 
disaster.  Inadequate  as  is  that  reason,  it  appears  to  be  the 
only  one  assignable  to  the  surprising  course  of  the  Committee. 
That  the  weight  of  expert  opinion  is  preponderatingly  in  favor 
of  the  lock,  or  high-level  plan,  is  indisputable.  Prudence,  pub- 
lic policy,  and  the  interests  of  the  tax-payer  point  in  the  same 
direction.  There  are  hazards  involved  in  both  projects,  but  by 
far  the  greater  proportion  attach  to  the  sea-level  undertaking. 
As  to  the  earthquake  risk,  a  shock  that  would  seriously  injure 
the  lock  canal  as  planned  might  be  expected  to  work  equal, 
or  greater  injury  to  the  sea-level  channel,  and  such  a  shock 
is  not  within  the  recorded  experience  of  the  Panama  region. 
The  sea-level  plan  includes  dams,  levees,  and  locks,  connected 
with  a  waterway  so  restricted  in  dimensions,  that  any  disturb- 
ance of  its  normal  conditions  could  not  fail  to  subject  traffic 
to  grave  inconvenience  and  danger.  In  this  connection  it 
should  be  noted  that  the  earth  dams  at  San  Francisco  and 
Oakland,  which  are  much  less  strong  and  massive  than  that 
proposed  for  Gatun,  appear  to  have  survived  the  recent  con- 
vulsion on  the  Pacific  Coast  without  damage. 


X. 

PANAMA. 
VARIOUS  ASPECTS  OF  THE  CANAL. 

The  Healtu  Problem  —  The  Opinions  of  a  Medical  Expert  — 
The  Sanitary  Campaign  —  Conservative  Views  of  Colonel 
Gorgas  —  The  Labor  Question  —  Many  Lands  Will  be 
Drawn  Upon  for  Labor  —  Poor  Quality  of  Labor  is  one  oi 
the  Chiei  Drawbacks  —  Expensive  Character  of  Low-grade 
Labor  —  The  Canal  and  the  Commerce  of  America  —  Effect 
of  the  Canal  on  the  Commerce  of  the  South  —  Great  Bene- 
fits to  Our  Pacific  States  —  A  Boon  to  the  Northeastern 
Territory  —  Our  Advantage  Over  Foreign  Competitors  — 
Political  and  Military  Aspects  —  Difficulty  of  Guarding  the 
Canal. 

No  material  work  of  man  since  the  creation  of  the 
•world  has  had  so  deep  and  widespread  influence  upon 
the  affairs  of  mankind  in  general  as  that  which  may 
calculably  be  expected  to  ensue  from  the  establish- 
ment of  the  Panama  Canal.  The  results  will  be  seen 
in  commercial,  political,  social,  and  even  religious, 
effects.  It  will  make  and  mar  the  fortunes  of  na- 
tions. Cousin,  the  French  philosopher,  has  said: 
"  Tell  me  the  geography  of  a  country  and  I  will  tell 
you  its  destiny."  By  creating  important  modifica- 
tions in  the  geographical  relations  of  certain  com- 
munities the  Canal  will  be  the  means  of  bringing 

240 


THE  HEALTH  PROBLEM.  241 

about  great  and  lasting  changes  which  are  beyond  the 
range  of  accurate  forethought.  The  subject  is  a 
vastly  interesting  one  that  would  afford  ready  mate- 
rial for  a  volume  of  speculative  studies,  but  our 
present  purpose  will  only  permit  a  limited  considera- 
tion of  a  few  of  the  most  obvious  conditions  con- 
nected with  the  construction  and  future  operation  of 
the  prodigious  waterway. 

THE    HEALTH    PROBLEM. 

The  question  of  sanitation,  closely  allied  as  it  is 
to  that  of  labor,  has  always  been  an  important  factor 
in  operations  conducted  upon  the  Isthmus  of  Pan- 
ama, but  fortunately,  with  the  advance  of  time, 
the  difficulties  presented  by  it  have  become  ever  more 
susceptible  to  scientific  treatment.  The  Panama 
Railroad  was  built  at  an  appalling  sacrifice  of  life. 
At  that  time  a  blind  contest  was  waged  with  disease, 
but  no  serious  effort  was  made  to  mitigate  the  con- 
ditions that  produced  it.  The  French  companies 
adopted  some  preventive  measures  and  their  pro- 
vision for  the  care  of  the  sick  was  admirable,  but  it 
remained  for  American  administration  to  attack  the 
problem  in  the  determined  and  radical  manner  that 
promises  to  minimize  effects  by  reducing  causes. 

The  observation  and  experience  of  medical  scien- 
tists in  recent  years  has  led  to  the  conclusion  that 

the  dangers  to  health  and  the  difficulties  of  sanita- 
16 


242  PANAMA. 

tion  in  Panama  have  been  very  much  exaggerated. 
It  is  believed  that  the  climate  is  not  nearly  so  harm- 
ful, even  to  white  men,  as  has  generally  been  sup- 
posed. Due  allowance  has  not  been  made  hitherto 
for  the  indulgent  habits  of  most  of  the  French  em- 
ployees of  the  canal  company,  nor  for  the  poor  phy- 
sique of  a  large  majority  of  the  laborers  engaged  by 
it.  Furthermore  the  physical  conditions  of  the  scene 
of  operations  have  undergone  great  changes  since  the 
inception  of  the  work  and  we  are  now  past  the  stage 
of  surface  disturbance,  when  deadly  emanations  were 
constantly  released  by  the  excavations.  Several  ac- 
tive factors  of  a  favorable  character  enter  into  the 
present  calculations  of  the  sanitary  department  The 
cities  of  Panama  and  Colon  are  being  rapidly  placed 
in  possession  of  good  and  adequate  water  and  sewer- 
age systems  and  strict  quarantine  regulations  are  en- 
forced. Certain  unsanitary  practices  of  the  inhabit- 
ants of  the  Canal  Zone  and  the  cities  in  question 
have  been  abated  and  will  be  abolished.  Add  to  all 
this  the  war  on  the  infectious  mosquito  and  we  have 
conditions  that  ensure  a  vast  improvement  in  the 
general  health  of  the  Isthmus.  Still  it  is  not  ex- 
pected that  the  utmost  results  hoped  for  will  enable 
white  men  in  general  to  perform  manual  labor  at 
Panama  any  more  than  they  may  in  other  tropical 
regions.  The  object  sought,  and  which  will  surely  be 
attained,  is  to  eliminate  all  unnecessary  inimical 
conditions  and  limit  the  difficulty  of  residence  on  the 


A  MEDICAL  OPINION.  243 

Isthmus  to  mere  resistance  to  a  tropical  climate  of 
not  extraordinary  severity. 

THE   OPINIONS   OF   A   MEDICAL   EXPERT. 

In  this  connection  we  can  not  do  better  than  quote 
Doctor  Lacroisade,  who  resided  on  the  Isthmus  in  an 
official  medical  capacity  from  1887  until  recently: 
"  Among  the  diseases  attributed  to  the  climate  the 
most  numerous  are  simple  marsh  fevers,  which  have 
not  occasioned  a  single  death.  Two  diseases  only 
belonging  to  the  epidemic  type  have  appeared  —  the 
beriberi,  of  which  there  is  no  longer  any  question,* 
and  yellow  fever.  The  latter,  after  having  been  ab- 
sent from  the  Isthmus  for  at  least  six  years,  was  im- 
ported in  1897,  and  continued  about  six  months, 
from  March  to  August,  when  it  again  disappeared 
after  very  slight  ravages  (only  six  deaths).  Thus  it 
can  not  be  considered  that  this  pest  is  really  epidemic 
on  the  Isthmus.  From  the  other  infectious  epi- 
demics, such  as  variola,  typhoid  fever,  diphtheria, 
etc.,  the  Isthmus  appears  to  be  almost  entirely  ex- 
empt. From  the  foregoing  we  may  conclude  that 
life  on  the  Isthmus  scarcely  incurs  more  dangers  than 

*  The  disease,  which  had  probably  never  before  been  known  in 
the  region,  was  introduced  with  an  experimental  importation 
of  negroes  from  Africa,  and  disappeared  when  they  were  re- 
turned to  their  homes,  but  it  has  recurred.  There  were  no 
fewer  than  thirty-two  cases  in  the  Ancon  Hospital  during 
October,  1905. 


244  PANAMA. 

elsewhere,  even  for  Europeans,  who,  after  the  blacks 
of  the  British  Antilles,  appear  to  resist  the  climate 
best.  Residence  here  would,  then,  offer  nothing 
alarming,  were  it  not  for  a  constant  feeling  of  fatigue 
and  uneasiness  due  to  a  temperature  always  high, 
and  an  atmosphere  saturated  with  moisture."  In 
thus  advancing  arguments  against  the  exaggerated 
notions  prevalent  regarding  the  climate  and  sanita- 
tion of  the  Isthmus  there  is  no  thought  of  detracting 
from  the  splendid  work  which  the  medical  officers  are 
performing  under  the  Commission.  The  object  is  to 
show  that  with  their  aid  the  canal  operations  may 
be,  and  doubtless  will  be,  completed  without  an  at- 
tendant heavy  mortality.  The  Walker  Commission 
was  accompanied  on  its  first  visit  to  the  Isthmus  in 
March,  1904,  by  three  eminent  physicians,  who  had 
achieved  wide  distinction  by  their  sanitary  work  in 
Cuba.  They  were  Colonel  Gorgas  and  Major  La 
Garde  of  the  United  States  Army  and  Captain  Rosa 
of  the  Navy.  The  sanitary  work  of  the  Isthmus  was 
entrusted  to  these  officers,  but  they  occupied  dis- 
tinctly subordinate  positions  and  had  no  voice  in  the 
Commission  nor,  it  is  believed,  the  degree  of  inde- 
pendent authority  in  their  particular  sphere  of  labor 
with  which  they  should  have  been  invested.  Amongst 
the  charges  of  inefficiency  that  were  brought  against 
the  former  Commission  was  that  of  failure  to  give 
sufficient  consideration  to  the  immediate  demands  of 
sanitation.  It  was  generally  understood  that  the 


AN  EARLY  MISTAKE.  245 

medical  staff  felt  dissatisfied  with  conditions  on  the 
Isthmus  in  so  far  as  they  related  to  the  departments 
of  health?  but  it  is  much  to  the  credit  of  those  officers 
that  they  made  no  public  complaint  and  pursued  their 
efforts  with  unimpaired  zeal  whilst  conscious  that 
the  arrangements  were  far  from  the  best  possible. 
Perhaps  the  Walker  Commission  may  be  excused 
for  devoting  its  immediate  and  closest  attention  to 
excavation  when  we  remember  the  unreasonable  im- 
patience of  the  press  and  the  people  to  see  "  the  dirt 
fly."  One  of  the  members  of  the  former  Commis- 
sion has  declared  that  it  was  fully  appreciative  of 
the  wisdom  of  the  policy  since  adopted  and  at  pres- 
ent in  force,  and  the  presumption  is  that  in  following 
a  different  course  Admiral  Walker  and  his  associates 
were  impelled  by  a  desire  to  have  "  something  to 
show  "  as  soon  as  possible. 

One  of  the  first  important  decisions  of  the  Execu- 
tive Committee  of  the  Shonts  Commission  was  to 
stop  the  work  of  excavation  and  to  direct  the  labors 
of  the  entire  force  upon  sanitary  improvements. 
This  policy  is  based  upon  a  conviction  that  after 
the  region  has  been  cleansed  and  subjected  to  pre- 
ventive measures  and  when  proper  provision  has  been 
made  for  lodging  and  feeding  the  laborers  and  em- 
ployees the  construction  will  progress  with  greater 
speed  and  fewer  casualties  than  if  it  were  to  be 
pushed  ahead  without  such  preliminary  work. 

Aside  from   the  permanent  improvements  at  the 


246  PANAMA. 

terminal  ports  the  most  important  element  in  the  task 
of  sanitation  is  that  of  destroying  or  rendering  in- 
nocuous the  mosquitoes,  through  whose  agency  ma- 
laria and  yellow  fever  are  propagated.  A  similar 
problem  was  presented  to  Colonel  Gorgas  and  his 
associates  in  Havana.  The  methods  followed  there, 
with  necessary  modifications,  will  be  adopted  in  Pan- 
ama. 

THE  SANITARY    CAMPAIGN. 

The  plan  is  simple  but  entails  a  vast  amount 
of  labor.  It  is  thoroughly  established  that  the 
anopheles  becomes  infected  by  biting  a  sufferer  from 
malaria.  The  first  step,  then,  is  to  bring  under  im- 
mediate supervision,  as  nearly  as  possible,  all  the 
malarial  subjects  within  the  Zone,  and  to  carefully 
isolate  them  within  screens  until  the  malarial  para- 
site has  been  eliminated  from  their  blood.  Mean- 
while a  vigorous  campaign  is  in  progress  against  the 
insect  carrier.  Long  grass  and  rank  vegetation  is  cut 
down  all  along  the  line,  pools  are  swept  out  and 
sprinkled  with  oil,  dwellings  are  cleansed,  and,  in 
short,  every  effort  is  made  to  destroy  the  pest.  Re- 
ferring to  the  result  experienced  from  similar  action 
in  Havana,  Colonel  Gorgas  says :  "  At  the  end  of 
about  eight  months  of  this  work  it  was  found  that 
the  number  of  yellow-fever  mosquitoes  had  been 
greatly  decreased,  and  those  that  were  left  could  find 
no  human  being  infected  with  yellow  fever,  whereby 


VIEWS  OF  COLONEL  GORGAS.  247 

they,  the  yellow-fever  mosquitoes,  might  become  in- 
fected, and  thus  convey  it  to  other  human  beings. 
For  the  past  three  years  Havana  has  been  free  from 
yellow  fever.  An  unacclimated  man  can  go  to  Ha- 
vana now,  and  though  he  may  probably  be  bitten  a 
good  many  times  by  yellow-fever  mosquitoes  these 
mosquitoes  have  had  no  opportunity  in  the  past  three 
years  of  biting  a  human  being  infected  with  yellow 
fever,  and  therefore  are  themselves  entirely  harm- 
less. This  condition  we  hope  to  bring  about  in  the 
villages  along  the  canal  route  by  means  similar  to 
those  adopted  in  Havana." 

CONSERVATIVE  VIEWS  OF  COLONEL  GORGAS. 

We  will  close  this  discussion  of  the  health  prob- 
lem with  a  further  quotation  from  Colonel  Gorgas, 
in  which  it  will  be  seen  that  his  ideas  conform  very 
closely  to  those  expressed  by  Doctor  Lacroisade: 
"  The  Panama  strip  is  now  about  as  healthy  as  the 
ordinary  tropical  country.  The  death  rate  is  a  great 
deal  higher  than  that  in  New  York,  but  this  would 
be  the  cast  almost  anywhere  in  the  tropics.  About 
twenty  people  per  thousand  in  New  York  die  every 
year  and  about  fifty  per  thousand  at  Panama.  The 
general  idea  about  Panama  seems  to  be  that  we  shall 
suffer  as  the  French  did  and  as  all  former  European 
venturers  into  Panama  did,  and  that  instead  of  dy- 
ing as  we  do  in  New  York  at  the  rate  of  twenty  per 


248  PANAMA. 

thousand  per  year,  we  shall  die,  as  sometimes  oc- 
curred to  the  French  and  others  at  Panama,  at  the 
rate  of  five  or  six  hundred  per  thousand  a  year. 
Other  men  of  experience  in  the  tropics  and  who  have 
been  at  Panama  for  some  time,  maintain  that  the 
matter  of  sanitation  is  exceedingly  simple  and  easy, 
and  that  the  health  of  the  Panama  strip  ought  to  be 
as  good  as  that  of  most  parts  of  the  United  States. 
Both  opinions,  it  seems  to  me,  are  extreme,  and  the 
truth  will  fall  somewhere  between  the  two.  Any 
health  officer  with  experience  in  dealing  with  a  prac- 
tical question  of  this  kind  will  know  how  exceed- 
ingly difficult  it  will  be  in  a  population  of  about  fif- 
teen thousand  t  people  infected  with  malaria  to  de- 
vise and  apply  any  system  by  which  the  cases  can  be 
individually  recorded  and  treated.  Personally  I  ap- 
proach the  problem  with  hope  and  the  expectation  of 
having  approximately  the  same  success  that  rewarded 
similar  efforts  applied  by  our  military  authorities 
in  Cuba.  But  it  is  no  simple  matter.  We  shall  no 
doubt  meet  with  many  disappointments  and  discour- 
agements, and  shall  succeed  in  the  end  only  after 
many  modifications  of  our  plans  and  after  many  local 
failures."  * 


f  This  refers  to  the  population  of  the  villages  along  the 
line  of  the  canal. 

*  It  may  be  added  that  this  was  written  about  twelve 
months  ago  and  that  at  the  present  time  a  great  degree  of 
success  is  within  sight. 


D 
% 


THE  LABOR  QUESTION.  249 

Each  of  the  enterprises  that  preceded  the  Ameri- 
can occupation  of  the  canal  territory  found  the  diffi- 
culty in  securing  satisfactory  labor  one  of  the  great- 
est deterrents  to  success. 

THE  :LABOR  QUESTION. 

The  experiences  of  the  railroad  and  French  com- 
panies embraced  the  enployment  of  almost  every 
available  form  of  labor  and  seemed  to  point  to  the 
conclusion  that>  all  things  considered,  the  West  In- 
dian negro  is  the  best  adapted  to  the  work.  The 
French  did  the  greater  and  most  satisfactory  portion 
of  their  work  with  Jamaican  field  hands  and  the  ma- 
jority of  laborers  at  present  upon  the  pay-rolls  of  the 
Commission  are  of  the  same  class,  but  it  is  question- 
able whether  the  enlarged  demand  which  will  present- 
ly exist  can  be  satisfied  from  the  same  source.  Secre- 
tary Taft  has  already  expressed  his  misgivings  on 
this  score.  In  the  early  part  of  the  year  1905  he 
reported  to  the  President  the  result  of  a  visit  to 
Jamaica  undertaken  for  the  purpose  of  sounding  the 
local  authorities  on  the  subject.  "  The  governor  of 
Jamaica,"  the  Secretary  states,  "  was  unwilling  to 
consent  to  our  taking  10,000  laborers  from  the  is- 
lands unless  we  deposited  five  pounds  sterling  per  la- 
borer with  the  island  government  to  meet  the  bur- 
den which  his  leaving  the  island  would  probably 
throw  upon  his  parish  under  the  poor  law  of  the 


250  PANAMA. 

island  for  the  support  of  those  dependent  upon  him. 
He  also  insisted  that  we  should  agree  to  pay  the 
expenses  of  the  return  of  each  laborer  whether  he  was 
satisfactory  or  not  and  whether  he  abandoned  the 
work  in  violation  of  his  contract  or  not."  Such 
terms  are  of  course  completely  beyond  the  question 
of  acceptance,  but  there  is  a  strong  probability  that 
a  large  number  of  laborers  will  go  to  the  Isthmus 
from  Jamaica  of  their  own  initiative.  There  are 
two  regular  lines  between  Kingston  and  Colon  which 
carry  passengers  from  one  port  to  the  other  for  five 
dollars  a  head.  Of  course  there  is  a  great  induce- 
ment in  the  fact  that  the  wages  offered  on  the  Isth- 
mus are  twice  as  much  as  those  paid  in  Jamaica. 

MANY  LANDS  WILL,  BE  DEAWN  UPON  FOE  LABOR. 

The  Jamaican  negroes  like  the  service  and  the 
extremely  good  treatment  they  receive.  A  very  large 
proportion  of  those  who  enter  the  employ  of  tHe 
Commission  remain  in  it.  There  is,  however,  a  ten- 
dency among  them  to  take  a  holiday  whenever  their 
accumulated  savings  will  permit,  and  so  there  is  a 
constant  flow  of  laborers  to  and  fro  between  Jamaica 
and  the  Isthmus.  The  Commission  has  hope  that 
natives  of  the  north  of  Spain  will  prove  more  satis- 
factory than  any  laborers  heretofore  employed  and  it 
is  believed  that  they  can  be  secured  in  large  numbers. 
The  governor  of  Porto  Rico  has  expressed  his  opinion 


THE  CHINESE  LABORER.  251 

that  the  agricultural  laborers  of  the  island  may  be 
satisfactorily  employed  on  the  canal  works,  and  it 
is  the  intention  of  the  Commission  to  try  a  selected 
number.  At  the  same  time  a  test  will  be  made  of 
one  thousand  Chinamen  and  the  same  number  of 
Japanese  contract  laborers.  Not  a  great  deal  should 
be  expected  from  the  Porto  Ricans  probably,  but  if 
exemption  of  the  Canal  Zone  from  the  operation  of 
the  Chinese  exclusion  law  is  effected  a  large  propor- 
tion of  the  permanent  working  force  will  in  all  like- 
lihood be  drawn  from  China.  There  is  no  good 
ground  for  hope  that  Japan  will  furnish  any  con- 
siderable number  of  the  laborers  required.  The 
Japanese  are  not  capable  of  great  exertion  in  a  trop- 
ical temperature.  The  climate  of  Formosa,  which  is 
not  nearly  so  trying  as  that  of  Panama,  overtaxes 
their  powers  of  endurance.  Furthermore,  several 
years  must  elapse  before  Japan  can  spare  any  consid- 
erable number  of  laborers  from  her  own  neglected 
fields.  Aside  from  the  mere  matter  of  digging, 
Chinese  are  likely  to  be  very  desirable  employees  in 
the  future.  The  construction  of  a  multi-lock  canal 
will  involve  a  great  deal  of  cement  and  other  work 
closely  approaching  to  expert  labor,  and  requiring  for 
its  proper  accomplishment  a  degree  of  intelligence  on 
the  part  of  the  workman,  which,  in  the  absence  of 
white  labor,  may  only  be  looked  for  in  the  Chinaman. 
The  real  difficulty  of  the  labor  situation  pertains 
less  to  quantity  than  it  does  to  quality.  Probably  the 


252  PANAMA. 

Commission  will  eventually  be  able  to  secure  as  many 
men  as  it  desires  from  one  source  and  another,  but 
unless  the  standard  of  efficiency  which  has  hitherto 
obtained  in  the  "  silver  "  force  of  the  operation  is  en- 
hanced the  labor  problem  will  continue  to  be  a  serious 
one. 

THE  POOR  QUALITY  OF  LABOR  IS  ONE  OF  THE  CHIEF 
DRAWBACKS. 

It  is  the  general  agreement  of  those  who  are  in 
position  to  judge  from  experience,  that  the  efficiency 
of  the  common  laborer  on  the  canal  is  not  in  excess 
of  33  per  cent  measured  by  the  American  standard. 
In  this  connection  Mr.  Stevens  says :  "  On  the  basis 
of  the  present  rates  of  pay  for  West  Indian  colored 
labor,  which  is  the  lowest  grade  of  labor,  we  are  pay- 
ing 20  cents  silver  per  hour,  and  on  the  8-hour  basis, 
to  which  we  are  confined  by  law,*  it  is  $1.60  silver 
per  day,  or  80  cents  gold.  The  relative  efficiency  of 
this  labor  as  compared  to  ours  at  home  is  about  three 
to  one.  In  other  words,  we  are  paying  to-day  for 
this  labor  $2.40  in  gold,  or  $4.80  in  silver.  Close 
inspection  of  the  different  gangs,  which  extended  over 
at  least  five  months,  demonstrates  very  clearly  that 
the  average  superintendent  or  foreman,  either  white 
from  the  Northern  States,  or  colored  from  Jamaica 

*  This  hampering  restriction  was  recently  removed  by  act  ol 
Congress. 


LOW  GRADE  LABOR  COSTLY  253 

and  the  other  West  Indian  islands,  has  never  been 
able  to  work  continuously  more  than  50  per  cent  nu- 
merically of  the  different  gangs.  .  .  .  Instead  of 
obtaining  a  fairly  continuous  amount  of  labor,  as  we 
do  from  gangs  here  at  home,  one-half  of  the  efficiency 
of  this  colored  labor  is  lost,  owing  to  their  deliberate, 
unceasing,  and  continuous  effort  to  do  as  little  work 
as  possible.  In  other  words,  instead  of  our  colored 
labor  costing  us  $2.40  per  day,  the  real  situation  is 
that  we  are  paying  twice  $2.40  gold  per  day,  or  al- 
most $5  for  eight  hours  labor." 

EXPENSIVE     CHARACTER    OF    LOW-GRADE    LABOR. 

Nor  is  the  item  of  wages  by  any  means  a  full  meas- 
ure of  the  excessive  expense  entailed  upon  us  by  the 
necessity  of  employing  low-grade  labor.  Xot  only 
are  we  paying  for  this  300  per  cent  of  its  true  value 
judged  by  our  standard,  but  the  employment  of  it 
entails  upon  us  in  incidental  expenses,  connected  with 
housing,  feeding,  hospital  treatment,  supervision,  etc., 
probably  three  times  as  much  as  would  be  expended 
upon  one-third  the  number  of  men. 

To  put  the  statement  in  another  form:  White  la- 
bor, if  it  were  practicable,  would  do  the  work  upon 
the  canal  at  a  wage  of  $2.50,  gold,  per  day.  We 
pay  for  colored  labor  of  30  per  cent  efficiency,  80 
cents  per  day,  which  would  make  the  rate  practically 
the  same  but  for  the  fact  that-  the  colored  laborer 


254  PANAMA. 

works  on  an  average  only  half  the  time  for  which 
he  draws  pay.  Hence  our  colored  labor  costs  in 
wages  twice  as  much  as  would  white  labor.  But  since 
it  is  necessary  to  employ  three  times  as  many  of  the 
former  as  of  the  latter  to  perform  a  certain  amount 
of  work,  our  incidental  expenses,  which  may  be  reck- 
oned on  a  per  capita  basis,  are  probably  three  times 
as  great  in  one  case  as  they  would  be  in  the  other. 

The  West  Indian  laborer  entertains  the  idea,  not 
without  good  reason,  that  he  is  indispensable  to  the 
progress  of  the  operation  and  the  only  prospect  of 
getting  good  work  from  him  depends  upon  creating 
competition  by  the  introduction  of  Chinamen  or  some 
equally  efficient  laborers. 

THE  CANAL,  AND  THE   COMMERCE  OF  AMERICA. 

The  establishment  of  a  waterway  between  the  two 
great  oceans  of  the  globe  will  more  widely  affect  the 
commerce  of  the  world  than  any  single  work  or  event 
in  its  history.  President  Hayes,  in  1879,  declared 
that  "  an  interoceanic  canal  across  the  American  Isth- 
mus will  essentially  change  the  geographic  relations 
between  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  coasts  of  the  United 
States  and  between  the  United  States  and  the  rest 
of  the  world."  The  Panama  route  will  effect  much 
greater  economies  of  time  and  distance  than  those  that 
are  at  present  secured  by  the  use  of  the  Suez  Canal. 

Colquhoun,   in  his  "  Key  to  the  Pacific,"   says : 


CANAL'S  EFFECT  ON  COMMERCE.  255 

"  It  will  bind  together  the  remote  sections  of  that 
immense  country,  assimilate  its  diverse  interests,  go 
far  towards  solving  many  difficult  problems,  and  make 
the  United  States  still  more  united.  .  .  .  No 
greater  impulse  to  commerce  can  be  given  than  this 
complement  to  the  Suez  Canal.  It  will  benefit  Amer- 
ica in  an  infinitely  greater  degree  than  Europe. 
It  will  give  an  immense  impetus  to  United 
States  manufactures,  especially  cotton  and  iron, 
and  will  greatly  stimulate  the  shipbuilding  industry 
and  the  naval  power  of  the  United  States." 

Whilst  the  opening  of  the  Panama  Canal  must 
prove  an  universal  boon  it  will  doubtless  work  to  the 
detriment  of  some  countries  and  certain  industries, 
at  least  until  after  adjustment  of  the  new  trade  rela- 
tions. America  will  always  be  the  greatest  benefici- 
ary of  the  advantages  accruing  from  the  use  of  the 
waterway  and  we  will  briefly  consider  a  few  of  the 
conditions  that  may  most  surely  be  calculated  upon  to 
follow  the  completion  of  the  enterprise  to  which  so 
large  an  amount  of  American  energy,  intellect  and 
capital  is  devoted. 

EFFECT  OF  THE  CANAL  ON  THE  COMMENCE  OF  THE 
SOUTH. 

No  region  in  the  United  States  may  be  expected  to 
feel  the  immediate  benefit  of  the  new  route  to  the 
same  extent  as  the  Southern  States  and  the  vast  \7al- 


256  PANAMA. 

ley  of  the  Mississippi.  The  latter  territory,  the  rich- 
est in  all  the  world,  one  and  a  quarter  million  square 
miles  in  extent,  intersected  by  five  thousand  miles 
of  navigable  waterway,  with  prolific  soil  and  ener- 
getic people,  will  find  new  markets  and  a  new  outlet 
for  its  varied  products  no  longer  dependent  upon  ex- 
pensive railway  transportation.  Chicago  is  nearly 
the  same  distance  from  New  Orleans  as  from  New 
York,  but  St.  Paul,  Omaha,  Dnbuque,  Evansville 
and  Denver  are  nearer  to  the  former  point  than  to 
the  latter.  It  is  quite  probable  that  the  present  gen- 
eration will  see  ocean  steamships  coming  down  from 
Duluth,  through  the  Great  Lakes,  an  inland  canal, 
and  the  Mississippi  River,  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico, 
and  passing  on  to  Pacific  and  Asian  ports. 

The  opening  of  the  new  gateway  to  the  Pacific  will 
give  a  tremendous  impetus  to  the  industries  of  the 
South.  Its  raw  cotton,  which  for  a  decade  has  been 
making  small  gains,  under  difficult  competition  with 
the  British  East  Indies  and  China,  in  the  Japanese 
market,  will  be  relieved  of  an  onerous  handicap.  The 
product  of  its  mills,  a  coarse  fabric,  such  as  is  es- 
pecially adapted  to  the  requirements  of  South  Amer- 
ican and  Oriental  consumers,  must  enjoy  an  enlarged 
demand  under  stimulating  conditions.  At  present 
almost  all  the  cotton  goods  exported  from  this  coun- 
try to  Asia  go  out  through  New  York  eastward  by 
way  of  the  Suez  Canal. 

Alabama  coal  will  find  a  constant  and  extensive 


EFFECT  ON  PACIFIC  STATES.  257 

demand  at  Panama,  which  will  become  the  greatest 
coaling  port,  in  the  world.  Birmingham,  where  iron 
can  be  produced  more  cheaply  than  at  any  other 
place  on  the  earth,  will  find  new  markets  in  South 
America  and  Asian  countries  for  its  output  The 
steel,  machinery,  and  various  hardware  of  Tennessee 
and  other  Southern  States,  which  have  been  reaching 
Australia  and  China  during  the  past  few  years  under 
the  most  disadvantageous  conditions  of  shipment,  will 
be  sent  through  the  Canal  to  these  and  other  destina- 
tions at  a  cost  which  may  defy  competition.  The 
large  lumber  and  wood  manufacturing  industries  of 
the  South  will  be  obviously  benefited  to  a  great  ex- 
tent by  the  creation  of  a  short  route  to  the  western 
coasts  of  Central  and  South  America. 

GREAT    BENEFITS    TO    OUR    PACIFIC    STATES. 

The  immense  saving  in  the  journey  from  our  east- 
ern ports  to  the  Pacific  Coast  will  revolutionize  the 
trade  of  the  latter  region.  Von  Schierbrand  says :  * 
"  It  has  been  computed  that  on  a  single  voyage  of  a 
1,500-ton  sailing  vessel  between  Port  Townsend,  Se- 
attle or  San  Francisco  and  Boston,  New  York  or 
Philadelphia,  the  saving  effected  in  wages,  repairs,  in- 
surance, provisions,  and  freight  charges,  by  reason  of 
the  Panama  Canal  will  aggregate  between  $8,000  and 

*  America,  Asia  and  the  Pacific.     Wolf  von   Schierbrand. 

New  York,   1904. 
17 


258  PANAMA. 

$9,500."  Many  raw  products  of  our  Pacific  Coast, 
which  at  present  can  not  bear  the  cost  of  long  rail- 
road hauls,  will  be  made  available  to  eastern  markets 
at  prices  profitable  to  the  producer  and  the  manufac- 
turer. This  applies  particularly  to  building  lumber 
and  furnishes  a  partial  solution  to  the  problem  with 
which  the  rapidly  disappearing  forests  of  our  middle 
and  eastern  states  are  confronting  us.  The  economies 
that  will  be  effected  in  the  transportation  of  the  cereal 
and  fruit  products  of  California  and  other  western 
regions  may  easily  be  imagined.  Millions  of  pounds 
of  fish  are  sent  annually  in  ice  across  the  continent, 
aside  from  the  enormous  quantities  that  go  to  Europe 
in  English  sailing  vessels  round  Cape  Horn.  All 
this  would  pass  through  the  Canal  if  it  were  open, 
and  the  present  shipments  of  salmon  alone  would  re- 
quire twenty  vessels  of  2,000  tons  each. 

The  Canal  will  be  the  means  of  enabling  the  peo- 
ple of  the  Pacific  Coast  to  buy  more  cheaply  and  to 
secure  better  prices  for  their  products.  By  breaking 
the  monopolistic  power  of  the  railroads  it  will  lead 
to  the  agricultural  development  of  the  unoccupied 
sections  of  this  territory,  to  a  vast  increase  in  its 
population  and  to  the  creation  of  world-wide  mar- 
kets for  its  products. 

A  BOON  TO  THE  NORTHEASTERN  TERRITORY. 

The  industries  of  the  northeastern  section  of  the 


COAL  AND  THE  CANAL.  259 

United  States,  that  is  to  say  the  territory  lying  to  the 
east  of  Pittsburg  and  to  the  north  of  the  James  River, 
consist  mainly  of  the  manufactures  of  iron  and  steel, 
machinery,  tools,  etc.,  and  textiles,  coal  mining,  and 
shipbuilding.  The  exports  of  manufactured  cotton 
from  this  and  other  parts  of  the  United  States  go 
principally  to  ports  in  Asia  and  Oceania,  where  their 
chief  competitor  is  the  product  of  the  British  mills. 
It  is  not  necessary  to  expatiate  upon  the  advantage 
which  the  short  route  will  give  to  us  in  this  trade. 
The  countries  of  South  America  expend  about  $80,- 
000,000  annually  in  the  purchase  of  cotton  goods. 
At  present,  however,  little  more  than  five  per  cent  of 
this  large  sum  is  paid  for  American  cloth,  but  the 
facilities  for  shipping  economically  that  will  be  cre- 
ated by  the  Canal  must  have,  among  other  results, 
that  of  giving  to  the  manufacturers  of  our  North- 
eastern and  Southern  States  a  very  large  share  of 
this  desirable  business. 

It  is  hoped  that  by  the  use  of  a  new  type  of  steel 
river  barge  of  large  capacity  and  small  draft  the 
coal  of  Pennsylvania  and  the  Southern  mines  may  be 
shipped  direct  to  Panama  at  a  cost  of  one  dollar  per 
short  ton.  This  would  allow  of  its  being  sold  at  three 
dollars,  a  figure  sufficiently  low  to  preclude  success- 
ful competition.  The  ability  to  supply  cheap  fuel 
would  not  only  accrue  to  the  benefit  of  our  coal 
mining  interests,  but  would,  where  other  consid- 
erations balanced,  decide  shipmasters  in  favor  of 


260  PANAMA. 

the  Panama  route,  for  the  contract  price  of  steam 
coal  at  Port  Said  is  about  six  dollars  and  the  current 
price  about  ten  dollars  per  ton. 

OUR    ADVANTAGE    OVER    FOREIGN     COMPETITORS. 

The  principal  exporting  competitors  of  the  United 
States  in  the  markets  for  the  manufactures  of  iron 
and  steel  are  Great  Britain,  Germany  and  Belgium. 
European  producers  can  reach  the  west  coast  of  South 
America,  and  the  oriental  countries  in  general,  more 
readily  than  can  our  manufacturers,  but  the  opening 
of  the  Canal  will  entirely  subvert  the  condition  in 
the  favor  of  the  latter.  Few  of  our  industries  are 
likely  to  receive  such  an  expansive  impulse  from  that 
event  as  those  dependent  upon  iron  and  steel  for  their 
material  and  the  section  which  will  benefit  most  in 
that  respect  is  the  coal  and  ore  region  of  the  South. 

One  of  the  most  certain  consequences  of  the  in- 
creased American  trade  that  will  follow  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  waterway  between  the  Atlantic  and 
Pacific  Oceans  will  be  the  great  extension  of  the  mer- 
chant marine  and  the  expansion  of  the  shipbuilding 
industry  of  the  country.  The  Canal  will  have  the  ef- 
fect of  largely  increasing  the  coasting  trade  of  the 
United  States  and  all  the  vessels  engaged  in  it  must 
be  built  in  American  yards*  Aside  from  this  the  in- 
creased foreign  trade  under  conditions  that  will  make 
the  shipping  business  once  more  profitable,  must  lead 


OPINION  OF  A  SHIPBUILDER  261 

to  the  construction  of  a  large  additional  number  of 
American  vessels. 

A  large  shipbuilder  responded  to  an  inquiry  by  the 
Isthmian  Canal  Commission  with  the  following  state- 
ment :  "  In  my  judgment  the  opening  of  the  isth- 
mian canal  and  the  development  of  its  traffic  would 
stimulate  American  shipbuilding  to  the  extent  of  an 
increased  demand  for  vessels  to  be  used  in  trade  af- 
fected by  said  canal.  As  a  rule  increased  demand  de- 
velops increased  sources  of  supply  and  the  cost  of 
product  is  invariably  reduced  in  proportion  of  in- 
creased business  to  fixed  expenses  of  any  manufactur- 
ing establishment,  and  therefore  the  canal  would  in 
this  case  tend  to  enable  shipbuilders  to  construct 
ships  more  economically  and  more  surely  to  compete 
with  foreign  builders." 

The  foregoing  are  only  a  few  illustrative  examples 
of  the  benefits  to  certain  portions  of  the  United  States 
that  may  be  counted  upon  from  the  construction  of 
the  Panama  Canal.  Anything  approaching  a  compre- 
hensive statement  of  the  matter  would  fill  a  large 
volume.* 

POLITICAL,   AND    MILITARY    ASPECTS. 

Although  the  prime  purpose  of  the  canal  is  essen- 


*  The  subject  has  been  extensively  treated  by  Professor  Em- 
ory R.  Johnson  in  the  report  of  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commis- 
sion of  1899-1901. 


262  PANAMA. 

tially  of  a  commercial  character,  its  construction  can 
not  fail  to  entail  important  political  results.  These 
will  be  felt  chiefly  by  the  countries  of  the  American 
continents  and  the  adjacent  islands.  The  Spanish- 
American  republics,  by  being  brought  into  closer  and 
more  frequent  relations  with  the  older  civilizations 
will  learn  the  lessons  of  modern  government  and  the 
advantages  of  ordered  and  industrious  social  condi- 
tions. Whilst  affording  greater  facilities  for  military 
movements,  the  Canal  will  ultimately  prove  to  be  a 
potent  factor  in  the  abolition  of  war.  Without  ven- 
turing too  far  into  the  realm  of  fancy,  it  may  be  per- 
missible to  suggest  one,  by  no  means  improbable, 
means  to  this  end.  Perhaps  no  agency  within  the 
bounds  of  present  possibility  could  so  effectively 
maintain  the  peace  of  nations  as  an  alliance  for  that 
purpose  and  for  mutual  defence  between  the  great 
naval  powers,  Britain,  America  and  Japan.  The 
bonds  of  friendship  and  commercial  interest  are  more 
closely  drawn  in  the  case  of  these  three  peoples  than 
between  any  other  nations  in  the  world  and  they  will 
be  the  chief  beneficiaries  of  the  commercial  and  mili- 
tary facilities  derivable  from  the  Canal. 

THE  CANAL   PART  OF  OUE  COAST  LINE. 

To  the  United  States  the  isthmian  passage  between 
the  oceans  has  become  a  military  necessity.  The 
need  for  a  short  route  from  one  coast  to  the  other  of 


PROTECTION  OF  THE  CANAL.  263 

our  country  was  forcibly  felt  when  the  Pacific  terri" 
tories  were  acquired  and  again  when  at  the  outbreak 
of  the  war  with  Spain,  the  battleship  Oregon  was 
obliged  to  make  the  long  journey  round  Cape  Horn  in 
order  to  join  the  Atlantic  fleet.  The  Canal  will  be- 
come, as  President  Hayes  tersely  put  it,  "  a  part  of 
the  coast-line  of  the  United  States."  It  will  be  essen- 
tial to  the  safety  of  this  country  that  the  Canal  is  pre- 
served from  the  possibility  of  falling  into  the  hands 
of  an  enemy  in  time  of  war.  It  will  be  a  simple  task 
to  fortify  the  entrances,  but  to  guard  the  whole  extent 
of  a  structure  so  susceptible  to  damage  would  be  an 
altogether  different  matter  and  it  would  not  perhaps 
be  feasible  and  certainly  not  desirable  to  employ  guns 
and  forts  for  that  purpose. 

DIFFICULTY  OF  GUARDING  THE  CANAL. 

A  canal  of  any  type  must  necessarily  be  extremely 
vulnerable.  A  few  sticks  of  dynamite  in  the  hands 
of  determined  men  would  put  it  out  of  use  for  a 
greater  or  less  period.  Nor  could  any  practicable 
system  of  precautions  insure  immunity  from  such  a 
hazard.  Fortifications  would  be  futile,  for  a  covert 
attack  by  a  small  body  would  be  more  likely  to  suc- 
ceed than  an  assault  in  force.  Aside  from  guarding 
locks,  dams  and  other  important  works  it  is  difficult 
to  conceive  of  anything  like  effective  defensive  meas- 
ures. In  this  connection  the  Isthmian  Canal  Com- 


264  PANAMA. 

mission  of  1899-1901  said :  "  It  is  the  opinion  of 
the  Commission  that  a  neutral  canal,  operated  and 
controlled  by  American  citizens,  would  materially 
add  to  the  military  strength  of  the  United  States.; 
that  a  canal,  whether  neutral  or  not,  controlled  by 
foreigners,  would  be  a  source  of  weakness  to  the 
United  States,  rather  than  of  strength;  and  that  a 
canal  not  neutral,  to  be  defended  by  the  United 
States,  whether  by  fortifications  on  land,  or  by  the 
navy  at  sea,  would  be  a  source  of  weakness." 

The  question  is  amongst  the  many  problems  con- 
nected with  the  Canal  which  are  receiving  the  care- 
ful consideration  of  the  Government,  and  it  is  quite 
probable  that  it  will  decide  that  we  must  depend 
upon  the  Navy  to  prevent  any  hostile  force  from 
landing  upon  the  American  Isthmus. 

Our  possession  of  the  Canal  has  emphasized  the 
desirability  of  the  United  States  owning  the  West 
Indies,  or  at  least  the  four  islands  constituting  the 
Greater  Antilles,  which  most  effectually  control  the 
approach  to  the  Caribbean  Sea,  and  are  characterized 
by  Captain  Mahan  as  "  the  very  domain  of  sea  power, 
if  ever  region  could  be  called  so." 


SHORTENED  DISTANCES. 


265 


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XI. 

PANAMA. 
PREPARATORY  WORK  ON  THE  ISTHMUS. 

Difficulty  of  Gauging  Work  Done  —  The  Work  of  the  French 
Companies  —  Deteriorated  Property  —  We  Have  Greater 
Opportunities  Than  Had  the  French  —  The  Death  Roll 
Under  French  Management  —  Former  Condition  of  Panama 
and  Colon  —  Sanitary  Detective  Work  —  Extensive  Work  of 
the  Sanitary  Department  —  the  Question  of  Food  Supply  — 
Extraordinary  Treatment  of  the  Laborers  —  Improvements 
in  the  City  of  Panama  —  Conditions  in  the  City  of  Colon 
—  The  Opinions  of  an  Expert  —  Mr.  Hunter  is  Favorably 
Impressed  with  Conditions  —  The  Panamans  Are  Satisfied 
with  the  Situation  —  Heavy  Expenditures  for  Material  and 
Supplies  —  A  Clean  and  Well-directed  Management. 

Considered  in  all  its  aspects,  the  Panama  Canal 
is  undoubtedly  the  greatest  material  enterprise  of 
modern  times.  Nevertheless,  no  question  in  recent 
years  has  been  generally  discussed  with  so  little 
discrimination  and  so  much  ignorance  of  the  facts. 
The  average  citizen  depends  upon  his  newspaper  for 
information  in  such  cases  as  this,  and  the  American 
press,  with  few  exceptions,  has  treated  this  great 
national  undertaking  in  a  manner  which  must  be 
characterized  either  as  inefficient  or  unfair.  There 

266 


YELLOW  JOURNALISM.  26? 

has  been  displayed,  almost  from  its  inception,  a 
pessimistic  attitude  towards  the  project  and  a  hyper- 
critical attitude  towards  its  management  that  are 
not  consistent  with  an  understanding  of  the  task 
and  a  knowledge  of  the  conditions  attaching  to  it. 
There  has  been  an  incomprehensible  readiness  to  print 
any  silly  canard  in  connection  with  the  undertaking, 
and  no  story,  apparently,  has  been  too  extravagant  to 
meet  with  wide  credence.  One  or  two  of  the  most 
flagrant  instances  of  misrepresentation  have,  it  is 
true,  been  characterized  by  a  degree  of  mendacity 
sufficiently  transparent  to  defeat  its  purpose,  but  on 
the  whole,  unjustifiable  criticism  by  publications  of 
large  circulation  has  seriously  hampered  the  work 
of  the  Commission  and  perhaps,  somewhat  impaired 
the  efficiency  of  the  personnel  under  its  direction. 
The  bilious  effusions  of  yellow  journalism  and  the 
mendacious  maunderings  of  sensation-mongers  never 
furthered  a  good  cause  and  can  neither  be  expected 
to  help  us  build  the  canal  nor  to  aid  us  in  arriving 
at  a  better  understanding  of  the  unfamiliar  matters 
relating  to  it. 

The  Panama  Canal  is  the  greatest  engineering 
undertaking  in  the  history  of  the  world,  and  its 
accomplishment  involves  deeper  problems  and  more 
difficult  tasks  than  those  with  which  any  similar 
enterprise  in  the  past  has  been  beset.  The  best  talent 
and  the  most  active  brains  of  all  civilized  countries 
have  contributed  to  the  perfection  of  the  plans,  and 


268  PANAMA. 

we  have  every  reason  to  believe  that  the  consumma- 
tion of  them  has  been  placed  in  the  hands  of  the 
best  men  available  in  America,  It  is  safe  to  say 
that  no  great  engineering  work  ever  entered  upon 
the  constructive  stage  under  more  favorable  con- 
ditions and  with  better  prospects  for  success.  Ex- 
cellent work  has  been  done  during  the  period  of 
preparation.  We  have  an  assurance  of  this  fact  in 
the  unequivocal  statements  of  officials  who  are  in 
the  best  position  to  judge.  They  include  our  Presi- 
dent and  are  all  men  whose  word  is  unimpeachable. 
But,  if  that  were  not  sufficient,  the  testimony  might 
be  adduced  of  every  disinterested  individual  whose 
professional  training,  and  experience  on  the  Isthmus 
have  been  such  as  to  render  his  judgment  weighty. 

DIFFICULTY   OF   GAUGING   WORK   DONE. 

It  is  difficult  to  conceive  of  an  undertaking  in 
which  so  much  effective  work  might  be  done  with  so 
little  to  "  show  for  it "  as  in  this.  Much,  indeed, 
of  the  most  important  labor  has  no  visible  result  at 
present.  The  extensive  surveys,  the  borings,  the 
fluvial  investigations  and  a  hundred  similar  re- 
searches are  in  evidence  only  in  the  office  files.  Even 
the  splendid  sanitary  achievements  are  to  be  realized 
only  by  an  examination  of  the  records,  which  bear 
eloquent  testimony  to  the  scientific  attainment  and 
determined  energy  of  Americans.  Nor  is  it  possible 


FAULTY  OBSERVERS.  269 

for  one  to  appreciate  the  vast  amount  of  work  that 
has  been  done  in  the  matters  of  organization  and 
equipment  unless  he  has  some  technical  knowledge  of 
such  affairs  and  an  opportunity  for  comparison  with 
the  pre-existing  conditions.  The  progress  that  has 
been  made  on  the  Isthmus  can  not  be  discerned  by 
casual  inspection.  The  observer  who  permits  super- 
ficial phenomena  to  fill  his  eye  to  the  exclusion  of 
sub-surface  indications  can  not  avoid  erroneous  con- 
clusions and  unwarranted  judgments.  Photograph- 
ing discarded  French  machinery  and  nosing  about 
in  gutters  and  backyards  are  not  conducive  to  a 
broad  view  or  a  just  appreciation  of  what  has  been 
accomplished  by  our  people  on  the  Isthmus.  The 
bruised  and  bandaged  victim  of  a  railroad  collision 
affords  little  scope,  except  to  the  practised  surgeon, 
for  accurate  judgment  as  to  his  condition  when  ad- 
mitted to  the  emergency  ward,  or  as  to  the  treatment 
which  he  has  received.  What  would  we  say  of 
the  visitor  to  a  hospital  who  should  allow  the  per- 
vading presence  of  sickness  and  disease  to  excite 
his  condemnation  of  the  faculty,  in  ignorance  or 
disregard  of  the  fact  that  they  are  not  responsible 
for  its  existence  and  have  accomplished  much  towards 
its  alleviation  and  cure.  And,  as  the  conduct  of 
the  most  efficient  hospital  will  not  be  free  from  fail- 
ures and  mistakes,  so  these  will  be  experienced,  and 
should  be  expected,  in  the  course  of  so  extensive  an 
operation  as  the  construction  of  the  Panama  Canal. 


270  PANAMA. 

A  clearer  understanding  of  the  present  state  of  affairs 
in  the  Canal  Zone  and  of  the  progress  that  has  been 
made  since  American  occupation  will  be  secured  by 
a  review  of  the  conditions  and  work  during  the 
French  tenure. 

Little  excavation  has  been  done  on  the  line  of 
the  canal  since  1889,  when  the  Old  Panama  Canal 
Company  failed.  During  the  five  years  of  receiver- 
ship nothing  more  than  the  preservation  of  the  prop- 
erty was  attempted.  In  1894,  the  New  Panama 
Canal  Company  resumed  the  excavation  of  the  divide 
in  a  restricted  manner.  At  no  time  had  they  as 
many  as  4,000  laborers  employed,  and  when  the 
United  States  came  into  possession,  in  1904,  the 
number  was  about  600.  Aside  from  the  limited 
excavation  mentioned,  the  new  company  performed 
no  work  in  furtherance  of  the  project  than  some 
dredging  at  La  Boca. 

THE   WOEK    OP   THE    FRENCH    COMPANIES. 

The  Trench  companies  made  extensive  surveys  and 
soundings  and  the  results  of  these  investigations  were 
amongst  the  most  valuable  of  the  assets  turned  over 
to  us.  The  Old  Panama  Canal  Company  erected 
many  buildings,  shops,  hospitals,  etc.,  but  along  the 
line  of  the  canal  its  operations  were  confined  to  ex- 
cavation, except  for  the  construction  of  some  inade- 
quate docks  and  piers  at  Colon.  Along  the  low 


WORK  OF  THE  FRENCH.  271 

marshy  stretch  between  that  point  and  Bohio  the 
company  dredged  a  channel  with  an  original  bottom 
width  of  72  feet  and  a  depth,  near  Mindi,  of  29  feet 
below  sea  level,  gradually  decreasing  toward  its  end. 
The  portion  of  this  channel  between  Mindi  and  Ga- 
tun,  11  miles  in  length,  comes  within  the  alignment 
of  the  prospective  canal.  The  cut  between  Colon 
and  Bohio  and  the  excavation  at  Culebra  are  the  two 
largest  and  most  impressive  features  of  the  operation 
in  its  present  condition.  Omitting  the  divide,  there 
is  a  shallow  but  almost  continuous  ditch  between 
Bohio  and  Miraflores,  which  will  not  serve  to  expe- 
dite the  American  project.  A  large  amount  of  ma- 
terial was  removed  by  the  old  company  at  the  con- 
tinental divide  and  a  moderate  amount  —  about 
7,000,000  cubic  yards  —  by  its  successor.  The  orig- 
inal height  of  the  summit  at  this  point,  333  feet 
above  sea-level,  has  been  reduced  to  about  170  at  the 
maximum  depth.  The  old  company  excavated  the 
canal  for  a  distance  of  about  two  miles  from  La  Boca 
to  an  average  depth  of  about  20  feet  from  the  original 
surface,  which  is  at  nearly  extreme  high  water.  As 
the  extreme  range  of  tide  at  the  Pacific  terminus  of 
the  canal  is  about  10  feet  above  mean  sea  level  to  10 
feet  below,  the  old  company  planned  to  make  the 
Pacific  sea-level  section  of  the  canal,  from  Miraflores 
to  deep  water,  39.4  feet  deep  below  mean  tide.  Less 
than  one-third  of  the  total  requisite  excavation  was 
made  between  La  Boca  and  Miraflores,  nor  was  a 


272  PANAMA. 

channel  to  full  depth  completed  from  La  Boca  to  the 
deep  water  of  Panama  Bay.  The  old  company  ex- 
cavated a  number  of  diversion  channels  aggregating 
about  40  miles  in  length.  Very  little  of  this  work 
can  be  utilized  in  the  execution  of  the  plans  of  a 
lock  canal. 

A  total  amount  of  about  80,000,000  cubic  yards  of 
all  classes  of  material  has  been  excavated  throughout 
the  entire  length  of  the  canal.  By  far  the  greater 
part  of  this  was  soft  material  or  earth  removed  with 
dredges,  and  most  of  the  future  cutting  must  be 
through  rock,  much  of  it  hard  enough  to  necessitate 
blasting.  Of  course  the  entire  cutting  at  the  divide 
is  of  a  useful  character,  but  it  is  probable  that  all 
told,  less  than  half  the  excavating  done  by  the  French 
will  be  available  in  future  construction. 

DETERIORATED    PROPERTY. 

Immense  quantities  of  material,  machinery,  and 
appliances  were  received  by  the  old  company  and 
distributed  along  the  entire  line  of  the  canal,  and 
are  still  upon  the  Isthmus.  The  book  value  of  this 
property  is  about  $29,000,000.  Much  of  it  is  under 
cover  and  in  good  order,  but  practically  useless,  be- 
cause obsolete ;  the  greater  portion  of  it  is  scattered 
along  the  line  of  the  canal,  exposed  to  the  elements 
and  in  various  states  of  disrepair  and  decay. 

Upwards  of  2,000  buildings,  mostly  houses  for 


THE  AMERICAN  TASK.  273 

employees,  were  transferred  to  us  by  the  French 
company.  In  general  these  were  capable  of  being 
put  into  service,  but  most  of  them  needed  restoration 
or  alteration.  The  buildings  included,  besides  ex- 
cellent hospitals,  six  machine  shops  of  large  capacity 
with  a  fair  equipment.  These  have  been  enlarged 
and  better  furnished  and  will  prove  of  great  service 
in  repairing  machinery,  rolling  stock,  etc.,  and  may 
be  utilized  in  building  some  of  the  minor  plants 
required  in  the  work. 

When  the  United  States  took  possession  of  the 
canal  strip,  two  years  ago,  the  conditions  were  cha- 
otic. The  Canal  Zone  had  reverted  to  a  state  of 
wilderness.  Machinery,  rolling  stock,  and  appliances 
were  scattered  throughout  its  length  and  overgrown 
with  vegetation.  The  railroad,  with  its  out-of-date 
equipment  and  inefficient  personnel,  was  in  a  state  of 
extreme  deterioration.  Aside  from  the  few  hundred 
laborers  left  by  the  French  company  there  was  not 
even  the  nucleus  of  an  organization. 

These  conditions  were  not,  however,  the  most  for- 
midable that  confronted  the  Commission.  The  entire 
Zone  was  in  an  ideal  state  for  the  propagation  of 
disease,  and  the  cities  of  Colon  and  Panama,  but 
especially  the  latter,  were  a  reproach  to  civilization. 
The  French  had  not  the  authority  to  enforce  sanitary 
rules  in  the  city  of  Panama  and  in  Colon  only  within 
the  bounds  of  their  own  property.  Their  hospital 

system  was  admirable,  but  they  were  necessarily  re- 
18 


274  PANAMA. 

stricted  to  the  cure  of  sickness  or  the  mitigation  of 
its  effects.  Preventive  measures  against  the  prevail- 
ing diseases  were  impossible  to  them,  owing  to  ig- 
norance of  causes.  Malaria  was  attributed  to  mias- 
mic  exhalations  from  the  soil,  and  yellow  fever  to  an 
ever-present  poison.  Under  the  circumstances  it  is 
not  surprising  that  the  casualties  during  the  French 
occupancy  ran  into  extremely  high  figures. 

WE    HAVE   GREATER    OPPORTUNITIES    THAN    HAD    THE 
FRENCH. 

Our  latter-day  knowledge  enables  us  to  adopt  more 
effective  measures  and  affords  ground  for  the  hope 
that  we  shall  rid  the  Canal  Zone  of  yellow  fever, 
and  reduce  malaria  to  an  insignificant  factor.  The 
mosquito  theory  has  been  extensively  tested,  and  its 
truth  may  be  said  to  be  established.  The  experi- 
ences of  Havana,  New  Orleans,  and  other  places 
seem  to  prove  it.  A  few  years  ago  the  abandonment 
of  Ismalia  as  headquarters  of  the  Suez  Canal  was 
seriously  considered  on  account  of  the  general  sick- 
ness of  the  European  residents.  Among  2,000  of 
these  there  were  1,400  cases  of  malarial  fever  an- 
nually, many  of  which  resulted  in  death.  In  1902 
the  mosquitoes  were  extirpated  and  their  breeding 
places  destroyed.  The  number  of  cases  of  malaria 
since  has  been  214  in  1903,  90  in  1904,  and,  during 
ten  months  of  1905,  46,  without  a  death  in  the  whole 


HEAVY  MORTALITY.  275 

period.  Those  who  have  had  malaria  subsequent  to 
the  sanitating  of  the  place  had  been  chronic  sufferers 
from  the  disease  previously. 

The  inhabitants  of  Panama  are  immune  to  yellow 
fever,  but  until  recently  the  disease  has  never  been 
absent  from  the  Isthmus  when  there  have  been  any 
non-immunes  to  contract  it.  During  the  twenty-five 
years  since  the  inception  of  the  French  enterprise 
there  has,  on  several  occasions,  been  an  influx  of 
non-immune  persons,  and  on  each  such  occasion  there 
was  a  large  increase  in  the  mortality  from  yellow 
fever.  The  rule  held  good  continuously  until  full 
effect  was  had  from  the  sanitary  measures  taken  by 
the  United  States  authorities  in  the  Canal  Zone.  The 
records  of  the  Panama  cemetery  are  cited  by  our 
health  officers  as  furnishing  evidence  of  their  declara- 
tion that  it  is  not  only  possible  but  feasible  to  banish 
yellow  fever  from  the  Isthmus  and  to  maintain  the 
whole  force  of  employees  in  a  good  state  of  health. 

THE  DEATH  ROLL  UNDER  FRENCH  MANAGEMENT. 

Work  on  the  Canal  was  commenced  in  1881.  In 
1882  the  force  numbered  fewer  than  2,000,  and  in 
1884  the  average  number  employed  was  17,615.  The 
aggregate  of  the  numbers  of  those  reported  yearly  as 
employed  in  the  whole  period  of  eight  years  is  86,- 
812,  or  an  average  of  10,881  per  year.  The  total 
number  treated  for  sickness  was  52,814.  The  num- 


276  PANAMA. 

ber  of  deaths  of  employees  in  the  same  period  was 
5,627,  showing  a  rate  of  mortality  among  the  sick 
of  10.62  and  among  the  employed  of  6.48  per  cent. 

The  popular  clamour  to  see  "  the  dirt  fly  "  induced 
the  first  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  to  attack  the 
task  of  excavation  before  the  essential  one  of  prepara- 
tion had  been  accomplished.  The  consequence  was 
a  sudden  excess  of  mortality  and  sickness,  resulting 
in  panic  and  disorganization.  The  present  Commis- 
sion wisely  determined  to  defer  digging  until  such 
time  as  the  Zone  shall  be  rendered  thoroughly  sani- 
tary, the  organization  and  equipment  adequate,  the 
laborers  properly  housed  and  sufficiently  fed.  The 
work  will  then  proceed  to  a  rapid  and  successful  con- 
clusion without  interruption. 

Disease,  graft,  and  mismanagement  were  the  three 
great  factors  in  the  failure  of  the  French.  Not  the 
least  of  these  was  disease,  which  on  two  occasions 
necessitated  a  cessation  of  the  operations.  Business 
policy,  as  well  as  humane  considerations,  demanded 
the  sanitation  of  the  Zone  by  us.  Had  we  neglected 
this  duty  the  work  of  construction  must  have  been 
greatly  retarded  and  very  much  enhanced  in  cost. 
Not  only  that,  but  the  completed  Canal,  if  in  an  un- 
healthy region,  will  be  shunned  by  the  commerce  it 
is  designed  to  attract. 

The  treaty  between  the  United  States  and  Panama 
conveyed  to  the  former  a  strip  of  territory  ten  miles 
in  width,  extending  forty-two  miles  from  sea  to  sea. 


PANAMA  AND  COLON.  277 

Its  boundaries  embrace  twenty-five  towns  and  a  num- 
ber of  camps  besides  the  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon. 
These  last,  although  topographically  within  the  Canal 
Zone,  were  not  included  in  the  concession,  but  the 
terms  of  the  convention  specifically  permit  us  to 
exercise  discretionary  control  over  them  in  matters 
of  sanitation  and  order.  The  agreement  provides  for 
the  repayment  to  the  United  States  by  the  Panama 
Republic,  of  all  expenses  incurred  by  the  former  in 
these  respects. 

FORMER  CONDITION  OF  PANAMA  AND  COLON. 

When  we  took  over  the  Canal  the  entire  Zone  was 
covered  with  rank  vegetation  and  stagnant  pools  in 
which  the  anopheles,  the  malaria  mosquito,  bred  un- 
disturbed. The  City  of  Panama  had  neither  sewer 
nor  drainage  system.  Its  streets  were  paved  with 
cobble-stones  and  lined  with  gutters  through  which 
the  refuse  of  the  dwellings  trickled  slowly,  and  in 
places  stood  for  days  and  weeks  at  a  time.  The  in- 
habitants depended  for  their  water  supply  upon  rain, 
which  was  stored  in  open  cisterns  or  barrels.  These 
receptacles  were  the  most  fertile  breeding  places  of 
the  stegomyia,  or  yellow- fever  mosquito. 

The  low,  sandy  island  on  which  Colon  is  built  is 
nowhere  more  than  four  feet  above  mean  sea  level, 
and  high  tides  cover  considerable  portions  of  it.  Of 
course  no  adequate  drainage  system  could  exist  under 


278  PANAMA. 

such  circumstances,  and  the  city  was  devoid  of  sewers. 
The  small  section  that  contained  the  dwellings  of 
canal  officials  and  employees  of  the  railroad  company 
was  supplied  with  water  of  an  indifferent  quality 
from  a  reservoir  near  Mount  Hope.  The  remainder 
of  the  population  depended,  like  the  people  of  Pan- 
ama, upon  rain  water.  The  streets  of  Colon  were  in 
a  wretched  condition  and  the  whole  place  in  great 
disorder  when  it  came  into  our  hands.  Its  small 
population  of  about  6,000  has,  however,  rendered  the 
task  of  sanitation  comparatively  easy.  In  view  of 
the  probable  ultimate  abandonment  of  Colon  as  the 
entrepot  of  the  canal  it  would  be  an  extravagant  ex- 
penditure of  time  and  money  on  the  part  of  the 
Commission  to  fill  in  and  grade  the  island,  and  par- 
ticularly so  as  a  very  small  proportion  of  the  in- 
habitants are  in  the  American  service. 

The  plan  of  Colonel  Gorgas,  the  chief  sanitary 
officer,  consisted  mainly  of  the  destruction  of  the 
mosquitoes  and  their  breeding  places  and  the  treat- 
ment by  the  medical  staff  of  all  cases  of  sickness. 
This  plan  when  applied  to  the  entire  Zone  entailed  an 
enormous  amount  of  labor,  and  its  execution  was 
made  possible  only  by  the  most  constant  and  pains- 
taking energy.  The  Panamans  —  who  can  afford  to 
treat  yellow  fever  lightly  —  tell  funny  stories  of 
Gorgas's  men  chasing  a  single  mosquito  for  hours, 
and  after  the  capture  solemnly  executing  it  with  a 
machete.  Though  this  be  a  fanciful  picture  it  is  strict- 


SANITARY  WORK.  279 

ly  true  that  when  a  case  of  yellow  fever  is  discovered 
the  health  officers  trace  it  with  sleuth-like  persistency 
to  its  origin,  without  missing  a  link.  The  ingenuity 
and  care  exercised  in  these  searches  is  illustrated  in 
the  following  case,  by  no  means  an  exceptional  one. 

SANITARY    DETECTIVE    WORK. 

On  his  daily  tour  of  inspection  of  one  of  the  hotels 
in  Panama  a  health  inspector  learned  that  a  lodger 
had  been  taken  ill.  A  search  for  the  man  proved 
that  ho  had  left  the  house.  The  next  day  he  was 
found  on  the  street  drunk  and  was  taken  to  the  hos- 
pital. It  was  a  case  of  yellow  fever  and  resulted  in 
death.  Investigation  showed  that  the  hotel  contained 
none  but  non-immunes,  so  that  the  deceased  had  evi- 
dently contracted  the  disease  elsewhere.  No  one 
knew  him  or  anything  of  his  movements  previous  to 
his  sickness.  The  enquiry  was  transferred  to  a  cer- 
tain cafe  which  was  known  to  be  a  favorite  haunt 
of  men  of  the  same  nationality  as  the  deceased. 
Here,  after  much  questioning  it  was  learnt  that  he 
had  been  seen  in  the  company  of  an  Italian.  The 
inspectors  set  out  to  interrogate  every  Italian  in  the 
city,  and  at  length  found  one  who  declared  that  he 
had  seen  the  dead  man  with  the  bartender  of  the 
theatre.  The  bartender  could  not  be  found  at  his 
usual  place  of  business,  but  diligent  search  discov- 
ered him  in  a  secluded  lodging,  in  bed  and  sick  with 


280  PANAMA. 

yellow  fever.  He  said  that  the  former  victim,  whilst 
registered  at  the  hotel,  had  been  sleeping  with  him 
in  a  room  at  the  theatre.  From  this  it  appeared 
that  the  playhouse  was  the  centre  of  infection  and  it 
was  accordingly  fumigated.  The  discovery  of  a  third 
case  in  which  the  infection  was  traceable  to  the  same 
source  satisfied  the  health  officers  of  the  correctness 
of  their  conclusion,  which  was  further  confirmed  by 
the  fact  that  the  outbreak  was  limited  to  the  cases 
that  have  been  mentioned.  Under  the  old  conditions 
it  would  probably  have  spread  unchecked  throughout 
the  non-immune  population  of  the  city,  creating  a 
new  focus  of  infection  with  each  fresh  case. 

EXTENSIVE   WORK  OF  THE   SANITARY  DEPARTMENT. 

To  quote  Colonel  Gorgas :  "  When  one  considers 
the  five  hundred  square- miles  of  fever-ridden  jungle 
which  confronted  us;  when  one  remembers  that  the 
mortality  among  the  laborers  under  the  French  re- 
gime rose  at  times  to  the  enormous  figure  of  six  hun- 
dred to  the  thousand  annually,  some  idea  may  be 
gained  of  the  magnitude  of  the  undertaking." 

In  the  campaign  of  extermination  that  has  been 
vigorously  waged  against  the  mosquitoes  an  amount 
of  work  has  been  done  along  the  line  of  the  canal  of 
which  only  a  partial  conception  can  be  derived  from 
the  following  statements:  two  million  square  yards 
of  brush  and  grass  have  been  cut  and  burnt;  more 


— 


FOOD  AND  WATER  SUPPLIES.  281 

than  one  million  square  yards  of  swamp  Have  been 
drained  or  filled  in;  upwards  of  one  hundred  and 
fifty  thousand  feet  of  ditch  have  been  put  in  effective 
condition ;  three  million  cubic  feet  of  house  area 
have  been  fumigated.  This  the  sanitary  department 
describes  as  "  only  a  beginning."  It  is  a  very  fine 
beginning  and  one  that  has  already  borne  fruit  be- 
yond any  expectations  that  were  entertained  two 
years  ago. 

In  addition  to  the  sanitation  of  the  Zone,  the  pre- 
paratory work  of  the  Commission  has  been  directed 
toward  the  establishment  of  permanent  and  sufficient 
food  and  water  supplies,  the  erection  of  suitable 
dwellings,  the  installation  of  an  adequate  mechanical 
plant,  the  proper  equipment  of  the  Panama  Railroad 
and  the  organization  of  an  efficient  staff  of  em- 
ployees. 

There  are  within  the  Canal  Zone,  exclusive  of  the 
cities  of  Panama  and  Colon,  about  twenty-five  towns 
and  a  number  of  temporary  camps.  The  water  sup- 
ply of  each  of  these  centres  has  been  improved  and 
before  the  close  of  the  year  1906  pure  water  in  abun- 
dant quantity  will  be  readily  available  to  every  hu- 
man being  within  the  limits  of  the  territory  and  in 
the  terminal  ports.  Comfortable  houses  have  been 
erected  on  carefully  selected  sites  and  are  under  the 
constant  supervision  of  the  sanitary  inspectors. 
Emergency  hospitals,  schools,  churches  and  police 
courts  have  been  established  along  the  line.  The 


282  PANAMA. 

regulation  of  the  saloon  traffic  under  a  high  license 
has  produced  marked  results  in  the  abatement  of 
drunkenness. 

THE  QUESTION  OF  FOOD  SUPPLY. 

fl 

Food  supply  is  one  of  the  many  vexing  questions 
with  which  the  Commission  has  successfully  dealt. 
It  was  found  that  the  local  markets  could  not  be  de- 
pended upon  to  any  considerable  extent.  Not  only 
have  the  requirements  increased  by  reason  of  the 
employment  of  a  greater  number  of  laborers,  but  the 
local  supply  has  been  concurrently  curtailed  owing 
to  the  fact  that  the  high  wages  paid  on  the  Canal  are 
constantly  attracting  the  natives  and  inducing  them 
to  abandon  the  cultivation  of  their  fields.  The 
Commission  is  meeting  the  difficulty  by  establishing 
commissary  stores  at  convenient  points  where  the 
silver  employees  may  secure  good  food  at  low  prices 
and  on  credit.  In  connection  with  these  depots  a  sys- 
tem of  cold  storage  plants  will  be  operated  and  the 
bulk  of  the  supplies  will  be  imported,  thus,  not  only 
insuring  a  constant  sufficiency,  but  also  minimizing 
the  danger  of  infection  from  this  source. 

EXTRAORDINARY-  TREATMENT   OF  THE   LABORERS. 

All  statements  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding,  it 
is  true  that  the  laborers  in  the  employ  of  the  Com- 


THE  JAMAICAN  NEGRO.  283 

mission  are  receiving  better  treatment  than  they 
ever  experienced  before:  indeed,  it  is  safe  to  go  far- 
ther and  say  that  similar  care  and  attention  haa 
never  been  bestowed  on  a  large  body  of  common 
laborers  anywhere.  As  a  matter  of  fact  the  negro  on 
the  Canal  is  too  well  treated.  He  is  pampered  and 
his  natural  inefficiency  is  consequently  increasing. 
He  lives  in  a  model  tenement  which  is  a  palace  in 
comparison  with  his  Jamaican  shack.  He  has  good 
food  and  excellent  medical  attendance.  He  works 
when  he  thinks  fit,  and  loafs  when  he  pleases.  Every 
few  months  he  goes  jauntily  back  to  Jamaica  to  spend 
his  savings,  but  he  seldom  fails  to  return  to  the 
Isthmus.  If  we  could  substitute  even  a  fairly  good 
grade  of  labor  for  the  present  supply,  the  completion 
of  the  Canal  might  be  accelerated  by  two  or  three 
years  and  its  ultimate  cost  decreased  by  several  mil- 
lions. 

During  the  summer  of  1906,  every  house  in  Pan- 
ama and  Colon,  without  a  single  exception,  was 
fumigated.  So  far  as  the  authority  of  the  Commis- 
sion can  be  reasonably  exerted,  every  building  in  those 
cities  is  now  screened  and  every  dwelling,  hotel  and 
lodging-house  is  subjected  to  daily  inspection.  It 
should  be  said  to  the  credit  of  the  citizens  of  Panama, 
who  are  immune  to  yellow  fever,  that  they  have 
cheerfully  submitted  to  the  inconvenience  and  dis- 
comfort entailed  by  these  measures  of  sanitation. 
The  Panaman  is  shrewd  and  intelligent.  He  is  not 


284  PANAMA. 

slow  to  appreciate  the  prospective  advantages  to  be 
enjoyed  by  his  country  in  consequence  of  our  im- 
provements. One  of  the  most  immediate  results  must 
be  a  great  enhancement  in  real  estate  values  in  Pan- 
ama, La  Boca  and  Colon.  Such  a  movement  will 
redound  to  the  benefit  of  the  United  States,  which, 
as  the  owner  of  the  Panama  Railroad,  has  title  to  a 
great  deal  of  property  in  those  cities. 

IMPROVEMENTS  IN  THE  CITY  OF  PANAMA. 

The  city  of  Panama  is  far  advanced  in  the  process 
of  transformation  that  will  convert  it  into  an  at- 
tractive and  healthful  place.  A  considerable  por- 
tion of  the  city  was  supplied  with  pure  water  eight 
months  ago  and  before  these  lines  are  in  print  the 
system  will  be  complete.  It  is  very  extensive,  de- 
signed not  only  to  afford  a  practically  unlimited  sup- 
ply to  the  present  inhabitants,  but  also  to  meet  the 
requirements  of  considerable  expansion.  The  people 
of  Panama  know  for  the  first  time  what  modern 
sewerage  is  and  they  are  beginning  to  appreciate 
good  pavement  as  the  work  of  laying  the  thorough- 
fares with  vitrified  brick  progresses. 

A  similar  change  is  taking  place  in  La  Boca.  One- 
half  of  the  town  is  owned  by  the  United  States.  In 
that  section  the  old-time  ramshackle  buildings  have 
given  place  to  new  or  remodelled  houses,  freshly 
painted,  lighted  by  electricity,  supplied  with  good 


CONDITIONS  IN  COLON.  233 

water  and  sewers.  The  streets  have  been  improved, 
and  the  wharving  facilities  have  been  greatly  in- 
creased. The  action  of  the  Commission  in  its  quar- 
ter of  La  Boca  must  force  private  owners  of  prop- 
erty to  follow  suit  as  soon  as  the  requisite  workmen 
are  available. 

During  the  year  1905  two  separate  outbreaks  of 
bubonic  plague  occurred  in  La  Boca  and  by  the  ener- 
getic measures  of  the  health  department  each  was 
confined  to  the  original  case.  This  is  an  achieve- 
ment to  be  proud  of,  for  the  disease  is  probably  the 
most  virulent  and  quick-spreading  known. 

CONDITIONS  IN  THE  CITY  OF  COLON. 

The  residents  of  Colon  smile  at  the  hysterical  va- 
porings  of  recent  writers  who  have  been  moved  to 
tearful  protest  against  the  condition  of  the  place. 
Since  the  French  operations  began  the  Canal  em- 
ployee who  was  stationed  at  Cristobal  or  Colon  — 
they  are  in  reality  one  —  has  considered  himself  for- 
tunate in  the  place  of  his  abode  and  would  not  will- 
ingly change  it  for  any  other  on  the  Isthmus.  It 
will  readily  be  imagined  from  what  has  already  been 
said  with  respect  to  it,  that  Colon  is  not  pleasing  to 
the  eye,  with  a  swamp  on  one  side  and  an  invading 
tide  upon  the  other,  but  these  are  conditions  which 
until  quite  recently  were  markedly  pronounced  at 
Atlantic  City,  said  to  be  the  most  salubrious  spot  in 


280  PANAMA. 

the  United  States.  The  Colonite  will  tell  you  that 
he  is  not  especially  concerned  about  appearances,  but 
that  it  is  very  gratifying  to  know  that  his  city  has  a 
health  record  forty  per  cent  better  than  that  of 
Panama. 

Colon  cannot  be  effectively  drained  until  the  swamp 
is  filled  in  and  that  is  a  task  which  must  necessarily 
wait  upon  excavation  elsewhere,  if,  indeed,  it  is  found 
advisable  to  undertake  it  at  all.  Meanwhile  the 
streets  are  being  rapidly  graded  and  finished  with 
Telford  pavement.  A  canal  is  in  process  of  con- 
struction through  the  town.  This  will  give  continu- 
ous passage  to  fresh  sea  water  and  will  receive  sur- 
face drainage.  The  section  inhabited  by  the  Canal 
employees  has  had  the  advantage  of  a  complete  do- 
mestic system  of  sewerage  for  some  time.  In  the 
near  future  the  entire  city  will  be  sewered  for  house 
drainage  into  a  large  cesspool,  the  contents  of  which 
will  be  pumped  far  out  to  sea.  Colon  has  an  ample 
supply  of  water  from  two  permanent  standpipes  with 
an  aggregate  capacity  of  nearly  one  million  gallons. 

THE  OPINIONS  OF  AN  EXPERT. 

The  popular  impression  of  the  work  of  the  Com- 
mission upon  the  Isthmus  has  been  derived  generally 
from  unreliable  sources.  We  have  had  the  stories  of 
scared  "  quitters  "  and  disgruntled  incompetents,  who 
have  either  been  wanting  in  courage  or  capacity,  but 


MR.  HUNTER'S  OPINION.  287 

there  has  been  little  apparent  effort  to  secure  the  tes- 
timony of  men  whose  experience  entitles  them  to 
speak  with  authority. 

In  a  letter  dated  February  13,  1906,  and  ad- 
dressed to  the  writer,  Mr.  W.  Henry  Hunter,  the 
Chief  Engineer  of  the  Manchester  Ship  Canal,  made 
the  following  remarks : 

"  During  my  recent  visit  to  the  Isthmus  of  Pan- 
ama I  had,  together  with  the  other  members  of  the 
Board  of  Consulting  Engineers,  opportunity  for  some- 
what close  observations  of  the  conditions  which  now 
exist  in  the  portion  of  the  Isthmus  which  is  subject 
to  the  control  of  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission. 

"  The  days  of  compulsory  labor  have,  happily,  long 
since  passed  away;  if  therefore  the  construction  of 
the  Panama  Canal  is  to  proceed  with  economy  and 
despatch,  it  is  essential  that  labor,  both  of  a  skilled 
and  of  an  unskilled  sort,  should  1x3  attracted  to  the 
Isthmus,  and  consequently  essential  that  the  condi- 
tions in  the  Canal  Zone  should  be  made  such  as  will 
prove  attractive  to  reasonable  and  intelligent  men. 

"  The  initial  work  required  for  this  purpose  was 
naturally  divided  into  two  great  heads:  1.  Sanita- 
tion. 2.  Housing  of  employees. 

"  1.  The  work  of  sanitation,  i.  e.,  that  required 
to  render  the  Isthmus  a  safe  place  of  habitation,  has, 
since  the  American  Government  obtained  possession 
of  the  Isthmus,  been  taken  in  hand  in  the  vigorous, 
efficient  and  workmanlike  manner  which  those  who 


288  PANAMA. 

know  Colonel  Gorgas  expected  from  him,  and  from 
those  working  under  his  direction. 

"  The  work  which  has  already  been  accomplished 
has  proved  entirely  successful,  and  I  have  no  doubt 
but  that  Colonel  Gorgas  and  his  staff  will  effectually 
stamp  out  the  peril  of  yellow  fever,  and  will  reduce 
to  a  minimum  the  more  subtle,  though  less  apparent, 
dangers  from  malaria. 

"  2.  The  work  of  housing,  i.  e.,  that  required  to 
make  the  Canal  Zone  a  comfortable  place  of  residence, 
is  being  proceeded  with  in  the  same  vigorous  and 
effective  manner. 

"  Quarters  are  being  provided  for  all  classes  of 
labor,  in  which  workmen  may  dwell  under  conditions 
which  will  compare  favorably,  both  in  respect  of 
health  and  of  comfort,  with  many  workmen's  habita- 
tions in  large  cities  both  in  America  and  in  Europe. 

ME,    HUNTER  IS   FAVORABLY  IMPRESSED  WITH    CONDI- 
TIONS. 

"  Taken  all  together  I  was  favorably  impressed 
with  the  conditions  which  exist  in  the  Canal  Zone. 

"  It  appeared  to  me  that  when  the  provision  of  the 
necessary  plant  and  the  construction  of  the  transpor- 
tation railroads  have  been  completed,  no  obstacle  in 
the  way  of  putting  forth  of  strenuous  and  energetic 
effort  for  the  removal  of  the  excavation  from  the 
Canal  prism  will  remain. 


THE  NATIVES  ARE  SATISFIED.  289 

"  This  plant,  so  far  as  the  work  in  the  dry  is  con- 
cerned, is  being  provided  and  delivered  on  the  ground 
and  the  roads  are  being  laid  in,  so  that  I  see  no  rea- 
son why  the  dry  excavation  work  should  not  be  com- 
menced almost  immediately." 

Mr.  John  N.  Popham,  a  native  of  Virginia,  has 
been  engaged  in  railroad  building  and  other  enter- 
prises on  the  Isthmus  for  many  years  past.  Upon 
the  occasion  of  a  recent  visit  to  the  United  States  he 
made  the  following  statement : 

"Prior  to  last  May  (i.  e.,  May,  1905)  the  con- 
ditions on  the  Isthmus  may  have  been  open  to  just 
and  intelligent  criticism,  caused  by  the  delay  in  im- 
proving the  physical  condition  of  the  Panama  Rail- 
road, purchase  of  necessary  rolling  stock,  and  im- 
proving the  terminal  facilities.  But  those  condi- 
tions are  forgotten  history.  The  fair-minded  resi- 
dents of  the  Isthmus  appreciate  the  magnificent  ef- 
forts and  splendid  results  accomplished  since  that 
time. 

THE  PAJSTAMANS  ABB  SATISFIED  WITH  THE  SITUATION. 

"  The  statement  made  by  Mr.  Poultney  Bigelow 
is  so  far  from  being  fair,  the  views  so  distorted,  and 
the  inference  so  frail,  that  it  is  only  laughed  at  on 
the  Isthmus,  and  it  was  so  fully  covered  at  home  by 
that  part  of  the  President's  communication  to  Con- 
gress the  8th  instant,  under  the  heading  of  '  Scandal- 

19 


290  PANAMA.  . 

mongers,'  that  there  is  little  left  for  a  self-respecting 
American  resident  of  the  Isthmus  to  add.  The  peo- 
ple of  Panama  are  intelligent,  capable  people.  They 
appreciate  the  results  accomplished:  they  have  been 
and  are  anxious  and  willing  to  continue  to  help  our 
people  in  the  great  enterprise  that  means  so  much 
to  the  whole  world. 

THE  LABORERS   ARE   WELL   TREATED. 

I , 

"  After  sixteen  years  experience  on  and  in  the 
vicinity  of  the  Isthmus  and  knowing,  as  I  do,  the 
homes  of  the  West  India  laborers  in  the  great  banana- 
producing  districts  near  Colon,  and  having  for  many 
years  employed  from  400  to  700  Jamaicans  daily  at 
our  mines,  thirty-five  miles  from  Colon,  I  feel  compe- 
tent to  judge  and  to  tell  you  that  the  West  India 
laborer  has  never  known  and  in  his  most  pleasant 
dreams  has  never  hoped  for,  the  splendid  care  and 
liberal  treatment  he  is  receiving  from  our  government 
on  the  Isthmus  of  Panama. 

"  My  knowledge  of  the  affairs  of  the  Canal  com- 
pany only  enables  me  to  speak  of  conditions  on  the 
Isthmus  and  the  work  in  progress  there.  But  in 
every  department  of  the  Canal  work  during  the  past 
seven  months  on  the  Isthmus  the  people  of  this  coun- 
try can  rest  assured  that  the  investigation  to  be  made 
by  the  Senate  committee  will  confirm  the  following 
lines  found  in  the  President's  communication  to  Con- 


HEAVY  EXPENDITURES.  291 

gress :  '  The  work  on  the  Isthmus  is  being  admirably 
done,  and  great  progress  has  been  made.' ' 

The  cost  of  the  operations  on  the  Isthmus  has  af- 
forded subject  for  facetious  articles  and  comic  car- 
toons in  the  public  press.  Let  us  look  at  some  of  the 
items  of  expenditure  and  we  shall  thereby  improve 
our  conception  of  the  greatness  of  the  enterprise,  and 
of  the  complexity  of  its  details. 

In  June,  1902,  Congress  appropriated  $10,000,000 
for  the  use  of  the  Canal  Commission  and  all  expenses 
up  to  the  close  of  the  year  1905  were  paid  out  of  that 
amount.  The  purchases  range  over  the  greatest  va- 
riety and  degrees  of  magnitude,  from  steamships  to 
handcuffs.  Four  million  dollars  has  been  paid  for 
general  supplies,  including  fuel,  explosives,  lumber, 
machinery,  roofing,  paving  and  plumbing  material, 
medical  and  sanitary  supplies,  garbage  carts,  laundry 
equipment,  steel  vaults,  scientific  instruments,  and 
other  innumerable  and  diversified  items.  During 
1905,  upwards  of  one  million  dollars  was  laid  out  on 
steel  flat  cars,  half  a  million  on  steam  shovels  and 
three  times  as  much  on  locomotives. 

A    CLEAN    AND    WELL-DIRECTED    MANAGEMENT. 

The  Commission  has  observed  strict  business  prin- 
ciples in  all  these  purchases.  There  has  been  no  op- 
portunity for  graft  and  hence  without  doubt  has 
arisen  a  great  deal  of  the  dissatisfaction  expressed 
with  its  management. 


292  PANAMA. 

The  conduct  of  the  enterprise  so  far  should  be  a 
source  of  pride  to  Americans.  There  have  been  mis- 
takes, of  course,  but  no  blunders.  Errors  of  judg- 
ment and  miscalculations  have  been  quickly  recog- 
nized and  rectified.  Not  a  justifiable  suspicion  of 
graft  has  been  connected  with  the  operation  since  it 
came  into  American  hands.  Influence  and  favorit- 
ism have  been  singularly  absent  from  the  appoint- 
ments. The  men  at  the  head  of  affairs  have  nothing 
but  reputation  to  gain  from  the  undertaking  and  it 
is  not  their  purpose  to  allow  incompetents  to  hazard 
their  prospects  in  that  respect  As  the  conditions 
of  life  on  the  Isthmus  become  more  healthful  and 
comfortable  greater  pressure  will  doubtless  be  ex- 
erted by  the  drones  who  attach  to  the  skirts  of  Con- 
gressmen and  officials,  but  it  is  safe  to  predict  that  as 
long  as  the  present  Executive  Committee  of  the  Com- 
mission retain  their  positions  such  efforts  will  be 
unavailing. 

THE   COMMON  SENSE   OF  THE   SITUATION. 

We  approach  the  construction  stage  of  the  under- 
taking with  the  management  of  the  enterprise  in 
thoroughly  capable  hands,  supported  by  an  experi- 
enced and  efficient  staff.  The  organization  is  admir- 
ably calculated  to  work  harmoniously,  for  the  heads 
of  departments  have  been  at  pains  to  secure  the  ser- 
vices of  men  who  had  been  associated  with  them  in 


COMMON  SENSE  ATTITUDE.  293 

former  important  works  and  with  whose  characters 
and  capabilities  they  are  familiar.  In  many  cases 
these  men  are  making  sacrifices  in  thus  accepting 
service  umler  their  old  chiefs,  for  the  salaries  are  not 
such  as  to  attract  first-class  men  under  the  circum- 
stances that  surround  life  on  the  Isthmus  at  its  best. 
The  Commission  deserves  the  support  of  the  Amer- 
ican people  and  press.  Common  sense  demands  that 
we  refrain  from  the  puerile  nagging  and  fault-finding 
which  has  hitherto  been  our  only  reward  for  honest, 
energetic  and  patriotic  work.  The  present  Congres- 
sional investigation  will  prove  that  we  have  been  act- 
ing a  very  ungrateful  part.  At  the  close  of  it  we 
should  open  a  new  chapter  in  the  history  of  the 
Canal.  There  should  be  a  cessation  of  slander  and 
obstruction  and  a  disposition  toward  truth  and  fair 
play. 


APPENDIX 
GREAT  CANALS  OF  THE  WORLD. 


295 


APPENDIX. 
GREAT  CANALS  OF  THE  WORLD.* 

The  Suez  Canal  —  The  Cronstadt  and  St.  Petersburg  Canal  — • 
The  Corinth  Canal — The  Manchester  Ship  Canal  —  The 
Kaiser  Wilhelm  Canal  —  The  Elbe  and  Trave  Canal  —  Ca- 
nals Projected  in  Prussia  —  Ship  Canals  Connecting  the 
Great  Lakes  of  North  America  —  The  Welland  Canal  —  The 
Sault  Ste.  Marie  Canals  —  Lake  Borgne  Canal  —  The  Chi- 
cago Sanitary  and  Ship  Canal  —  Other  Canals  —  Canals 
of  the  United  Kingdom  —  Canals  of  the  United  States  — 
The  Economic  Effects  of  Ship  Canals  —  Canals  of  Holland 

—  Manchester  Ship  Canal  —  Effect  of  Suez  Canal  on  Ship- 
ping—  Traffic  of  Suez  and  St.  Mary's  Canals  Compared  — 
Changes  in  the  Lakes  Shipping  —  Effect  of  "  Soo  "  Canal 
on  Iron  Business  —  Enormous  Wheat  Traffic  of  the  Lakes  — 
Influences  of  St.  Mary's  and  Suez  Canals  —  Canals  in  China 

—  The  Canal  System  of  India. 

Ship  canals  connecting  great  bodies  of  water,  and 
of  sufficient  dimensions  to  accommodate  the  great 
modern  vessels  plying  upon  such  waters,  are  of  com- 
paratively recent  production  and  few  in  number. 
The  one  great  example  of  works  of  this  character 
which  has  been  a  sufficient  length  of  time  in  exist- 
ence and  operation  to  supply  satisfactory  data  as  to 
cost  of  maintenance  and  operation  and  practical  value 

*  The  following  matter  is  extracted  from  the  monograph 
under  this  title  issued  by  the  Department  of  Commerce  and 
Labor,  Washington,  D.  C. 

297 


298  PANAMA. 

to  the  commerce  of  the  world  is  the  Suez  Canal,  and 
for  this  the  available  statistics  begin  with  the  year 
1870,  while  its  new  and  enlarged  dimensions  only 
date  from  the  year  1896.  For  the  Sault  Ste.  Marie 
Canal,  connecting  Lake  Superior  with  Lake  Huron, 
statistics  date  from  1855.  Statistics  of  the  Welland 
Canal  date  from  1867,  but  for  the  canal  in  its  pres- 
ent enlarged  form  cover  but  four  years  of  operation. 
The  other  great  ship  canals  of  the  world  are  of  much 
more  recent  construction,  and  data  regarding  their 
operation  therefore  cover  a  comparatively  brief  term, 
and  in  some  cases  are  scarcely  at  present  available  in 
detail. 

The  artificial  waterways  which  may  properly  be 
termed  ship  canals  are  nine  in  number,  viz. : 

(1)  The  Suez  Canal,  begun  in  1859  and  completed 
in  1869. 

(2)  The  Cronstedt  and  St  Petersburg  Canal,  be- 
gun in  1877  and  completed  in  1890. 

(3)  The  Corinth  Canal,  begun  in  1884  and  com- 
pleted in  1893. 

(4)  The  Manchester  Ship  Canal,  completed  in 
1894. 

i       (5)   THe  Kaiser  Wilhelm  Canal,  connecting  the 
Baltic  and  North  Seas,  completed  in  1895. 

(6)  The  Elbe  and  Trave  Canal,  connecting  the 
North  Sea  and  Baltic,  opened  in  1900. 

(7)  The  Welland  Canal,  connecting  Lake  Erie 
with  Lake  Ontario. 


THE  SUEZ  CANAL.  299 

(8  and  9)  The  two  canals,  United  States  and  Cana- 
dian, respectively,  connecting  Lake  Superior  with 
Lake  Huron. 

THE    SUEZ   CANAL. 

The  Suez  Canal  is  usually  considered  the  most  im- 
portant example  of  ship  canals,  though  the  number 
of  vessels  passing  through  it  annually  does  not  equal 
that  passing  through  the  canals  connecting  Lake 
Superior  with  the  chain  of  Great  Lakes  at  the  south. 
In  length,  however,  it  exceeds  any  of  the  other  great 
ship  canals,  its  total  length  being  90  miles,  of  which 
about  two-thirds  is  through  shallow  lakes.  The  ma- 
terial excavated  was  usually  sand,  though  in  some 
cases  strata  of  solid  rock  from  2  to  3  feet  in  thick- 
ness were  encountered.  The  total  excavation  was 
about  80,000,000  cubic  yards  under  the  original 
plan,  which  gave  a  depth  of  25  feet.  In  1895  the 
canal  was  so  enlarged  as  to  give  a  depth  of  31  feet, 
a  width  at  the  bottom  of  108  feet  and  at  the  surface 
of  420  feet.  The  original  cost  was  $95,000,000, 
and  for  the  canal  in  its  present  form  slightly  in  ex- 
cess of  $100,000,000. 

The  revenue  of  the  canal  is  apparently  large 
in  proportion  to  its  cost,  the  latest  report  of  the  com- 
pany for  1903  giving  the  net  profits  for  that  year  at 
65,579,347  francs,  and  the  total  amount  distributed 
among  the  shareholders  64,565,634  francs,  or  over 


300  PANAMA. 

12  per  cent  of  the  estimated  cost  of  $100,000,000. 
The  canal  is  without  locks,  being  at  sea  level  the  en- 
tire distance.  The  length  of  time  occupied  in  pass- 
ing through  the  canal  averages  about  eighteen  hours. 
By  the  use  of  electric  lights  throughout  the  entire 
length  of  the  canal  passages  are  made  with  nearly 
equal  facility  by  night  or  day.  The  tolls  charged 
are  8.50  francs  per  ton  net  register,  "  Danube  meas- 
urement," which  amounts  to  about  $2  per  ton  United 
States  net  measurement.  Steam  vessels  passing 
through  the  canal  are  propelled  by  their  own  power. 
The  canal  has  accommodated  the  following  traffic 
since  its  opening: 

GROSS 
VESSELS.         TONNAGE. 

1870 ,     486  654,915 

1875   1,494  2,940,708 

1880 2,026  4,344,519 

1890   3,389  9,749,129 

1895   3,434  11,833,637 

1900   3,441  13,699,237 

1903   3,761  16,615,309 

THE  CKONSTADT  AND  ST.  PETERSBURG  CANAL. 

The  canal  connecting  the  Bay  of  Cronstadt  with 
St.  Petersburg  is  described  as  a  work  of  great  strate- 
gic and  commercial  importance  to  Russia.  The  ca- 
nal and  sailing  course  in  the  Bay  of  Cronstadt  are 
about  16  miles  long,  the  canal  proper  being  about  6 


THE  CORINTH  CANAL.  301 

miles  and  the  bay  channel  about  10  miles,  and  they 
together  extend  from  Cronstadt,  on  the  Gulf  of  Fin- 
land, to  St.  Petersburg.  The  canal  was  opened  in 
1890  with  a  navigable  depth  of  20^  feet,  the  orig- 
inal depth  having  been  about  9  feet ;  the  width  ranges 
from  220  to  350  feet.  The  total  cost  is  estimated 
at  about  $10,000,000. 

THE   CORINTH    CANAL. 

The  next  of  the  great  ship  canals  connecting  bod- 
ies of  salt  water  in  the  order  of  date  of  construction 
is  the  Corinth  Canal,  which  connects  the  Gulf  of 
Corinth  with  the  Gulf  of  zEgina.  The  canal  reduces 
the  distance  from  Adriatic  ports  about  175  miles  and 
from  Mediterranean  ports  about  100  miles.  Its 
length  is  about  4  miles,  a  part  of  which  was  cut 
through  granite  soft  rock  and  the  remainder  through 
soil.  There  are  no  locks,  as  is  also  the  case  in  both 
the  Suez  and  Cronstadt  canals,  already  described. 
The  width  of  the  canal  is  72  feet  at  bottom  and  the 
depth  26*4  feet.  The  work  was  begun  in  1884  and 
completed  in  1893  at  a  cost  of  about  $5,000,000. 
The  average  tolls  are  18  cents  per  ton  and  20  cents 
per  passenger. 

THE  MANCHESTER  SHIP  CANAL. 

The  Manchester  Ship  Canal,  which  connects  Man- 


302  PANAMA. 

Chester,  England,  with  the  Mersey  River,  Liverpool, 
and  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  was  opened  for  traffic  Janu- 
ary 1,  1894.  The  length  of  the  canal  is  351/2  miles, 
the  total  rise  from  the  water  level  to  Manchester  being 
60  feet,  which  is  divided  between  four  sets  of  locks, 
giving  an  average  to  each  of  15  feet.  The  minimum 
width  is  120  feet  at  the  bottom  and  average  175  feet 
at  the  water  level,  though  in  places,  the  width  is  ex- 
tended to  230  feet;  the  minimum  depth  26  feet, 
and  the  time  required  for  navigating  the  canal  from 
five  to  eight  hours.  The  total  amount  of  excavation 
in  the  canal  and  docks  was  about  45,000,000  cubic 
yards,  of  which  about  one-fourth  was  sandstone  rock. 
The  lock  gates  are  operated  by  hydraulic  power ;  rail- 
ways and  bridges  crossing  the  route  of  the  canal  have 
been  raised  to  give  a  height  of  75  feet  to  vessels  trav- 
ersing the  canal,  and  an  ordinary  canal  whose  route 
it  crosses  is  carried  over  it  by  a  springing  aqueduct 
composed  of  an  iron  caisson  resting  upon  a  pivot  pier. 
The  total  cost  of  the  canal  is  given  at  $75,000,000. 
The  revenue  in  1902,  according  to  the  Statesman's 
Yearbook,  was  £358,491,  and  the  working  expenses, 
£217,537. 


Two  canals  connect  the  Baltic  and  North  seas 
through  Germany,  the  first,  known  as  the  Kaiser 
Wilhelm  Canal,  having. been  completed  in  1895  and 


ELBE  AND  TRAVE  CANAL.  303 

constructed  largely  for  military  and  naval  purposes, 
but  proving  also  of  great  value  to  general  mercantile 
traffic.  Work  upon  the  Kaiser  Wilhelm  Canal  was 
begun  in  1887,  and  completed,  as  above  indicated,  in 
1895.  The  length  of  the  canal  is  61  miles,  the 
terminus  in  the  Baltic  Sea  being  at  the  harbor  of 
Kiel.  The  depth  is  29y2  feet,  the  width  at  the  bot- 
tom 72  feet,  and  the  minimum  width  at  the  surface 
190  feet  The  route  lies  chiefly  through  marshes  and 
shallow  lakes  and  along  river  valleys.  The  total  ex- 
cavation amounted  to  about  100,000,000  cubic  yards, 
and  the  cost  to  about  $40,000,000.  The  number  of 
vessels  passing  through  the  canal  in  1903-4  was 
32,038,  with  a  tonnage  of  4,990,287,  and  the  dues 
collected  amounted  to  2,414,499  marks. 

THE  ELBE  AND  TRAVE  CANAL. 

A  smaller  canal,  with  a  length  of  about  41  miles 
and  a  depth  of  about  10  feet,  was  opened  in  1900, 
known  as  the  Elbe  and  Trave  Canal,  and  is  described 
by  the  International  Yearbook,  1900,  as  follows: 

"  The  Elbe  and  Trave  Canal,  in  Germany,  was 
opened  by  the  Emperor  of  Germany  on  June  16, 
1900.  It  has  been  under  construction  for  five  years, 
and  has  cost  about  $5,831,000,  of  which  Prussia  con- 
tributed $1,785,000  and  the  old  Hansc  town  of  Lu- 
beck  $4,046,000.  The  length  of  the  new  canal  is 
about  41  miles,  and  is  the  second  to  joiii  the  North 


304  PANAMA. 

Sea  and  the  Baltic,  following  the  Kaiser  Wilhelm 
Canal  (or  Kiel  Canal),  built  about  five  years  ago  at  a 
cost  of  $37,128,000.  The  breadth  of  the  new  canal 
is  72  feet;  breadth  of  the  locks,  46  feet;  length  of 
locks,  261  feet;  depth  of  locks,  8  feet  2  inches.  It  is 
crossed  by  29  bridges,  erected  at  a  cost  of  $1,000,000. 
There  are  seven  locks,  five  being  between  Lubeck  and 
the  Mollner  See  (the  summit  point  of  the  canal)  and 
two  between  Mollner  See  and  Fauenberg-on-the-Elbe. 
At  this  point  it  may  be  noted  that  the  Germans  began 
experiments  during  1900  with  electric  towing  on  the 
Tinow  Canal  between  Berlin  and  Stettin.  A  track 
of  1-meter  gauge  was  laid  along  the  bank  of  the  canal, 
having  one  9-pound  and  one  18-pound  rail  laid  partly 
on  cross-ties  and  partly  on  concrete  blocks.  The 
larger  rail  serves  for  the  return  current,  and  has 
bolted  to  it  a  rack  which  gears  with  a  spur  wheel  on 
the  locomotive.  The  locomotive  is  6  feet  10  inches  by 
4  feet  10  inches,  mounted  on  four  wheels,  with  a 
wheel  base  of  3  feet  6  inches,  and  weighing  2  tons. 
It  is  fitted  with  a  12-horsepower  motor,  current  for 
which  is  furnished  by  a  9-kilowatt  dynamo,  driven  by 
a  15-horsepower  engine.  The  current  is  500  volts, 
and  is  transmitted  by  a  wire  carried  on  woodon  poles 
23  feet  high  and  about  120  feet  apart  The  boats 
are  about  132  feet  long  and  15  feet  6  inches  beam, 
and  carry  from  150  to  175  tons  on  a  draft  of  4  feet  9 
inches.  During  1900  the  Stettin-Swinemund  Canal, 
with  a  length  of  35  miles,  has  been  dredged  through- 


PROJECTED  PRUSSIAN  CANALS.  305 

out,  and  is  now  open  to  steamers  drawing  22  feet  of 
water.     Swinemund  is  on  the  Baltic  Sea. 

"  Among  the  various  projects  for  European  canals 
may  be  mentioned  one  connecting  the  Danube  a  little 
below  Vienna,  Austria,  with  the  Adriatic  Sea  at  Tri- 
este, a  distance  of  about  319  miles.  The  construc- 
tion will  cost  some  $120,000,000.  Late  in  1900  a 
canal  from  Liege  to  Antwerp,  in  Belgium,  was  being 
seriously  discussed,  in  order  to  connect  the  prosper- 
ous city  of  Liege  with  the  sea,  and  make  it,  like  the 
city  of  Manchester,  England,  a  seaport.  The  pro- 
moters propose  a  canal  84  miles  long,  200  feet  wide, 
and  23  feet  deep  from  Antwerp  to  Liege,  with  locks 
at  Liege,  Hasselt,  Herenthals,  and  Antwerp.  The 
difference  in  level  to  be  overcome  by  locks  would  be 
175  feet,  and  it  is  thought  that  thirteen  single  locks 
and  one  double  lock  would  be  sufficient.  The  total 
estimated  cost  of  the  work  is  $25,200,000." 

CANALS  PROJECTED  IN  PRUSSIA. 

According  to  a  recent  report  of  United  States  Con- 
sul-General  Guenther,  of  Frankfort,  Germany,  the 
committee  on  canals  of  the  Prussian  Diet  has  re- 
ported, with  a  favorable  recommendation,  a  bill  pro- 
viding for  the  following  construction : 

1.  A  navigable  canal  between  the  rivers  Rhine 
and  Weser,  with  a  connection  to  Hanover,  and  the 

canalization  of  the  River  Lippe : 
20 


306  PANAMA. 

(<r)  A  navigable  canal  from  the  Rhine  in  the  vi- 
cinity of  Ruhrort,  or  from  a  more  northern  point,  to 
the  Dortmund-Ems  Canal  or  the  vicinity  of  Herne 
(Rhine-Herne  Canal)  inclusive  of  a  branch  canal 
from  Datteln  to  Hamm;  estimated  cost,  74,500,000 
marks  ($17,731,000). 

(6)  Several  additional  works  on  the  Dortmund- 
Ems  Canal  between  Dortmund  and  Bevergern;  esti- 
mated cost,  6,150,000  marks  ($1,463,700). 

(c)  A  navigable  canal  from  the  Dortmund-Ems 
Canal  in  the  vicinity  of  Bevergern  to  the  River 
Weser,  connecting  with  Hanover;  branch  canals  to 
Osnabriick,  Minden,  and  Linden,  construction  of 
reservoirs  in  the  upper  parts  of  the  River  Weser  and 
some  regulation  works  of  the  Weser  below  Hameln; 
estimated  cost,  120,500,000  marks  ($28,679,000). 

(d}  Canalization  of  the  River  Lippe  or  construc- 
tion of  branch  canals  of  the  Lippe  from  Weser  to  the 
Dortmund-Ems  Canal,  near  Datteln,  and  from 
Hamm  to  Lippstadt;  estimated  cost,  44,600,000 
marks  ($10,614,800). 

(e)  Improvement  of  the  cultivation  of  the  soil  in 
connection  with  the  works  under  items  a  to  d,  and 
the  completed  Dortmund-Ems  Canal ;  estimated  cost, 
5,000,000  marks  ($1,190,000). 

The  total  estimated  cost  of  the  work,  items  a  to  e, 
is  placed  at  250,750,000  marks  ($59,678,500). 

2.  The  construction  of  a  deep  waterway  between 


NORTH  AMERICAN  CANALS.  307 

Berlin  and  Stettin ;  estimated  cost,  43,000,000  marks 
($10,234,000). 

3.  Improvement    of    the    waterway    between    the 
rivers  Oder  and  Weichsel,  also  of  the  river  Warthe 
from  the  mouth  of  the  river  Netze  to  the  city  of 
Posen;   estimated  cost  21,175,000  marks    ($5,039,- 
650). 

4.  The  canalization  of  the  river  Oder  from  the 
mouth  of  the  river  Glatzer  Neisse  to  the  city  of 
Breslau,    experimental   works   on   the   line   between 
Breslau  and  Fiirstenberg  and  the  Oder,  construction 
of  one  or  of  several  reservoirs ;  estimated  cost,  19,- 
650,000  marks  ($4,676,700). 

The  entire  cost  of  the  projects  named  is  placed  at 
334,575,000  marks  ($79,628,850). 

SHIP  CANALS  CONNECTING  THE  GREAT  LAKES  OF 
NORTH   AMERICA. 

Three  ship  canals  intended  to  give  continuous  pas- 
sage to  vessels  from  the  head  of  Lake  Superior  to 
Lake  Ontario  and  the  St.  Lawrence  River  are  the 
Welland  Canal,  originally  constructed  in  1833  and 
enlarged  in  1871  and  1900;  the  St.  Marys  Falls 
Canal  at  Sault  Ste.  Marie,  Mich.,  opened  in  1855 
and  enlarged  in  1881  and  1896,  and  the  Canadian 
Canal  at  St.  Marys  River,  opened  in  1895.  In  point 
of  importance,  measured  at  least  by  their  present  use, 
the  canals  at  the  St.  Marys  River  by  far  surpass  that 


308  PANAMA. 

of  the  Welland  Canal,  the  number  of  vessels  passing 
through  the  canals  at  the  St.  Marys  River  being 
eight  times  as  great  as  the  number  passing  through 
the  Welland,  and  the  tonnage  of  the  former  nearly 
forty  times  as  great  as  that  of  the  latter.  One  of 
the  important  products  of  the  Lake  Superior  region, 
iron  ore,  is  chiefly  used  in  the  section  contiguous  to 
Lake  Erie,  and  a  large  proportion  of  the  grain  com- 
ing from  Lake  Superior  passes  from  Buffalo  to  the 
Atlantic  coast  by  way  of  the  Erie  Canal  and  railroads 
centering  at  Buffalo.  The  most  important  article  in 
the  westward  shipments  through  the  Sault  Ste.  Marie 
canals,  coal,  originates  in  the  territory  contiguous  to 
Lake  Erie.  These  conditions  largely  account  for  the 
fact  that  the  number  and  tonnage  of  vessels  passing 
the  St.  Marys  River  canals  so  greatly  exceed  those 
of  the  Welland  Canal. 

THE    WELLAND    CANAL. 

The  Welland  Canal  connects  Lake  Ontario  and 
Lake  Erie  on  the  Canadian  side  of  the  river.  It 
was  constructed  in  1833  and  enlarged  in  1871  and 
again  in  1900.  The  length  of  the  canal  is  27  miles, 
the  number  of  locks  25,  the  total  rise  of  lockage  327 
feet,  and  the  total  cost  about  $25,000,000.  The  an- 
nual collection  of  tolls  on  freight,  passengers,  and  ves- 
sels averages  about  $225,000  and  the  canal  is  open 
on  an  average  about  240  days-  in  a  year.  By  order 


SAULT  STE.  MARIE  CANALS.  80S 

in  council  dated  April  27,  1903,  the  levy  of  tolls  for 
passage  through  Dominion  canals  has  been  abolished 
for  a  period  of  two  seasons  of  navigation. 

THE  SAULT  STE.  MARIE  CANALS. 

The  canals  at  Sault  Ste.  Marie,  Mich.,  and  On- 
tario are  located  adjacent  to  the  falls  of  the  St.  Marys 
River,  which  connects  Lake  Superior  with  Lake 
Huron,  and  lower  or  raise  vessels  from  one  level  to 
the  other,  a  height  of  17  to  20  feet.  The  canal  be- 
longing to  the  United  States  was  begun  in  1853  by  the 
State  of  Michigan  and  opened  in  1855,  the  length  of 
the  canal  being  5,674  feet,  and  provided  with  two 
tandem  locks,  each  being  350  feet  in  length  and  70 
feet  wide,  and  allowing  passage  of  vessels  drawing  12 
feet,  the  original  cost  being  $1,000,000.  The  United 
States  Government,  by  consent  of  the  State,  began  in 
1870  to  enlarge  the  canal,  and  by  1881  had  increased 
its  length  to  1.6  miles,  its  width  to  an  average  of  160 
feet,  and  its  depth  to  16  feet;  also  had  built  a  single 
lock  515  feet  long  and  80  feet  wide,  with  a  depth  of 
17  feet  on  the  sills,  which  was  located  100  feet  south 
of  the  State  locks.  The  State  relinquished  all  control 
of  the  canal  in  March,  1882.  In  1887  the  State 
locks  were  torn  down  and  replaced  by  a  single  lock 
800  feet  long,  100  feet  wide,  with  a  depth  of  22  feet 
of  water  on  the  sills.  This  lock  was  put  in  commis- 
sion in  1896.  The  canal  was  also  deepened  to  25 


310  PANAMA. 

feet  The  Canadian  canal,  1%  miles  long,  150  feet 
wide,  and  22  feet  deep,  with  lock  900  feet  long,  60 
feet  wide,  with  22  feet  on  the  miter  sills,  was  built 
on  the  north  side  of  the  river  during  the  years  1888 
to  1895.  In  1900  the  number  of  vessels  passing 
through  the  United  States  canal  was  16,144,  and 
through  the  Canadian  canal,  3,003,  showing  an  in- 
crease of  1,350  in  the  number  of  vessels  passing 
through  the  Canadian  canal,  and  a  decrease  of 
1,901  in  the  number  through  the  United  States 
canal,  the  increase  in  the  number  passing  through 
the  Canadian  canal  having  been  due  to  the  de- 
velopment of  the  Michipocoten  district  The  ton- 
nage passing  through  the  United  States  canal  in  1903 
was:  Registered  tonnage,  22,998,864  tons,  against 
19,901,463  in  the  year  1900 ;  the  freight  tonnage  in 
1903  was  29,172,252  tons,  against  23,251,539  tons 
in  1900.  The  Canadian  canal  shows:  Registered 
tonnage  in  1903,  4,737,580  tons,  against  2,160,490  in 
1900 ;  and  freight  tonnage  in  1903,  5,502,185  tons, 
against  2,018,999  in  1900.  A  marked  contrast  be- 
tween the  business  of  the  St  Marys  Falls  and  Wei- 
land  canals  is  found  in  a  comparison  of  their  figures 
for  a  term  of  years.  The  number  of  vessels  passing 
through  the  Welland  Canal  in  1873  was  6,425,  and 
in  1902,  1,568,  a  reduction  of  over  75  per  cent  in 
the  number  of  vessels.  The  number  of  vessels  pass- 
ing through  the  St  Marys  Falls  Canal  in  1873  was 


POE  AND  WEITZEL  LOCKS.  311 

2,517,  and  in  1903,  through  the  American  and  Ca- 
nadian canals,  18,596. 

The  following,  supplied  by  the  office  of  the  Chief 
of  Engineers,  War  Department,  shows  the  details  of 
the  Sault  Ste.  Marie  and  Welland  canals : 

The  total  cost  of  the  St.  Marys  Falls  Canal,  Mich- 
igan, and  of  the  locks  now  in  service  is  $6,033,533, 
made  up  as  follows : 

Dollars. 

Canal 2,250,786 

Weitzel  lock   983,355 

Poe  lock 2,799,392 

The  length  of  the  canal  is  1.6  miles,  depth  25  feet, 
and  width  varying  from  110  to  1,000  feet  The  size 
of  the  locks  is  as  follows: 

Weitzel  lock:  Feet. 

Depth  of  water  at  mean  stage 17 

Length  between  gates 515 

Width  of  chamber. ., 80 

Width  at  gates 60 

Poe  lock: 

Length  between  gates 800 

Depth  of  water  at  mean  stage 22 

Width    100 

The  lift  of  both  locks  varies  from  16  to  20  feet 
The  Canadian  lock  at  Sault  Ste.  Marie,  Ontario, 
Canada,  has  a  length  between  gates  of  900  feet  and 


312  PANAMA. 

a  width  of  60  feet;  the  depth  of  water  over  miter  sill 
of  lock  and  in  canal  is  22  feet  at  mean  stage  (20 
feet  3  inches  at  lowest  known  water  level).  The 
total  amount  expended  on  construction  to  June  30, 
1900,  was  $3,770,621. 

The  Welland  Canal  is  26.75  miles  long  and  100 
feet  wide;  it  has  25  lift  locks  and  one  guard  lock; 
the  locks  are  270  feet  long,  45  feet  wide,  and  have 
a  depth  of  water  of  14  feet ;  the  total  lift  is  326.75 
feet  The  total  amount  expended  on  construction  to 
June  30,  1900,  was  $24,293,587. 

According  to  the  International  Yearbook,  1900, 
the  most  notable  occurrence  of  the  year  1899  in 
canal  construction  was  the  opening  of  the  Soulanges 
Canal  by  which  the  Canadian  Government  completes 
the  last  link  in  its  long-projected  14-foot  waterway 
from  the  head  of  Lake  Superior  to  the  mouth  of  the 
St.  Lawrence  River. 

LAKE    BORGNE    CANAL. 

The  Lake  Borgne,  Louisiana,  Canal  was  formally 
opened  in  August  of  1901.  It  opens  continuous 
water  communication  with  lakes  Maurepas,  Pont- 
chartrain,  and  Borgne,  the  Mississippi  Sound,  Mo- 
bile, and  the  Alabama  and  Warrior  rivers,  and  the 
entire  Mississippi  River  system,  and  has  an  impor- 
tant bearing  as  a  regulator  of  freight  rates  between 
these  sections.  The  effects  of  the  canals  may  be 


LAKE  BORGNE  CANAL.  313 

briefly  summed  up  as:  Shortening  the  distance  be- 
tween New  Orleans  and  the  Gulf  points  east  of  the 
Mississippi;  bringing  shipments  from  the  Gulf  coast 
direct  to  the  levees  at  New  Orleans ;  saving  the  trans- 
shipment of  through  freights,  with  a  consequent  re- 
duction in  freight  rates ;  enabling  sea-going  vessels, 
drawing  10  to  12  feet  of  water,  to  come  within  20 
miles  of  New  Orleans,  saving  all  such  craft  the  cost 
of  tonnage  and  shortening,  by  60  miles,  direct  water 
communication  between  New  Orleans  and  the  deep 
water  of  the  Gulf.  In  addition  to  these  effects  may 
be  enumerated  the  cheapening  of  coal  for  consump- 
tion at  New  Orleans.  Coal  has  hitherto  been  floated 
down  the  rivers  from  Pittsburg,  a  distance  of  2,100 
miles.  The  canal  opens  up  the  coal  fields  in  the  in- 
terior of  Alabama  for  New  Orleans  consumption  and 
reduces  coal  prices  considerably,  giving  an  additional 
advantage  to  domestic  industries  and  to  steamers 
purchasing  bunker  coal.  The  canal  is  7  miles  long 
and  from  150  to  200  feet  in  width.  Bayou  Dupre 
forms  a  portion  of  the  canal.  The  lock  chamber  is 
200  feet  long,  50  feet  wide,  and  25  feet  deep,  and 
connects  the  canal  with  the  Mississippi  River. 

THE    CHICAGO    SANITARY    AND    SHIP    CANAL. 

The  Chicago  Sanitary  and  Ship  Canal  connects 
Lake  Michigan  at  Chicago  with  the  Illinois  River  at 
Lockport,  a  distance  of  34  miles.  The  canal  was 


314  PANAMA. 

cut  for  the  purpose  of  giving  to  the  city  of  Chicago 
proper  drainage  facilities  by  reversing  the  movement 
of  water,  which  formerly  flowed  into  Lake  Michi- 
gan through  the  Chicago  River  and  turning  a  current 
from  Lake  Michigan  through  the  Chicago  River  to 
the  Illinois  River  at  Lockport  and  thence  down  the 
Illinois  River  to  the  Mississippi.  The  minimum 
depth  of  the  canal  is  22  feet,  its  width  at  bottom  160 
feet,  and  the  width  at  the  top  from  162  to  290  feet, 
according  to  the  class  of  material  through  which  it 
is  cut.  The  work  was  begun  September  3,  1892, 
and  completed  and  the  water  turned  into  the  channel 
January  2,  1900.  The  flow  of  water  from  Lake 
Michigan  toward  the  Gulf  is  now  at  the  rate  of  360,- 
000  cubic  feet  per  minute,  and  the  channel  is  esti- 
mated to  be  capable  of  carrying  nearly  twice  that 
amount.  The  total  excavation  in  its  construction  in- 
cluded 28,500,000  cubic  yards  of  glacial  drift  and 
12,910,000  cubic  yards  of  solid  rock,  an  aggregate 
of  41,410,000  cubic  yards.  In  addition  to  this  the 
construction  of  a  new  channel  for  the  Desplaines 
River  became  necessary  in  order  to  permit  the  canal 
to  follow  the  bed  of  that  river,  and  the  material  ex- 
cavated in  that  work  amounted  to  2,068,659  cubic 
yards,  making  a  grand  total  displacement  in  the  work 
of  43,478,659  cubic  yards  of  material  which,  accord- 
ing to  a  statement  issued  by  the  trustees  of  the  sani- 
tary district  of  Chicago,  would,  if  deposited  in  Lake 
Michigan  in  40  feet  of  water,  form  an  island  1  mile 


LAKE-GULF  WATERWAY.  315 

square  with  its  surface  12  feet  above  the  water  line. 
All  bridges  along  the  canal  are  movable  structures. 
The  total  cost  of  construction,  including  interest  ac- 
count>  aggregated  $34,000,000,  of  which  $21,379,675 
was  for  excavation  and  about  $3,000,000  for  rights 
of  way  and  $4,000,000  for  building  railroad  and 
highway  bridges  over  the  canal.  The  city  and  State 
authorities  by  whom  the  canal  was  constructed  are 
now  proposing  to  Congress  to  make  this  canal  a  com- 
mercial highway  in  case  Congress  will  increase  the 
depth  of  the  Illinois  and  Mississippi  rivers  to 
14  feet,  with  locks  for  fleets  of  barges  from  Lock- 
port,  the  terminus  of  the  drainage  canal,  to  St.  Louis. 
This,  it  is  argued,  would  give  through-water  trans- 
portation from  Lake  Michigan  to  the  Gulf  by  way  of 
the  drainage  canal,  the  Illinois  River,  and  the  Mis- 
sissippi River,  and  would  enable  the  United  States  in 
case  of  war  to  quickly  transport  light-draft  war  ves- 
sels from  the  Gulf  to  the  lakes.  This  work  of  deep- 
ening the  Illinois  River  would  also  give  through- 
water  connection  from  Rock  Island,  on  the  Upper 
Mississippi  River,  to  Lake  Michigan  via  the  Illinois 
and  Mississippi  Canal,  elsewhere  described,  which 
extends  from  Rock  Island,  on  the  Mississippi  River, 
to  Hennepin,  on  the  Illinois  River.  The  estimate 
of  the  Chicago  sanitary  district  trustees  of  the  cost 
of  deepening  the  Illinois  and  Mississippi  rivers  from 
the  terminus  of  the  ship  canal  to  St.  Louis  to  a  depth 


315  PANAMA. 

of  14  feet  is  $25,000,000,  including  five  locks  and 
dams. 

OTHER  CANALS. 

In  addition  to  the  above  ship  canals,  there  is  a 
number  of  other  important  waterways  worthy  of  men- 
tion. The  great  North  Holland  Canal,  cut  in  1845 
from  Amsterdam  to  Helder,  a  distance  of  51  miles, 
to  avoid  the  shoals  of  the  Zuyder  Zee,  has  a  depth  of 
20  feet,  a  width  of  125  feet  at  the  surface,  and  car- 
ries vessels  of  1,300  tons  burden,  and  is  described 
as  "  the  chief  cause  of  the  great  prosperity  of  Ams- 
terdam." 

The  Caledonian  Canal,  which  connects  the  Atlan- 
tic Ocean  and  North  Sea  through  the  north  of  Scot- 
land, is  17  feet  in  depth,  50  feet  in  width  at  the 
bottom,  and  120  feet  at  the  surface,  with  a  surface 
elevation  at  the  highest  point  of  94  feet  above  sea 
level.  The  canal  proper  is  250  miles  long,  and  the 
distance  between  the  terminals  over  300  miles.  The 
cost  has  been  stated  at  $7,000,000,  including  repairs. 

The  Canal  du  Midi,  cut  through  France  from 
Toulouse,  on  the  Garonne  River,  to  Cette,  on  the 
Mediterranean,  a  distance  of  150  miles,  is  60  feet 
wide,  61/2  feet  deep,  has  114  locks,  and  is,  at  its  high- 
est point,  600  feet  above  the  level  of  the  sea.  Its 
cost  was  $3,500,000,  and  it  is  navigable  for  vessels 
of  100  tons. 


CANADA'S  CANALS.  317 

A  ship  canal  to  supply  passage  of  seagoing  vessels 
from  Antwerp  to  Brussels,  Belgium,  a  distance  of 
about  30  miles,  is  under  contemplation. 

The  Illinois  and  Mississippi  Canal,  which  is  to 
fuiyiish  a  navigable  waterway  from  the  Mississippi 
River,  at  the  mouth  of  the  Rock  River  in  Illinois,  to 
the  Illinois  River,  at  Hennepin,  111.,  and  thence  by 
river  and  canal  to  Lake  Michigan,  was  begun  in  1892, 
and  the  section  between  Rock  Island  and  Hennepin 
is  now  nearing  completion.  The  canal  is  about  80 
feet  wide,  7  feet  deep,  and  is  supplied  with  locks  150 
feet  long  and  35  feet  wide,  capable  of  passing  barges 
carrying  600  tons  of  freight. 

The  canal  systems  of  European  countries  and  of 
Canada  differ  from  those  of  the  United  States  in  that 
they  are  operated  in  conjunction  with,  and  made 
complemental  to,  the  railway  systems  of  those  coun- 
tries. Canada's  six  great  systems  of  government 
canals  afford,  with  the  St.  Lawrence  River  connec- 
tions, important  inland  communications.  The  total 
length  of  the  canals  in  operation  is  262  miles,  but  the 
aggregate  length  of  continuous  inland  navigation  ren- 
dered available  by  them  is  nearly  3,000  miles.  The 
receipts  in  1903  were  $230,213,  and  the  working  ex- 
penses, including  repairs,  $581,976.  The  amount 
expended  in  the  construction  and  maintenance  of 
these  canals,  including  the  Sault  Ste.  Marie  Canal, 
to  June  30,  1903,  is  $85,300,000.  In  India  the 


318  PANAMA 

canals  constructed  primarily  for  irrigation  purposes, 
at  a  cost  of  about  $15,000,000,  are  utilized  to  a  con- 
siderable extent  for  inland  navigation.  In  Germany 
the  canals,  aside  from  the  Kaiser  Wilhelm,  are  1,511 
miles  in  length,  and  the  canalized  rivers  1,452  mjles. 
In  France  the  length  of  the  canals  in  operation  is 
3,021  miles. 

CANALS    OF   THE    UNITED    KINGDOM. 

In  the  United  Kingdom  the  length  of  canals  be- 
longing to  railways  is  1,139  miles,  and  that  of  canals 
not  belonging  to  railways  2,768  miles.  The  traffic 
of  canals  belonging  to  the  railways  amounted  in  1898 
to  6,009,820  tons ;  of  those  not  belonging  to  railways 
33,348,573  tons.  The  total  revenue  of  both  classes 
of  canals  was,  in  the  same  year,  £2,408,534,  and  the 
expenditure  £1,764,037.  The  tonnage  figures  do  not 
include  the  1,142,477  tons  carried  on  the  Manchester 
Ship  Canal.  The  London  Daily  Mail  Yearbook  for 
1902  says  of  the  canal  system  of  England:  "  There 
are  3,520  miles  of  inland  navigation  in  England  and 
Wales,  of  which  1,234  miles  are  under  the  control  of 
the  railways,  the  London  and  Northwestern  and 
Great  Western  railways  owning  nearly  700  miles  be- 
tween them.  The  paid-up  capital  (from  all  sources) 
of  the  independent  canals  (excluding  the  Manches- 
ter Ship  Canal)  falls  little  short  of  £20,000,000,  ac- 


CANALS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.  319 

cording  to  the  board  of  trade  returns.  Including 
railway-owned  canals,  this  amount  will  probably  ex- 
ceed £30,000,000.  The  annual  traffic  runs  about 
37,000,000  tons,  comparing  unfavorably  with  a  prob- 
able 320,000,000  tons  carried  by  the  railways.  The 
improvement  and  development  of  these  internal 
waterways  is  regarded  by  the  chamber  of  commerce 
as  a  matter  of  urgent  necessity,  and  they  are  formu- 
lating proposals  with  regard  to  the  subject  to  put  be- 
fore the  Government." 

CANALS    OF    THE    UNITED    STATES. 

The  canals  of  the  United  States  still  used  for  com- 
mercial purposes  are  stated  by  the  New  York  World 
Almanac  for  1905  as  being  37  in  number,  with  an 
aggregate  length  of  2,443  miles,  the  total  cost  of  their 
construction  being  about  $180,000,000.  The  most 
important  of  these,  aside  from  that  connecting  the 
Great  Lakes,  of  course,  is  the  Erie  Canal,  387  miles 
in  length,  with  72  locks  and  a  depth  of  7  feet.  Next 
in  length  is  the  Ohio  Canal  from  Cleveland,  Ohio,  to 
Portsmouth,  Ohio,  317  miles  in  length,  with  150 
locks  and  a  depth  of  4  feet.  Next  in  length  is  the 
Miami  and  Erie  Canal,  from  Cincinnati  to  Toledo, 
274  miles  in  length,  with  93  locks  and  a  depth  of 
51/2  feet.  The  Pennsylvania  Canal,  from  Colum- 
bia to  Huntingdon,  Pa.,  is  193  miles  in  length,  with 
71  locks  and  a  depth  of  6  feet.  The  Chesapeake  and 


320  PANAMA. 

Ohio  Canal,  from  Cumberland,  Md.,  to  Washington, 
D.  C.,  is  184  miles  in  length,  with  73  locks  and  a 
depth  of  6  feet  The  Lehigh  Coal  and  Navigation 
Company's  Canal,  from  Coalport  to  Easton,  Pa.,  is 
108  miles  in  length,  with  57  locks  and  a  depth  of  6 
feet.  The  Morris  Canal,  from  Easton,  Pa.,  to  Jer- 
sey City,  N.  J.,  is  103  miles  in  length,  with  33  locks 
and  a  depth  of  5  feet  The  Illinois  and  Michigan 
Canal,  from  Chicago,  111.,  to  La  Salle,  is  102  miles 
in  length,  with  15  locks  and  a  depth  of  6  feet,  and 
the  Champlain  Canal,  from  Whitehall,  N.  Y.,  to 
West  Troy,  is  81  miles  in  length,  with  32  locks  and  a 
depth  of  6  feet 

COST  OF  MAINTENANCE  AND  OPERATION  OF  CANALS. 

In  order  to  form  an  estimate  of  the  cost  of  main- 
taining and  operating  the  Isthmian  Canal,  the  Isth- 
mian Canal  Commission  obtained  data  bearing  on 
this  point  from  the  Suez,  Manchester,  Kiel,  and  St. 
Marys  Falls  canals,  as  follows: 

There  are  no  locks  on  the  Suez  Canal,  but  the 
channel  is  through  drifting  sand  for  a  great  part  of 
its  length.  The  entrance  to  the  harbor  of  Port  Said 
on  the  Mediterranean  intercepts  the  drift  of  sand  dis- 
charged from  the  l^ile  and  carried  along  the  coast  by; 
the  easterly  current.  The  maintenance  of  the  Suez 
Canal  therefore  requires  a  large  amount  of  dredging 
and  consists  mainly  of  this  class  of  work.  The  oper- 


COSTS  OF  MAINTENANCE.  321 

ating  expenses  are  also  large,  the  great  traffic  involv- 
ing heavy  costs  for  pilotage.  The  general  expenses 
for  administration  have  necessarily  been  greater  for 
the  Suez  Canal  than  for  the  Kiel  or  Manchester 
canals,  on  account  of"  the  distance  of  the  work  from 
the  point  of  central  control,  a  disadvantage  which 
would  also  attend  the  operation  of  the  Isthmian 
Canal.  The  annual  cost  of  maintenance  and  oper- 
ation of  the  Suez  Canal  is  about  $1,300,000,  or  about 
$13,000  per  mile. 

The  annual  cost  of  maintenance  and  operation  of 
the  Kiel  Canal  is  $8,600  per  mile.  The  cost  of 
maintenance  only  of  the  Manchester  Canal  is  $9,500 
per  mile.  These  canals  have  locks  and  other  me- 
chanical structures,  and  therefore  might  be  expected 
to  have  a  higher  cost  of  maintenance  than  the  Suez 
Canal,  which  has  none,  but  this  appears  to  be  more 
than  offset  by  reduced  cost  of  maintaining  the  prism 
and  more  economical  central  control.  The  traffic  be- 
ing light  on  these  canals,  the  cost  of  pilotage  and  port 
service  is  small.  The  mechanical  structures  are  now 
nearly  new,  and  will  soon  require  larger  annual  out- 
lays for  maintenance,  while,  with  the  increase  of 
traffic,  operating  expenses  will  become  larger. 

The  St.  Marys  Palls  Canal,  when  compared  with 
those  just  mentioned,  is  remarkable  by  reason  of  its 
short  length,  large  proportion  of  mechanical  struc- 
tures, and  immense  traffic.  Its  length  is  about  l*/o 

mile«.     Its  annual  traffic,  limited  by  the  severity  of 
21 


322  PANAMA. 

the  winter  to  a  period  of  about  eight  months,  is  nearly 
three  times  that  of  the  Suez  Canal,  eight  times  that 
of  the  Kiel  Canal,  and  ten  times  that  of  the  Manches- 
ter Canal.  Both  maintenance  and  operating  expen- 
ses are  therefore  very  large,  amounting  to  from  $70,- 
000  to  $90,000  per  year,  or  $46,000  to  $60,000  per 
mile.  The  annual  cost  per  mile  of  maintenance  and 
operation,  however,  for  comparison  with  other  canals, 
should  be  determined  by  considering  the  18^  miles 
of  dredged  channel  ways  in  St.  Marys  River  as  part 
of  the  canal.  Then  for  the  20  miles  of  canal  and 
canalized  river  the  expenses  per  mile  would  be  from 
$3,000  to  $5,000  annually. 

Tolls  were  collected  by  the  State  from  1855-1881. 
Since  its  ownership  by  the  Government  no  tolls  have 
been,  charged. 

THE  CANAL  SYSTEM  OF  INDIA. 

In  a  few  of  the  colonies  of  the  world,  notably  India 
and  Ceylon,  irrigation  works  of  great  value  have  been 
constructed  by  the  colonial  governments.  While  these 
have  been  costly,  the  expense  has  been  entirely  borne 
from  colonial  funds  or  from  loans  which  are  borne 
by  the  colonial  government,  and  the  cost  has  been 
many  times  repaid  by  the  increased  production  of  the 
irrigated  areas.  It  has  been  estimated  that  the  value 
of  a  single  year's  crop  produced  in  the  irrigated  sec- 
tions of  India  in  excess  of  that  which  would  have  been 


CANAL  SYSTEM  OF  INDIA.  323 

produced  without  irrigation  more  than  equals  the  en- 
tire cost  of  the  irrigation  system. 

Sir  John  Strachey,  in  his  "  India,"  put  the  cost  of 
the  Indian  irrigation  works  up  to  that  time  at  320,- 
000,000  rupees  (present  exchange  value  of  rupee 
about  33  cents),  and  adds  that  the  estimated  value  of 
the  produce  of  the  lands  irrigated  by  works  con- 
tructed  by  the  government  was  in  1892  more  than 
550,000,000  rupees.  These  works  after  their  con- 
struction are  not  only  self-supporting  through  the 
charges  made  for  the  water  distributed,  but  produce  in 
addition  to  the  annual  expenditures  a  net  return  of 
about  51/2  P61"  cent  on  their  cost.  In  Ceylon  the  co- 
lonial government  has  recently  taken  up  the  work  of 
reconstruction  of  ancient  irrigation  tanks  and  the 
construction  of  new  irrigation  works,  and  by  this  pro- 
cess it  is  expected  that  large  additions  will  be  made 
to  the  productive  area  of  the  island.  The  irrigating 
system  of  India  is  described  by  Sir  John  Strachey  as 
follows : 

THE    IMPORTANCE   OF   CANALS   IN   INDIA. 

"  In  India  the  very  existence  of  the  people  depends 
upon  the  regular  occurrence  of  the  periodical  rains, 
and  when  they  fail  through  a  wide  tract  of  country, 
and,  still  worse,  when  they  fail  in  successive  years, 
the  consequences  are  terrible.  The  greater  part  of 
India  is  liable  periodically  to  this  danger,  but  the 


324  PANAMA. 

country  is  so  vast  that  it  never  happens  that  all  parts 
of  it  suffer  at  the  same  time.  Improvements  in  the 
economic  condition  of  the  people,  and  especially  more 
diversity  of  occupation,  can  alone  bring  complete 
safeguards  and  render  general  famine,  in  its  extrem- 
est  form,  through  a  great  tract  of  country  impossible. 
But  this  must  be  a  long  and  gradual  process.  Mean- 
while it  has  been  found  by  experience  that  although 
the  entire  prevention  of  famines,  the  most  destructive 
of  all  calamities,  is  beyond  the  power  of  any  govern- 
Inent,  we  can  do  much  to  mitigate  them  by  removing 
obstacles  which  hinder  commercial  intercourse  and 
which  diminish  the  productiveness  of  the  land.  The 
instruments  by  which  we  can  do  this  are  roads,  rail- 
ways, and  canals.  .  .  . 

IRRIGATION  CONSTANTLY  REQUIRED  IN  PARTS  OF  INDIA. 

"  In  northern  India,  even  in  good  seasons,  artificial 
irrigation  is  a  necessity  for  the  successful  cultivation 
of  many  of  the  more  valuable  crops,  and  when  there 
is  "a  general  failure  of  the  periodical  rains  there  is  no 
other  means  by  which  drought  and  scarcity  can  be 
prevented.  A  large  portion  of  northern  India  is  now 
protected  by  canals  of  greater  magnitude  than  exist 
in  any  other  country  of  the  world.  .  .  . 

"  Little  of  the  old  irrigation  works  of  our  predeces- 
sors is  retained  in  the  existing  canals.  Practically 
all  of  these  have  been  made  by  ourselves,  and  the 


INDIAN  IRRIGATION  SYSTEM.  325 

often-repeated  statement,  prompted,  I  believe,  by  that 
strange  inclination  to  depreciate  their  own  achieve- 
ments which  often  besets  Englishmen,  that  the  old 
canals  have  been  more  profitable  than  those  con- 
structed by  ourselves  has  not  the  least  foundation  of 
truth. 

IRRIGATION  SYSTEM    UNDER   ENGLISH    BULB. 

"  The  most  important  of  these  works  in  the  nortK- 
western  provinces  are  those  which  distribute  the 
waters  of  the  Ganges  and  Jumna.  In  the  winter  and 
spring,  before  the  Ganges  has  been  swollen  by  the 
melting  of  snow  in  the  Himalayas  and  when  water  is 
urgently  required  for  agricultural  operations,  nearly 
the  whole  visible  stream  of  the  great  river  at  Hard- 
war,  where  it  leaves  the  mountains,  is  thrown  into  an 
artificial  channel.  The  works  on  the  first  20  miles 
of  its  course  are  in  a  high  degree  remarkable,  for  the 
canal  intercepts  the  drainage  of  the  Lower  Himalayas 
and  has  to  be  carried  across  rivers  which  often  become 
furious  torrents,  bringing  down  enormous  floods. 
These  obstacles  have  been  overcome  by  various  meth- 
ods with  a  skill  of  which  our  Indian  engineers  may 
well  be  proud.  One  torrent  flows  harmlessly  in  a 
broad  artificial  bed  over  the  canal  which  runs  below ; 
over  another,  still  more  formidable,  with  a  bed  more 
than  2  miles  wide,  the  canal,  which  is  virtually  the 
whole  Ganges,  is  carried  by  an  aqueduct.  Some  200 


326  PANAMA. 

miles  farther  down,  the  Ganges  has  again  become  a 
large  river,  and  nearly  all  its  water  is  again  diverted 
into  a  second  canal.  The  two  canals  together  are 
capable  of  discharging  nearly  10,000  cubic  feet  of 
water  per  second ;  the  ordinary  supply  of  each  is  more 
than  double  the  volume  of  the  Thames  at  Teddington 
in  average  weather,  and  this  great  body  of  water  is 
distributed  over  the  country  by  a  number  of  smaller 
channels  for  the  irrigation  of  the  land.  The  length 
of  the  main  channels  exceeds  1,000  miles,  and  there 
are  more  than  5,000  miles  of  distributaries. 

"  Three  canals  of  smaller  dimensions,  but  which  in 
any  other  country  would  be  looked  upon  as  works  of 
great  magnitude,  distribute  in  a  similar  way  nearly 
the  whole  of  the  water  brought  by  the  Jumna  from 
the  Himalayas.  In  Bahar,  the  border  province  of  the 
Bengal  lieutenant-governorship,  which  in  its  physical 
character  closely  resembles  the  adjoining  provinces  of 
the  northwest,  another  great  canal  is  taken  from  the 
river  Son. 

"  There  are  other  important  irrigation  canals  in 
Orissa  and  in  Bengal ;  but  in  the  latter  province  irri- 
gation is  not  ordinarily  so  essential  as  in  countries 
farther  north,  where  the  climate  is  drier  and  the  sea- 
sons are  more  precarious. 

GREAT  ECONOMICS  IN   CANAL   OPERATION. 

"  The  following  facts,  which  I  take  from  the  report 


PROFITS  IN  IRRIGATION.  327 

of  the  Indian  famine  commissioners,  will  give  some 
idea  of  the  value  of  the  irrigation  works  of  the  north- 
western provinces : 

"  '  Up  to  the  end  of  1877-78  the  capital  outlay  on 
completed  canals  had  been  £4,346,000.  The  area  ir- 
rigated in  that  year  was  1,461,000  acres,  the  value  of 
the  crops  raised  on  which  was  estimated  at  £6,020,- 
000.  Half  the  irrigated  area  was  occupied  by  au- 
tumn crops,  which  but  for  irrigation  must  have  been 
wholly  lost,  and  it  may  be  said  that  the  wealth  of 
these  provinces  was  consequently  increased  by  £3,- 
000,000 ;  so  that  three-fourths  of  the  entire  first  cost 
of  the  works  was  thus  repaid  to  the  country  in  that 
single  year. 

"  '  In  1891-92  the  area  irrigated  by  canals  in  the 
northwestern  provinces  exceeded  2,000,000  acres.' 

"  In  the  Punjab  works  of  equal  importance  have 
been  constructed  to  utilize  the  waters  of  the  Sutlej, 
the  Ravi,  and  other  rivers,  and  their  value  has  been  as 
great  as  in  the  northwestern  provinces. 

"  '  During  the  droughts  of  1877-78,'  Sir  Henry 
Cunningham  tells  us,  f  their  benefits  were  extended  to 
1,333,000  acres,  the  greater  portion  of  which  but  for 
canal  irrigation  would  have  been  absolutely  barren. 
During  this  period  the  land  irrigated  by  the  two  prin- 
cipal canals  produced  food  grain  to  the  amount  of 
300,000  tons,  worth  £2,000,000,  and  enough  to  keep 
1,800,000  people  for  a  year;  while  the  non-food  crops 
—  sugar,  dyes,  spices,  etc. —  were  reckoned  to  be 


328  PANAMA. 

worth  another  £1,000,000.  In  other  words,  the  value 
of  the  crops  saved  by  the  two  canals  in  a  single  season 
was  more  than  equal  to  the  entire  cost  (£2,260,000) 
of  the  completed  system/ 

"  The  benefits  described  by  Sir  Henry  Cunning- 
ham have  become  far  greater  since  this  passage  was 
written.  The  Sirhind  Canal,  which  distributes  the 
water  of  the  Sutlej  throughout  not  only  our  own  ter- 
ritories but  through  the  native  State  of  Patiala, 
I^abha,  and  Jhind,  is  a  work  of  greater  magnitude 
than  either  of  the  canals  from  the  Ganges.  It  is  ca- 
pable of  discharging  more  than  6,000  cubic  feet  of 
water  per  second;  the  length  of  its  main  channel  is 
540  miles,  and  that  of  its  distributaries  4,700  miles, 
and  it  can  irrigate  1,200,000  acres.  Its  cost  has  ex- 
ceeded 40,530,000  rupees,  and  the  direct  returns  to 
the  State  in  1890-91  amounted  to  about  4.6  per  cent 
on  the  capital  invested. 

"  Different  systems  of  irrigation  prevail  in  other 
parts  of  India,  In  central  and  southern  India  large 
tracts  of  country  are  dependent  for  their  supply  of 
water  on  lakes  and  reservoirs,  known  by  the  not  very 
appropriate  name  of  tanks.  These  are  in  some  cases 
natural  lakes,  but  oftener  they  have  been  formed  by 
the  construction  of  dams  of  masonry  or  earth  across 
the  outlets  of  valleys  in  the  hills,  and  they  are  fed 
sometimes  by  rivers  and  sometimes  by  the  rainfall  of 
a  more  or  less  extensive  area.  They  vary  in  size 
from  ponds  irrigating  a  few  acres  to  lakes  of  several 


.  GREAT  TANKS  OF  INDIA.  329 

miles  in  circumference.  Some  of  them  are  works 
constructed  in  the  times  of  which  we  have  no  histor- 
ical record. 

GREAT   TANKS    OF   SOUTHERN    INDIA. 

"  These  are  not  the  only  means  of  irrigation  in 
southern  India.  Work  hardly  inferior  in  importance 
to  those  of  the  northwestern  provinces  and  Punjab, 
but  on  a  different  system,  have  been  carried  out  by  the 
British  Government  in  the  Madras  Presidency  for 
utilizing  the  waters  of  the  Godaveri  and  Kistna  riv- 
ers. At  the  head  of  each  of  the  deltas  which  they 
form  before  they  reach  the  sea  a  great  weir,  or,  as  it  is 
locally  called,  an  '  anicut,'  is  thrown  across  the  river, 
which  is  diverted  into  irrigation  canals  and  distrib- 
uting channels,  some  of  which  are  also  used  for  nav- 
igation. A  large  area,  with  a  population  of  nearly 
2,000,000,  thus  obtains  complete  protection  against 
failure  of  rain,  and  these  works  have  not  only  been 
in  the  highest  degree  beneficial  to  the  people,  but 
very  profitable  to  the  State.  In  the  famine  of  1876- 
77  these  irrigated  tracts  produced  rice  to  the  value  of 
50,000,000  rupees,  a  large  part  of  which  was  avail- 
able for  the  relief  of  the  suffering  districts.  Without 
canal  irrigation  there  would  have  been  no  crops  at  all, 
and  the  value  of  the  produce  in  a  single  year  was  four 
times  as  great  as  the  whole  capital  expended  on  the 
canal  works  by  the  Government.  Farther  south,  in 


330  PANAMA. 

Tanjore,  works  of  a  similar  kind  provide  the  means 
of  utilizing  through  a  large  tract  of  country,  in  the 
delta  of  the  Kaveri,  almost  the  entire  water  supply  of 
that  river.  In  northern  India  the  ordinary  rental  of 
land  is  doubled  by  irrigation,  and  it  is  often  more 
than  quadrupled  in  Madras. 

"  In  the  province  of  Sind  another  system  prevails. 
Little  rain  falls  there,  and  without  irrigation  there 
would  be  no  cultivation.  In  the  same  way  that  ag- 
riculture in  Egypt  depends  upon  the  inundation  of 
the  Nile,  it  depends  in  Sind  on  the  floods  brought 
down  by  the  Indus  in  the  season  of  the  periodical 
rains.  There  is  great  room  for  further  improvement, 
but  the  existing  irrigation  renders  the  province  fairly 
prosperous,  and  gives  the  means  of  subsistence  to 
some  2,400,000  people. 

EXTENT,  VALUE,  AND  COST  OF  IRRIGATING  SYSTEM. 

"  Altogether  there  are  in  India,  under  the  man- 
agement or  supervision  of  the  British  Government, 
some  36,000  miles  of  canals  and  other  works,  irrigat- 
ing nearly  14,000,000  acres,  or  more  than  21,000 
square  miles.  Although  some  of  the  canals  have 
been  financially  unsuccessful  and  others  were  incom- 
plete, the  irrigation  works  of  India,  taken  as  a  whole, 
yielded  in  1891-2  a  net  return  of  51/2  per  cent  on 
their  cost,  which  amounted  to  about  320,300,000 
rupees.  It  is  a  remarkable  illustration  of  their  great 


CHINA'S  CANAL  SYSTEM.  331 

utility  that  this  sum  falls  far  short  of  the  annual  value 
of  the  crops  they  protect.  In  the  single  year  of 
1891-92  the  estimated  value  of  the  produce  of  the 
land  irrigated  by  works  constructed  by  the  Govern- 
ment was  more  than  550,000,000  rupees. 

"  No  similar  works  in  other  countries  approach 
them  in  magnitude,  and  it  is  certain  that  no  public 
works  of  nobler  utility  have  ever  been  undertaken  in 
the  world." 

CANALS    IN    CHINA.* 

There  are  several  features  of  the  canal  system  of 
China,  especially  of  the  Imperial  or  Grand  Canal, 
which  can  be  studied  with  profit  by  the  people  of  the 
United  States.  One  of  these  is  the  use  of  the  canal 
for  the  production  of  food  in  addition  to  its  uses  as  a 
means  of  transportation.  Allied  to  this  is  the  use  of 
the  muck  which  gathers  at  the  bottom  of  the  water- 
way for  fertilization.  Another  is  the  use  of  every 
particle  of  plant  life  growing  in  and  around  the  canal 
for  various  purposes. 

The  Chinese  secure  a  vast  quantity  of  food  of  one 
sort  or  another  from  their  canals.  To  appreciate  the 
exact  situation  with  respect  to  the  waterways,  it  must 
be  realized  that  the  canals  of  China  cover  the  plain 
country  with  a  network  of  water.  Leading  from  the 

*  Report  of  United  States  Consul  Anderson,  Hangchau, 
China. 


332  PANAMA. 

Grand  Canal  in  each  direction  are  smaller  canals,  and 
from  these  lead  still  smaller  canals,  until  there  is 
hardly  a  single  tract  of  40  acres  which  is  not  reached 
by  some  sort  of  ditch,  generally  capable  of  carrying 
good-sized  boats.  The  first  reason  for  this  great  net- 
work is  the  needs  of  rice  cultivation.  During  prac* 
tically  all  of  the  growing  season  for  rice  the  fields  are 
flooded.  Wherever  a  natural  waterway  can  be  made 
to  irrigate  the  rice  fields  it  is  used,  but,  of  course, 
from  these  to  the  canals  or  larger  rivers  there  must  be 
waterways.  Where  natural  streams  can  not  thus 
be  adapted  the  Chinese  lead  water  in  canals  or  ditches 
to  the  edge  of  their  fields  and  raise  it  to  the  fields  of 
rice  by  the  foot-power  carriers  which  have  been  de- 
scribed so  often  by  tourist  writers.  However  the 
water  is  supplied  to  the  rice,  it  is  evident  that  there 
must  be  a  waterway  leading  to  the  field  and  back  to 
a  principal  stream,  which  is  generally  a  branch  canal. 
These  waterways  naturally  take  up  a  considerable 
portion  of  the  land,  and  the  Chinese  make  as  profit- 
able use  of  them  as  of  the  land  itself. 

The  first  use  of  the  waterways  is  for  fishing.  The 
quantity  of  fish  taken  from  the  canals  of  China  an- 
nually is  immense.  The  Chinese  have  no  artificial 
fish  hatcheries,  but  the  supply  of  fish  is  maintained  at 
a  high  point  by  the  fact  that  the  flooded  rice  fields  act 
as  hatcheries  and  as  hiding  places  for  the  young  fish 
until  they  are  large  enough  to  look  out  for  themselves. 
In  the  United  States  this  fish-propagation  annex  to 


VARIOUS  UTILITIES  OF  CANALS.  333 

the  canals  is  probably  neither  possible  nor  needful  in 
view  of  the  work  done  by  the  State  and  National 
bureaus,  but  in  China  it  is  nothing  less  than  provi- 
dential. 

CHINESE    CANALS   SUPPLY    FERTILIZER. 

Along  the  canals  in  China  at  any  time  may  be 
found  boatmen  gathering  muck  from  the  bottom  of 
the  canal.  This  muck  is  taken  in  much  the  same 
manner  that  oysters  are  taken  by  hand  on  the  Atlantic 
coast.  In  place  of  tongs  are  large  bag-like  devices  on 
crossed  bamboo  poles  which  take  in  a  large  quantity 
of  the  ooze  at  once.  This  is  emptied  into  the  boat, 
and  the  process  is  repeated  until  the  boatman  has  a 
load,  when  he  will  proceed  to  some  neighboring  farm 
and  empty  the  muck,  either  directly  on  the  fields  — 
especially  around  the  mulberry  trees,  which  are  raised 
for  the  silkworms  —  or  in  a  pool,  where  it  is  taken 
later  to  the  fields.  From  this  muck  the  Chinese 
farmer  will  generally  secure  enough  shellfish  to  pay 
him  for  his  work,  and  the  fertilizer  is  clear  gain. 
The  fertilizer  thus  secured  is  valuable.  It  is  rich  in 
nitrogen  and  potash  and  has  abundant  humus  ele- 
ments. This  dredging  of  the  canals  for  fertilizers 
is  the  only  way  by  which  the  Chinese  have  kept  their 
canals  in  reasonably  good  condition  for  centuries. 
The  fertilizer  has  paid  for  itself  both  ways.  Re- 
cently there  were  complaints  filed  at  Peking  that  the 


334  PANAMA. 

ashes  from  the  steam  launches  plying  on  the  canal 
were  injuring  the  muck  for  fertilizing  purposes,  and 
the  problem  has  been  considered  a  serious  one  by  the 
Chinese  Government 

In  addition  to  securing  fertilizers  from  the  canals, 
and  thus  keeping  the  canals  in  condition,  the  farmers' 
help  keep  them  purified  by  gathering  all  floating 
weeds,  grass,  and  other  vegetable  debris  that  they  can 
find  upon  them.  Boatmen  will  secure  great  loads  of 
water  plants  and  grasses  by  skimming  along  the 
surface  of  the  canal.  The  reeds  growing  along  the 
canals  are  used  for  weaving  baskets  of  several  grades, 
and  for  fuel.  In  short,  no  plant  life  about  the  canal 
goes  to  waste. 

UTILIZATION   OP   SWAMP   LAJH). 

Where  there  are  so  many  canals  there  is  more  or 
less  swamp  ground.  In  China  this  is  utilized  for  the 
raising  of  lotus  roots,  from  which  commercial  arrow- 
root is  largely  obtained.  There  is  no  reason  why 
much  of  the  wast©  swamp  land  in  the  southern  portion 
of  the  United  States  should  not  be  used  for  a  similar 
purpose,  and  the  commercial  returns  from  a  venture 
of  this  sort  in  that  part  of  the  country  ought  to  be  sat- 
isfactory.  Where  the  canals  of  China  widen,  by 
reason  of  natural  waterways  or  for  other  reasons,  the 
expanse  of  water  not  needed  for  actual  navigation  is 
made  use  of  in  the  raising  of  water  nuts  of  several 


DUCK  FAPxMS  IN  CHINA.  335 

varieties,  especially  what  are  known  as  water  chest- 
nuts. These  nuts  are  raised  in  immense  quantities. 
They  are,  strictly  speaking,  bulbs  rather  than  nuts. 
They  are  rich  in  arrow-root  and  are  prolific,  an  acre 
of  shallow  water  producing  far  more  than  an  acre  of 
well-cultivated  soil  planted  in  ordinary  grain  or  sim- 
ilar crops.  These  nuts,  also,  could  be  produced  to  ad- 
vantage in  the  United  States  where  there  is  land  in- 
undated for  the  growing  season  to  a  depth  which  will 
give  ordinary  water  plants  a  chance  to  thrive  and 
which  is  not  capable  of  being  drained  for  the  time  be- 
ing. The  nuts  or  bulbs  are  toothsome  when  roasted, 
and  are  wholesome,  but  probably  would  be  more  val- 
uable in  the  United  States  for  the  manufactured  pro- 
ducts which  can  be  secured  from  them. 

There  are  duck  farms  all  along  the  canals  in  China. 
These  are  profitable.  Chinese  canals,  as  a  rule,  con- 
sidering the  population  upon  them  and  their  varied 
uses,  are  cleaner  than  canals  in  the  United  States. 
There  are  few  if  any  factories  to  contaminate  them. 
The  Chinese  use  of  certain  sewage  for  fertilization 
also  prevents  contamination  to  a  great  extent.  The 
canal  water  is  used  for  laundry,  bath,  and  culinary 
purposes  indiscriminately.  A  canal  in  the  United 
States  could  never  be  what  it  is  in  China,  but  the 
Chinese  have  a  number  of  clever  devices  and  ideas  in 
connection  with  canals  which  can  be  adopted  in  the 
United  States  with  profit 


336  PANAMA. 


The  Grand  Canal  system  in  China  has  existed  in 
almost  its  present  shape  since  about  the  time  Colum- 
bus discovered  America.  The  Grand  Canal  itself,  ex- 
tending from  Hangchau  to  Peking,  is  about  a  thou- 
sand miles  long.  Much  of  it  is  banked  with  stone, 
and  all  of  it  is  in  such  condition  that  with  the  ex- 
penditure of  a  little  money  the  system  could  be  put 
upon  a  modern  and  effective  basis.  As  it  is,  the 
canal  handles  practically  all  the  internal  trade  of 
China,  and  this  trade  is  far  greater  than  its  foreign 
trade.  The  coming  of  railroads  will  affect  the  canals 
somewhat,  but  not  so  much,  as  may  be  imagined,  for 
the  railroads  will  very  largely  build  up  a  trade  of 
their  own.  A  little  money  will  make  China's  canal 
system  in  the  future  what  it  has  been  in  the  past,  the 
greatest  on  earth.* 

THE    ECONOMIC   EFFECTS   OF  SHIP   CAJSTALS.I 

Much  has  been  written  concerning  the  ship  canals 
of  the  world  as  great  works  of  engineering;  much, 
too,  on  their  political  and  military  importance;  but 
of  the  part  they  have  played  in  the  great  economic 

*  Mr.  Anderson's  closing  statement  is  open  to  question  when 
the  canal  system  of  India  is  considered. 

f  J.  A.  Fairlie,  in  Annals  of  the  American  Academy  of 
Political  and  Social  Science,  January,  1898. 


ECONOMIC  EFFECTS  OF  CANALS.  337 

changes,  the  result  of  the  marvelous  development  of 
transport  industries  during  this  last  half  century,  it 
is  not  so  easy  to  find  definite  or  satisfactory  accounts. 
At  the  same  time  vague  and  indefinite  statements  fre- 
quently made  indicate  that  their  economic  import- 
ance has  been  significant;  and,  in  fact,  it  is  only  as 
they  are  influential  in  this  way  that  they  become  com- 
mercially profitable  undertakings.  The  attempt  is 
made  in  this  paper  to  trace  with  some  degree  of  pre- 
cision these  economic  effects,  showing  how,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  canals,  important  changes  have  been 
made  in  business  machinery,  in  business  methods,  in 
producing  and  marketing  commodities,  and  in  gen- 
eral economic  development. 

The  ship  canals  do  not  form  a  connected  part  of 
the  world's  transportation  system,  and  in  consequence 
the  economic  results  of  each  are,  in  the  main,  inde- 
pendent of  all  other  canals.  Furthermore,  the  eco- 
nomic importance  of  the  different  canals  presents  the 
widest  variations.  Each  opens  the  way  for  the  crea- 
tion of  many  and  extensive  carrying  routes;  but,  while 
the  influence  of  some  has  been  merely  local,  the  con- 
sequences of  others  have  been  felt  throughout  the  com- 
mercial and  industrial  world.  These  conditions  sug- 
gest the  natural  method  of  treatment  to  be  a  consid- 
eration of  each  canal  separately,  tracing  so  far  as 
possible  the  economic  effects  that  have  resulted  from 
its  existence. 

The  Amsterdam  and  Manchester  canals,  each  con- 

22 


338  PANAMA. 

structed  to  serve  the  needs  of  a  single  port,  do  not 
present  the  possibilities  of  any  large  and  general 
economic  results.  The  Welland,  Corinth,  and  Kiel 
canals  have  a  larger  field  of  possibilities,  but  their 
actual  consequences  have  as  yet  been  small.  The  re- 
sults of  these  less  important  canals  are  therefore  but 
briefly  considered  in  this  paper.  The  examination 
of  the  vastly  more  important  and  significant  results 
of  the  Suez  and  St.  Marys  Falls  canals  will  comprise 
the  larger  part  of  this  study. 

CANALS    OF    HOLLAND. 

In  a  country  as  well  supplied  with  smaller  canals 
as  Holland  is,  it  was  natural  that  the  idea  of  a  ship 
canal  should  present  itself  to  Amsterdam,  when  the 
shallowness  of  the  Zuyder  Zee  and  other  difficulties 
of  approach  were  causing  her  to  lose  trade  to  her 
rival,  Rotterdam.  The  idea  soon  took  practical  form, 
and  in  1826  the  Helder  Canal,  with  an  18-foot  chan- 
nel, offered  an  easier  approach  to  the  Dutch  port. 
With  the  development  of  the  shipping  industry  the 
dimensions  of  this  canal  became  inadequate  after  a 
few  decades,  while  its  length  (50  miles)  and  the  diffi- 
cult entrance  in  the  passes  of  the  Texel  proved  ad- 
ditional disadvantages.  To  maintain  the  commercial 
position  of  Amsterdam  the  construction  of  a  new 
and  larger  canal,  built  by  the  shortest  line  to  the  sea, 
was  decided  on,  and  in  1876  the  North  Sea  Canal, 


MANCHESTER  SHIP  CANAL.  339 

miles   in  length  and  23  feet   in  depth,  was 
opened  for  use. 

The  effect  of  the  new  canal  on  the  commerce  of 
Amsterdam  was  instantaneous.  For  twenty  years 
the  tonnage  statistics  for  shipping  at  that  port  had 
shown  an  almost  complete  stagnation,  while  at  Rot- 
terdam the  shipping  had  trebled.  In  six  years  after 
the  new  canal  was  opened  the  tonnage  entering  and 
clearing  at  Amsterdam  had  more  than  doubled,  ris- 
ing from  802,000  tons  in  1876  to  1,T34,000  tons  in 
1882.  In  the  former  year  the  Amsterdam  shipping 
was  but  little  over  one-quarter  that  of  Rotterdam; 
in  the  latter  year  it  was  almost  a  half.  Since  1882, 
however,  the  increase  has  been  at  a  much  slower  rate, 
while  the  continued  rapid  upward  movement  of  the 
Rotterdam  figures  shows  that  there  is  no  falling  off 
in  the  general  trade.  Evidently  the  larger  and  deep- 
er draft  vessels  now  constructed  find  the  23-foot  chan- 
nel too  shallow,  and  an  enlargement  of  the  canal  will 
be  necessary  to  enable  Amsterdam  to  retain  even  her 
existing  position. 


The  Manchester  Ship  Canal  resembles  the  Amster- 
dam Canal  in  connecting  a  large  city  with  the  open 
sea,  and  in  being  constructed  with  a  view  to  its  effects 
on  the  city  at  its  inland  terminus.  There  is  the  dif- 
ference, however,  that  the  promoters  of  the  English 


340  PANAMA. 

canal  aim  not  simply  at  retaining  and  developing  an 
already  existing  trade,  but  at  creating  a  new  port. 
The  expectation  of  the  promoters  and  of  the  corpora- 
tion of  Manchester,  which  has  bonded  itself  heavily 
to  secure  the  completion  of  the  canal,  is  that  the  raw 
materials  for  Manchester  manufactures  will  be 
brought  via  the  canal,  this  route  saving  the  heavy 
expenses  connected  with  the  transfer  to  the  railroad 
at  Liverpool.  It  is  perhaps  too  early  to  say  whether 
these  expectations  will  be  realized ;  although  the  esti- 
mate of  a  traffic  of  3,000,000  tons  within  two  years 
of  opening  has  not  been  fulfilled,  a  large  trade  has 
been  developed.  The  canal  was  opened  on  January 
1,  1894,  and  during  the  first  year  1,280  seagoing  ves- 
sels and  1,660  boats  for  coast  traffic  came  up  to  Man- 
chester. For  the  nine  months  ending  September, 
1896,  the  traffic  was  1,300,000  tons,  an  increase  of 
350,000  tons  over  the  corresponding  period  of  the 
year  before.*  This  development  within  three  years 
of  a  trade  approaching  that  of  Amsterdam  in  volume 
is  not  without  significance,  and  with  a  continued  in- 
crease Manchester  in  a  few  years  will  become  an  im- 
portant shipping  port.t 

Like  the  Manchester  Canal,  the  Corinth  and  Kiel 

*  In  1900  it  exceeded  3,000,000  tons  and  has  steadily  in- 
creased since. 

t  From  the  investor's  point  of  view,  the  results  of  the  Man- 
chester Canal  are  more  discouraging  because  of  the  heavy 
expense  of  construction,  it  being  almost  equal  to  the  cost 
of  the  Suez  Canal. 


THE  QUESTION  OF  PROFIT.  341 

canals  have  not  produced  immediate  effects  equal  to 
the  anticipations  of  their  promoters.  The  Corinth 
Canal  was  opened  in  October,  1893,  and  the  total 
traffic  at  the  end  of  December,  1895  (twenty-six 
months),  had  been  but  4,589  ships,  with  a  tonnage 
of  596,000  tons.  The  first  year's  operation  of  the 
Kiel  Canal  between  the  Baltic  and  North  seas  showed 
a  record  of  7,500  steamers  and  9,300  sailing  .vessels, 
but  these  were  mostly  small  vessels,  and  the  receipts 
from  tolls  were  under  900,000  marks,  against  an  es- 
timate of  5,000,000  marks. 

It  is  evident,  however,  that  these  canals  have  been 
in  operation  too  short  a  time  for  a  full  development 
of  their  possibilities.  The  future  may  demonstrate 
that  these  routes  offer  a  net  advantage-  to  shipping 
on  account  of  the  saving  in  distances  and  the  greater 
safety  from  shipwreck;  and  a  considerable  traffic 
may  develop  with  important  economic  results.  The 
Welland  Canal  does  not  seem  at  first  sight  to  offer 
this  hopeful  outlook.  The  present  14-foot  channel 
has  been  in  use  since  1887,  yet  the  traffic  does  not 
exceed  1,000,000  tons  a  year.  But  a  deepening  of 
the  channel  and  the  enlargement  of  the  locks,  so  as 
to  reduce  the  number,  might  result  in  a  considerable 
increase  in  the  traffic. 

There  may  be  latent  possibilities  in  the  traffic  of 
each  of  these  canals  we  have  been  considering,  but 
thus  far  the  great  bulk  of  the  trade  they  were  in- 
tended to  get  remains  undiverted  from  old  routes, 


342  PANAMA. 

little  new  trade  has  been  developed,  and  no  impor- 
tant economic  results  have  appeared.  This,  how- 
ever, is  not  the  case  with  the  Suez  and  St.  Marys 
canals. 

THE  SUEZ   CANAI* 

In  December,  1858,  a  company  was  found  to  un- 
dertake M.  de  Lesseps'  audacious  scheme  of  connect- 
ing the  Mediterranean  and  Red  seas;  in  the  follow- 
ing spring  work  was  commenced,  and  in  1869  the 
Suez  Canal  opened  a  new  water  route  to  the  East 

It  takes  but  a  glance  at  the  statistics  of  traffic  to 
notice  the  enormous  difference  between  the  trade  that 
has  developed  through  the  Suez  Canal  and  that  of  the 
canals  already  considered.  Beginning  in  1870,  with 
486  vessels,  having  a  tonnage  of  436,000  tons,  there 
was  a  steady  increase  until  1875,  when  it  had  reached 
nearly  1,500  ships  and  over  2,000,000  tons.  After 
a  few  years  of  quiescence  came  a  second  period  of 
rapid  increase,  from  1880  to  1883,  in  the  latter  year 
the  figures  of  3,300  ships  and  5,800,000  tons  being 
reached.  Since  then  there  has  been  a  slowly  in- 
creasing tonnage,  reaching  the  maximum  figure  of 
8,700,000  tons  in  1891,  but  falling  off  somewhat 
since  that  year.  In  1896  the  figures  were  3,409 
ships  with  a  tonnage  of  8,594,307.* 

*  The  tonnage  for  the  year  1906  will  probably  exceed 
18,000,000. 


EFFECT  OF  SUEZ  CANAL  ON  SHIPPING.         343 

The  importance  of  these  figures  may  be  made  clear- 
er by  recalling  the  fact  that  the  foreign  tonnage  en- 
tering at  the  port  of  New  York  has  rarely  exceeded 
7,500,000  tons  in  any  year,  and  that  the  foreign  ton- 
nage for  all  the  ports  of  the  United  States,  both  en- 
tering and  clearing,  is  about  35,000,000  tons ;  that  is, 
the  traffic  through  the  Suez  Canal,  measured  by  vol- 
ume, is  almost  a  quarter  of  the  total  foreign  trade  of 
the  United  States.  But  if  measured  by  value,  the 
importance  of  the  canal  traffic  is  seen  to  be  much 
greater.  The  imports  and  exports  of  India,  via  the 
Suez  Canal,  are  equal  in  value  to  $360,000,000, 
which  is  nearly  one-quarter  of  the  value  of  the  for- 
eign trade  of  the  United  States.  As  the  Indian  trade 
constitutes  rather  less  than  one-half  the  total  traffic 
of  the  Suez  Canal,  the  value  of  the  whole  of  that 
traffic  must  be  not  far  from  a  half  of  the  foreign 
trade  of  the  United  States. 

EFFECT    OF    SUEZ    CANAX,    ON    SHIPPING. 

The  development  of  a  trade  of  such  an  extent  and 
value  by  a  new  route  within  the  space  of  twenty-five 
years  could  not  but  have  an  important  and  far-reach- 
ing influence  on  the  economic  interests  of  the  world. 
Perhaps  the  most  striking  results  of  the  opening  of 
the  canal  route  to  the  East  were  those  on  the  machin- 
ery of  trade  —  meaning  by  this  term  both  the  ma- 
terial appliances  and  the  business  organization  of 


344  PANAMA. 

trade.  One  effect  might  have  been  in  part  antici- 
pated. The  new  route  saved  nearly  3,000  marine 
leagues  on  the  voyage  from  the  ports  of  western 
Europe  to  the  East,  or  almost  half  the  distance  to 
Bombay.  The  obvious  result  of  the  use  of  the  new 
route  would  be  that  half  of  the  vessels  engaged  in 
the  Eastern  trade  would  be  out  of  employment.  In 
fact,  however,  the  change  came  more  indirectly. 
Sailing  vessels  did  not  find  it  advantageous  to  use 
the  canal,  and  continued  on  the  old  route  around  the 
Cape  of  Good  Hope.  But  the  canal,  by  making  prac- 
ticable the  use  of  steamships  in  the  oriental  trade, 
brought  about  an  even  greater  revolution  in  the 
character  of  the  shipping  business  to  the  East.  By 
the  Cape  route  coaling  places  were  few,  and  the 
facilities  for  coaling  expensive.  The  consequence 
was  that  the  enormous  expense  of  coaling  at  these  out- 
of-the-way  places,  with  the  loss  of  freight  room  for 
the  extra  space  needed  for  coal,  made  the  use  of 
steamers  unprofitable.  But  by  the  canal  route  a 
steamer  could  coal  at  Gibraltar,  Malta,  Port  Said, 
and  Aden,  where  coal  could  be  furnished  at  moder- 
ate rates,  while  the  space  saved  from  coal  could  be 
used  to  carry  a  larger  cargo.  Accordingly,  a  large 
number  of  new  iron  screw  steamers  were  soon  con- 
structed for  the  trade  with  the  East,  and  replaced 
a  large  percentage  of  the  sailing  vessels.  It  has  been 
estimated  that  2,000,000  tons  of  vessels  were  thus 
thrown  out  of  employment,  and  the  effect  of  this  can 


ORIENTAL  STEAMSHIP  COMPANIES.  345 

be  seen  in  the  immediate  reduction  in  the  tonnage  of 
sailing  vessels.  In  1869  the  sailing  tonnage  in  the 
British  foreign  trade  was  3,600,000  tons ;  in  1876  it 
was  but  3,230,000  tons. 

GREAT    ORIENTAL   STEAMSHIP    COMPANIES. 

In  the  construction  of  the  new  steamers  for  the 
canal  trade  two  lines  already  in  existence  —  the  Pen- 
insular and  Oriental  Steamship  Company  and  the 
Messageries  Compagnie  —  took  prominent  parts. 
But  new  companies  also  were  rapidly  organized, 
which  built  steamers  and  established  new  lines  to  the 
East,  among  which  may  be  noted  the  British  India 
Steam  Navigation  Company,  the  Clan  Line,  the  Aus- 
tro-llungarian  Lloyds  Company,  the  Italian  Steam 
Navigation  Company,  and  the  Kubbotino  Company, 
of  Genoa.  It  is  not  possible  to  get  at  the  amount  of 
shipbuilding  made  necessary  by  the  change  in  the 
kind  of  ships  used  in  the  Eastern  trade,  but  some 
idea  of  the  importance  of  the  change  may  be  seen  by 
noting  the  fact  that  the  total  steam  tonnage  in  the 
British  foreign  trade  increased  from  650,000  tons 
in  1869  to  1,500,000  tons  in  1876.  It  would,  of 
course,  be  possible  to  learn  the  number  and  tonnage 
of  ships  now  engaged  in  the  trade  between  Europe 
and  the  East,  but  to  account  for  all  of  this  by  the 
Suez  Canal  would  be  to  exaggerate  its  effects.  Im- 
provements in  marine  engines  and  in  the  construction 


346  PANAMA. 

of  steamers  make  much  longer  steamer  voyages  pos- 
sible to-day  than  were  possible  in  1870,  as  is  shown 
by  the  lines  to  Australia  and  across  the  Pacific  Ocean. 
It  is,  therefore,  certain  that  if  no  Suez  Canal  had 
been  built,  there  would  have  been  by  this  time  steam- 
ers in  the  Eastern  trade ;  but  the  change  would  have 
come  at  a  much  later  period,  and  sailing  vessels 
would  continue  to  carry  a  large,  perhaps  a  dominant, 
share  of  the  traffic.  The  effect  of  the  Suez  Canal 
was  to  make  the  transition  from  sail  to  steam  sharp 
and  decisive,  and  to  bring  it  about  in  the  decade 
1870-1880. 

AN  ANTICIPATED   EFFECT   NOT   -REALIZED. 

One  change  in  the  shipping  industry  that  was  ex- 
pected from  the  construction  of  the  Suez  Canal  has 
not  been  realized.  It  was  predicted  that  the  geo- 
graphical advantage  given  to  the  Mediterranean  ports 
by  the  new  route  would  soon  enable  them  to  regain 
the  position  they  had  held  in  the  Middle  Ages  as  the 
carriers  of  Eastern  produce  to  the  markets  of  Europe. 
In  England  it  was  felt  that  the  canal  would  seriously 
threaten  British  maritime  supremacy,  but  the  results 
have  been  otherwise.  It  was  only  in  England  that 
the  capital  was  at  hand  to  build  the  large  screw 
steamers  which  alone  could  profitably  use  the  canal, 
and  from  the  start  three-fourths  of  the  vessels  using 
the  canal  have  been  British.  Of  late  years  there  has 


CHANGE  IN  SHIPPING  TBADB.  347 

been  a  slight  decline  in  the  percentage  of  British  ves- 
sels, but  this  has  been  due  not  to  an  increase  in  the 
ships  of  southern  European  nations,  but  to  an  in- 
crease in  German,  Dutch,  and  Belgian  vessels. 

But  while  the  carrying  trade  is  still  in  British  ves- 
sels a  much  larger  and  a  growing  share  of  the  traffic 
is  carried  from  the  East  directly  to  the  Continent, 
and  England  has  declined  in  relative  importance  as 
a  warehousing  and  distributing  point  for  Eastern 
goods.  Under  the  old  regime  of  sailing  vessels 
around  the  Cape,  when  voyages  from  India  took  a 
good  part  of  a  year,  and  the  time  of  arrival  could  not 
be  calculated  on  within  a  month  or  two,  it  was  neces- 
sary that  large  stocks  of  goods  should  be  kept  on 
hand  to  enable  dealers  to  meet  the  varying  demand 
for  their  goods.  Steamers  by  way  of  the  Suez  Canal 
make  the  voyage  in  thirty  days  and  the  time  of  their 
arrival  can  be  regulated  within  a  day.  Shorter  voy- 
ages and  punctuality  of  arrivals  make  it  possible  for 
local  dealers  both  in  England  and  on  the  Continent 
to  order  directly  from  the  East  and  the  change  in  the 
method  of  this  business  rendered  useless  to  a  large 
extent  the  immense  warehouses  at  London,  Liver- 
pool, and  other  English  ports.  A  few  statistics  will 
show  the  extent  to  which  direct  trade  between  the 
East  and  the  Continent  has  taken  the  place  of  trade 
via  England.  In  1870  the  value  of  exports  from 
India  to  the  United  Kingdom  was  nearly  $70,000,000, 
to  the  rest  of  Europe  $13,000,000 ;  in  1893-94  the 


348  PANAMA. 

value  of  Indian  exports  to  the  United  Kingdom  was 
$93,000,000,  to  other  European  countries  $85,000,- 
000.  In  other  words,  while  the  total  export  trade  of 
India  and  the  total  exports  to  Europe  have  doubled 
in  value  within  twenty-three  years,  and  the  exports 
to  European  countries  other  than  Great  Britain  have 
multiplied  sixfold,  the  exports  from  India  to  the 
United  Kingdom  have  increased  but  40  per  cent. 
The  proportion  of  Indian  exports  to  Europe,  that 
are  landed  first  in  the  United  Kingdom,  declined 
from  83  to  53  per  cent. 

DIRECT    EXPORTS    FROM   INDIA   TO   EUROPE. 

This  change  in  the  direction  of  trade  has  not  been 
simply  the  transfer  of  the  distributing  points  from 
England  to  the  Mediterranean  ports  of  southern 
Europe.  The  towns  of  Italy,  Greece,  and  southern 
France  have  been  almost  as  greatly  disappointed  in 
their  expectations  of  becoming  trade  centers  as  in 
their  hopes  of  controlling 'the  shipping  trade  to  the 
East  through  the  operation  of  the  Suez  Canal.  To 
be  sure  there  has  been  a  heavy  increase  in  Indian  ex- 
ports to  Italy,  Austria,  and  Russia ;  and  the  Mediter- 
ranean ports,  notably  Genoa,  have  increased  in  im- 
portance. But  the  most  striking  feature  of  the 
change  in  the  direction  of  Indian  exports  lies  in  the 
increased  traffic  to  France,  Holland,  Belgium,  and, 
above  all,  to  Germany.  The  statistics  of  Indian  ex- 


WAREHOUSE  DISTRIBUTION  SYSTEM.  349 

ports  to  these  countries  show  that  there  is  no  longer 
any  one  country  pre-eminent  as  a  distributing  point 
for  Eastern  produce,  but  that  all  Europe  trades  di- 
rectly with  the  East.  Nevertheless,  with  this  great 
change  in  the  character  of  the  Indian  export  trade 
the  imports  of  European  goods  to  India  continue,  as 
in  the  days  before  the  canal,  to  come  almost  entirely 
from  England. 

The  termination  of  the  warehouse  distribution  sys- 
tem of  England  was  one  of  the  forces  which  led  to 
the  disappearance  of  the  class  of  merchant  princes 
who  had  hitherto  monopolized  the  Eastern  trade. 
The  system  of  bank  discounts  and  commercial  loans, 
by  enabling  men  of  ability  to  secure  capital  at  low 
rates  of  interest,  also  played  a  large  part  in  driving 
out  of  trade  the  old  houses  doing  business  on  their 
own  capital,  from  which  they  expected  large  rates  of 
interest.  But  as  long  as  large  stocks  of  goods  had 
to  be  kept  on  hand  for  six  months  or  more  at  a  time, 
it  was  difficult  for  the  new  business  man  to  get  the 
credit  that  would  enable  him  to  supplant  the  old- 
established  houses  in  the  eastern  trade.  When,  how- 
ever, the  new  route  by  the  Suez  Canal,  by  bringing 
steamers  into  use,  enabled  a  cargo  to  be  sold  and  de- 
livered within  a  month  after  the  order  had  been  sent 
the  advantages  on  the  side  of  the  man  working  with 
borrowed  capital  were  decisive. 

As  a  result  of  the  opening  of  the  Suez  Canal  sail- 
ing vessels,  warehouses,  merchant  princes,  dealers  in 


350  PANAMA. 

six  months'  bills  found  their  old  occupations  slipping 
away.  The  old  modes  and  channels  of  business  were 
altered  and  new  adjustments  had  to  be  made.  In  the 
meantime  the  confusion  and  disturbances  in  the  busi- 
ness world  were  so  great  that  the  London  Economist 
has  said  that  they  constituted  one  great  general  cause 
for  the  universal  commercial  and  industrial  depres- 
sion and  disturbance  of  1873. 

The  effect  of  the  opening  of  the  Suez  Canal  and 
the  new  route  to  the  East  on  the  production  and  mar- 
keting of  Eastern  produce  is  by  no  means  so  easy  to 
trace  as  the  effects  on  the  machinery  of  trade.  If 
all  the  necessary  statistical  material  were  at  hand  it 
would  be  an  almost  endless  task  to  disentangle  from 
the  complex  results  of  complicated  causes  the  exact 
changes  that  have  been  due  to  the  canal.  It  is  pos- 
sible, however,  to  see  the  effects  produced  by  the 
canal  in  the  case  of  a  few  leading  commodities,  and 
in  other  respects  the  general  tendency  of  the  new 
route  can  be  recognized. 

EFFECT   ON   CERTAIN    COMMODITIES. 

A  few  commodities  will  serve  to  show  that  not 
every  article  in  the  Eastern  trade  has  been  affected 
by  the  new  route  and  the  new  methods  of  business 
brought  about  by  it.  The  exports  of  Indian  cotton 
have  remained  at  about  the  same  figure  since  the 
opening  of  the  canal,  showing  that  for  that  article 


TEA  AND  RICE  TRADES.  351 

the  sailing  vessel  and  the  Cape  route  provided  as 
cheap  a  road  as  the  canal  route.  The  exports  of  In- 
dian wool  and  of  spices  have  increased  to  some  ex- 
tent, but  with  nothing  to  indicate  that  the  increase  is 
greater  than  would  have  taken  place  in  the  ordinary 
development  of  trade.  The  exports  of  tea  from 
India  show  an  astonishing  increase  from  11,000,000 
pounds  in  1870  to  120,000,000  in  1893-94.  But 
with  an  article  of  such  high  value  the  direct  effects  of 
the  canal  through  cheaper  freight  rates  can  have  had 
little  influence  here,  though  indirectly  the  increased 
Indian  production  may  be  due  in  part  to  the  easier 
communication  with  the  West  that  was  made  pos- 
sible by  the  canal.  In  the  earlier  arrival  of  the  new 
season's  teas  the  influence  of  the  canal  in  shortening 
the  time  from  India  to  England  is  clearly  evident. 
Tea  imports  to  England  in  July,  1870,  were  711,000 
pounds;  in  July,  1871,  4,000,000  pounds;  in  July, 
1872,  23,000,000  pounds  —  the  enormous  increase 
being  the  direct  result  of  the  use  of  steamers  via  the 
canal  in  place  of  sailing  vessels  and  the  long  Cape 
voyage. 

Rice  is  a  commodity  the  trade  in  which  has  been 
subject  to  important  changes  as  a  direct  result  of  the 
use  of  the  canal  route  to  the  East.  Rice  is  a  staple 
Italian  cereal  and  a  leading  article  of  Italian  export. 
It  had  formerly  been  imported  into  European  coun- 
tries by  the  Cape  route,  but  by  the  canal  route  East- 
ern rice  was  enabled  to  reach  markets  in  southern 


352  PANAMA. 

Europe  formerly  inaccessible,  and  even  to  be  sold  in 
Italy  itself,  much  to  the  displeasure  of  the  Italian 
producers.  In  the  six  years  following  the  opening 
of  the  Suez  Canal  the  export  of  Indian  rice  doubled 
and  has  continued  to  increase  since.  It  constitutes 
the  largest  single  item  in  the  export  trade  of  India. 

INDIA    AS    A    WHEAT-EXPOBTING    COUNTRY. 

The  creation  of  the  wheat  export  trade  of  India 
is  due  directly  to  the  opening  of  the  Suez  Canal  route 
to  Europe.  Efforts  had  been  made  to  carry  wheat 
around  the  Cape,  but  the  liability  to  heat  during  the 
long  voyage  and  the  loss  from  weevil  in  the  cargo 
made  all  such  attempts  unsuccessful.  The  possibili- 
ty of  carrying  wheat  by  the  new  and  shorter  route 
was  soon  demonstrated,  and  a  trade  was  established 
that  has  grown  until  India  has  become  the  second 
wheat-exporting  country  in  the  world.  In  1870  the 
wheat  exports  of  India  were  130,000  bushels;  in 
1876,  over  4,000,000  bushels;  in  1883,  35,000,000 
bushels;  in  1891,  50,000,000  bushels. 

Since  the  last  date  there  has  been  a  considerable 
decline  in  the  extent  of  the  export  owing  to  poor 
crops,  .but  under  ordinary  conditions  the  Indian  pro- 
duct is  an  important  item  in  the  wheat  market  of  the 
world.  It  will  be  observed  that  the  great  increase 
in  this  Indian  export  trade  did  not  begin  until  after 
the  year  1876.  The  extension  at  that  time  came 


INDIAN  IMPORT  TRADE.  353 

about  through  the  reduction  in  freight  rates  made 
possible  by  improved  steamers.  It  is  nevertheless 
true  that  the  establishment  of  the  wheat  export  trade 
of  India  and  the  possibility  of  any  such  trade  exist- 
ing at  all  is  to  be  ascribed  to  the  Suez  Canal. 

Of  the  imports  into  India  the  direct  influence  of 
the  Suez  Canal  seems  to  be  striking  in  the  case  of  but 
one  commodity  —  petroleum  from  the  Russian  oil 
fields  at  Batoum.  Before  the  discovery  of  these 
fields  the  imports  of  oil  into  India  were  insignificant. 
The  value  of  such  imports  in  1869  was  about  $110,- 
000  and  in  1876  had  risen  only  to  $175,000.  But 
when  the  Batoum  oil  fields  were  discovered  an  exten- 
sive trade  to  India,  via  the  Suez  Canal,  immediately 
developed.  In  1880  the  imports  of  oil  into  India 
were  6,500,000  gallons,  valued  at  $1,360,000;  in 
1885  this  had  risen  to  26,300,000  gallons;  in  1890, 
to  51,800,000  gallons,  and  in  1893,  to  86,600,000 
gallons.  For  a  considerable  period  the  Indian  de- 
mand absorbed  more  than  half  the  total  product  of 
the  Russian  oil  wells,  and  to-day  it  takes  more  than 
a  quarter  of  their  output.  As  the  distance  from  Ba- 
toum to  India  around  Africa  is  as  great  as  that  from 
the  American  oil  fields,  it  does  not  seem  possible  that 
any  of  this  Russian  oil  would  have  found  its  way  to 
India  by  the  Cape  route.  Some  trade  might  have 
arisen  by  the  overland  route  to  India,  which,  when 
railroad  connections  from  the  Caspian  Sea  to  India 
are  complete,  would  have  become  important,  but  the- 

23 


354  PANAMA. 

oil  imports  of  India  as  they  stand  to-day  are  made 
possible  only  by  the  existence  of  the  canal  route. 

It  may  be  well  while  dealing  with  particular  com- 
modities to  note  that  nearly  1,000,000  tons  of  coal 
are  annually  brought  to  Port  Said  for  the  steamers 
passing  through  the  canal.  This  coal  makes  a  con- 
siderable item  in  the  Mediterranean  trade  due  to  the 
Suez  Canal. 

If  the  question  be  asked,  What  is  the  total  signifi- 
cance of  the  Suez  Canal  on  the  production  and  mar- 
keting of  commodities  ?  the  answer  can  be  given  only 
in  general  terms.  A  superficial  observer  might  base 
an  estimate  on  the  increase  in  Indian  trade  with 
Europe  from  $280,000,000  in  1870  to  $700,000,- 
000  in  1894.  If,  however,  it  is  borne  in  mind  that 
this  increase  has  been  at  a  less  proportionate  rate 
than  that  from  1850  to  1870  without  the  canal,  and 
if  the  large  extensions  of  the  foreign  trade  of  Aus- 
tralia, South  Africa,  Argentina,  and  the  United 
States  within  the  last  twenty  years  are  also  remem- 
bered, it  must  be  evident  that  other  and  more  general 
causes  than  the  opening  of  the  canal  have  affected  the 
development  of  India.  On  the  other  hand,  to  limit 
the  effects  of  the  canal  to  those  results  which  can  be 
directly  traced,  such  as  the  development  of  the  trade 
in  rice,  wheat,  and  petroleum,  is  to  err  by  under- 
statement. The  greater  ease  of  communication  by 
the  canal  route  has  brought  much  more  Western  life 
into  personal  contact  with  the  East,  and  this  has  had 


INFLUENCE  OF  SUEZ  CANAL.  355 

much  to  do  with  the  development  not  only  of  the 
foreign  trade  of  the  Eastern  countries,  but  also  of 
their  internal  resources.  One  phase  of  this  general 
development  in  which  the  canal  has  had  an  indirect 
share  may  be  seen  in  the  tonnage  statistics  of  some 
of  the  Eastern  countries.  From  1870  to  1894  the  total 
foreign  tonnage  of  India  rose  from  4,000,000  tons  to 
7,660,000 ;  of  Ceylon  from  1,420,000  tons  to  6,360,- 
000  tons ;  of  the  Straits  Settlements  from  1,650,000 
tons  to  10,000,000  tons;  of  Hongkong  from  2,640,- 
000  tons  to  10,460,000  tons.  How  much  of  this  in- 
crease is  to  be  ascribed  to  the  canal  and  how  much 
to  other  causes  can  not  be  calculated  or  even  roughly 
estimated.  We  must  remain  content,  in  this  part  of 
our  inquiry,  with  recognizing  that  the  canal  is  one  of 
the  factors  in  the  great  economic  development  of 
southern  Asia. 

To  recapitulate:  The  construction  of  the  Suez 
Canal  has  led  to  the  immediate  and  rapid  develop- 
ment of  the  use  of  steamers  in  the  Eastern  trade,  has 
brought  about  the  disuse  of  most  sailing  vessels  in 
that  trade,  has  caused  the  decline  of  the  warehouse 
distribution  system  of  England,  and  the  rise  of  a  di- 
rect trade  between  the  East  and  the  consuming  coun- 
tries of  Europe.  The  shorter  and  more  direct  route 
has  also  made  possible  the  wheat  export  trade  of  In- 
dia, and  the  trade  in  oil  from  Batoum  to  India,  and 
has  doubled  the  rice  exports  of  the  latter  country. 
The  canal  has  also  been  one  of  the  many  factors  in 


356  PANAMA. 

other  important  economic  changes,  among  which  may 
be  mentioned  the  crisis  of  1873  and  the  general  de- 
velopment of  trade  and  industry  in  the  East. 

THE   ST.    MARYS    FALLS    CANAL. 

There  has  been  a  canal  around  the  falls  in  St 
Marys  River  between  Lake  Superior  and  Lake  Mich- 
igan, available  for  vessels  drawing  not  more  than  12 
feet  of  water,  from  1855  on,  but  fifteen  years  later 
the  average  annual  increase  of  21  per  cent,  of  each 
year's  freight  traffic  over  that  of  the  preceding  year 
made  it  so  evident  the  canal  would  soon  be  inade- 
quate for  the  increasing  commerce  that  the  United 
States  Government  began  improvements,  and  by  1881 
had  completed  a  17-foot  channel  between  the  lakes, 
and  provided  a  515-foot  lock,  with  a  single  lift  of  20 
fee^  for  carrying  vessels  from  the  level  of  one  lake  to 
that  of  the  other.  The  continued  growth  of  the  traf- 
fic led  to  an  improved  20-foot  channel,  provided  with 
an  800-foot  lock  in  1896.  Following  the  example 
of  the  United  States  the  Dominion  Government  built 
a  canal  around  the  Canadian  side  of  the  falls  in 
1895. 

TRAFFIC    OF   SUEZ   A5TI>   ST.    MART'S    CANALS 
COMPARED. 

The  volume  of  traffic  through  this  canal  far  ex- 


SUEZ  AND  ST.  MARY'S  COMPARED.  357 

ceeds  that  through  the  Suez  Canal.  In  1881  the 
traffic  of  the  old  St.  Marys  Falls  Canal  was  1,560,- 
000  tons,  as  against  4,130,000  tons  through  the  Suez 
Canal;  but  with  the  enlargement  of  the  American 
canal  a  rapid  increase  in  traffic  immediately  de- 
veloped. By  1889  it  equaled  that  of  the  Suez  Canal 
(about  7,000,000  tons  in  each)  ;  in  1895  a  tonnage 
of  15,000,000  tons  went  through  the  St.  Marys  Falls 
Canal,  as  compared  with  8,500,000  tons  through  the 
Suez  Canal;  and  in  1901  the  figures  for  the  St. 
Marys  Falls  Canal  were  28,403,065  tons.*  The 
present  traffic  through  the  American  canal  exceeds  the 
total  foreign  trade  of  the  port  of  New  York  and  is 
equal  to  nearly  half  the  total  volume  of  the  foreign 
trade  of  the  United  States.  In  value  the  traffic 
through  St.  Marys  Falls  Canal  presents  less  impos- 
ing figures,  though  even  in  this  respect  it  is  by  no 
means  insignificant.  The  value  of  the  freight  pass- 
ing through  the  canal  in  1896  is  estimated  at  $195,- 
000,000,  and  in  1901  at  $290,000,000.t  The  Indian 
traffic  alone  through  the  Suez  Canal  in  1896  is  valued 
at  $300,000,000.  Nevertheless,  a  trade  increasing 


*  In   1005  they  were  36,617,699. 

f  The  discovery  and  utilization  of  the  mineral  wealth  of  the 
Great  Lakes  region,  supplemented  by  timely  appropriations 
by  Congress  for  the  improvement  of  navigation,  have  brought 
about  a  maritime  growth  in  that  portion  of  our  country 
which  is  without  parallel  in  maritime  history.  Our  lake  fleet 
alone  is  greater  than  the  fleet  of  any  foreign  nation  except 
Great  Britain  or  Germany. 


-  368  PANAMA. 

nearly  $100,000,000  a  year  within  a  period  of  five 
years,  may,  prima  facie,  be  expected  to  have  had  im- 
portant economic  effects. 

As  in  the  case  of  the  Suez  Canal  the  most  striking 
results  have  been  on  the  machinery  of  trade,  the  in- 
fluence of  the  St.  Marys  Canal  on  the  shipping  in- 
dustry of  the  Great  Lakes  being  especially  marked. 
It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  the  development  of  the 
carrying  trade  on  the  Great  Lakes  both  in  the  num- 
ber and  kind  of  vessels  used  is  due  almost  wholly  to 
the  "  Soo  "  Canal.  From  1881  to  1895  the  volume  of 
commerce  through  the  Detroit  River  increased  from 
17,500,000  tons  to  29,000,000  tons.  During  the 
same  period  the  volume  of  commerce  through  the  St. 
Marys  Falls  Canal  increased  by  13,500,000  tons,  and 

.  as  the  larger  share  of  the  canal  traffic  goes  through 
the  Detroit  River  to  Lake  Erie  ports,  the  increase  in 
the  traffic  through  the  Detroit  River  is  seen  to  have 

,  been  mainly  in  the  traffic  from  Lake  Superior  made 
possible  by  the  existence  of  the  canal  and  locks  at 
Sault  Ste.  Marie.  This  increase  in  traffic  has  meant 
a  corresponding  increase  in  the  number  of  vessels  in 
the  lake-carrying  trade,  and  probably  half  of  the 
3,230  vessels  on  the  lakes  are  employed  in  business 
depending  on  the  canal.-  Between  1883  and  1897 
the  total  tonnage  on  the  lakes  increased  from  720,000 
to  1,410,000  tons,  the  increase  being  more  than  the 
total  increase  in  the  American  merchant  marine  dur- 
ing this  time.  Further,  while  in  1883  the  lake  ton- 


CHANGES  IN  LAKE  SHIPPING.  359 

nage  was  but  a  sixth  of  the  total  American  merchant 
marine,  in  1897  it  was  nearly  two-sevenths  of  that 
total. 

CHANGES    iTT    THE   LAKES    SHIPPING. 

Not  only  has  there  been  this  increase  in  traffic  and 
shipping  due  to  the  canal,  but  within  the  last  ten 
years  there  has  been  a  rapid  and  striking  change  in 
the  material  and  structure  of  the  ships  on  the  Great 
Lakes,  which  could  hardly  have  taken  place  had  it  not 
been  for  the  canal.  There  has  not  been  any  sudden 
displacement  of  the  old  vessels  such  as  was  occasioned 
by  the  Suez  Canal,  but  the  new  ships  built  for  the  in- 
creased traffic  and  to  replace  those  that  were  out  are 
not  sailing  vessels  of  wood,  but  large  steel  and  iron 
steamships  with  double  bottoms,  water-tight  compart- 
ments, triple-expansion  engines,  and  modern  electri- 
cal appliances.  In  1870  there  were  1,699  sailing 
vessels  and  but  642  steamers  on  the  lakes;  in  1897 
there  were  993  sailing  vessels  and  1775  steamers. 
In  1870  the  average  tonnage  of  vessels  on  the  lakes 
was  175  tons;  in  1897  it  was  440  tons.  In  1880  a 
1,000-ton  vessel  was  a  rarity.  In  1895  there  were 
five  lines  owning  together  60  steamships  of  from 
1,750  to  3,000  tons,  and  in  1901  over  100  steamers 
and  sailing  vessels  from  5,000  to  8,000  tons,  and  10 
over  8,000  tons. 

The  "  Soo  "  Canal  is  connected  in  two  ways  with 


360  PANAMA. 

these  changes  in  the  lake  shipping.  In  the  first  place, 
the  increase  in  lake  traffic,  which  has  necessitated 
large  numbers  of  new  ships  and  thus  hastened  the  in- 
troduction of  larger  and  modern  ships,  has  been,  as 
we  have  seen,  mainly  in  the  traffic  from  and  to  Lake 
Superior,  made  possible  by  the  canal;  in  the  second 
place,  the  iron  ore  from  which  the  iron  and  steel  ships 
are  constructed  comes  from  the  iron  mines  of  north- 
ern Michigan  and  Wisconsin,  which  have  been  made 
available  by  the  canal  route  from  the  mines  to  the 
ports  in  the  southern  lakes. 


The  mention  of  these  iron  ores  brings  up  the  second 
phase  of  the  economic  effects  of  the  "  Soo  "  Canal  — 
those  on  the  production  and  marketing  of  commodi- 
ties. The  case  of  iron  and  steel  may  well  be  given 
the  first  place  as  the  largest  item  in  the  traffic  through 
the  canal.  The  most  striking  features  in  the  iron 
and  steel  industries  since  1880  have  been  the  decline 
in  the  importance  of  the  Pennyslvania  mines,  the  de- 
velopment of  the  Lake  Superior  region,  and  the  trans- 
fer of  the  manufacture  of  pig  iron  and  steel  from  the 
east  to  the  west  of  the  Alleghenies.  Several  factors 
have  served  to  bring  about  this  remarkable  shift. 
The  Superior  ores  are  of  the  quality  available  for 
making  steel  by  the  Bessemer  process;  the  large  de- 
posits have  made  profitable  the  use  of  labor-saving 


TRADE  OF  THE  ORE  REGION.  361 

machinery  in  mining  and  the  construction  of  special 
terminals  for  loading  and  unloading  the  ore.  But 
an  equally  important  factor  is  the  low  rates  of  freight 
from  the  mines  to  the  manufacturing  points  in  Ohio, 
western  Pennsylvania,  and  Illinois  by  the  water 
route  through  the  canal.  In  1895  the  rate  from  the 
mines  to  Erie  ports  was  80  cents  per  ton,  equal  to 
nine-tenths  of  a  mill  per  ton-mile.  The  lowest  rail- 
road rate  per  ton-mile  would  equal  a  charge  of  $2.59 
a  ton  from  Duluth  to  Cleveland;  and  as  the  price 
of  red  hematite  ore  of  Bessemer  quality  at  Cleveland 
in  1895  was  $2.80  a  ton,  the  dependence  of  Lake 
Superior  ore  on  the  water  route  may  be  easily  seen.' 

An  interesting  case  of  interacting  causes  is  to  be 
seen  in  the  relation  between  the  Lake  Superior  iron 
mines  and  the  shipping  on  the  Great  Lakes.  It  was 
the  developemnt  of  the  iron  mines  which  furnished 
the  trade  of  the  large  steel  steamships,  and  also  the 
material  for  constructing  them,  while  the  use  of  the 
larger  and  better  ships  has  lowered  freight  rates  and 
still  further  developed  the  iron  industry. 

The  development  of  the  Lake  Superior  iron  mines 
has  been  an  important  factor  in  causing  the  great  re- 
duction in  the  price  of  Bessemer  steel  during  the  last 
sixteen  years,  and  it  is  this  reduction  that  has  made 
possible  the  largely  increased  use  of  steel  in  ship- 
building, in  bridges ;  in  heavier  rails,  and  in  the  tall 
buildings  of  our  large  cities.  Indirectly,  then,  all 
these  improvements  have  depended  to  a  large  degree 


362  PANAMA. 

-^ 

on  the  existence  of  the  St.  Marys  Falls  Canal.  The 
extent  of  this  relation  may  be  indicated  in  some  de- 
gree by  the  statistics  of  the  iron-ore  movement 
through  the  canal.  From  1860  to  1881  the  amount 
of  iron  ore  passing  through  the  canal  increased  from 
100,000  tons  to  750,000  tons  per  year,  but  since  the 
construction  of  the  larger  lock  the  increase  has  been  at 
a  much  greater  rate.  In  1887,  2,500,000  tons  went 
through  the  canal;  and  for  each  of  the  years  1895, 
1896,  8,000,000  tons;  and  in  1901,  18,000,000  tons. 
Throughout  the  period  since  1881  the  traffic  in  iron 
ore  has  formed  about  one-half  the  total  tonnage  pass- 
ing through  the  canal.  The  figures  for  1895  and 
1896  are  equal  to  four-fifths  of  the  total  production 
of  the  Lake  Superior  mines,  which  in  turn  constitutes 
two-thirds  of  the  total  iron-ore  output  of  the  United 
States. 

ENORMOUS   WHEAT   TRAFFIC    OF   THE   LAKES. 

The  most  important  part  of  the  traffic  through  the 
"  Soo  "  Canal,  however,  is  not  iron  ore,  but  wheat 
and  flour  and  other  grains.  The  value  of  these 
items  in  the  canal  traffic  is  one  and  a  half  times  that 
of  the  iron  ore,  and  equal  to  $84,000,000,  or  nearly 
a  third  of  the  valuation  of  the  total  commerce 
through  the  canal.  In  volume  the  traffic  has  grown 
from  3,500,000  bushels  of  wheat  and  600,000  bar- 
rels of  flour  in  1881  to  63,250,000  bushels  of  wheat 


EFFECT  OF  CANALS  ON  WHEAT  TRADE.         363 

and  nearly  9,000,000  barrels  of  flour  in  1896.  The 
last  figures  account  for  a  large  fraction  of  the  467,- 
000,000  bushels  of  wheat  raised  in  the  United  States 
in  1896,  being  in  fact  almost  equal  to  that  portion 
of  the  crop  exported.  The  movement  of  wheat 
through  the  canal  just  about  equals  the  total  receipts 
at  Buffalo  and  Erie. 

It  is  not,  however,  possible  to  give  the  canal  alone 
the  credit  for  having  developed  this  wheat  trade. 
The  production  of  the  wheat  was  only  made  pos- 
sible by  the  construction  of  railroads  through  Min- 
nesota and  the  Dakotas,  and  these  same  railroads 
provide  a  means  of  getting  the  wheat  to  market  via 
Chicago.  But  if  all-rail  rates  had  to  be  paid,  Min- 
nesota and  Dakota  wheat  and  flour  could  not  com- 
pete so  well  with  that  from  the  country  near  the 
eastern  markets  as  it  does  by  having  water  rates  from 
Duluth  to  Buffalo.  It  should  also  be  borne  in  mind 
that  railroad  building  in  Dakota  and  Minnesota  be- 
gan on  a  large  scale  only  after  the  enlargement  of 
the  canal,  when  it  was  seen  that  they  could  connect 
with  a  through  direct  water  route  to  Buffalo.  The 
canal  has  therefore  been  an  important  factor  in  de- 
veloping wheat  production  in  the  country  west  of 
Lake  Superior. 

Besides  wheat  there  has  been  a  considerable  traffic 
in  other  grain,  but  this  first  assumed  large  dimensions 
in  the  year  1806,  when  27,000,000  bushels  of  grain 
other  than  wheat  went  through  the  canal,  as  against 


364  PANAMA. 

8,000,000  bushels  in  the  previous  year.  As  yet  this 
is  a  less  important  item  than  that  of  wheat,  but  the 
relations  between  the  canal  and  the  development  of 
the  traffic  are  the  same  in  both  cases. 

DEVELOPMENT  OF  LUMBER  TEADE. 

The  same  relations  can  also  be  traced  in  the  de- 
velopment of  the  lumber  traffic.  This  grew  from 
82,000,000  feet  in  1881  to  685,000,000  feet  in  1896. 
As  in  the  case  of  wheat,  a  considerable  increase  would 
have  resulted  from  the  construction  of  railroads,  but 
the  construction  of  railroads  has  been  hastened  and 
increased  by  the  existence  of  the  water  route  to  the 
East  through  the  canal,  and  it  is  only  by  cheap  water 
rates  that  such  a  huge  traffic  has  been  developed. 
If,  however,  the  cutting  down  of  forests  is  the  true 
explanation  of  the  destructive  spring  floods  in  the 
Mississippi  Valley,  the  encouragement  given  to  the 
lumber  traffic  by  the  canal  may  not,  after  all,  have 
been  of  economic  advantage  to  the  country  as  a  whole. 

The  other  important  item  in  the  south-bound  traffic 
through  the  canal  does  not  seem  to  have  been  depend- 
ent on  the  canal.  The  amount  of  copper  going  by 
this  route  increased  from  29,000  tons  in  1881  to 
116,000  tons  in  1896 ;  but  the  cheaper  freights  made 
possible  by  the  canal  can  have  had  little  effect  in  pro- 
moting the  production  of  an  article  valued  at  $200 
a  ton. 


INCREASES  OF  POPULATION.        365 

Of  the  north-bound  traffic  the  only  item  of  large 
dimensions  is  that  of  coal.  In  1881,  295,000  tons 
of  coal  passed  through  the  canal;  in  1896,  over  3,- 
000,000  tons.  The  whole  of  this  traffic  may  be  said 
to  have  been  created  by  the  canal.  The  lowest  rail- 
road rates  would  be  too  high  to  allow  any  coal  to  be 
carried  to  the  country  around  Lake  Superior,  but  the 
lake  steamers,  going  back  empty  for  their  cargoes  of 
iron  ore  and  wheat,  can  afford  to  carry  coal  at  rates 
which  seem  incredible.  In  1890  the  average  freight 
rate  on  coal  from  Buffalo  to  Duluth  was  45  cents  a 
ton.  It  is  through  such  rates  that  the  northward 
movement  of  coal  and  the  consequent  development 
of  a  large  iron  manufacturing  industry  near  the  ore 
mines  are  made  possible. 

INCREASES  OF  POPULATION  DUE  TO  THE   CANAL. 

The  geographical  changes  in  production  that  have 
resulted  from  the  operation  of  the  St.  Marys  Falls 
Canal  have  been  accompanied  by  important  move- 
ments of  population.  A  definite  connection  can  be 
shown  between  the  canal  and  certain  particular  popu- 
lation movements,  but  with  other  changes  the  canal 
has  been  only  one  of  several  factors.  The  increase  of 
population  around  the  shores  of  Lake  Superior  may 
fairly  be  ascribed  to  the  development  which  has  been 
given  to  that  country  by  the  canal.  Taking  the  coun- 
ties bordering  on  Lake  Superior,  we  find  that  from 


366  PANAMA. 

1880  to  1890  the  population  of  the  Michigan  coun- 
ties increased  from  61,750  to  116,600;  of  the  Wis- 
consin counties,  from  8,000  to  41,000,  and  of  the 
Minnesota  counties,  from  6,400  to  54,700.  The 
total  increase  is  not  a  startling  figure  in  the  United 
States,  but  compared  with  the  percentage  increase  in 
these  same  States  as  a  whole  the  result  is  striking. 
During  the  decade  the  population  of  Michigan  and 
Wisconsin  increased  in  each  case  about  27  per  cent, 
and  of  Minnesota  about  70  per  cent;  in  the  Lake 
Superior  counties  the  percentage  of  increase  was,  in 
Michigan  90  per  cent,  in  Wisconsin  400  per  cent,  and 
in  Minnesota  800  per  cent.  The  only  explanation  of 
the  difference  is  that  new  lines  of  industry  have  been 
opened  up  by  the  larger  "  Soo  "  Canal.  One  con- 
spicuous feature  of  this  increase  of  population  in  the 
Lake  Superior  region  is  the  development  of  cities. 
Of  the  total  increase  of  136,000,  72,000  occurs  in 
the  six  cities  of  Duluth,  Superior,  Ishpeming,  Ash- 
land, Marquette,  and  Iron  Mountain.  Duluth,  from 
a  town  of  3,500  in  1880,  had  become  a  city  of  33,000 
in  1890,  and  six  years  later  had  a  population  of  60,- 
000.  Ishpeming  increased  during  the  ten  years  from 
6,000  to  11,000;  Superior,  from  4,700  to  9,000, 
while  the  other  three  places  were  not  in  existence  in 
1880,  but  had  populations  between  8,500  and  12,- 
000  in  1890. 

Among  the  movements  of  population  where  the  ef- 
fects of  the  "  Soo  "  Canal  have  been  greater  but  are 


COMPARATIVE  REVIEW.  367 

not  so  exactly  calculable,  may  be  mentioned  the  settle- 
ment of  the  Red  River  Valley  and  the  increase  in  the 
cities  on  and  near  the  southern  shores  of  Lake  Erie. 
The  first  of  these  is  connected  directly  with  the  de- 
velopment of  wheat  production  in  that  region,  in 
which,  as  has  been  seen,  the  canal  had  a  most  impor- 
tant influence.  The  second  is  due,  in  large  part,  to 
the  development  of  the  iron  and  steel  manufacturing 
industries,  brought  about  by  the  use  of  iron  ore  from 
the  Lake  Superior  region. 

INFLUENCES  OF  ST.   MARY'S  AND  SUEZ  CANALS. 

A  comparison  of  the  influence  of  the  St.  Marys 
Falls  Canal  with  that  of  the  Suez  Canal,  shows  that 
both  have  led  to  a  rapid  change  in  the  material  and 
character  of  ships  used,  that  brought  about  by  the 
Suez  Canal  being  the  most  important,  both  in  the  ex- 
tent of  new  shipping  and  in  the  consequent  disloca- 
tion of  old  forms  of  industry.  Both  canals,  too,  have 
led  to  important  changes  in  the  sources  of  production 
of  several  commodities,  and  the  effects  of  the  Ameri- 
can canal  on  iron  and  wheat  production  are  greater 
than  any  effects  traceable  to  the  Suez  Canal.  In  the 
case  of  the  more  general  changes  in  which  the  extent 
of  the  influence  of  the  canals  can  not  be  measured,  no 
accurate  comparison  between  the  two  is  possible,  but 
considering  the  greater  area  and  population  in  Asia 


308  PANAMA. 

affected  by  the  Suez  Canal,  it  is  evident  that  its  influ- 
ences on  general  development  have  been  greater. 

Both  canals  have  led  to  the  production  of  wheat  on 
a  large  scale  in  areas  hitherto  unused  for  that  pur- 
pose, these  districts  constituting  a  large  part  of  the 
total  increase  in  the  area  devoted  to  wheat  production. 
In  consequence  of  this  total  increase  of  wheat-raising 
area  during  the  last  fifteen  years,  and  the  cheaper 
transportation  to  European  markets,  there  has  been 
a  large  reduction  in  the  normal  price  of  wheat. 
Cheaper  food  and  less  distress  from  famines  and  the 
fall  in  prices  received  bjt  farmers  in  the  old  wheat- 
producing  districts  have  been  due  in  no  small  degree 
to  the  canals. 


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BOARD  OF  CONSULTING  ENGINEERS 
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